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This book is about Europe’s attempt to find its place in the international order 
today – in an international order which is, in fact, largely of Europe’s own histori-
cal making� This attempt was undertaken after the end of the Cold War, the fall of 
the Iron Curtain and the abolition of the division of Europe into East and West, 
under the control of superpowers from outside of Europe� These efforts, made 
“in the name of Europe”, were undertaken by the European Union (EU), itself 
a dream-come-true for many generations of Europeans and a response to their 
dramatic experiences, especially from the first half of the XX century� Europeans 
united as the EU not only for reasons of security and economic development, 
but also because they wished to rebuild the position of Europe on the world 
stage enabling its influence on the international order post Cold War� Europe-
ans believed that the “Old Continent” could offer the world much in the way of 
values – its cultural heritage, ideas, a model of economic growth and social life� 
Yet much that we have witnessed in the second decade of the XXI century seems 
to indicate that this attempt is ending in fiasco before our very eyes�
Europe’s current situation in international relations and its prospects for the 
future require that we take a step back and study its historical path to great-
ness – the long centuries it took to create its unique civilisation, the good and 
bad experiences undergone while building its identity and its relations with the 
outside world� There are elements of this identity to be found in ancient Greece 
and Rome – elements which come together to shape Europe’s later shape and 
fortune� However, Europe itself – with an identity strongly marking it out from 
the surrounding world and forming the basis for relations between European 
nations – appeared in the Middle Ages, at the end of the first millennium� Tur-
bulent centuries of war between European nations and against external invaders 
will come to pass – exhibiting a fascinating spiritual and material development� 
Finally, stable politico-territorial structures appeared on the basis of a shared 
civilisational foundation, enabling foreign policy and lasting relations between 
counterparts across the entire continent�
In this way, we arrive at the first genuine international order – that which de-
veloped in the Europe of the XVI and XVII centuries� The literature on our subject 
sometimes gives a contrary impression, but in fact neither the order represented 
by ancient Greece nor the orders created by ancient China or imperial Rome 
amounted to international orders in the sense intended here� Claiming otherwise 
is to fall victim to terminological and/or methodological imprecision� A variety 
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of authors have taken [these] imperial formations to represent an international 
order, with even superficial contacts between the frequently tentative territorial–
political entities being granted the status of “international relations”� The prob-
lems are compounded by the use of the terms “international order” and “world 
order” as interchangeable�1 Equally careless is the common use of the concept of 
“international system”,2 also used interchangeably with “international order”�
Without engaging at this point in deliberations of a terminological or meth-
odological nature, let me say that for the purposes of this work I understand an 
international order to be a distinct geopolitical whole, made up of participants; re-
lations between those participants regulated by agreed-upon norms (institutions); 
a balance of power stabilising the order, whereby questioning that balance of pow-
er may destabilise the order or even hasten its demise; an economic formation 
represented by the order’s participants and finally a cultural–ideological sphere 
which sustains its coherence and legitimacy� Just such a whole arose in Europe and 
was raised up to ever greater heights of development in Europe itself� At the same 
time the European powers, in virtue of their level of advancement, extended the 
influence of Europe across the world – via colonialism, imperialism – and ensured 
Europe’s hegemony in the global order which Europe itself had created (the turn 
of the XIX and XX centuries)� After World War I, Europe added to its order a 
normative dimension in the form of the system of the League of Nations� Thanks 
to its economic and military superiority, colonial influences and its leadership role 
in the League of Nations, Europe appeared to sit on top of the pyramid implicit in 
the world’s international order�
This position of dominance as a world power was suddenly challenged by 
two revisionist powers: fascist Germany and the communist Soviet Union� Those 
powers had appeared in aggressive opposition both to the newly created interna-
tional order – at this moment in its “Versailles stage” – and to the very economic 
and political system of “old Europe”� As a consequence of World War II, Europe 
not only lost its former position, but it was also deprived of real influence on 
the international order� One part of Europe became a protectorate of the United 
States, while the other part became a vassal of the international system created 
1 Including H� Kissinger, the author of the fundamental work: World Order, New York, 
2014� However, Kissinger has no doubts that, “What passes for order in our time was 
devised in Western Europe nearly four centuries ago…”, pp� 3–4�
2 An example of the aforementioned “carefree attitude” to methodology is the well-
known work (one indeed based on extensive historical material): International Systems 
in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations by B� Buzan, R� Little, 
Oxford, 2000�
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by the Soviet Union� The western part of this division was, however, able to pre-
serve and develop its own cultural identity, laying the foundations for impressive 
economic growth� It was in the west too that the first steps were taken towards a 
united and integrated Europe (the European Community)�
After the gaps of the Cold War period had been bridged, Europe took up the 
most ambitious, peaceful unification project of its history – the EU� The goal of 
this project was both to support Europe in its quest to become a “global power” – 
even a “superpower” (in the words of the British Prime Minister) –, one ready to 
participate in the resolution of the leading international issues of the day, and to 
influence the very parameters of the world order� To this end, the first decade of 
the EU’s existence witnessed the birth of a whole series of institutional mecha-
nisms, beginning with the Maastricht Treaty of 1991–1992� These institutional 
innovations were meant to serve the effective representation of the Union, its 
interests and initiatives on the international stage� They were also meant to max-
imise the combined potential of member states in exerting their influence on 
regions both nearer to and further from Europe, in accordance with Europe’s val-
ues, security and stability� Above all, at stake was a common foreign and security 
policy� Somewhat later a military component was added as well as one-person 
organs representing the EU to the world – the High Representative and the Presi-
dent of the European Council�
For the first fifteen or so years of the EU, everything went according to plan, 
for all appearances following the plot of a well-written script� Success followed 
success for the Union – the Schengen Zone, the eurozone, the expansion of the 
Union, defence policy� Then, all of a sudden, at the end of the 2000s, this line 
of development collapsed� Internal crises combined with publicised divisions to 
deprive the EU of its ability to impact the global region surrounding it� At first 
one might have thought that this was a transitory stage that the Community 
would overcome as it had in the past, emerging strengthened, perhaps even go-
ing on to take a further step in the process of integration� But this time nothing 
of the sort looked on the cards� On the contrary, on top of a passing but deep 
crisis (financial or political) there appeared long-term problematic tendencies� 
At the same time, a contributing factor was the so-called “return” of the rest of 
the world to the international stage� Everything seemed to suggest that Europe, 
and with it the Union, was in something of a “Spenglerian” crisis� While it is true 
that perhaps the first work to declare a new phase in the international order came 
with the title “Post-American” (F� Zakaria), it might have been more appropriate 
to speak of a “post-Western” order, and in particular of a “post-European” order�
Though one must be concerned by the accelerated erosion of the civilisational 
foundation of Europe and the dramatic shrinking of its demographic potential, 
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this work is not going to be one about Europe’s “twilight”� Proclamations of this 
kind would be premature, for Europe still has at its disposal significant material 
potential and superiority in some areas� If it is indeed appropriate to speak of a 
twilight, then it is only one in its first phase� This book speaks of the contribution 
of Europe in the development of the global international order, and then about 
the necessary and ambitious attempt of Europe to find its place in the latest, 
post-Cold-War version of that order� That this attempt has ended in fiasco – a 
fiasco also brought on by the fact that the European powers have begun to treat 
the EU as they once treated the League of Nations – should not deter the nations 
of Europe from searching for a better way to express their collective interests and 
projects� We should begin by restoring the EU’s former functionality� This is not 
an easy task and is one of the subjects at issue here� It is hard to say whether this 
restoration is still possible, or whether a new institutional form will be required� 
This in turn will depend on whether the situation we are currently witnesses to is 
merely a passing “illness” of the European organism and a crisis of form alone, or 
whether Europe’s “civilisational fuel” is simply running out� In the case of stars, 
once their energy has gone, their light continues for a time to reach us – though 
the star itself has already disappeared�
Roman Kuźniar
Part I The March of Europe through 
History: From Charlemagne  
to the Cold War

1 Europe Becomes an International Order
1  The ancient roots of the European international  
order – Greece
The early first signs of a future international order in Europe were provided by 
the microcosmos of ancient-Greek city-states� Two thousand years later Europe 
would be able to witness how the instincts, practices, logic and ideas of those 
times came to shape the now full-blooded international relations of European 
modernity� From the VIII to the VII centuries BC, not only where Greece lies 
today but also along the Mediterranean coasts (and the coasts of the smaller seas 
of the region), there emerged a constellation of city-states representing ancient 
Hellas� These Greeks were capable warriors, travellers and merchants� Thanks to 
their mastery of the craft of sailing in the waters around them, they easily gained 
control of the scattered islands and established colonies in Asia Minor� How-
ever, it was mostly on the continent of Europe that they developed a territorial–
political form of organisation that had not been seen before and has not been 
seen since – the autonomous city-state or polis� The polis came, with time, to be 
the subject of the relations within the constellation of city-states as well as those 
with the outside world�
Two axes or poles came rather quickly to structure this region – Athens and 
Sparta� They fought between themselves for leadership position, but perhaps 
were even more motivated to block the other from acquiring a position of hegem-
ony over the rest of the world of Greek poleis� These two poles did not impose a 
sharp duality: from time to time other pretenders came forward, but above all 
because Athens and Sparta joined forces to face common foes – especially the 
Persians� These two centres also represented two kinds of political system in the 
Greek city-state: democracy and oligarchy� Sometimes “tyranny” took hold, but 
this was not at that time a cruel system based on oppression and the persecution 
of subjects� Tyranny rather meant autocracy, which of course does not mean 
there were not cases of abuse of power by the “tyrants”� And democracies and 
oligarchies were also capable of being cruel systems with “democracy” in any 
case excluding slaves and women from the enfranchised� The division of systems 
was at least significant to the extent that it gave reason to go to war: democratic 
Athens desired the overthrow of oligarchies and Sparta the oligarchy lent sup-
port to city-states which resisted or overthrew democracy – to return power to 
the “rightful” oligarchs�
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The kind of political system will also come to play an important role in the in-
ternational relations of contemporary Europe, which is why it is worth recalling 
what was said about the virtues and vices of democracy by one of democracy’s 
greatest supporters, the Athenian politician Pericles (end of V century BC)� It 
was because of democracy that they were an example to others� “We have a form 
of government which does not emulate the practice of our neighbours: we are 
more an example to others than an imitation of them� Our constitution is called 
a democracy because we govern in the interests of the majority, not just the few� 
Our laws give equal rights to all in private disputes, but public preferment de-
pends on individual distinction and is determined largely by merit rather than 
rotation: and poverty is no barrier to office, if a man despite his humble condition 
has the ability to do some good to the city� We are open and free in the conduct of 
our public affairs […] in all public matters we abide by the law […] We cultivate 
beauty without extravagance, and intellect without loss of vigor; wealth is for us 
the gateway to action, not the subject of boastful talk”�3 But it was Pericles who 
already pointed out the weaknesses of this system, weaknesses that came to light 
in the first stage of the Peloponnesian War� The Athenians did not heed the words 
of Pericles and “did the opposite […], and in other ways too which seemed to 
have no relevance to the war they pursued policies motivated by private ambition 
and private gain, to the detriment of Athens herself and her allies…”� Comment-
ing on this speech, Thucydides wrote: “What was happening was democracy in 
name, but [was] in fact the domination of the leading man”� Nevertheless, he tried 
to be fair to Pericles, adding: “Pericles’ successors were more on a level with one 
another, and because each was striving for first position they were inclined to in-
dulge popular whim even in matters of state policy”�4 And as our Greek historian 
continues, the main sickness of democracy turned out to be the fighting of vari-
ous factions which shook the state and weakened it� “The cause of all this was the 
pursuit of power driven by greed and ambition, leading in turn to the passions of 
the party rivalries thus established� The dominant men on each side in the vari-
ous cities employed fine-sounding terms, claiming espousal either of democratic 
rights for all or of a conservative aristocracy, but the public whose interests they 
professed to serve were in fact their ultimate prize…”�5 We may easily perceive 
3 Thucydides, tr� Hammond, Martin, The Peloponnesian War, Kindle Edition, OUP, 
Oxford, 2009, pp� 91–92�
4 Ibidem, p� 106�
5 Ibidem, p� 171� Thucydides also writes that, “in this out-and-out contest for supremacy 
they committed the most appalling atrocities and took their acts of vengeance yet 
further, imposing punishments beyond anything required by justice or civic interest, 
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an analogous situation in the politics of contemporary Europe� The primitive in-
stincts which sustain internal conflicts are also present in the relations between 
the various Greek poleis�
The logic and principles of these relations will develop both out of the in-
stincts of the rulers of internal city-state politics and out of the necessity of de-
fence from the outside world� Which is why the reality of these external relations 
will remain above all war� The Greeks will have their first serious encounters with 
war with their Eastern and for some time powerful neighbour – the expansive 
Persian empire� The series of “King of kings” – from Cyrus and Darius in the VI 
century BC – attempted to subdue the Greek colonies in Asia Minor as well as 
the city-states from the border areas� These Greek cities, in rebellion against the 
Persian rule, looked to Athens – by then a Hellenic “power”� So, it was that the 
turn of the VI and V centuries was marked by the Greco-Persian wars� Further 
chapters in this historical epic will be: the conquest and destruction of the Greek 
Miletus by the Persians (494 BC), the failure of the Persian expedition against the 
Athenians at Marathon (490 BC) and the battle of Thermopylae (“Passerby, go 
tell the Spartans…”) (480 BC), where Hellenic solidarity in the face of a common 
enemy was evident but which nevertheless did not protect Athens from destruc-
tion� Zygmunt Kubiak writes that out of the wars with the Persians, “the idea of 
freedom – or perhaps it was the idea of independence – took hold in Greece� This 
was the idea of the independence of the poleis, whether democratic like Athens 
or subject to a structure of stern discipline, like Sparta”�6 To protect them, the 
Greeks were forced to found for the first time a coalition, known as the Delian 
League� Run by Athens, it was a kind of system of joint defence which became a 
model for subsequent alliances� But Athens also used the League to consolidate 
their leadership position, sometimes hegemonic in nature, towards the other 
city-states that made up the League� It is also worth recalling that there were not 
infrequent cases where Greek city-states went over to join the Persian side that 
was able to influence the city-states in a variety of ways, including pecuniary�
With time, the Persian threat diminished (internal problems befell the em-
pire) and the Greeks were able to focus on their own goals� These were not limit-
ed to literature, art, games, the cult of gods or the cultivation of vineyards� Greece 
will enter a series of internal wars and persistent battles with her neighbours, as 
well as embarking on pointless expeditions which with time will come to exhaust 
and limited only by their supporters’ appetite at the time…”� And he concludes: “Thus 
civil wars brought every form of depravity to the Greek world…” (p� 171)�
6 Z� Kubiak, Dzieje Greków i Rzymian [The History of the Greeks and the Romans], Świat 
Książki, Warsaw, 2003, p� 66�
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Greece and make her easy prey for the external conqueror� The first of these wars 
will be the Peloponnesian War, made familiar to Europe by the work of Thucy-
dides� Greece never learnt the lesson of this war: by its length (twenty-seven 
years), pointlessness, the level of destruction and cruelty it may be compared 
to the European Thirty Years’ War�7 The Peloponnesian War was a war between 
Athens and Sparta for leadership position in the Greek world� Though both sides 
were prompted by predominantly low motives, the ultimate cause of the conflict 
was the greater ambition of Athens and her intolerance of the strength, inde-
pendence and political character of Sparta� Sparta, on the other hand, was ready 
to upset the hegemonic plans of its rival, exhibiting at the same time an aristo-
cratic–democratic sense of superiority� Some twenty-odd centuries later, the ac-
count of this war – with a precise description of the parties’ underlying instincts 
and arguments, the logic and principles of the ongoing conflict – will form the 
basis of the realist school of thought in international relations�
Thucydides emphasises “human nature” which dominates over laws and 
justice and pushes people towards evil� By human nature he had in mind one’s 
self-interest, fear of one’s enemies and ambition�8 The primacy of power over 
law – the foundation stone of the realist school – was frankly laid out by the 
Athenian representatives at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War� “Nor again 
did we start anything new in this, but it has always been the way of the world 
that the weaker is kept down by the stronger� And we think we are worthy of 
our power� There was a time when you thought so too, but now you calculate 
your own advantage and talk of right and wrong – a consideration which has 
never yet deterred anyone from using force to make a gain when opportunity 
presents”� And further: “The reason is that those who can get their way by force 
have no need for the process of law”�9 The Athenians were not the only ones of 
their times who presented and practiced the hard rules of realism (as we well 
know, these rules are present in the thinking of world powers at the beginning of 
the XXI century AD)� The Corinthians, encouraging their Peloponnesian allies 
to confront the Athenians, said: “A peace won through war has a firmer base: to 
7 In view of the costs borne, it is hard to see the point of the Thirty Years’ War, yet 
religious freedom was a stake besides the interests of the powers involved, that is the 
freedom from the imposition of a given religion which was important for the future 
peace of Europe� This element of the pursuit of religious freedom is missing from the 
Peloponnesian War�
8 Thucydides, op. cit., p� 172; K� Kumaniecki in the Preface to his Polish translation of 
the Peloponnesian War, Wojna peloponeska, Czytelnik, Warsaw, 1988, p� X�
9 Ibidem, p� 38�
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refuse war for the sake of the quiet life runs the greater risk”�10 The Athenians 
were notorious for the severity of their treatment of allies who were not willing to 
bear the burdens of their protection (i�e� payment of tribute, ruthlessly levied by 
the Athenians)� The harsh punishments served as a deterrent, discouraging oth-
ers from rebellion against the hegemony of the metropolis which lay under the 
Acropolis� A paradigm of this severe realism is the argumentation with which 
they defended the necessity of subduing the peaceful inhabitants of the Island of 
Melos� The Athenian ambassadors explained that, “we are here in the interests 
of our own empire, yes”, but they also wish to save Melos, “Our desire is to take 
you under our rule without trouble…”� The Athenian demand was simple: they 
wanted the Melians to become their allies and pay them tribute� When the Me-
lians, invoking justice and honour, offered them friendship and neutrality, the 
Athenians refused, arguing in the following manner: “Your friendship is more 
dangerous to us than your hostility� To our subjects friendship indicates a weak-
ness on our part, but hatred is a sign of our strength”� The Melians, however, did 
not succumb to the imperial overtures of the Athenians and took up arms in 
defence of their freedom� In the end, they gave in to the overwhelming force of 
the Athenians who murdered all their men, sold their women and children into 
slavery, and then colonised the island�11
The Peloponnesian War, though cruel and pointless, became the paradigm 
case for future alliances� Many and short-lived were the alliances that were estab-
lished in this war, and this despite the fact they were often agreed for long peri-
ods of time – even for fifty years! Such was the term of the alliance between the 
Athenians and the Lacedaemonians that it envisaged mutual support in the event 
of external attacks, guaranteeing that neither party would have to fight off an ag-
gressor alone� The parties did not trust each other from the start, however, and 
other city-states tried to pull their alliance apart – with success in fact, when, 
after a few years, the former allies renewed their war� Somewhat later, a similar 
alliance – concluded for a period of hundred years – united the Athenians with 
other Peloponnesian city-states� It was an agreement to provide mutual support 
in the event of aggression from outside parties and the commitment to refrain 
from hurting the interests of the other party to the alliance� The alliance was 
concluded with an oath: “I shall abide by the alliance on the terms agreed with 
all justice, fidelity, and honesty, and I shall not violate it by any means or con-
trivance”� The individual clauses of the text and the language of the covenant 
10 Ibidem, p� 60�
11 Ibidem, pp� 301–307�
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could have appeared without shame in the Treaty of Washington or the Warsaw 
Pact from the middle of the XX century AD�12 Yet this alliance did not last long 
either� In the history of Greece, there were many relations which were similar 
to alliances and were for either collective security or collective defence; some 
were aggressive, some were ad hoc� Some, especially those concluded by Athens, 
enabled a party to influence the internal situation of an allied polis, that is these 
alliances were a means of extorting protection and strengthening (in this case) 
Athens’ leadership position� In various constellations of city-states, besides the 
opposition of Athens and Sparta, a permanent problem of the relations was the 
autonomy of the city-states, preserving a balance between them, the pursuit of a 
leadership role or hegemony�13 The Athenians themselves often referred to their 
hegemony as an empire “which they richly deserved”�
Let us say it once again: these relations breathed the air of war� Thucydides 
writes about the nature of war in the same way as war’s greatest theoretician 
Clausewitz, writing twenty-two centuries later� The greatest historian of the 
Greeks writes that, “War is not something that proceeds on set rules – far from 
it: for the most part war devises its own solutions to meet any contingency”�14 The 
Greeks will go on to become the masters of pointless, self-destructive wars� Al-
ready at the time of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians, wanting to make up 
for their lack of success in the confrontation with the Greeks from the peninsula, 
made a decision to mobilise against Sicily� They decided to embark on this expe-
dition democratically, easily convinced by those who promised easy loot, which 
after all the empire “deserved”, at the same time being able to consolidate their 
security� How European were the arguments for war laid out to the Athenians 
by Alcibiades, the aristocrat and demagogue: “And we cannot ration ourselves 
to some voluntary limit of empire� Given the position we have reached, we have 
12 Ibidem, pp� 283–284, 298–299�
13 M�A� Cichocki, Problem politycznej jedności w Europie [The Problem of Political Unity 
in Europe], PISM, Warsaw, 2012, pp� 30–35�
14 Thucydides, op. cit., p� 58� Von Clausewitz writes of war as “more than a chameleon” 
[emphasis added] but it is at least that: “War is more than a true chameleon that slightly 
adapts its characteristics to the given case� As a total phenomenon its dominant tenden-
cies always make war a paradoxical trinity – composed of primordial violence, hatred, 
and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance 
and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of 
subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone�” 
V� Clausewitz, M� Howard and P� Paret (ed� and tr�), Princeton University Press, New 
Jersey, 1989, Book One, Chapter One, Section 28: The Consequences for Theory�
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no choice but to keep hold of our present subjects and lay designs on more, be-
cause there is the danger that, if we do not rule others, others will rule us”�15 For 
Greece did not only produce strategists (in the narrow sense of this word), but 
above all it also produced demagogues (in the worst sense of the term), dema-
gogues who destroyed their democracy� The extravagantly equipped Sicilian ex-
pedition ended in unprecedented catastrophe, contributing to the final failure of 
Athens in the Peloponnesian War� Athens never again reached its former glory, 
and in the ensuing chaos it was easier for the rather small Macedonia – ethnically 
and culturally akin – to gain control of the conflicted and weakened nebula of 
poleis� Macedonia’s King Philip II entered Hellas almost without a fight, because 
the Athenians, despite the wonderful speeches of Demosthenes, were neither 
inclined to fork out on defence nor come to the aid of those who were in the first 
line of danger from the Macedonians� Athens brings to mind our own Rzeczpo-
spolita during the last 150 years of its existence�
After Philip II, power passed to his son, the favourite of historians – Alexander 
the Great� His expedition into the heart of Asia (334–323 BC) – financed by his 
almost complete conquest of Greece – was as pointless and destructive as the Ath-
ens’ Sicilian expedition nearly a century before� This aspiring empire of a madly 
ambitious, despotic and capricious leader – despite also being an exceptional 
general – collapsed and vanished without trace within two decades of his death� 
Neither his education with Aristotle nor his legendary, ingenious cutting of the 
Gordian knot was to any avail�16 After his death, Athens became a mere province�
The reality of Greek wars was sometimes exceptionally cruel� The victors 
might completely destroy the conquered city and murder its population (es-
pecially the men – women and children were more often sold into slavery)� 
Which is why the Sicilians defended themselves against the Athenians with such 
15 Ibidem, p� 318� Alcibiades’ argumentation is reminiscent of the behaviour of the current 
president of Russia, Vladimir Putin�
16 This did not stop Zygmunt Kubiak – in any case a great classicist – from writing with 
characteristic emphasis: “Jakiej to jednak wymagało męki, tak zmienić świat, jak on 
zmienił” [“What a struggle it was, to change the world as he did”], op. cit., p� 183� Yet 
Alexander’s “empire” was only a region controlled directly by his ever-advancing army� 
He had no influence on the rule over these provinces, each being run by a local or a 
Macedonian satrap� Nor was Alexander’s expedition a channel for the transmission 
of Hellenic culture� Influence went rather in the opposite direction – Alexander being 
affected especially by Persian culture�
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determination�17 When it came to their own security, they stubbornly ignored 
the criticisms made by the Corinthians both towards themselves and towards 
their allies� These criticisms were made in the context of their joint efforts to fend 
off the ever-advancing Athenians: the accusation of a lack of reason, weakness of 
character and carelessness� By not heeding the warnings, they fell into a compla-
cence which blinds and brings the greatest of harm�18
The end of the Greek order of city-states came at the turn of the III and II 
centuries BC when their relations (coalitions) – whether formed to fight among 
each other or with an external enemy (still Macedonia) – began to impact Rome, 
the rising power, and connect their security arrangements� The decisive step was 
taken by the Aetolian League who invited Rome to settle the question of its dom-
ination of Greece – which, it turned out, did not require any great battles� The 
final episode in the transformation of the microcosmos of the Greek poleis into a 
Roman province came with the pacification of the Achaean League (Corinth and 
its vicinity) by the Roman forces in around 150 BC�19 The new power gratefully 
accepted the most valuable achievements of Greek civilisation� Greece was un-
able to form an international order – its inhabitants belonged to a single nation, 
believed in the same gods, had the same culture� Yet they bequeathed to what 
was to become Europe bad and good experiences of a pluralistic, decentralised 
society of city-states, the experiences of war and peace, attempts at hegemony 
and alliances aimed at restoring balance, political thought of distinction com-
bined with scurrilous political practice� The Hellenic “proto-order” permits us to 
speak of Greece as a “proto-Europe”�
2 The pre-European experience of empire – Rome
Ancient Rome bequeathed to Europe – what Europe would apply in its attempts 
at an international order – the idea of an empire, the imperial instinct and a 
model empire to imitate� Rome is already much closer in time to Europe than the 
17 As one of leaders declared to inspire them to greater determination in their self-
defence, “the Athenians are not only enemies but the worst of enemies� They came 
against our country to enslave it� If they had succeeded in this, they would have brought 
the ultimate suffering on our men, the worst indignities on our children and women, 
and on the whole city the most shameful name there can be�” Thucydides, op. cit., p� 401�
18 Ibidem, p� 57: “People whose present comfort makes them reluctant to act will quickly 
find that inaction brings the loss of that agreeable ease which caused their reluctance: 
and people who make grand presumptions after military success have not realized the 
fragility of the confidence which excites them�”
19 Z� Kubiak, op. cit�, pp� 303–306; M�A� Cichocki, op. cit�, pp� 42–43�
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Hellenic “proto-order”, partly because when Europe proper came into existence 
with the Carolingian Empire, the Eastern Roman Empire (the Byzantine Em-
pire) was still in existence� Rome provided an attractive example because of her 
size� Furthermore, it was in Roman territory that Christianity developed – at first 
ruthlessly resisted, then granted a legal place, finally become the official state re-
ligion� The process by which Rome metamorphosed into an empire lasted a long 
time – even for technical reasons it could not have happened faster� Rome had no 
imperial design or ideology to follow, though various Roman Caesars and con-
suls before them had demonstrated imperial instincts� Nevertheless, Rome was 
an empire pure and simple, and there were attempts to replicate Rome in Europe 
once Europe – thanks in part to Rome – had become a political–territorial entity 
conscious of its own identity�
During the first few centuries of its existence (regardless of the date and legend 
we adopt as constituting that beginning), Rome built its position of primacy in 
Italy, that is in its own backyard, in the V to the III centuries BC� Subsequently, its 
neighbours provoked its expansion – the Greek colonies of the Italian peninsula 
and Greece itself seeking Rome’s protection� A similar challenge presented itself 
in the conflict with Carthage for the Greco-Italian Sicily, which led to the series of 
Punic Wars (three altogether)� From northern Africa, passing through Spain and 
the Alps, came Hannibal himself� He arrived in the direct vicinity of Rome, ex-
pressly with the purpose of holding back the rise of his Roman rival in the western 
part of the Mediterranean� Victory over the aggressive Carthage in the III century 
BC allowed Rome to dominate the region� The acquisition of the “windfall” of 
Greece’s territories up to and including those in Asia Minor, as well as northern 
Africa and the northern coast of the Mediterranean, unexpectedly made Rome 
master of this extensive sea� In the II century BC, these successes only whetted 
Rome’s appetite for more� All this took place in the times of the Republic when 
consuls oversaw the Senate� Despite civil wars between the ambitious governors 
of individual provinces and the generals of legions, as well as slave revolts (Sparta-
cus), Rome in the I century BC did not lose its desire to conquer�
In hindsight, the most significant conquest was that of Gaul, achieved by the 
“Roman Alexander the Great”, Julius Caesar, in the middle of the I century BC� 
Julius Caesar’s conquests differed from those of the Macedonian: he connected 
the conquered peoples and regions to the metropolis and they thereby became 
a part of the empire with its power structures, culture, law and administration� 
Julius Caesar went on to expand the empire to include the rest of Iberia and a 
small part of North Africa� His successor Octavian continued in like manner, 
expanding the borders of Rome in Europe, North Africa and Asia Minor� The 
Empire would later stretch from the Persian Gulf through the Pillars of Hercules 
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(the Gibraltar Strait), from Egypt to the English Channel and the Rhine and the 
Danube� But the most significant of these conquests and assimilations was Gaul� 
It was in Gaul that the seeds of the future Europe would lie dormant and later 
sprout into the first European empire – the state of Charlemagne� Neither the 
Greeks nor the Romans regarded themselves as Europeans, indeed the very term 
“Europe” had a merely geographical connotation, concerning the northern coast 
of the Mediterranean, as opposed to the eastern coastline (Asia) and the south-
ern (Africa),20 all three being parts of the greater whole that was a single empire 
consisting of some fifteen-odd provinces�
An empire modelled on the Roman example might have seemed attractive 
to the Europe of the Middle Ages if we take the period from Octavian Augustus 
(27 to 14 BC) through Vespasian to the times of Trajan and Hadrian at the turn 
of the I and II centuries AD� Those were Rome’s glory days, even if we leave out 
the madness of Caligula and Nero� The Pax Augusta was a period of sufficient 
peace, of restrained governance, a rule which ensured stability, security and the 
stable prosperity of citizens� Rome’s territory expanded, but not as the result of 
bloody conquest but through a combination of soft power and, of course, mili-
tary force, but even then mainly in response to barbarian intrusions� Borders 
shifted to strengthen the security of the existing extent of the empire� The divine 
Augustus himself preferred to be known as the Restorer of Rome (the initia-
tor of many constructions, renovating and developing infrastructure) once the 
period of civil war had finished� He himself had been a party to that conflict, 
reaching the zenith of his power only after defeating Mark Antony with whom 
he had earlier formed the triumvirate�21 The honorific “Father of the Country” 
(Pater Patriae) was very much deserved� After nearly two centuries of prosperity 
there came a long period of crisis – degeneration in the manner of ruling; the 
decline of republican virtues; the spread of the parasitic role of the aristocracy; 
the neglect of domestic production, especially agricultural, progressive depopu-
lation; and the need to acquire cheap labour, soldiers and products from foreign 
sources� The Empire was able to continue living off previously acquired wealth 
for some time� The Diocletian Reforms at the turn of the II and IV centuries 
seemed to revitalise the empire, but it was only to be for a short time� After 395, 
when Theodosius formally divided the empire into two parts, its western part 
(Europe to-be) did not survive even a hundred years despite centuries of history� 
20 The term “Europe” appeared at that time, that is between the II century BC and the 
II century AD, in the work of a few geographers and historians, including Polybius, 
Strabo and Ptolemy�
21 Z� Kubiak, op. cit., pp� 435–483�
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(The division of the empire into west and east had in fact appeared much earlier 
with Diocletian if not earlier�) By 476, the German military leader Odoacer had 
overthrown the last emperor in Rome, sending his crown to Constantinople and 
himself becoming king of Italy� The weaknesses of the Roman Empire opened 
the way for barbarians pressing in from outside� They wanted to enjoy the fruits 
of Rome’s civilisation but were unable to sustain it, unable as they were to assimi-
late its code of culture, its public ethos�
As an empire, Rome owed its greatness to the excellent organisation of its 
state authorities and of the space it ruled over� For its first centuries it had been a 
republic, but even when it became an empire it held onto many republican tools 
of governance� Individual institutions of this system long ensured what was for 
those times the highly efficient operation of the republic� The assemblies (repre-
sentative of the people) expressed opinions and sometimes took decisions, the 
Senate gathered the most distinguished personalities (qualified advisors, includ-
ing legislative advisors), officials and executive offices (consuls, proconsuls), the 
judiciary, that is the praetors, censors with a variety of roles (including the gath-
ering of statistical data), the equites who also dealt with a range of issues (from 
trade to taxes), tribunes of the people – the ombudsmen of the rights and opin-
ions of the people� These were elected, rotating positions and, what is important, 
they could be occupied by people coming from the lowest levels of society� This 
principle also applied to the emperors who were most often selected from among 
the most successful military leaders� Besides good organisation and civilisational 
superiority, it was precisely the army which was the basis for the empire, the 
instrument of its expansion, the demonstration of its vitality and, of course, the 
guarantee of its security and territorial integrity� Rome had at its disposal what 
no other power at that time in that part of the world had – a professional army� 
Conscripts served for fifteen to twenty years� They had time to learn their craft, 
to master the technology and tactics of battle and to learn how to solve the prob-
lems of logistics and related issues concerning army supplies (in this the legions 
of Julius Caesar were unrivalled�) It was thanks to these skills that Julius Caesar 
was able to carry out “Blitzkrieg” wars – something no one else managed until 
Napoleon� Julius Caesar’s Gallic Wars were ahead of their times by some fifteen 
centuries�22 Still, it bears repeating: the foundation stone of Rome’s military suc-
cesses and its expansion was its entire civilisational superiority to the rest of the 
world at that time�
22 J� Caesar, The Gallic War, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
1989�
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Rome’s advance as an empire led to tensions between the republic and the 
centralisation of power� For centralisation meant in the hands of someone able 
to ensure effective rule and success in relation to the outside world (with victo-
ries over barbarians, expansion of territory and glory to Rome)� The republican 
framework was not able to satisfy the ambitions of the victorious Julius Caesar� 
Glorified as the conqueror of Gaul, he pursued a brutal civil war and became the 
sole ruler – an emperor� He united in his own person the roles of consul, com-
mander in chief of the army, the head of the Senate and highest priest (pontifex 
maximus)� Thus he aspired to divine status� The speeches of Cato, the defender 
of the republic, were to no avail and he took his own life unable to bear the fall 
of the republic� Julius Caesar ruled for a short time, just a few years, stabbed to 
death in the Senate by supporters of the republic� Yet their triumph was also 
short-lived – the empire needed an emperor, and that emperor (following an-
other short civil war) was Octavian Augustus� He also concentrated in his hands 
the same powers as Julius Caesar had, and this situation remained unchanged 
until the final Roman provinces enjoyed a considerable measure of administra-
tive autonomy, to facilitate the management of such an enormous empire� The 
empire was superbly integrated by, among other things, its network of roads ena-
bling rapid travel and communication� The empire’s strength, besides the gen-
eral organisation of state authority, was also a unified legal system� It is said that 
Greece gave Europe philosophy and the aesthetic canon while Rome, besides the 
organisation of the state, gave Europe law� First there was customary law; this 
was followed by positive law, with clear procedures and sanctions enforced and 
amended in the codes of particular Caesars (the greatest codifier being Justin-
ian the Great, the emperor of the East Roman empire in the VI century AD)� 
There was a veritable army of professional jurists, creating great legal works and 
schools of law� Particular attention was paid not only to the law defining the per-
sonhood of a physical person, citizenship (i�e� freedom), property – but also to 
the status of other inhabitants of the empire� After the fall of the Western Roman 
Empire, in the area Europe would come to occupy, the region underwent a deep 
legal regress� “Pre-Europe” witnessed a period of wildness, lawlessness, chaos, in 
short – barbarity� The later nostalgia for empire was also a longing for the rule 
of law – “it might be severe law, but it was law nonetheless” (dura lex, sed lex)� 
From the XII century, Roman law would find its place in European universities�
Ancient Rome achieved fame for its many civilisational achievements� In 
the actual exercise of power as an empire, however, it revealed its weaker sides� 
The majority of Caesars suffered unnatural deaths often accompanied by their 
wives and children� (Cleopatra preferred to take poison after Mark Antony’s 
death rather than wait for her fate at the hands of the people of the victorious 
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Octavius�) Christians were fed to wild animals and the conquest of Gaul led to 
the deaths of a third of its population� In the civil wars alone whole legions were 
decimated� And yet it was a better life under the empire than beyond its bor-
ders� The excellent Polish classicist Zygmunt Kubiak, though at times uncritical 
towards the empire, seems to hit the mark when he cites the opinion of a wise 
Greek: one prayed that the dominion of Rome would last for ages� Subjects of the 
empire felt liberated from the constant, pointless fighting they had had to deal 
with pre-Rome� The Greek cities under Rome no longer clamoured over illusory 
goods but sought to outshine each other in wisdom and beauty� Why were the 
Romans able to rule? Because they combined strength with gentleness�23
3  The emergence of Europe and the European  
international order
It is hardly surprising after the early part of the Middle Ages, the so-called “Dark 
Ages”, Europeans longed for empire to overcome the brutal chaos around them� 
“Europeans” came onto the scene nearly 300 years after the fall of the (Western) 
Roman Empire� The term “European” was used for the first time to describe the 
army of Charles “the Hammer” Martel� The Battle of Tours of 732 held off the 
army of the Umayyad Caliphate who had earlier taken Iberia with ease� In this 
area, there already existed the country of the Franks who had much earlier con-
quered Gall after it was abandoned by Rome� There the Franks encountered Latin 
culture – preserved by Christianity and preserving the memory of empire – and 
they assimilated that civilisation as best they could� As far as the conception of 
empire was concerned, it was still highly simplistic� The ideal of empire has been 
accurately reconstructed by Marek A� Cichocki24 – “the pursuit of universalism, 
the pursuit of hegemony by expansion, globalism, territorial expansion, convic-
tion of the universal validity of the model” – but still this was far from the think-
ing and efforts of the Middle Ages� The creators of the first European empire 
(Charlemagne and his milieu, as well as his immediate predecessors and heirs) 
had a much simpler ideal – a state and a ruler completely in charge of their terri-
tory, that is a sovereign political and territorial entity, with a supranational scope 
(able to encompass several nations)� Charlemagne’s state was supposed only to 
include Christian nations, whereas all of Rome’s borders lay in lands which ef-
fectively resisted Rome� The expansion of Rome was not justified much or at all 
by religious or ideological motives� It was a matter of civilisational superiority as 
23 Z� Kubiak, op. cit., p� 483�
24 M�A� Cichocki, op. cit�, p� 55�
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evidenced by their military power and to which the weaker and less developed 
must succumb, accepting Rome’s dominion and the principle that might makes 
right� An unquestioned legitimation of empire, however, and one Charlemagne 
was also able to prove, was its provision of peace and security� Empire allowed for 
stable development – of production, agriculture, trade� People ceased to live in 
fear of their neighbours; they could travel once again, as they had under Rome� 
Against the bleak backdrop of contemporary Europe with its war of all against 
all where various marauding tribes and their leaders brought death, destruction 
and pillaging (whether Huns, Ostrogoths, Alemanni, Vandals, Pannonian Avars 
and their like), the imperial alternative was highly attractive�
It is worth recalling a certain paradox: whereas the monoethnic Greece was a 
“proto international order”, the multi-ethnic Rome was an out-and-out empire� 
Perhaps that is why Europe first developed as an empire yet the attempts to sus-
tain it in this form were not successful – neither in the Middle Ages nor later� The 
empire of Charles the Great was perhaps an essential stepping stone, but it was 
nevertheless only a stepping stone en route to the international European order 
which at first was reminiscent of Greece’s constellation of city-states� Charles, 
who ruled the Franks from 768 and quickly became known as “the Great” (Char-
lemagne), decided that he would bring all the lands of western Christendom 
under his sceptre� And he was successful: from central Italy to Belgium, from 
eastern Germany (where western Slavs also lived) to Gaul (almost in its entire-
ty)� In recognition of this feat, the Pope crowned him Emperor (800 AD), in 
some way requiring of Charles that he build Christian Europe after the imperial 
model� This is another irony of our story: Christians had been persecuted by the 
Romans, managed to survive the fall of that empire, now served to legitimise a 
new emergent empire, even playing the role of co-host of that empire� This was 
also Charlemagne’s wish: he consciously built up his empire on the spiritual and 
ideological foundation of Christianity, as well as in opposition to neighbouring 
lands – the barbarians and the East Roman Empire, at that time a more advanced 
civilisation� Christianity was supposed to support the acceleration of Europe’s 
development, and it did�
Firstly, as H�G� Wells wrote, thanks to Christianity the empire “conquered its 
conquerors, the barbarians”� He also argues that, “Had it not been for the monks 
and Cristian missionaries Latin learning might have perished altogether”� It is 
true that the empire, when it came to lack reason and the will to survive, died� 
But something else was born in its place: “the Latin-speaking half of the Catholic 
Church”� The Church survived the early Middle Ages, a time of darkness and 
dread, rife with warlords, because “it had books and a great system of teachers 
and missionaries to hold it together”, “it appealed to the minds and wills of men” 
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and these, Wells concludes, were “things stronger than any law or legions”�25 To 
the Christian foundation of the Carolingians – above all to Charlemagne – the 
Church accorded “gravity and unity to the power of the state [powagę i jedność 
władzy państwowej]” (Jan Baszkiewicz)�26 The lands of the Holy Roman Empire 
were not mere provinces that conquered and attached to a “centre” as in Roman 
times; they were constituents of equal standing� Latin became the official state 
language and the whole was welded together not only by Catholicism but also by 
sound military organisation, efficient civil and Church administration, and the 
development of infrastructure as well as of literature, science and art, all which 
were patronised generously by Charlemagne� The empire was vertically organ-
ised according to the feudal system� This system required the loyalty which still 
obtained in the times of Charlemagne himself, but later disintegrated due to the 
increase in wealth, power and autonomy of the counts and bishops – that is the 
entire, diversified aristocracy� Which is why the empire of Charlemagne did not 
survive long after the death of its founder who has with justice been referred to as 
the Father of Europe� The empire lasted sufficiently long to allow for the process 
of the synthesis, the joining of three defining constituent elements for European 
identity� The borders of these three subsequently defined the borders of Europe: 
the borders of Greece, Rome and Christendom� “Europe” acquired an identity 
and was no longer merely the name of a geographical region�
Charlemagne’s empire fell apart along ethnic borderlines� They were still weak-
ly designated at the time, but still they were already the basis for the formation 
of political societies� The grandchildren of the great predecessor first started to 
fight among themselves, until in 843 they signed a treaty at Verdun� On its basis, 
the empire was divided into three states: the west went to Charles, the central-
southern region to Lothar and the east to Ludwig� Broadly speaking, these states 
represented the future France, Italy and Germany� The title of Emperor first fell 
to Lothar I, but relatively quickly came to the Ottonian house and the German 
imperial line� The Ottonians, especially Otto III, had the ambition of recreating 
the empire of Charlemagne to be comprised of four equal parts: Italy, Gaul, Ger-
many and the Sclaveni� The last of these and the newest were otherwise known as 
Slavs; they were represented by the Polish Bolesław Chrobry� Otto came in 1000 
to Gniezno with the express purpose of empire-building, encouraged by Pope 
25 H�G� Wells, A Short History of the World, The Collected Works of H�G� Wells, Pergamon 
Media, 2015�
26 J� Baszkiewicz, Historia Francji [History of France], Zakład Narodowy im� Ossolińskich, 
Wrocław, 1974, p� 24�
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Sylvester II who came from Burgundy�27 Poland here also represented another 
broader process which was underway: around 1000 AD Europe, western Chris-
tianity reached its pinnacle in terms of geographical area covered� As a result of 
their contact with the empire of Charles the Great and the Christianity which 
was being reborn there, peoples were baptised (in practice their leaders were 
baptised)� These were peoples who had not been a part of the Roman Empire: 
central-European peoples (Magyars, Moravian-Czechs and the tribes organised 
under the state of Mieszko II and his son Bolesław) and the Normans living 
in today’s Denmark and Scandinavia� The Rus from the Kiev region were bap-
tised by Byzantium in 984� Latin Europe coincided with these new geopolitical 
borders� So, the schism of 1054 did not have as much impact as it might have 
done – it only served to confirm the “actual” borders which had already been 
established�28
The fleeting and chimerical “empire” the Ottonians created could not contain 
Europe’s march towards a pluralist and decentralised international order� The 
“Empire” was an empire only in name, unable to consolidate real power because 
it did not have at its disposal executive apparatus – it lost its “imperial capacity”� 
Europe moved towards its pluralistic destiny in the late Middle Ages� Surprising-
ly, it was then that Europe gained a clear identity, in a period of dramatic conflict 
and change� From a political perspective, this was a time of a kind of entropy, the 
collapse of the unity that had been previously taking shape� Instead there ap-
peared a nebula of countless states – kingdoms, earldoms, bishoprics, republics, 
free cities� Some of them were formed as part of quasi-federal or feudal relations 
and some attempted to preserve their autonomy but were only able to sustain in-
dependence until they were absorbed into larger geopolitical entities or unities, 
through royal marriages or other dynastic relations� None of the countries of to-
day’s Europe is close to the form it took in its formative stage in the Middle Ages, 
an excellent example being Poland, a promising state of the first two Piasts, but 
one which was to become engulfed in 300 years of civil war, to return to the map 
of Europe at the time of the last of the Piasts in a greatly deformed state, nothing 
like its original territory (the Poland of Chrobry and Kazimierz the Great)�
27 One might suggest, in a light-hearted manner, that this event anticipated the future 
Weimar Triangle (a Burgundian, i�e� a Frenchman, sent a German to a Pole)� It is a 
pity that it took a thousand years to fulfil the intention! The appearance of the Triangle 
can indeed be seen as confirmation of the geopolitical-cultural intuition of Sylvester 
II, Otto III and Bolesław Chrobry�
28 O� Halecki, The Limits and Divisions of European History, Sheed and Ward, New York, 
1950�
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The dominant form of relations at the political level was armed conflict� To 
begin with, if for no other reason than the limited resources of the participants, 
these were local conflicts� Of exceptionally large scale for the times were the ex-
pedition of Frederic Barbarossa against Italy, the wars between Italian states, the 
German–Danish conflict and the Franco-English conflict which was only getting 
going� Many conflicts were private wars, with marauding bandits – often brutal 
and cruel� It seemed Europe had returned to the situation following the fall of the 
Roman Empire�29 This situation intensified at the same time as the newly form-
ing states increased in strength� Fully fledged, all-out war came with the Hun-
dred Years’ War between England and France (1337–1453), against a backdrop 
of dynastic conflict as was typical for the times� Accounts of the crime, the rape, 
cruelty, the sheer scale of destruction freeze the blood, especially in view of the 
fact that both sides were Christian� No less cruel was England’s civil war30 – the 
War of the Roses (between the Lancasters and the Yorks), later an inspiration 
for Shakespeare and Hobbes� In Central and Eastern Europe (including Poland 
and Hungary), similar destruction, robbery, depopulation, civilisational collapse 
followed the invasions of the Tartars in the XIII and XIV centuries� Only the XV 
century brought relative peace, a peace which immediately bore fruit� However, 
a new threat to Europe was coming on the scene: the Ottoman Empire, which 
was growing in strength� It conquered Byzantium and took over its Balkan ter-
ritories, thereby appearing geographically in Europe� Until then Europe might 
have thought – after regaining Spain and repelling the Saracens who had been 
the scourge of Europe from the south – that they had seen off bellicose Islam�
In a sense, European civilisational identity developed as opposition to end-
less fighting and wars� Johan Huizinga’s “autumn of the Middle Ages” is Europe’s 
spring� The XI–XIII centuries, following the emergence from the cultural and eco-
nomic crisis of the X century, is a period in which Europe flourishes both cultur-
ally and economically – indeed the two were intertwined� Europe owed its spring 
to Christianity which – though not without sin in its upper echelons – developed 
at the grassroots of ordinary people, the parish and, especially in the beginning, 
the monastery� Over the course of three centuries, Cistercians, Dominicans, 
Franciscans and other orders – including the Benedictines of earlier times  – 
transformed the cultural landscape of Europe� In particular the Cistercians, “the 
29 G� Duby, The Age of the Cathedrals: Art and Society, 980–1420, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1983, introductory pages to Part 1, The Monastery; French original: 
Les Temps des cathédrals: L’art et la société, 980–1420, Gallimard, Paris, 1976�
30 N� Davies, Europe: A History, OUP, Oxford, 1996, pp� 419–423; M� Howard, War in 
European History, OUP, Oxford, 2009, Chapters 1 and 2�
Europe in the International Order24
white brothers”, were famous not only for their prayer and asceticism but also for 
their achievements in husbandry, herbal medicines and mineral products� They 
took the Benedictine ora et labora, but placed their emphasis on labora� This was 
a conscious plan of their spiritual leader of the time – St� Bernard – also evident 
in the excellent organisation of the abbeys and monasteries and the logistics of 
their interconnections� The Cistercians sowed the seeds of civilisation in many 
hitherto dangerous and remote regions of Europe� The monastery was a bearer 
not only of faith – and the word of God, sacred art, the tradition of holidays – but 
also of education in general, as well as health care and compassion for the needy� 
Step by step, steadily they were a force transforming a mere species, Homo sapi-
ens, into “humanity”� However inadequately Christianity performed this civilis-
ing mission, they were often the only “game in town”� The pilgrimages initiated 
by the monks to holy places, sometimes a thousand or more kilometres away, 
allowed the faithful to get to know their emerging European homeland, which 
referred to itself as Christianitas�
At the same time there came the development of the gothic cathedral – one 
of the wonders of the world, phenomenally combining metaphysics with the art 
of building and logistics on a grand scale�31 Towns were developing and becom-
ing more and more numerous; there appeared whole series of larger and smaller 
conglomerations of people across Europe from east to west and from north to 
south� Cities create civilisation (municipal laws and local government!), and the 
level of urbanisation of Latin Europe was initially behind that of the East Roman 
Empire� “Where there is gothic, there is Europe” – gothic constructions like the 
Pillars of Hercules would come to mark the boundaries of the emergent civilisa-
tion� In cities, by cathedrals there were created universities – another miracle of 
the Middle Ages and a wonderful invention of Western civilisation� Their crea-
tion was the ambition of popes and bishops who believed that the development 
of learning required autonomy, and the universities from the start had that au-
tonomy assured� The university – besides theology – is philosophy, law, medi-
cine� The study of law and philosophy brought Europe back into contact with 
Greece and Rome� The spread of the university across the whole of Europe of 
that time gave Europe a powerful impulse to develop and gave our civilisation a 
Promethean element – the desire to expand the borders of knowledge, a refusal 
to accept received wisdom as well as the ability to question oneself� The develop-
ment of cities and universities, education in general, created an environment in 
which once again – after centuries of absence – art and literature could appear; 
31 G� Duby, op. cit�, “The Threshold”, pp� 77–89�
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the novel, poetry and painting flourished� Dante’s Divine Comedy and Petrarch’s 
Sonnets to Laura took Europe by storm� The whole of educated Europe followed 
with baited breath the dialectics of Thomas Aquinas, the father of the humani-
ties, as he taught in Paris about the harmony of reason and faith; the passionate 
argumentation of Abelard the rationalist fascinated its audience and the drama 
of his feelings towards and relationship with Heloise moved them� The univer-
sity’s “republic of reason” is the European reality from the XIII century on� The 
XI-century Song of Roland, about a knight of Charlemagne, became the source of 
the chivalric code for the whole of Europe in the late Middle Ages�
Advances in agriculture released a huge number of hands for non-agricultural 
tasks, such as crafts and trade or the processing of raw materials found in nature� 
As Fernand Braudel claimed, this brought on a peculiar economic turnaround 
in the middle of the XV century� Handicraft products came to achieve higher 
prices than agricultural goods, yet the latter brought the market to life (in the 
form of numerous town markets), which marked the beginnings of capitalism� 
The dynamics of the market became a powerful integrating factor for Europe and 
its development in other domains – building, learning, art�32 Referring to similar 
conclusions of other researchers, Krzysztof Pomian in Europe and Its Nations 
writes about “the religious, cultural and social unity of Latin, Christian society, a 
unity of beliefs and church institutions, a unity of liturgy, calendar and holy days, 
a unity of the state organisation of society, of a similarity of institutions repre-
senting states before the country, a unity of writing and language of the educated, 
a unity of learning and secular knowledge, a unity of architecture and the plastic 
arts, a unity of monastic, chivalric and urban culture”�33
In these circumstances, it might be expected that there would be one more 
attempt at unification, on the basis of Christianitas – with a uniform politi-
cal construction, a “soft” empire� The very young King (soon-to-be emperor 
of Habsburgian Spain) Charles V took up the challenge� He had come from 
the Netherlands, which was still under the control of Spain� His long struggles 
against Italy – the Italian wars bringing most suffering to the native population, 
especially to Rome, which was horribly desolated by German soldiers in 1527 – 
finally collapsed in the face of opposition from France (also a Catholic country)� 
France did this in the name of balance in Europe and out of fear of a hegemony 
of the Habsburgs who were already well established in central Europe� France 
32 F� Braudel, La dynamique du capitalism, Arthaud, Paris, 1985�
33 K� Pomian, Europa i jej narody [Europe and Its Nations], PIW, Warsaw, 1992, especially 
pp� 32, 51�
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did not hesitate to seek an ally in the Islamic Ottoman Empire with whose help 
they kept the Habsburgs at bay in the Balkans� Charles’ unification plans were 
also frustrated for another important reason: assuming the title of Emperor in 
the year 1519, he could not have picked a worse moment for the realisation of 
his goals� Two years before, in 1517, Martin Luther had nailed his ninety-five 
theses to the doors of the church in Wittenberg, demanding the reform of the 
Church and the Christian faith� The Reformation would not only come to divide 
western Christianity but also wherever it was accepted it strengthened state-
hood and, in its various versions (Lutheranism, Calvinism, Anglicanism), was 
a national movement, whereas Catholicism (the “Papists”) was still universalist, 
by the standards of the time� Charles’s efforts, rather weak in any case, to sup-
press reformist tendencies came to nothing� The wave of local religious wars, 
brought on by the Reformation and the Counterreformation, finished in 1555 
with the decision of the Imperial Diet (the Peace of Augsburg) and the accept-
ance of the principle of Cuius regio, eius religio� This was recognition of sorts of 
the sovereignty of the German principalities, since it allowed the dukes a free 
hand in defining the faith of their territory� The solution was such a total fiasco 
that a year later Charles V abdicated the imperial and the royal crown�
Summing up this attempt, Jean Delumeau wrote in his exceptional La Civi-
lisation de la Renaissance: “For the future belonged to territorial structures 
founded on an authentic sense of nationhood”�34 And somewhat more broadly 
about the same process: “At the beginning of the XIV century, Europe was still a 
constellation of indefinite shape with an uncertain future� By 1620, quite to the 
contrary, political divisions on the continent, if not fully settled, were at least 
clearly marked out� […] The map of Europe in 1850 does not fundamentally 
differ from the form it took at the beginning of the Thirty Years’ War” (the only 
key difference which Delumeau points to being the fall of Poland)� “In this great 
period […] Europe defined itself in the political sphere, acquiring for example 
Italy; and thanks to France’s resistance to Habsburg ambition the golden rule of 
the balance of powers was established� A certain relationship of powers came to 
take the place of the ideal of European unity under the rule of the Emperor”�35 
34 J� Delumeau, La Civilisation de la Renaissance, Arthaud, Paris, 1993�
35 Ibidem� Delumeau also draws attention to the birth of national individualism already 
at the beginning of the renaissance, encouraged by the religious factor as well (the 
translation of the Bible into various languages following Luther’s example) and the 
flourishing in this period of national languages and great literature (represented in 
Poland, according to Delumeau, by the work of Mikołaj Rej)�
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This is no way, in Delumeau’s opinion, weakened the process of the deepening 
cultural unity of Europe and its separation from the rest of the world�
The bloody culmination of this process was the Thirty Years’ War which, we 
might say, began as “reluctantly” as World War I (here the defenestration of the 
Emperor’s emissaries, there the assignation of the Archduke Ferdinand in 1914)� 
The Czech nobility did not want the Viennese court to choose their religion (and 
in Czech the reformation had a definite national hue – Hussitism)� The initially 
local conflict dragged in all the European powers, especially the military of all 
of Europe� The conflict mainly took place in Germany, at that time still highly 
divided, and it was Germany’s population and civilisational achievements that 
suffered the most� The death toll in some countries reached a level of 50% of the 
population; the brutality of soldiers from northern and southern Europe even led 
to racial changes in the population in central parts of Germany� Production and 
trade regressed by several decades� Once again, France was the victor – under 
Louis XIV, France entered a golden age� Other key changes were as follows: for 
a short time Sweden became an international power; the Seventeen Provinces 
gained their independence; Switzerland was recognised and a status quo was 
preserved in the geopolitical strategic territories of Germany and later Germany 
would enter the European stage in a leading role� Another result of this war was 
the beginning of Spain’s marginalisation, not held back by their mass robbery 
of ore from the New World� The treaty ended the war more effectively than the 
Peace of Augsburg (whose resolutions mainly affected German territories – after 
all the St� Bartholomew massacre happened after the Peace of Augsburg)�
The Thirty Years’ War drained Europe, especially its central region� The Treaty 
of Westphalia, concluded at the end of the hostilities in 1648, has been variously 
interpreted� For example, in France, which had actively participated in the war 
and has been regarded as the war’s main beneficiary, the geopolitical resolutions of 
the treaty are almost all that is perceived�36 In the Anglo-Saxon school of thought, 
“Westphalia” has been made into a foundation stone of the European internation-
al order� This perception is above all due to Henry Kissinger, whose opinion holds 
some sway in the interpretation of international issues, including historical ones� 
In his opinion, “The Peace of Westphalia became a turning point in the history of 
nations because the elements it set in place were as uncomplicated as they were 
sweeping� [Here “elements” refers to the elements of international life – R�K�] The 
36 Delumeau presents the matter in this way and the French Nouveau Larousse of 1904 in 
a similar vein presents under “Westphalia” exclusively the religious and geo-political 
resolutions of the treaty, Volume 7, p� 1380�
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state, not the empire, dynasty, or religious confession, was affirmed as the build-
ing block of European order”� There are also – as he continues – other important 
elements of the international order: the conception of sovereignty (the shaping 
of the internal political order without intervention from outside), diplomacy and 
talks as an art of preserving peace (to avoid wars as terrible as the Thirty Years’ 
Wars) and the development of international law which was intended to serve the 
same purpose� The legitimation of the European order was henceforth to come 
not from the papacy (from religion) or from the empire, but from a balance of 
powers assuming ideological neutrality�37 It is worth, however, recalling that the 
treaties of Münster and Osnabrück announced “peace for the glory of God and 
the security of Christendom” – the community of Christian nations� Kissinger’s 
position and the whole of his school may easily be relativised� Europe in 1648 
was only in part a Europe of countries� Most of the parties to the treaty were not 
countries but tiny republics, bishoprics, dukedoms or principalities the size of a 
county today� Sovereignty was a function of power and it had been practised and 
promoted before, as had the balance of powers which had its origins in the rela-
tions between the Italian states, as evidenced by the much earlier Treaty of Lodi of 
1454� As long as the law of nations granted (sovereign) states the right of war (as 
was very much the case at the time), the principle of non-intervention was a fa-
cade�38 The Fall of Poland or the Napoleonic Wars provide striking confirmation 
of the fleeting nature of the Westphalian resolutions� Without getting into a more 
detailed polemic with this position, it is more appropriate to recognise the ex post 
myth-making significance of Westphalia, what does not diminish its status in the 
eyes of researchers in international relations�39
37 H� Kissinger, World Order, Penguin Press, New York, 2014, pp� 25–27�
38 B� Simms even considers that the Westphalian treaties were an expression of agreement 
between the statesmen of the time as to the “direct link between domestic liberty, the 
balance of power and the right to intervene”, the treaties being “nothing less than a 
charter for intervention”, and “by placing the whole German settlement under inter-
national guarantee, they provided a level for interference in the internal affairs of the 
empire throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries”� B� Simms, Europe. The 
Struggle for Supremacy, from 1453 to the Present, Basic Books, New York, 2013, p� 64� 
Simms also considers “Westphalia” a myth�
39 A� Gałganek, “Westfalia” jako metafora genezy w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych 
[“Westphalia” as a metaphor of genesis in the science of international relations], in: M� 
Pietraś, K� Marzęda (eds�), Późnowestfalski ład międzynarodowy [The Late Westphalian 
International Order], UMCS, Lublin, 2008� The “Westphalian Myth” is a term used by 
western historians outside of the United States�
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Regardless of whether it is worth arguing about key turning points, it is now 
received wisdom that every international order has its own name� The adjective 
“Westphalian” has found its place in the literature� From the perspective of this 
book, Europe’s approach in the XV to the XVII centuries is important as the first 
international order worthy of the name (the previous period being concerned 
with the development of European identity)� From the XVII century, regardless 
of the role played by the treaties of Münster and Osnabrück, the leading actors 
in international life are states – some being more equal than others – and big 
powers, which together define the changing balance of power� Secondly, there 
appeared at this time the first and still simple principles governing the mutual 
relations of countries: the principle of sovereignty and the principle of balance 
(anti-hegemony)� Thirdly, there also appeared institutions regulating interna-
tional relations – permanent diplomacy, congresses, law in the form of doctrine 
which is also its source� And fourthly, the first European international order had 
support, strengthening its legitimacy, in the form of peace for Christianitas ac-
cording to the provisions of the treaties of 1648� The papacy lost its ideological 
pre-eminence – Pope Innocent X condemned the Treaty of Westphalia – but 
Christianity remained the ideological source for Europeans� The divisions creat-
ed by the Reformation were deep and painful, but no one questioned the realities 
which formed the basis for “the family of Christian nations”, nor the membership 
of the various countries in one circle of faith and spirit� Finally, the fifth change 
from the XVII century, Europe started to become one rather integrated economic 
structure, both in terms of the level of trade or close relations in production and 
finance, or in the institutions of economic life which illustrated the homogeneity 
of the economic region that was Europe (more on that in Chapter 2)� Finally, it 
is notable that the most mature of the plans for an ideal international order for 
Europe at that time – the perpetual peace of King Georg von Podiebrad from the 
mid-XV century and the European Federation of Maximilien de Béthune, the 
Duke of Sully, from the beginning of the XVII century – both invoke the idea of 
a pluralist community of sovereign states�40
40 For a more detailed discussion, see: R� Kuźniar, My, Europa [We, Europe], Scholar, 
Warsaw, 2013, pp� 37–39, 45–46�

2  Europe Conquers the World
1 Europe’s discovery of the world
Having formed her identity and built her first international order, Europe set off 
to conquer of the World� To begin with, however, this conquest was not deserv-
ing of the name “European venture”, nor was it even one carried out in the name 
of Europe� Europe’s initial spread across the globe was undertaken by individual 
European countries, as they acquired the ability to discover, explore and then 
gradually subjugate the peoples they discovered and the faraway lands they en-
countered� In the first three or four centuries of these endeavours, only a few 
of Europe’s nations – including her main powers (Spain, Portugal, England, the 
Netherlands and France) – were in a position to carry out these complex opera-
tions� These countries exhibited a combination of extraordinary courage and en-
terprise, technical competence, a thirst for discovery – and a desire for plunder 
and profit� At the same time, the same countries ignored threats closer to them: 
from the south of the continent, from the Ottoman Empire which was enlarging 
its territory at Europe’s expense; and from the east of Europe, from Muscovite 
Russia which had been growing in might from the XIV century on�
Europe’s conquest of the World took place in three broad phases� The first 
phase was one of discovery and exploration, beginning with Columbus’s discov-
ery of America in 1492� (It is worth noting that by that time Portuguese sailors 
had already been exploring Africa’s western coast, far to the South, for many 
decades�) The second phase, European settlement, secured Europe’s presence in 
the new lands� This was ostensibly a matter of establishing outposts to facilitate 
stable trade relations, even if this “facilitation” meant the plundering of such re-
sources as were interesting to the Europeans, be that slaves or spices� In time, 
settlement would also become an option for those seeking a better life outside 
Europe� The third phase was ruthless conquest, driven by profit� This required 
the full subjugation of the conquered lands, turning them into extensions of 
Europe’s economy and her international order� We may call this the imperialist 
phase� The three phases are only approximate as they took place in a non-linear, 
asynchronous fashion and frequently varied as forms of domination, as well as 
in terms of benefits and final consequences�41
41 J� Kieniewicz, in his excellent work Od ekspansji do dominacji. Próba teorii kolonializmu 
[From Expansion to Domination. An Attempt at a Theory of Colonisation], Czytelnik, 
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The entire process was, however, only possible because Europe was becoming 
a more unified economic system, with a centre and peripheries� This allowed for 
sufficient accumulation of capital to build up an energy which sought release out-
ward� Some historians place the birth of the European economy around the reign 
of Emperor Charles the Great, at the end of the IX century� This economy was 
supported by a lively trade in people, in essence the sale of inhabitants of Central 
Europe to the Arabs to gain the requisite capital for development of other areas 
of business�42 Subsequent developments do not bear this out, however� Although 
the regression of the X century was followed by three centuries of growth, as 
witnessed by rising urbanisation, development of trades and crafts, and the ap-
pearance of the Gothic cathedral and the university43� The XIV century and the 
beginning of the XV century were marked by another deep regression, by nu-
merous plagues, including the Black Death, and by wars, such as the destructive 
Hundred Years’ War� Progress and regression followed each other unpredictably 
in different parts of Europe� Economic development mostly took place within 
individual countries, but their borders, in most cases, remained shifting� Cross-
border trade in luxury crafts, say goldsmithing, was but a fraction of the turnover 
of the largely self-sufficient national or local economies�
This all begins to change rapidly during the “long sixteenth century” (F� Brau-
del’s term), that is from the middle of the XV century to the middle of the XVII 
century� This period saw lasting economic development and a shift of Europe’s 
economic epicentre from the Mediterranean, especially Italy (Venice, Genoa), 
to the North-West� As noted by the Polish economic historian Andrzej Lubba, 
changes which took place in the XVI and XVII centuries led to the establishment 
of an economic system, “a relatively well-formed whole, whose constituent eco-
nomic and political organisms form lasting economic relationships which, at the 
Warsaw, 1986, p� 46, separates out four phases of this process, each with its associated 
set of actions: arrival (exploration), contact (violence), actualisation (plunder and ex-
change) and fixing (the factory and imperium)�
42 According to M� McCormick in Origins of the European Economy: Communications 
and Commerce, AD 300–900, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, especially 
Chapter 9, Traders, Slaves, and Exiles, pp� 237–253� The author carefully reconstructs 
even minor mercantile exchanges, but his work demonstrates that those had little 
importance for the “national” economies of the time� Those were highly localised as 
well as transient in terms of their borders and the structure of production�
43 As we know, this was due to the development of agricultural technology, which led 
to rapid increases in efficiency and, as a result, freeing up of labour force� This made 
people available for work other than agriculture�
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same time, define each country’s place in the system’s internal division of work”� 
Within this system the West and North-West of the Continent specialised in the 
production of processed goods (“industrial items”) and increasingly monopo-
lised continental trade and financial transactions, while the north-eastern and 
eastern parts of Europe concentrated on the production, sourcing and export of 
agricultural products (especially grain and cattle), timber and mined resourc-
es� An interdependency is thus formed, but the West finally gained the upper 
hand through rapid urbanisation and the adoption of a capital-based economy� 
The East adjusted the structure of its production to the demands of the Western 
countries and returned to feudalism�44 Through this, an increasingly anachronis-
tic social and economic structure was put in place through the region, impacting 
the Polish Republic in particular� Thus, the “(North)West” became the “centre” 
while the “(North)East” became the “periphery” of Europe’s economic system�45
Through the evolution of manufacturing (from individual crafts to small-
scale to large-scale production) and through trade, England, the Netherlands, 
northern Germany and the Baltic countries accumulated capital at a scale al-
lowing them to further grow their industry� A special role in this process was 
initially played by “Holland, which already half-way through the XVI century is 
Northern Europe’s most powerful centre of industry, trade and finance, far more 
urbanised than Italy” (A� Lubbe)� The might of the Dutch, and then English, 
manufacturing and trade demanded the creation of new, specialised services in 
transport, banking and administration, and associated occupations from sail-
ors to commercial agents� Intra-continental migration also contributed to the 
development of European production and mass-market products, especially in 
relation to specialist professions� Jewish people made a particularly strong contri-
bution in this area� Of great importance was also the mining of precious metals as 
the foundation of monetary trade, and the establishment of a European banking 
44 A� Lubbe, Imperium europejskie? Ekspansja Europy a powstanie gospodarki światowej 
[European Empire? The Expansion of Europe and the Emergence of a Global Economy], 
Państwowe Wyd� Naukowe, Warsaw, 1982, pp� 17–18, 27–36�
45 The shaping of this structure was studied and presented in detail by Marian Małowist, 
whose work is fundamental to the theory of the World system, initiated by the “World 
economic system” (as put forward by F� Braudel and fully developed by Immanuel 
Wallerstein)� M� Małowist, Wschód a Zachód Europy w XIII–XVI wieku. Konfrontacja 
struktur społeczno-gospodarczych [East and West in Europe in XIII to XVI Centuries. 
Confrontation of Socio-Economic Structures], Wyd� Naukowe PWN, Warsaw, 2006�
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network and stock exchanges, beginning with the largest one in Amsterdam�46 
In other industries, such as cloth and textile manufacturing, mining, metallurgy, 
armament production and fisheries, the scale of activity encouraged the estab-
lishment of capitalist-type enterprises� Economic historians have no doubt that 
all of those changes, including the accumulation of capital, took place without 
the participation of colonial trade� The great merchant capital of the XVI century 
was almost exclusively invested in trade within Europe� Andrzej Lubbe writes: 
“The success of colonial trade would have been impossible without a substantial 
base which, at the time, consisted of almost the entire European economy� Oce-
anic journeys were also immensely costly and risky enterprises, demanding great 
seamanship and substantial trade knowledge� The experience which the English 
and the Dutch had gained in European trade were also required”, as was the 
trans-Europe water transport, from the Baltic to the Mediterranean�47 The Dutch 
and the English East India Companies, established at the beginning of the XVII 
century, were prototypical for Europe’s colonial and subsequently imperial activ-
ity� They took advantage of both the experience and the capital gained through 
intra-European trade� Portuguese and Spanish expansion represented a different 
paradigm: conquest and plunder� It was devoid of a capitalist base, broke down 
quickly, and was even the source of the subsequent regression and backwardness 
of both European countries�
However, Europe’s expansion beyond its geographic boundaries, across the 
surrounding seas and oceans, began paradoxically with expeditions sponsored 
by the kings of Portugal and Spain� Columbus’ journey was of course the break-
through which opened up new horizons, although the Portuguese had been sail-
ing relatively regularly along the western coast of Africa as far as the Congo Delta 
– a greater distance than that between Europe and America� Still, Africa had been 
Europe’s neighbour for centuries, even if knowledge of it had been confined to its 
coastal areas� The discovery of America, on the other hand, confirmed the theory 
of the earth’s spherical nature and the existence of other, heretofore unknown 
lands� The superiority of Europe’s civilisation over the peoples of America was 
attested to by the ease with which pre-capitalist Spain easily conquered the rich 
and remote nations of the Maya, Aztecs and the Inca� Groups of several hundred 
conquistadors armed with firearms – unknown to the locals – and led by Hernan 
Cortes (known for his determination, religious zeal and cruelty) conquered vast 
46 A� Mączak (ed�), Historia Europy [History of Europe], Zakład Narodowy im� 
Ossolińskich, Wrocław, 1997, especially the chapter by J� Kieniewicz, pp� 240–245�
47 A� Lubbe, op. cit., p� 33�
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swathes of territory� By the middle of the XVI century, almost the entire South 
and Mesoamerica was within the Spanish imperium� An unprecedented period 
of robbery and exploitation of the local population began, from plunder of pre-
cious metals and other riches to use of forced labour in mines and on planta-
tions� La Conquista also led to demographic catastrophes among the Indians and 
to ecological changes on the continent� Settlers from the Iberian Peninsula, and 
then mestizos, began to displace the Indians� It was there that the exploration 
phase turned into the colonial phase the fastest�
Even before the end of the XV century, Vasco da Gama circumnavigated the 
globe and established Portugal’s presence in Asia, though this proved to be a 
spotty and superficial presence (mere exclaves on the coast of India)� The Portu-
guese would soon be pushed from that part of the World by the more enterprising 
Dutch and English� Things looked somewhat different with Portugal’s conquest 
of Brazil� It resulted in mass-scale development of another phenomenon already 
known in the past – slavery� The slave trade enlivened transatlantic business� 
Ships from Europe would sail do Africa where European products would be ex-
changed for slaves who would then be transported to the West Indies (Caribbe-
an) and Brazil� There, in turn, the slaves would be traded for local produce such 
as sugar or rum, which would then be transported back to Europe� Later slaves 
began to be transported to North America� The Atlantic would quickly become 
for Europe what the Mediterranean had been for the ancient world, in particular 
Rome� It would also enable Europe to play a global role�48
This came to pass as a result of England and, to a lesser degree, France joining 
the process of European expansion� British colonialism was from its beginnings 
a capitalist, business-oriented undertaking, resting on a solid administrative 
base� Once Francis Drake circumnavigated the globe (1577–1579) and the 
English fleet defeated the Great Armada (1588), it became clear whose model 
of conquest and domination would triumph� It was to be, however, a drawn-out 
process� It was only at the beginning of the XVII century that the English settled 
in New England� In the first few decades of settlement, France was to keep the 
English company on the east coast of North America, and in Canada and Louisi-
ana� From the beginning of the XVII century, it would be the English, the Dutch 
and the French who would rapidly become rivals with Spain and Portugal� How-
ever, with a few exceptions that strengthened the settlement of North America, 
this was to be a mercantile expansion motivated by trade (England and Holland 
in particular being more motivated by business)� To be sure, there were other 
48 A� Mączak (ed�), op. cit., pp� 280–286�
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states which began to support the expansion and increased their interest in it, but 
for some time (and especially in the case of France, Spain and Belgium) this was 
more due to a need for prestige and rivalry against their European competitors 
(“court ambitions”) than to the economic interests of the country or its ability 
to dominate politically the territories discovered by its sailors, merchants and 
missionaries� The English, Dutch and French made inroads into Asia, too, ef-
ficiently limiting any initial influence gained by the Portuguese and the Spanish� 
The East India Companies set up at the beginning of the XVII century played 
an important role in their owners taking of control over the Asia trade� These 
organisations quickly became private empires – supported by their capitals but 
at the same time enjoying immense independence, with private armies at their 
disposal, able to defend their presence and their interests in Asian beachheads, 
whether on the coast of India, in Indonesia, or in individual locations in China 
and Japan� During this phase, Africa was only lightly “touched” by the Europeans 
who kept to the coasts to a degree sufficient only to enable trade and the export 
of slaves, as well as to secure support centres for sailing ships bound for India� 
Of particular importance in this context is the territory surrounding the Cape 
of Good Hope, discovered by the Portuguese in 1488� It would later become a 
Boer49 country, then a British colony and finally the Republic of South Africa�
To begin with, the best sailors, merchants, financiers and organisers of this 
expansion were Dutch, though later they had to give way to the English whose 
might had been growing� Both nations, as well as others who took part in this ex-
pansion, were driven by a desire to discover combined with expansive entrepre-
neurship, thirst for profit and adventure and missionary zeal� The Jesuits played 
a primary role in this respect� By spreading their faith, they frequently attempted 
to protect locals from the cruelty and exploitation imposed by the whites, though 
this influence largely ended in the second half of the XVIII century, following 
the dissolution of the Order in 1773� In any event, Christianity took root only in 
South and Mesoamerica – in the North it was only ever the religion of the white 
settlers� For two centuries, trade consisted of spices, precious metals, later cloth – 
depending on the direction of trade in question� A certain role in Europe’s money 
economy was played by the import of precious metals from America at the turn 
of the XVI and XVII centuries, and later by the slave trade aimed at increasing the 
capital of its stakeholders�50 Economic historians agree, however, that all of this 
49 The Boers, that is Calvinists, Lutherans, Protestants or Huguenots from Northwestern 
Europe�
50 Text of the Act, ibid.
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expansion and trade did not have major influence on the economic development 
of Europe herself until we reach the end of the XVIII century�51 Trade and expan-
sion brought benefits to capital groups, and entrepreneurs, but with time even 
the East India Companies began to generate losses while Spain’s American ad-
venture would drive it into bankruptcy, crisis and relegation to Europe’s second 
rung of nations� It was actually Europe’s own development that made exploration 
possible� It was the Europeans who discovered distant regions, took their prod-
ucts there, popularised their cultural and organisational models, not the other 
way around� This lengthy initial period was, however, important for events which 
would come later� It was during that time that Europeans came to know the “Rest 
of the World” and built a network of connections� This made Europe the “centre” 
of the future international order while the “Rest of the World” was becoming 
its periphery� This was not yet a relationship of domination – that would come 
later – but the rapidly growing and evolving model of relations of advantageous 
trade, plunder or exploitation based on technical and organisational superior-
ity was taking hold in pockets of overseas territories, heralding the domination 
to come� The “Rest of the World” was oblivious to how, over the next hundred 
years, a distant and almost unknown western piece of Eurasia – a small peninsula 
sticking out of a vast continent – would come to dominate it, building its own 
international order�
2 Europe breaks away from the Rest of the World
Between the exploration phase and the initial, violent forms of contact and ex-
change – leading to the advantage of the discoverers over the discovered – and 
the phase of permanent presence turning the exchange into an imperial (im-
perialist) relationship, Europe underwent important changes� Two revolutions 
took place, an economic one (capitalism) in England and a political one (re-
public, human rights) in France� Further, following the Napoleonic wars, a new 
international order was established on the Continent� By ensuring a long period 
of relative peace, it enabled a hastening of Europe’s general development, and 
made possible for her powers to expand outwards, by way of colonisation� This, 
51 J� Milewski, Dlaczego Europa? Źródła przyspieszenia wzrostu gospodarczego Europy – 
przegląd literatury [Why Europe? The Sources of the Accelerated Economic Growth of 
Europe – A Review of the Literature], in: M� Koźmiński (ed�), Cywilizacja europejska. 
Wykłady i eseje [European Civilisation. Lectures and Essays], Scholar (Commissioned 
by ISP PAN), Warsaw, 2004, p� 162�
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finally, would lead to imperialist domination over large portions of the “Rest of 
the World”�
The phenomenon of Europe’s hastened economic development and her re-
sultant “breaking away” from the remaining regions and civilisations is covered 
in quite extensive literature, both global and Polish� It includes the already men-
tioned works of Andrzej Lubbe or Jan Kieniewicz� Of particular value there is Jan 
Milewski’s overview “Dlaczego Europa? Źródła przyspieszenia wzrostu gospodarc-
zego Europy – przegląd literatury” [Why Europe? The Sources of Europe’s Acceler-
ated Economic Growth – A Review of the Literature]�52 As already mentioned, the 
moment in which Europe lurched forward is often placed around the year 1000� 
At that time, nothing was yet determined, and that move was non-linear, tortu-
ous and marked by long periods of war and regression� However, as it is also 
believed, around the year 1500 Europe began to outdistance China in terms of 
economic activity and technological innovation, gaining in speed along its own 
developmental trajectory� For a long time, this was not, however, a meaningful 
advantage� Until half way through the XVIII century, China was seen as wealthier 
than Europe and a more advanced civilisation, even if it had been mired in stag-
nation for a long time� Only around 1830 would Europe overtake China in terms 
of volume of production� At that time the later Third World was producing 60% 
of the World’s industrial production (processed goods)� By around 1900, how-
ever, Europe’s output would exceed 62% while the non-Western World’s would 
fall to around 19% (!) This chasm was even larger, and widening, when it came 
to value of production and revenue per head of population� The years 1750–1900 
are the key period during which the gap grew from a scale of “a few times larger” 
(up to three to six times, depending on which region of the World we consider) 
to “forty-fifty times larger”� This chasm continued to widen during the XX cen-
tury and in addition, the United States’s share in the gross world product grew 
from 1% to 24% during the same period�53
This sudden leap was possible thanks to the industrial revolution which had 
begun in England� Machines began to be used not just in production but also, 
and this is important in this context, in communication and transport� This radi-
cally strengthened Europe’s chances of reaching any corner of the world it de-
sired� Demographic growth also contributed to its expansion� In the period we 
52 Published in the first volume of the excellent work by M� Koźmiński (ed�), Cywilizacja 
europejska. Wykłady i eseje [European Civilisation. Lectures and Essays], Scholar (Com-
missioned by ISP PAN), Warsaw, 2004� Among other authors dealing with these issues 
we ought to also mention M� Małowist, M� Kula and A� Mączak�
53 J� Milewski, op. cit�, pp� 149–155�
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examined earlier – 1750–1900 – Europe’s population grew by 300% while other 
parts of the world grew by about 50%� Between 1800 and 1914 alone, Europe 
grew from around 150 million to 400 million, or more than twice the increase 
of the previous three centuries� Colonial expansion, most closely connected to 
migration, solved part of Europe’s demographic problem (surfeit of labour) – 
increasing population created the pressure for migration�54 The rapid natural 
increase of the population of Europe was due to economic and technological 
advances, which had made possible massive increases in food production as well 
as substantial improvement of the sanitary conditions in the cities and in health 
care� The average life expectancy of people as well as their number of productive 
years increased, while infant mortality dropped at the same time�
Another factor commonly taken as influencing growth and expansion was 
Europe’s system of political institutions, whose ideals were represented by both 
the English and the French revolutions: freedom, equality, property� Rule of law 
(including the constitutional system which began in France and spread through 
Europe) and property rights were particularly important� They secured the safety 
of individuals and their property and released creativity and market competi-
tiveness which, in return, stimulated innovation and entrepreneurship� The at-
titude of “greed is good” had already begun to develop� A new social class – the 
bourgeois – emerged and stimulated changes in the organisation of the state and 
contributed to economic nationalism, at least at a certain stage� All those chang-
es meant that from the middle of the XVIII century in a large part of Western 
Europe a capitalist economy began to develop, with mass industrial production 
which required labour and resources� All this output required a market, which 
was internal to begin with but soon became international� Technological inno-
vations in industry and transport (mainly in England) took us into the “age of 
coal and steel” – the XIX century� Long-distance voyages became commonplace� 
Economic, social and political changes (Karl Polanyi’s “great transformation”) 
were also the context of a revolution in the military, one which had already be-
gun in the XVII century with widespread use of firearms and artillery but whose 
greatest stimulus were the Napoleonic wars� The immense size of armies and the 
scale of their operations, the engineering advances, mass production of weap-
ons and their unprecedented lethal power caused the emergence of professional 
military staff and strategists, able to prepare and carry out incomparably more 
complex military campaigns� The accompanying readiness or, at times, necessity 
to sacrifice many thousands of casualties became standard – killing on a large 
54 Ibidem, pp� 165–169�
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scale ceased to make a big impression�55 These new skills and abilities would be 
useful in expeditionary force operations, which would come to characterise the 
imperialist conquest phase� The “Rest of the World” lagged behind Europe in this 
aspect too, a fact which enabled Europe to conquer much larger, distant states 
with relatively little effort�
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Europe’s advantage over the “Rest of 
the World” in the modern era has stemmed from the presence of the university 
in the social and political life of the Continent’s nations� “The university” here 
means the whole culture of constant development knowledge and the emergence 
of scientific corporations whose achievements in many disciplines became very 
helpful, and eventually vital, to social, technical and economic development� No 
other place had anything like it, especially in terms of basic science� Innovation 
and discovery became Europe’s domain� For instance, the discovery of the me-
chanical clock meant that time became a valuable commodity, put into the ser-
vice of the development of both the economy and society� The university sensu 
stricto, a late mediaeval European invention, had ceased to be a “cloister” six cen-
turies later and was becoming a source of Europe’s civilisational advantage over 
the “Rest of the World”�56 The interaction of knowledge, technology and technical 
inventions which the university fostered became the nature of economic growth, 
along with changes in management practice (market, competition) and many 
institutions and political mechanisms� In time, this energy would have to seek 
release� Jan Milewski concludes that the extent of mutually stimulating transfor-
mations in many disciplines, at the same time and in the one place, was the basis 
for Europe’s hastened economic growth and her “breaking away” from the “Rest 
of the World”� Only a few managed to follow Europe along that path, to take ad-
vantage of her developmental paradigms and take part in expansion and division 
of the World (Japan, the United States)�57
Another important thing happened to Europe between its discovering the 
World, establishing lasting relations with it, starting to create a European World 
system (centre/peripheries) and building Europe’s particular form of govern-
ment within the framework of that system – imperialism-to-be� This new thing 
was her own new order, called the “Concert of Powers”� Perhaps, with a less 
55 M� Howard, The Military Factor in European Expansion, in: H� Bull, A� Watson (eds�), 
The Expansion of International Society, OUP, New York, 1984; R� Kuźniar, Polityka i 
siła. Studia strategiczne – zarys problematyki [Politics and Power. Strategic Studies – An 
Outline of the Issues], Scholar, Warsaw, 2006, pp� 30–39�
56 J� Milewski, op. cit�, pp� 175–181�
57 Ibidem, p� 185�
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rigorous understanding of the category of international order, we can actually 
talk about a new phase (or stage, version) of the European international order 
which emerged for the first time in the XVII century from the constellation of 
late mediaeval and late feudal entities, as mentioned in Chapter 1� The order of 
the “Concert of Powers” has its own rich literature, with Henry Kissinger’s classic 
work at its head� Besides this, its nature is of a secondary value to us, so it will be 
introduced here only cursorily�
Napoleon’s attempt at creating an empire missed its historical context, which 
is why it had to end in failure� In any event, Napoleon did not desire “unification” 
of Europe – he wanted an imperium, and France’s hegemony, with him at the 
imperial helm� We ought to remember that Napoleon’s France was the largest of 
all the historical empires in Europe – it covered almost the entire continent – but 
also the most short-lived� At the time Europe was already a Europe of states and 
a Europe of nations, so Napoleon had no chance of creating a lasting empire, 
despite his undoubted strategic genius� “The God of War” was late by a few hun-
dred years� Napoleonic France did, however, set free two phenomena, two ideas 
which would have strong influence over the European order for the subsequent 
hundred years or more: liberalism and nationalism� Nationalism would keep ap-
pearing in both large states and small: as a path to independence in the small 
ones, and in the large ones as a path to imperialism� In the second case, national-
ism would be frequently lined with liberalism, using the latter as a kind of fig leaf, 
covering up the imperialist goals of European powers�
Napoleon’s collapse following the defeat at Waterloo gave the victorious pow-
ers a chance to lay down a European order anew� This occurred at the Congress 
of Vienna, which saw the emergence of the “Concert of Powers”, commonly 
called the “Concert of Europe” – the “European Directorate of the Five”� To begin 
with, its core was the Holy Alliance of three big powers – Russia, Prussia and 
Austria – together guarding the legitimacy of the new order� Russia, outside of 
Europe in terms of civilisation, became one of the guarantors (stabilisers) of the 
European order following an intra-European war which involved Russia� This 
situation bears some resemblance to Ancient Greece� The other two big pow-
ers involved were Great Britain and France� Overseas expansion became also a 
stabilising factor on the Continent� Formal restoration of the “old order”, along 
with Talleyrand’s masterful diplomatic craft, allowed France to avoid punish-
ment for Napoleonic excesses� Next to the Concert of Europe, including the Holy 
Alliance, the constituent parts of the order were the anti-hegemonic balance of 
power, written into the Final Act of the Congress, and the right to intervene 
within smaller neighbouring states to maintain internal order� More precisely 
this was to preserve the legitimacy of the dynastic power, in opposition to the 
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revolution, although the political achievements of the French Revolution re-
mained untouched in France herself� It was further decided that regular con-
gresses should be held to review the situation in Europe from the perspective of 
balance and legitimacy� This ensured continued cooperation by the big powers 
in preserving lasting peace (stability) in Europe� This was the goal of the Holy 
Alliance, and the Concert of Powers which was formed a little later� Within that 
order international legal regulations began to appear, though to begin with those 
did not touch on any fundamental issues� The Congress of Vienna already saw 
the emergence of the first diplomatic law (the Vienna-Aquitaine Regulation of 
1815–1818) followed by bans on the slave trade and looting of works of art, and 
respect for neutrality (of Switzerland)�
The Vienna order, despite its rules of legitimacy and the right to intervene, 
did not manage to halt the development of both nationalist and liberal move-
ments – even in France the Empire fell and the Third Republic was born – but 
it did prevent larger conflicts from appearing� Those that did arise between the 
powers which made up the Concert were limited in their scope: between Prussia 
and Austria in 1866, the Crimean War of 1853–1856, the Franco-Prussian War 
of 1870–1871� With its short and relatively limited conflicts, the Vienna order 
is known as the “hundred-year peace” in Europe� This was in marked contrast 
to the preceding 200 years (1600–1800)� Peace laid groundwork for the “Great 
Transformation” of European civilisation which Karl Polanyi discussed� This was 
a transformation “from the pre-industrial world to the era of industrialisation, 
and the shifts in ideas, ideologies, and social and economic policies accompany-
ing it”�58 According to Polanyi, XIX-century Europe rested on four pillars: the 
balance of power system, the international gold standard, the self-regulating 
market and the liberal state� In the international sphere, peace was made pos-
sible by the invisible and uncoordinated conjunction of two factors: the Concert 
of Europe (“European directorium in a suborganized form”) and “the pressure 
of private interests” which penetrated the entirety of life, reached across borders 
and was the “invisible mainstay of international reciprocity”�59 In Polanyi’s view, 
however, of greater significance is the belief that people react defensively to the 
socially destructive consequences of the “self-regulating market” (both in theory 
and in practice)� That is why they reach for contrary political doctrines which 
58 Page vii of J� Stieglitz’s Foreword to: K� Polanyi, The Great Transformation. The Political 
and Economic Origins of Our Time, Beacon Press, Boston, 2001�
59 Ibidem, pp� 3–4, 271–272�
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they hope will put an end to the process of the economy being “uprooted” from 
society� Hence, the rise of Communism and Fascism following World War I�60
3 Europe imposes its rule on the World
The global expansion of Europe was a function of the processes which took place 
within Europe herself, as previously discussed� Importantly, the hastening of 
Europe’s development, her growing economic and demographic potential and 
the laying down of a new order following the Napoleonic turmoil activated the 
next phase of expansion� This led directly to Europe’s conquest and rule of the 
World – though not necessarily the entire World� Paradoxically, the countries 
of both Americas, which were colonised earliest, were the first to liberate them-
selves� The United States were the first to reject London’s power� In this manner, 
Europe (England) lost a marvellous overseas possession, but Europe’s civilisation 
would anyway soon become “Western Civilisation”, including a strong North-
American pillar� Following in the footsteps of the United States, the countries 
of South America and Mesoamerica freed themselves from European, mainly 
Spanish, dominion (1810–1826�)
Unfazed, Europe enlarged its rule in places where its presence had been hith-
erto limited to the coastal regions, and largely trade oriented� True colonisation, 
that is permanent settlement, began and aimed to take full control over the con-
quered area� The English led the way in this process and began to dominate “East 
of Suez”� The Suez Canal, built by the French and completed in 1869, was soon 
taken over by the English, becoming a significant asset for them� Particularly im-
pressive was the spread of British domination over the ancient and mighty civi-
lisation of India (the Moghul Empire) which had been second in greatness only 
to China in all of Asia� The old and highly developed Asian cultures were de-
fenceless against the technology, organisational abilities, and military skill of the 
Europeans� Great Britain quickly took control of Central Asia and large swathes 
of the Middle East, along with East Africa, including Egypt� British expedition-
ary forces mercilessly broke the resistance of the local coloured populations, with 
no regard for casualties� France reached for Africa, to begin with the North (Al-
geria became virtually a part of France) and then the East� The Portuguese also 
placed themselves there, as did the Belgian king Leopold II, with the Congo be-
coming his own personal property (!) The French also colonised Indochina� The 
Germans arrived late and gained only a few modest possessions in Africa� The 
60 Ibidem, pp� 3–4 and following pages�
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speed with which Europe swallowed up Africa is borne out by the fact that while 
in the 1870s only about 10% of that continent was in European hands, by 1914 all 
of it had been colonised with the exception of Ethiopia and Liberia� The ancient 
and gigantic, but at the time powerless, China became a kind of British–French 
protectorate in 1901� While the Europeans needed to reach for their colonial 
bounty far overseas, Russia had an easier job� During the XIX century, Russia 
finished colonising the great void of Siberia, reached the Pacific and began to put 
pressure on countries to the South, in Central Asia and beyond the Caucasus�61
In their attitude towards conquered peoples and territories, the Europeans 
employed a logic made plain during the Berlin Congress of 1818� The Congress 
itself dealt with the division of influence in the Balkans but at a micro-scale 
served to demonstrate the low and imperialist instincts of the European pow-
ers� Spheres of influence were agreed to and borders were drawn with no re-
gard for history, geography, social relations, or for ethnic or cultural divisions� 
The interests of the local populations were of no importance� The last quarter 
of the XIX century, therefore, saw the culmination of Europe’s conquest of the 
World� Colonialism turned into imperialism, although it could be said that both 
were merely two sides of the same process of expansion and domination, lead-
ing to the creation of a world system with Europe at the centre and the global 
capitalist economy as foundation� The creation of a colonial system preceded the 
next phase of domination: imperialism� In Europe’s case, this phenomenon can 
be extended to World War II or even some years following its conclusion� Jan 
Kieniewicz writes that “the years from 1875 to 1945 can be seen as a period of 
particular importance for the colonial system, colonial expansion, colonies and 
the ultimate domination of the capitalist system over the rest of the World”�62
In practice, the colonial system meant the use of almost free labour, provid-
ed by the colonised populations, the exploitation of the colony’s resources, the 
imposition of changes in the economic structure of the colony by imposing a 
monoculture whose beneficiary was the metropolis, as well as the imposition of 
social and cultural norms aimed at imitating the life and culture of the metropo-
lis, albeit at an inferior level� Those changes had the effect of creating not only 
dependency but also pauperisation and, worse, creeping backwardness which 
replaced the existing stasis� Destabilisation and destruction of local social and 
quasi-national systems took place� Colonies became the furthest peripheries of 
the global system� “White man’s” rule was marked by cruelty, with the aim of 
61 A� Mączak (ed�), op. cit�, pp� 569–573�
62 J� Kieniewicz, op. cit�, p� 262�
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maintaining obedience and destruction of any resistance to exploitation or slav-
ery� It was accompanied by an ideology intended for both sides: white superiority, 
whose worse version was simple racism� According to this ideology, the whites 
did not employ inhuman methods to impose their power but sought to “bring 
a superior civilisation”, in other words leading a “civilising mission”, which can 
be seen particularly in the English and French versions of colonialism� At least 
the French version, lined by ideas of republicanism, gave the local population a 
chance at gaining citizenship and performing more important functions within 
that system� The tenor of Rudyard Kipling’s The White Man’s Burden (1899) is, 
however, more indicative of the entirety of the situation� White Man’s burden 
combined ruthlessness towards conquered populations with generosity in shar-
ing the gifts of civilisation, such as education or health care, what did indeed take 
place in many cases� The “Rest of the World” was included into the broad map 
of the culture of Europe, especially by means of (global) language – the medium 
of cultural messaging, which could unite regions by means of communicated 
world view, and could communicate the paradigms of social and political order 
which for the Europeans signified progress� On the other hand, the Europeans 
preferred not to remember the dark sides of this whole process, or its many de-
generations personified by the sinister Kurtz in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness�
The predatory form of colonialism, which reveals the economic and politi-
cal underpinnings of international colonialism in general, was defined and de-
scribed most fully by the British sociologist and economist John A� Hobson in 
his 1902 work Imperialism: A Study� The imperialism we are considering was 
not the same as earlier imperial forms which had amounted to the conquest of 
the weaker by the stronger and whose aim was rule for its own sake, be it for 
the glory of the ruler or for national security� The source of the later imperial-
ism, according to Hobson, lay not in the state (or government) but in capitalist 
oligarchy or, deeper still, in the nature of the organisation of capitalist economy� 
Imperialism was, in his view, not necessary, while also being immoral� It came 
from a desire for easily gained profits which would normally have to be attained 
by the capitalists through increasing the purchasing power of their employees 
(mostly workers) – which would require a better distribution of wealth through 
more complex state mechanisms; it would require greater justice and equality� 
Capitalists, said Hobson, rejected this more difficult path towards enrichment 
and preferred to gain their wealth faster and in greater extremes� They preferred 
to seek profit through exclusive access to new overseas markets and investments� 
This required a state and its instruments, that is a diplomatic service and an 
army� Thanks to the capitalists’ ambitions, their own states would shape other 
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more distant countries and territories, to achieve that goal� Imperialism, accord-
ing to Hobson, was an economic, political and cultural practice, through which 
European powers included other countries and peoples into the sphere of their 
own economies and the global capitalist system, which was thus enlarged� Those 
lands and peoples had to become “civilised” along the norms of the nations of the 
centre�63 This is how Great Britain become the “factory of the World” in the XIX 
century – and not just the factory but also its financial centre and its main sea 
power� Hobson began an entire school of study of imperialism, whose most im-
portant figures were Vladimir Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg and Karol Kautsky� While 
Hobson analysed imperialism, they worked towards its downfall� In his brilliant 
work Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, Lenin added another, inher-
ent, characteristic of imperialism to the description: war� Imperialism could not 
exist without war� This thought came all the more easily to him writing, as he 
was, during World War I�64
Importantly, the shift from colonialism to imperialism awoke in the European 
powers an instinct for military expansion, for battle and victory – an instinct 
which came to dominate all other thoughts of politics or international relations� 
Since there was nothing left to take over, the imperialist powers began to grab 
their prizes from each other, turning against each other as they did� An arms race 
began� Germany, the mighty but late arrival, became the main advocate of this 
process� Following unification, Germany quickly overtook Great Britain in steel 
production� Steel means armaments and a fleet – more of a navy than a merchant 
fleet� Soon, what would have been unthinkable not long before, Germany caught 
up with the Royal Navy� The German gauntlet thrown at the feet of Great Britain 
could be seen all the more clearly as Germany became the continent’s leading 
power� London’s policy, ever since the Peace of Westphalia, had been to provide 
balance for a potential hegemony in Europe� At the turn of the XIX century a 
realignment of allegiances took place, altering the Vienna Congress paradigm� 
It had already begun earlier, and before the outbreak of World War I the roles 
defined and the “decorations” were ready: the earlier Triple Alliance (Germany, 
Austro-Hungary, Italy) stood against the Triple Entente (France, England and 
Russia)� A longish overture began, starting with the war between Japan and 
Russia (1904–1905), through the conflicts in the Balkans and North Africa� All 
of this had the same basis – a fight for influence� The powers’ determination to 
defend or extend their dominions must have been great if an event so “marginal” 
63 J�A� Hobson, Imperialism: A Study, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1938�
64 V� Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, Penguin Classics, London, 2010�
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as the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo on the 28th of June 1914 
meant that a month later Europe was already engulfed by the Great War, later 
renamed World War I as it extended to the Middle East, North Africa and East 
Asia – as Japan entered China and the United States joined in�

3  Europe Creates a Normative Dimension  
for International Order
The politicians promised that the Great War would end in a few weeks, before 
the winter at the latest� It lasted four bloody years (until 11 November 1918), left 
huge numbers of casualties and effectively ended the previous international or-
der (as laid down at the Congress of Vienna)� The enormity of the war, its direct 
results and costs, and its long-term geopolitical consequences forced the leaders 
of the entente countries to think deeply about the framing of the post-war order� 
Even before the end of the war, there had been many opinions about the condi-
tions and the future foundations of Europe, and beyond – it had been a world 
war, after all� The Paris Peace Conference faced this subject in the first half of 
1919� It not only took on the issue of settling the War’s results – in particular in 
relation to Germany and its allies (the conditions imposed on them were often 
severe) – but also attempted to establish, for the first time in history, a normative 
view of the international order� The aim was not an order set down and regulated 
according to a mechanism of power relations (a balance of one kind or another), 
but rather one governed by norms of international relations, with multilateral in-
stitutions keeping watch over those norms, enabling the development of interna-
tional cooperation� Adam Watson noted that this was the third stage of Europe’s 
creation of an international order, this time through a type of transposition onto 
the World of its own model�65
1 Inspiration
As is well known, the ideas of American president Woodrow Wilson, put before 
the US Congress on the 8th of January 1918, gained a wide audience before the 
beginning of the Paris Conference� The last of his Fourteen Points said that a 
“general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the 
purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial 
65 For Watson, the first stage was overseas exploration, in parallel with the shaping of 
the order� The second stage was the extension of power over the World thanks to the 
means afforded by the industrial revolution� The third stage was the imposition onto 
the World of rules and institutions� A� Watson, European International Society and Its 
Expansion, in: H� Bull, A� Watson (eds�), The Expansion of International Society, OUP, 
New York, 1984�
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integrity to great and small states alike”�66 A number of other points in that speech 
also referred to future bases of international relations (the openness of treaties, 
arms control)� Leaders and representatives of France and Great Britain were par-
ticularly active in the discussions over the text of the Pact, as were the Italians 
and the Japanese� In its entirety, the Pact of the League of Nations would draw 
mostly upon projects of European federation and the plans for eternal peace 
which had been proposed for many years by various European thinkers and rul-
ers, but which had never before been subject to serious discussion or negotia-
tion� Previously ignored, they were now the point of departure for creation of an 
audaciously constructed world order�
In support of this thesis, we should point out two main inspirations to be 
found in the spirit and the letter of the Pact of the League, and in the League’s 
activities� To begin with, let us consider the relatively well-known “A project for 
settling an everlasting peace in Europe” [“Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle 
en Europe”], penned by Abbot Charles de Saint-Pierre between 1714 and 1716, 
following the War of the Spanish Succession and the Treaty of Utrecht� We will 
find a great majority of its elements in the League of Nations� De Saint-Pierre 
also postulated that a permanent association of nations be formed, guaranteeing 
them security and integrity of their borders� A fundamental rule of avoiding the 
use of force would therefore need to be accepted, along with non-interference 
in the internal affairs of other states (sovereigns)� The project assumed a politi-
cal status quo� Rule breakers would be required to pay reparations, and aggres-
sors would be disarmed� Prevention of the use of force would consist of peaceful 
means of resolving conflicts (conciliation, mediation, arbitration)� The main or-
gan of the association would be a senate or a congress, whose main task would 
be to police the fulfilment of obligations and participation in conflict revolution, 
and imposition of sanctions�67 De Saint-Pierre’s project bears great resemblance 
to what would be agreed more than 200 years later at the Paris Peace Conference� 
66 Text of the speech, English original: http://avalon�law�yale�edu/20th_century/wilson14�
asp� A Polish edition is found in: K� Kocot, K� Wolfke (eds�), Wybór dokumentów do 
nauki prawa międzynarodowego [A Selection of Documents for the Study of International 
Law], Państwowe Wyd� Naukowe, Wrocław–Warsaw, 1976, pp� 45–47� We should men-
tion that Wilson’s ideas stemmed largely from projects discussed by various organisa-
tions made up of international lawyers of the day�
67 A project for settling an everlasting peace in Europe. Gale ECCO, Andover, Hamp-
shire, 2010� Polish edition: Leksykon pokoju [A Lexicon of Peace], KAW, Warsaw, 1987, 
pp� 186–187�
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It is a wonder that his ideas were not made use of a hundred years before, in 
Vienna�
In approaching the future international order, Woodrow Wilson (who prob-
ably was unaware of de Saint-Pierre’s plan) was inspired more by the key assump-
tions of Immanuel Kant’s To Perpetual Peace (1795)� Seeing wars as immoral, 
Kant also postulated that they ought to be banned and that international institu-
tions be established charged with protecting that ban� The Königsberg hermit 
also formulated three main conditions conducive to the preservation of peace: 1) 
a republican (in practice – democratic) system of state government, 2) federal 
alliances to promote peace and 3) international law, to which all would be sub-
ject� To these he added a ban on expansion into foreign territory, and gradual 
disarmament�68 This is why Kant and Wilson are considered the precursors of 
the idealist approach to international relations� With earlier projects for peace in 
Europe becoming the reference points for work on a global organisation, it is not 
surprising that it was on the forum of the already established and functioning 
European organisation that the only governmental project for organisation of 
Europe was presented� This was the project to establish a European Union, in-
troduced by France’s 1929–1930 foreign minister, Aristide Briand, at the League� 
Faced with many objections, mainly from London and Berlin, that project never 
entered the stage of serious discussion� Briand had undoubtedly been influenced 
by the concepts discussed within the Pan-European Movement, of which he had 
been the honorary president�69
The project of a normative international order, which became the League of 
Nations, was inspired not just by plans for a European federation and perpetual 
peace, but also by earlier attempts at regulating certain aspects of international 
conduct� Those had come from Europe but had universalist ambitions� The idea 
of the League of Nations was a response not only to World War I but also to war 
68 I� Kant, (tr�) Ted Humphrey, To Perpetual Peace. A Philosophical Sketch, Hackett Pub-
lishing, Indianapolis, 2003�
69 The Pan-European Movement was initiated by Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi 
in 1924� He was an Austrian aristocrat with international roots, essentially a textbook 
example of a cosmopolitan� His main inspiration came from his experience of the “soft” 
Habsburg Empire� Original and frequently controversial, his ideas were concerned 
primarily with European unity, but because the Movement included many intellectu-
als, politicians and diplomats, many of those ideas were carried onto the forum of 
the League of Nations� Expanded in: J� Łukaszewski, Cel: Europa. Dziewięć esejów o 
budowniczych jedności europejskiej [Goal: Europe. Nine Essays on Building European 
Unity], Noir sur Blanc, Warsaw, 2002, pp� 17–47�
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in general� As we know, that had become something of a dark “speciality” of 
Europe, due to her extraordinary technical prowess and superior military strat-
egy and materiel, the destructive power of which had already then begun to be 
terrifying� A reaction to the cruelty of wars waged by Europeans was the emer-
gence of international law and the Red Cross movement� A beginning had been 
made in 1864 when sixteen nations accepted the Geneva Convention aimed at 
improving the lot of the wounded and infirm in the armed forces� It took a young 
Genevois named Henri Dunant to witness the battlefield at Solferino in 1856, a 
day after the clash fought as part of the Austro-Italian war� After that, instead 
of becoming a banker,70 Dunant devoted himself to the cause of creating the 
Red Cross and the signing of the aforementioned convention� This signing was 
already incredibly late, given the general scale of civilisational development of 
Europe and the growing scale of European wars and battles, accompanied by 
growing numbers of casualties� When it came to warfare, the apparently civi-
lised Europe took a very long time to become civilised� The convention, though 
limited, was a first attempt at introducing a humanitarian element into interna-
tional affairs, an element resting on international law� We owe the emergence of 
the convention not to politicians or military leaders who had been waging wars 
with gusto, but a representative of what we would today call “civil society”� And 
it would be civil society that would turn out to be Europe’s contribution to the 
civilisation of international affairs�
The next, much broader, approach at solving the issue of war and peace from a 
normative perspective was represented by the Hague conferences from the turn 
of the XIX century� Although initiated by politicians – the Tsar of All Russia and 
the Queen of the Netherlands – they were actually inspired by a Polish entrepre-
neur and philanthropist of Jewish extraction, Jan Bloch� He became interested in 
the results of a future war in Europe and was convinced that those would be so 
catastrophic that any such war had to be prevented�71 The Hague Conference of 
1899 gathered twenty-six nations – the United States, China and Japan among 
the non-Europeans adopted several conventions limiting the use of military 
force during war and also called for further conferences� The participants also 
stated that, “The Conference is of [sic] opinion that the restriction of military 
70 Henri Dunant was the recipient of the first Nobel Peace Prize in 1901�
71 J� Bloch, The Future of War in Its Technical, Economic and Political Relations, Hanse-
books, Norderstedt, 2017 (reprint of 1899 edition)� This work was created in stages 
during the last decade of the XIX century� Tsar Nikolai II became interested in it and 
extended his personal invitation to Bloch to take part in the first Hague Conference 
in 1899�
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charges, which are at present a heavy burden on the world, is extremely desirable 
for the increase of the material and moral welfare of mankind”�72 Self-awareness, 
it seemed, was in ample supply; actual politics somewhat less so� The second 
Hague Conference of 1907 had a far broader reach� Forty-four nations took 
part in it – mostly still European ones but also sixteen from Latin America, plus 
the United States and a few from Asia and Africa�73 A full thirteen conventions 
were drawn up, dealing mostly with limiting the means and ways of conducting 
both land and naval warfare, as well as the customs and laws governing war on 
land� Most important was the First Hague Convention of 1907, which dealt with 
peaceful settlement of international disputes� The title of its first section already 
sounded promising: “The Maintenance of General Peace”� Here, too, the sides 
agreed to prevent “as far as possible recourse to force in the relations between 
States” and to use peaceful methods to settle international disputes� As it turned 
out seven years later, in 1914, the capacity of countries to refrain from the use 
of force were rather limited� And this was despite the fact that the convention 
offered an entire spectrum of means of achieving peaceful settlement, from use-
ful assistance through fact-finding to arbitrage� Our point here is not to criticise 
the actions of the big powers at the time – that is obvious – but to notice those 
early attempts by Europe to introduce a normative dimension into international 
relations�
2  The League of Nations as a normative dimension  
of international order
The League of Nations was the first comprehensive project for an international 
order, whose value lay primarily in its unprecedented normative and institutional 
aspects� Evidence for this thesis is the fact that the treaty established, firstly, rules 
and regulations of law and international relations; secondly, universally avail-
able membership of the international organisation; and thirdly, an international 
security system� The latter is important since security is always a key issue in any 
international order, and it is the first role of a state� In this sense, the League of 
Nations, its make-up and tasks, reached far beyond what President Wilson had 
72 Point A�2 in: http://opil�ouplaw�com/view/10�1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e305; 1907 Conference: http://avalon�law�yale�edu/20th_century/ 
pacific�asp#art1� Polish edition: Text of the Final Act of the Hague Conference, 
K� Kocot, K� Wolfke (eds�), op. cit�, p� 282�
73 The second Hague Conference was convened by the Queen of the Netherlands, the 
Tsar of Russia and the President of the United States�
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postulated in his Fourteen Point speech� This is because it was created from with-
in the European tradition of how eternal peace and the organisation of Europe 
were thought of�
In terms of values, the sense of the League of Nations written in the preamble 
of the Pact, lay in its care for peace and security, in refraining from warfare, in the 
transparency of international relations, justice and honour (perhaps the last time 
the word “honour” would appear in an international treaty) and the respect for 
binding international law� The League’s structure as an organisation was simple, 
made up of members states, representing mainly Europe and South America at 
the time, plus a few countries from beyond those two continents� At the begin-
ning there were thirty-two member states; at its peak there were fifty-eight� (The 
United Nations [UN] would start with fifty-one states�) All member states sat in 
the Assembly and the work of the League was to be undertaken by committees 
in addition to plenary sessions� The League’s Council was to be a continuation of 
the concert of powers victorious in World War I, that is Great Britain, France, the 
United States, Japan and Italy� This was to be a representation of the balance of 
power in the international order of the time� During the almost twenty-year pe-
riod of the League’s activity, its composition changed all the time, a fact which we 
will examine, while the Council’s only two permanent members were two Europe-
an powers – France and Great Britain� Moreover, like any organisation, the League 
had an international secretariat, headquartered in stable and stately Geneva�
From a normative point of view, the League’s greatest value besides its sheer 
existence was the acceptance of a set of core rules which were to govern inter-
national relations, ensuring peace and security to its members� From this per-
spective, member states’ undertaking to “respect and preserve as against external 
aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all 
Members of the League” (Article 10)� This was unprecedented in the history of 
diplomacy and international relations� What is more, “in case of any such ag-
gression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression” the Council would 
“advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled”� This is, of 
course, the core of the League’s collective security system, and any other such 
subsequent system� Further, Article 11 states that “any war or threat of war […] 
is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League […]”� Breaking, by 
any member of the League, of the ban on war “in disregard of its covenants […]” 
would be understood as “an act of war against all other Members of the League” 
(Article 16)� The same article then states what sanctions would be levied against 
an offending state: severance of relations, possibility of military action by the 
League, possible removal from the League�
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Implementation of obligations stemming from Article 10 was to be assisted by 
the dispositions of Articles 12–16, which set down a broad spectrum of peaceful 
means of settlement of disputes� Member states undertook not to resort to war 
until such peaceful means were exhausted� These included arbitration, an inter-
national court and political settlement with the help of the Council� The Cov-
enant foresaw the establishment of the League’s judiciary arm, the Permanent 
Tribunal of International Justice� This was created, with its seat in The Hague� 
Article 20 of the Covenant established the primacy of obligations (rules, law) of 
the League over all other international obligations of member states�
The mandate system created by the League of Nations was primarily a means 
of stripping of colonies away from countries which had lost a war – mainly Ger-
many – and turning them over for management by other colonial powers� This 
was therefore, in a sense, acquisition of foreign bounty� Despite this, the aim was 
to improve the situation of peoples who resided in those territories and offer 
them a path towards independence� Article 22 refers to “peoples not yet able to 
stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world […]” 
and that “[…] the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred 
trust [read: obligation] of civilisation […]”� No international document today 
could include this wording because of political correctness, but at the time it 
denoted the universalism of the League’s rules and practices, and the desire to 
extend those standards to peoples who did not yet have their own states� A spe-
cial permanent commission of the League was to supervise the enactment of 
a mandate, that is the treatment by the mandatory (“developed nation”) of the 
people in its care� Such rules had not existed before and would influence the 
standards of conduct of the European powers towards their colonies�74
The acceptance of the Covenant and the establishment of the League of Na-
tions attested to the most radical transition of how international order was 
thought of, from si vis pacem para bellum (ius ad bellum which was a sover-
eign’s “God-given” right) to pax per iustitiam (peace through law)� The League of 
Nations was also the first expression of the existence of the “international com-
munity”� From then on, this phrase would enter the parlance of commentary and 
publications concerned with international relations� Europe would be seen by 
the rest of the World through the prism of not only colonial conquest and impe-
rial politics but also universal institutions and laws which it was creating for the 
benefit of the rest of the World� In the times of the League, Europe became the 
74 Text of the Covenant of the League of Nations: http://avalon�law�yale�edu/20th_ 
century/leagcov�asp� Polish edition: K� Kocot, K� Wolfke (eds�), op. cit�, pp� 47–58�
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international centre of diplomatic activity, with its capital in elegant Geneva� As 
Great Britain had been considered “the World’s factory” during the XIX century, 
so during the times of the League, Europe was the “factory” which turned out 
international norms and mechanisms which regulated international relations� 
Her role vis-à-vis the Rest of the World was not to change – remaining a collec-
tive colonial metropolis�
The establishment of the League of Nations with all of its functions activated 
a mighty diplomatic machinery aimed at consolidating the letter of the Pact in 
the form of more detailed agreements, setting down more concrete regulations 
based on its sometimes general and declarative wording� At this stage, therefore, 
I will point only to three large areas of the League’s norm-producing activity�
The first is anti-war law� Europe’s experience, including the most recent events 
of World War I, as well as the potential for conflict following the cessation of 
hostilities, gave this issue highest priority� Most important here was, of course, 
the Kellogg–Briand Pact (an anti-war treaty), initiated by the French minis-
ter Aristide Briand and proposed also by the Head of US diplomacy Frank B� 
Kellogg� It was signed on 27 August 1928 and the parties to it (including Ger-
many) renounced “war as an instrument of national policy”�75 There had never 
been such a treaty� Ius ad bellum was delegalised! In addition, within the frame-
work of the League many other agreements were signed, further developing a 
regime of peaceful resolution of conflicts� Of particular importance was the 1928 
General Act concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes� The Act significantly 
enlarged the scope of possible conciliatory procedures, including arbitrage and 
legal argument before a court� We can include in this category the 1931 Conven-
tion on improving the means of prevention of war, developed by a special com-
mission for investigation of disputes and conflicts�
Disarmament and arms control were a second area� In this realm, the word-
ing of the Pact of the League of Nations turned out to be most idealistic� In its 
lengthy Article 8, the League’s members agreed that “the maintenance of peace 
requires the reduction of national armaments”� In addition, the Council was 
to “formulate plans for such reduction” for each state� Thirdly, members of the 
League undertook to “interchange full and frank information as to the scale 
75 Text of the Pact: http://avalon�law�yale�edu/20th_century/kbpact�asp� Aristide Briand 
wanted to include the United States in issues of Europe’s balance of power and security 
through a bilateral treaty� This could not be accomplished at the time� Instead, the treaty 
banning the use of force was signed in Paris – a historic achievement in the context 
of international relations� Fifteen states comprised the initial signatories; by 1939 that 
number had reached sixty-three�
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of their armaments”, as well as their plans for arms development and the state 
of their arms industry� These ideas were initially implemented only in Europe 
(within the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe [CSCE] and the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE]), and only in the 
1990s, that is following the end of the Cold War� To be sure, 1927 saw the estab-
lishment of the League’s Expert Committee which was charged with formulating 
lists of expenditures required for defence – different for each state, while the 
rest of the expenditures were to be struck off� It is easy to see how the effective-
ness of this Committee was nil� The largest and most unprecedented undertaking 
was the World Disarmament Conference which took place in 1932–1934 after 
several years of preparations� The United States and the Soviet Union, neither 
of which was a member of the League at the time, also took part in this Confer-
ence� The Conference worked on the definition of aggression (an even narrower 
one emerged),76 the means to control the implementation of obligations and the 
development of common security – although the term was not used at the time� 
Following Hitler’s rise to power and the German armament programme, the 
Conference was soon suspended and postponed sine die� Naturally, it was a fail-
ure for other reasons as well and the other powers did not have completely pure 
intentions� The carefully prepared disarmament conference, its order of proceed-
ings, or selection of issues to be solved would eventually become a point of refer-
ence for other similar undertakings in the future, as part of the UN and beyond�
Human rights were another area of activity of the League� The phrase was not 
in use at the time, but the beginnings of protection of human rights did emerge 
within the League, as evidenced by the League’s European genesis and its idealis-
tic, normative profile� Article 23 of the Pact makes this clear, by referring to the 
rights of (native) populations of earmarked territories� It talks about securing for 
them humane working conditions, of generally just treatment and of the duty 
which the League had to address the issue of trade in women and children� In 
Article 25, members of the League supported the activities of the Red Cross� The 
League of Nations system also included the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) (Chapter 13 of the Versailles Treaty) which would be the inception of an-
other mighty branch of human rights – international labour law� Even within the 
times of the League, the ILO drew up many tens of conventions from that field� 
Finally, the League of Nations system gained fame with one more area of human 
76 The USSR initiated the 1933 creation of an agreement on the definition of aggression� 
This covered more than ten of the Soviet Union’s neighbours and was something of a 
repeat of Litvinov’s protocol, who had extended the decisions of the Kellogg–Briand 
Pact over those countries�
Europe in the International Order58
rights, established through national minority treaties� These treaties were signed 
between the League and new states (of Central and Southern Europe) formed 
from the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and also in part on the territory for-
merly belonging to imperial Germany� The issue here was the protection of rights 
of national minorities, whether they be minorities of race, language or religion� 
The unilateral practice of those treaties got a bad name (favouring Berlin’s revi-
sionist policies) but even the mere identification of these issues and the establish-
ment of grievance procedures would have major, unprecedented influence on 
the general development of human rights and individual regional systems after 
World War II� We ought to mention that non-governmental steps towards intro-
ducing “classic” human rights through a suitable document, a kind of declaration 
of human rights, were attempted, but due to the worsening international climate 
of the 1930s, these steps never reached the level of intergovernmental discussion�
3 The fall of the system of the League
This wonderful, innovative, breakthrough project that aimed to civilise the in-
ternational order fell apart less than twenty years after its inception�77 It was de-
stroyed by states which deemed themselves victims of the Versailles system, and 
the destruction of the League was completed thoughtlessly, though consciously, 
by the powers that had created that system – Great Britain, France and the United 
States� The United States, as we know, never became a member of the League as, 
in the autumn of 1919, the US Senate had rejected ratification of the Pact� The 
United States had refused in particular to be limited in its actions (the “right to 
intervene”) in Latin America, as per the Monroe Doctrine� The US also wanted 
to avoid having to submit to the rigours of the League in terms of arming itself� 
The diversionary tactics employed against President Wilson during the time of 
the Paris conference and the commission to establish the League are very well 
described by Elmer Bendiner in the well-known work A Time of Angels.78
77 The most highly regarded Polish work on the state of diplomacy in international rela-
tions during the era of the League of Nations is H� Batowski, Między dwiema wojnami 
1919–1939. Zarys historii dyplomatycznej [Between Two Wars 1919–1939. A Sketch of 
Diplomatic History], Wydawnictwo Literackie, Kraków, 1988�
78 A Democratic senator, in criticism of the Covenant, stated that America would “never 
renounce its rights” and “the Sermon on the Mount, the Decalogue and the Monroe 
Doctrine are absolutely sufficient”� Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R, Conn�), as the main 
opponent of the League of Nations, said that, “under this draft of the constitution of the 
league of nations American questions and European questions and Asia and African 
questions are all alike put within the control and jurisdiction of the league� Europe 
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Germany and the Soviet Union had felt themselves the victims of the Ver-
sailles system� They did, after all, have to agree to a loss of some of their pre-war 
territories to the benefit of states which had been reborn in Central and Eastern 
Europe� Further, Moscow and Berlin did not wish to be bound by the League’s 
rules and the demands of multilateral diplomacy, depending as it did on dialogue 
and compromise� Due to geopolitical or ideological reasons, they openly strove 
towards a revision of the system or its annulment� Following Locarno, Germany 
entered the League as a tactical measure for a few years (1926–1933) but left it as 
soon as Hitler came to power, beginning preparations for the destruction of the 
European order and imposition of its own, murderous hegemony� Soviet Rus-
sia entered the League “for a moment” (1934–1939) when it seemed that it had 
come to terms with Versailles (that, too, was a tactical measure) but ceased to be 
a member after the invasion of Finland in 1939� Italy, with its theatrical Fascism, 
had little to say within the League, and left following the invasion of Ethiopia in 
1935� Japan’s story was similar – due to the distance it had not made its presence 
in the League felt particularly strongly, and finally left in 1933, to enact its aggres-
sive plans in East Asia, joining the Anti-Comintern Pact�79
So, of the five powers that were permanent members of the Council of the 
League (or seven, counting the long-term membership of Germany and Soviet 
Russia), only two had continuous membership, France and Great Britain� And 
they were the two states, France in particular, that understood the sense of the 
League as a project of an international order� They, too, however, began to treat 
the League as either an instrument, or a barrier to the realisation of their own 
national or imperial interests� Pre-war thinking and practice quickly took over 
in Europe, with political and diplomatic manoeuvres contrary to the spirit and 
the letter of the League of Nations� The Locarno Pact (1925) was the beginning 
of this end, with Western states and global powers guaranteeing that Germany 
would respect the integrity of their borders� The Pact did not include Germany’s 
will have the right to take part in the settlement of all American questions… We are 
asked, therefore, in a large and important degree to substitute internationalism for 
nationalism and an international state for pure Americanism…”� Henry Cabot Lodge, 
Constitution of the League of Nations, February 28, 1919, https://www�senate�gov/
artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/LodgeLeagueofNations�pdf� See also E� Bendiner, 
A Time for Angels: The Tragicomic History of the League of Nations, Littlehampton Book 
Service, Worthing, 1975�
79 This was an agreement between Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Japan, which was 
readying itself for military expansion� It was formally directed against the Comintern, 
the Communist International, formed by Moscow in 1919�
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neighbours to the East, offering them arbitration conventions instead� This was, 
of course, against the logic of the Pact of the League of Nations, and its underlying 
system of collective security� The path from Locarno to Munich turned out to be 
a short one – a mere thirteen years in fact� The steps which followed, kept in the 
general logic of Locarno, saw the European powers adopt unilateral actions which 
were as myopic as they were selfish: the Pact of the Four, the Stresa Front and the 
Munich Conference – perhaps the most heinous diplomatic event of the time� 
An exception to this trend was the project of an Eastern Pact, an attempt by Paris 
to right the wrongs of Locarno, though that one also ended before it began� The 
openly expansionistic policies of Nazi Germany were greeted with an astonish-
ingly lax attitude� Its 1936 annexation of Rhineland, until then a buffer for France, 
precipitated an arms race but, at the same time, the Western powers, in particular 
Great Britain, did everything to direct Germany’s attention eastwards� The infa-
mous term “appeasement”, which comes from British politics of the time, would 
forever enter the vocabulary of – not just European – diplomacy�80 The evapora-
tion of the spirit of self-preservation from the democratic powers of Europe, from 
France and Britain – be it out of convenience, fear or selfishness – returned only 
a short time before German’s attack on Poland�81 Which was, alas, too late� The 
war which in 1934 could have been averted through concerted action, was inevi-
table by the late summer of 1939�82 Europe had allowed itself to be set on fire� The 
League of Nations was destroyed by a central European power which in a short 
time had become the mighty, destructive antithesis of European civilisation�
The fall of the first normative international order, created in Europe by 
Europe, came about not so much through it being contested but through geo-
political actions of big powers, whose nationalist ambitions led to the outbreak 
of another great war� The international order of the League of Nations was de-
stroyed by two totalitarian systems of Europe, “Europe” being taken in the sense 
of geography, not of civilisation: Fascism and Communism� It has to be said that, 
although culturally the enemies of Europe, both of those were nourished at their 
inception by entirely European and, initially, innocent ideas� The democratic 
West attempted to halt Communism, that is the expansion of the Soviet Union, 
80 This process of Europe’s slide towards war through myopic manoeuvring by the 
European powers is eloquently described in: B� Simms, op. cit., pp� 362–404�
81 J� Karski, Wielkie mocarstwa wobec Polski 1919–1945. Od Wersalu do Jałty [Great Powers 
and Poland 1919–1945. From Versailles to Yalta], Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, Poznań, 
2014�
82 For example, Józef Piłsudski suggested that France ought to take preventative measures 
in arming herself following Hitler’s rise to power� Paris rejected that idea�
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and actually succeeded� The Soviet leaders decided that they would have to wait 
for their next opportunity, for instance the one described by Lenin – the next 
intra-imperialist war� The Third Reich did not obscure its intentions from the 
beginning, but those intentions were initially ignored, perhaps precisely because 
Hitler was so open about them� The belief existed that it may be enough to offer 
him the “East-European sacrificial lambs”� The genocidal traits of this project 
were also ignored for a long time� Characteristically, two powers (Germany and 
Soviet Russia), although ideologically opposed, cooperated for a long time to de-
stroy the Versailles order in its geopolitical dimension� European democracies, 
which ought to have been interested in retaining the League of Nations, tolerated 
the growing threats for a long time while – as in Munich – betraying the funda-
mental rules and ideals which had led to the League’s formation�
The punishment for not coming to the defence of the order of the League of 
Nations and the basic values of their own civilisation, for cowardice and deals 
with Hitler, for the degeneration of European politics was monstrous� Europe 
allowed itself to be set on fire� Writers called this European suicide, a European 
auto da fé, and the defeat was twofold – both in real terms and in terms of ideals� 
Europe ceased to be the centre of the World, the political and economic hub, the 
place where the fates of the geopolitical shaping of the World and its balance of 
powers were decided� Europe also ceased to establish the normative dimension of 
geopolitics� Highly symbolically, the headquarters of global normative authority 
moved from Geneva (the League of Nations’ headquarters) to New York (UN)�
Still, the normative patterns of an international order would survive the fall 
of Europe and of the League of Nations itself, which finally dissolved in January 
of 1946� Although the League was subsequently mainly discussed in political 
pamphlets, the international community did not come up with anything new 
or different, only a modified and improved version of the League – the UN – 
forged in the experiences of the inter-war period� So, although Europe could 
not defend its own normative international order, she gave the World a certain 
paradigm, towards the end of her reign as the “centre of the World” (according 
to Wallerstein)� This paradigm was accepted by the World, and since 1945 has 
been protected more effectively than the European League of Nations ever was 
in Europe� That, however, is a separate issue� Characteristically, Norman Davies, 
the author of a monumental history of Europe, titled the chapter dealing with the 
period 1914–1945 “Tenebrae: Europe in Eclipse”�83 We could take that to mean 
that this exceptional historian wished to comment on the eclipse of the minds 
83 N� Davies, op. cit.
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of European politicians� The inter-war period was the time of the culmination 
of Europe’s position in the World, in imperial terms as well as normative and 
cultural ones� The eclipse, the “invisibility”, of Europe in the international order 
occurred after 1945�
4 Europe’s Absence from the Cold War Order 
Europe’s inability to defend the League of Nations’ system had numerous far-
reaching consequences� To begin with, the human, biological and moral costs 
were immense: 40–45 million dead (the exact number remains an estimate), 
most of them civilians� A part of this death toll was taken by the holocaust, a 
system of concentration camps, an attempt at the industrial-scale extermination 
of the Jews who, after all, had been living in Europe before the Germans ever did� 
Carpet bombing had laid a number of cities to waste� The war had been apoca-
lyptic as none before� The Old Continent and its nations had bled themselves dry, 
been brought to their knees, morally devastated, economically blighted, socially 
destabilised� The term “hecatomb”, used to define World War I, took on its full 
meaning only in the light of World War II�
The punishment for Europe consisted not just of the unprecedented drama of 
the war itself; Europe had been taken off its pedestal� It had ceased to be the cen-
tre of the World system, the leader of the rest of the world and the avant-garde 
for the development of humanity� Worse yet, Europe was denied any agency 
in the new, bi-polar international order� Without her former might and great-
ness, she moved from conqueror to an object of the confrontation between two 
superpowers which were established in the void left by Europe’s downfall� The 
international order “had to manage” without Europe while it was left to watch, 
full of bitterness and frustration, as others took on the roles of conqueror and 
leader� Europe had to accept their primacy and – in the case of the nations of the 
eastern part of the continent – the imposition of their brutal power� Nothing of 
this kind had been seen in Europe since her very beginnings, the time of Charles 
the Great�
1 A new cuius regio, eius religio (400 years later)
The disenfranchisement of Europe stemmed primarily from her division, which 
both strategically and ideologically impacted the entire world� In this global con-
frontation, “The main battlefield remained Europe” (B� Simms)�84 At any time the 
metaphorical battlefield could become a real battlefield, as both sides possessed 
gigantic military potential whose purpose was to prevent even slight shifts in 
84 B� Simms, Europe. The Struggle for Supremacy, from 1453 to the Present, Basic Books, 
New York, 2013, p� 456�
Europe in the International Order64
international borders and any change in the balance of power, and anxiety, set 
over the few years which followed the end of World War II� The demarcation line 
itself was set by the moment of the capitulation of the Third Reich� Towards the 
end of the war, the Allied forces in the West and the Red Army were effectively 
racing each other to take far-reaching positions since both sides were very con-
scious of the fact that every scrap of territory liberated from the Nazis would be-
come a highly valuable strategic and ideological possession, a bargaining piece in 
the coming confrontation with the then ally� The West (the Americans) realised 
this relatively late, delaying the opening of the Western Front thereby allowing 
the Soviets to settle as far as the Elbe� There, the soldiers and commanders of the 
Western and Eastern Fronts greeted each other somewhat less effusively than 
the soldiers of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army had done in Brest on the River 
Bug – after invading Poland in September of 1939�
The division manu militari had been, as it were, accepted in advance at the po-
litical and diplomatic levels� Its symbol became the Yalta Conference which took 
place in Crimea in February 1945� This event has a terrible reputation in the po-
litical discourse as well as within the academic community, although its essential 
decisions did not bear on the division of Europe, decided after the war� It is true 
that Germany had been divided into various occupation zones, and the Soviet 
Union received one of those; it is true that none of the territorial gains made by the 
Soviet Union at the expense of its Eastern European neighbours was questioned; it 
is true that power in liberated Poland was, de facto, to be held by the Communists 
installed there by Stalin (the temporary government)� Nevertheless, it was made 
plain in several places that political changes in the liberated countries were to 
take place in a democratic way, that is respecting the will of those nations and by 
means of secret and open elections� This was especially stressed in the Declaration 
of Liberated Europe, an integral part of the Yalta documents signed by the “great 
three”, that is the leaders of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain – Joseph 
Stalin, Franklin D� Roosevelt and Winston Churchill� The Declaration, which is 
full of phrases like “democratic institutions”, “sovereign rights of nations” and “free 
elections”, was also an undertaking to coordinate and commonly agree actions of 
the “three” in respect of the liberated lands as well as the victims, and allies, of the 
Third Reich� At the Potsdam Conference attended by the “great three” in July and 
August of 1945, following the close of World War II of that year, the leaders con-
firmed those general rules of conduct and the need for the “three” to cooperate in 
solving political and economic problems of those states�
After some years, when – as it turned out – Stalin had not adhered to the Yalta 
undertakings, and when the reality of Soviet rule in Moscow’s sphere of influ-
ence became clear, questions were raised whether the Western leaders could have 
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foreseen this a turn of events� To a degree, certainly – especially in the case of 
Churchill who held no illusions as to the true nature of Russian Communism� In 
such circumstances, it was more convenient for them to pretend that they trusted 
their ally’s, Stalin’s, signature, for two reasons� Firstly, they needed him to bring 
the war in Europe to a final, victorious end, while the Americans needed him 
to lessen the cost of victory over Japan (they did not have atomic weapons just 
yet)� The price for this was a series of territorial and political concessions, at the 
expense of smaller states, which had already been the victims of either Germany 
or the Soviet Union� Secondly, the Anglo-Saxons had no intention of fighting for 
freedom or democracy in nations of Central Eastern or Southern Europe� They 
did not think it would be effective, nor that it would suit their interests� Already 
before the war, London had excluded the possibility of actual fighting in defence 
of Poland, though the enemy was a common one� Any military action against the 
Soviets, who had been their allies since 1941, was all the more unlikely�
The division of Europe began with the division of Germany� The “fight for the 
soul of Europe” was primarily a fight for the soul and the shape of that particular 
country�85 The Western Allies had agreed their policies in the three occupation 
zones� They aided their economic development with a free market model, in-
stalled a democratic regime, in which the Germans found themselves remarkably 
comfortable, and unified the three zones to form one entity� A Germany that 
stood on its own two feet while remaining under Allied control was necessary 
due to the growing tension in relations with the Soviet Union� Germany’s im-
portance to Stalin’s politics was underscored by a blockade of Berlin’s Western 
sectors (1948–1949) in response, in part, to the West’s policies in the Western oc-
cupation zones� Soviet policies in the largest, eastern zone resulted in economic 
ruin for the area (looting and terror being commonplace)� There, Moscow was 
ruthless in implementing their rule, and receiving payback for their role in the 
victory� Russia exited the committee of the four powers whose role was to coor-
dinate common policies towards Germany� In these circumstances, the Western 
Allies decided to announce the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany 
out of their three occupation zones (May 1949)� In response, the Soviets formed 
the entirely communist German Democratic Republic (GDR)� The division 
of Germany, into two separate states belonging to opposing camps, became a 
fact�86 This turn of events gave Russia (in its Soviet form), a civilisationally non-
85 B� Simms, op. cit�, p� 459�
86 For a more detailed discussion, see: J� Holzer, Europa zimnej wojny [Europe in the Cold 
War], Znak, Kraków, 2012, pp� 173–196�
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European superpower, a chance to extend its power to the Elbe as never before in 
history (apart from a short episode during the Napoleonic era)� All this, thanks to 
the “internal” war which Old Europe had been incapable of preventing�
The GDR was merely the westernmost flank of Soviet power in Europe� Its 
victims included countries from across the central and southern parts of the con-
tinent� The Soviets worked hard to assimilate their war booty – territory from the 
GDR to the USSR, from the Baltic to the Adriatic� The former Central Europe 
might also be referred to as “Intermarium” (in Polish: “Międzymorze”), to use 
Piłsudzki’s conception of a union of central-European countries in resistance to 
Russia� Central Europe had been an integral part of Europe for over a thousand 
years, yet it relatively quickly became a part of the Soviet Empire – a force which 
rejected European heritage and announced its desire to extend its power uni-
versally� With its regional position, its geo-strategic location, and a history of 
relations with both White and Red Russia, Poland was a key acquisition in this 
context� The “Polish issue” was therefore one of the most difficult questions ad-
dressed by the “Big Three” at the end of the war� The Yalta and Potsdam decisions, 
along with Stalin’s iron-fisted politics of fait accompli, decided the fate of Poland’s 
inclusion in the Soviet sphere of influence� As it had been the first victim of the 
war, with aggression against it beginning the hostilities, it became also the first 
victim of the victory� The pattern was the same in Poland as in other countries 
that fell to the Soviets� The physical presence of the Red Army and the Narodnyy 
Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (NKVD) made it possible to install communist 
regimes supported, or even delivered, by Moscow� Physical elimination of forces 
of democracy opposed to the regime ensued simultaneously, through murder, 
imprisonment or flight to the West� Within two to three years a new system, 
complete in all detail would be formed: ideology, government (primacy of the 
party over the state), nationalised economy (“reform”), internal security appara-
tus, all would be subject to Moscow’s control and directives�
The introduction of this new order resembled the implementation of the 1555 
Augsburg rule – cuius regio, eius religio� The many long and bloody wars through-
out Europe’s history had never managed to break ordinary interpersonal – as well 
as economic, cultural or scientific – contacts between people� Following World 
War II, however, things were rather different� The regions under Soviet control 
became subject to the imposition of the new “religion” through most brutal, odi-
ous, far-reaching means ever� In 1555 the issue was only religion� After World 
War II, the “faith” imposed by one of the sides was totalitarian and equipped 
with numerous instruments of imposing its decisions and enforcing obedience, 
from the torture chamber to a monopoly over information and propaganda� 
The revolution and defence of its “achievements” required terror, and terror was 
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employed liberally�87 In order for any of this to have effect, imposition of imper-
meable boundaries was necessary� This was accomplished at such a knock-out 
speed that only ten months after the end of World War II, and only eight months 
after the “great three” conference in Potsdam, on 5 March 1946, Churchill was 
able to give his famous Fulton (Missouri) speech: “From Stettin in the Baltic 
to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent� 
[…] The Communist parties […] are seeking everywhere to obtain totalitarian 
control� Police governments are prevailing in nearly every case […] this is cer-
tainly not the Liberated Europe we fought to build up”88 (referring to the Yalta 
declaration)�
2  The institutionalisation of the division of Europe  
and its consequences
The division of Europe, and the division of the World as a parallel process, had 
many dimensions and was presented in many ways� It had multidimensional 
consequences, not limited to economic, diplomatic or military formulae such 
as the entente, Locarno or the Anti-Comintern Pact – as had been the case in 
the past� The new division was spoken of in such terms as “West-East” (blocs), 
“bipolar” (antagonism of two opposed superpowers), “Cold War” (confrontation 
without the use of military force)� This division manifested itself in the following 
spheres:
 –  Political (a fight for influence in individual states, the propagation of different 
models of government)
 –  Strategic (balance of power in Europe and the World, and the accompanying 
arms race)
 – Economic (the clash of two opposing models of development)
 –  Ideological and social (the clash of two opposing visions of social order, in 
individual states as well as globally)
This division had one more feature� Not only was it all-embracing, it was also 
universalist – stretching as it did across the entire World – and binary: success 
87 P� Courtois et al�, Czarna księga komunizmu. Zbrodnie, terror, prześladowania, Pró-
szyński i S-ka, Warsaw, 1999� The chapter concerned with Poland was written by Prof� 
A� Paczkowski�
88 W� Churchill, This Is Certainly Not the Liberated Europe We Sought to Build Up, “Inter-
national Herald Tribune”, 12 March 1999�
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for one side meant loss for the other� This context defined the sharpness of the 
conflict and the constant threat of the Cold War turning hot�
Nothing worse could have happened to Europe� Not only was it thrown off 
the pedestal of the “Ruler of the World”, standing Athena-like over the globe 
and its peoples, but her destiny was also decided by powers beyond her borders� 
This disenfranchisement was all the more painful because of the United States’s 
European roots and Russia’s perceived civilisational inferiority� The two foreign 
superpowers competed in Europe, within her territory, but their competition 
had a global character� On the one hand, Europe was one of the theatres of this 
competition, while her potential was subjugated to the global interests of those 
powers, on the other� Pax Americana and Pax Sovietica took the place of Pax 
Europaea (and Pax Britannica and others) in territories where the two extended 
their control and influence� Both declared their universal ambitions, but their 
main potential was concentrated in Europe whose division was therefore so rigid 
and complete� Both sides were convinced that the situation in Europe would 
decide the global balance of power, which is why no geopolitical shifts were al-
lowed once the new order was set� Each superpower attempted to pull its part of 
Europe closest to itself and to shape it in its own image, in the sense of spreading 
its developmental model�
As for the train of events which were the results of the World War II and of de-
cisions taken by the “Big Three” in 1945, well, those are well known and the scope 
of this work does not require that they be recounted in detail� In the name of 
chronology, only the main events will be mentioned here� The US Army brought 
liberation to Western Europe and, with the exception of Germany, was relatively 
quickly recalled back home, across the Atlantic� It could not, however, bring eco-
nomic, and certainly not social, restoration� The ruin of Europe’s economies was 
not limited to the physical destruction of factories but also included the results 
of production being shifted to serve the war effort, severing of connections and 
a lack of workers, alongside unemployment� The drop in gross national product 
reached 50% or more for some countries and regions� This meant poverty, so-
cial unrest, instability and resultant attractiveness of populist and leftist, includ-
ing communist, ideologies� The model of the victorious Soviet Union appeared 
to be an attractive alternative, especially as the human cost of “Soviet progress” 
was never seen up close� Communist parties in the West were in fact gaining 
in popularity� There were reasons to believe that, at the right moment, Moscow 
might use them as a fifth column� Therefore, in June of 1947, the Marshall Plan 
was announced� The plan of the Secretary of State, and of Washington, was to 
use massive financial aid to enable Western Europe, and Germany in particu-
lar, to rebuild its economies� “The Plan” could have included the countries of 
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Eastern Europe, but Stalin would have none of it� The need for substantial fi-
nancial assistance to revitalise its economies, minimise poverty and prevent its 
societies from sliding into social instability and political radicalism showed how 
far Europe had fallen, from having been the richest part of the world only a few 
years before, and how deep the war’s consequences had been�89 The Plan worked 
very well and bound the economies of Western Europe closer to economy of the 
United States (previously those relations had been relatively limited)� To imple-
ment the Marshall Plan, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation 
(OEEC) was set up� The assistance was feasible not only for strategic reasons but 
also because the United States had become, for a short time at least, an economic 
mega-superpower; its share in global production was almost 50% – an unprec-
edented situation�90
The binding of the United States and Western Europe in the political and stra-
tegic sphere followed very easily� The Europeans quickly realised that in their 
condition – and faced with the geo-strategic superiority of the USSR – they 
would not be able to withstand an offensive by the Red Army� The blockade of 
West Berlin confirmed Moscow’s determination in the heart of Europe and its 
readiness to use force to achieve its aims� The Brussels Pact of five countries 
signed in March 1948 was not sufficiently credible in this respect�91 At the com-
mon request of London and Paris, therefore, the Americans decided to enter 
into a broader treaty with a larger number of European countries, signing the 
Washington treaty in April of 1949� This provided the groundwork for the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization – to be established within a few years� The western 
part of Europe – which not a half century earlier had been conquering the World 
and extending its empires – became a US protectorate in terms of its security� 
The Atlantic Treaty became the main instrument in the strategy of halting the 
Soviet Union and a nuclear deterrent�92
The political, strategic and economic planes were most important, in terms of 
absorbing the western part of the Continent into post-war Pax Americana� The 
United States’s primacy among Western nations was felt in other areas too� For 
89 The Plan meant some 13 billion dollars for Europe, although the full extent of America’s 
assistance was almost twice of that� Further discussion in: J� Holzer, op. cit�, Chapter 5: 
Odbudowa gospodarcza na Zachodzie [Economic Revitalisation in the West]�
90 In the following years the share dropped slowly to around 25%, where it remained for 
the subsequent decades�
91 A London initiative which bound Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg in a military alliance�
92 R� Kuźniar, Polityka i siła…, op. cit�, p� 207 and subsequent pages�
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example, in finance, where the US dollar replaced European currencies in the 
international financial system and became a true world currency (though the 
British pound retained a substantial role, due to City of London and the remain-
ing British colonies)� The 1944 Bretton Woods system, consisting of two finan-
cial institutions – the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund93 – was 
entirely in American hands, due to their share in the global product and the role 
of the dollar� America took over from Europe in terms of scientific development 
and technological innovation� In the two decades following World War II, the 
great majority (over 50%) of Nobel Prize laureates in physics, chemistry as well 
as physiology and medicine were American� Finally, America took over from 
Europe in terms of ideology� The “American way of life” had no equal in terms of 
the attractiveness of its lifestyle and its social order� Popular culture enforced the 
vision of, sometimes rebellious, freedom and the ability for anyone to reach suc-
cess through courage and hard work, in a place where everybody got a chance� 
The leading figures of Hollywood’s dream factory from John Wayne to Glenn 
Ford or singers from Elvis Presley to Bob Dylan were heroes to the imaginations 
of people from Los Angeles through Warsaw to Tokyo�
In the discourse describing the World, Europe was replaced not just by the 
United States (“America”) but also by the West� In a geopolitical sense, this 
phrase, like the Atlantic Alliance, became common only after World War II� Af-
ter all, there had not been a geopolitical “West” before� Europe’s place in the 
international order was taken by “the Free World” (in an affirmative version) or 
Pax Americana (in a version for those with some scepticism)� Western European 
countries remaining within the American sphere of influence had the distinct 
advantage of continuation of civilisation� Western Europe did not need to leave 
its civilisation� To the contrary, she could safely continue developing it� Mean-
while, the nations of Eastern Europe, under Soviet power, faced the threat of 
sudden civilisational uprooting�
The Soviet plan for the nations which had fallen under their sphere of in-
fluence included tearing them away from Europe not just in political and eco-
nomic terms, but in civilisational terms too� Hence the widespread attempts at 
cutting their Christian heritage away at its roots� This was an attempt to control 
their identity which was to fail, due to the depth of that identity in those nations 
and people� “Breaking away from Europe” and connecting to Moscow centre 
93 The establishment of the International Trade Organization (ITO), the third of the 
planned institutions, did not eventuate� In its place, 1947 saw the creation of GATT, 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade�
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included all areas of life – in keeping with the consciously totalitarian character 
of Soviet Communism – and was executed at several levels�94 The first of those 
were the bilateral relations between each state and the USSR, giving the countries 
satellite status� Appropriate agreements shaped their inferiority in legal terms 
(limited sovereignty), as well as in terms of the party ideology, economy and 
military affairs� Altogether, these agreements made Moscow the sun in its solar 
system, radiating its influence to all the other states� The second plane of imple-
mentation consisted of individual agreements between all of the satellite capitals 
(Warsaw and Sofia, e�g�, or Bucharest and East Berlin), also governing all mat-
ters regarding relations between them, from party ideology to the military� The 
third plane of this structure were multilateral agreements� These began with the 
“Cominform” (a mutation of the Comintern, which had been dissolved in 1943), 
or the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties, created in March 1947 
and tasked with party-ideological supervision over the newly-minted “allies” 
and “satellites”�95 In 1949, in response to the Marshall Plan and the creation of 
OEEC, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance was formed� Its main ob-
jective was the permanent establishment of the communist economic model in 
the member countries (eight of them to begin with) and autarchy in the face of 
the West (breaking of earlier connections to avoid “the threat” of interdepend-
ency)� Finally, in response to the Paris treaties signed by the Western countries in 
1954,96 the Warsaw Pact was created� It stood not just as a political and military 
alliance but also as a powerful instrument through which Moscow could disci-
pline its “allies”, as confirmed by the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw 
Pact forces, once it became clear that there was a probability of substantial reform 
of the socialist system in that country, and the introduction of “socialism with a 
human face”� Not surprisingly, Moscow took this, quite rightly, as an attempt to 
depart from socialism altogether�
94 See also: W� Roszkowski, Półwiecze. Historia polityczna świata po 1945 roku [A Half-
Century. The Political History of the World after 1945], Wyd� Naukowe PWN, Warsaw, 
1997, Chapter: W bloku komunistycznym [In the Communist Bloc]; and J� Holzer, op. 
cit�, Chapter: Tworzenie bloku wschodniego i żelazna kurtyna [Creating the Eastern Bloc 
and the Iron Curtain]�
95 It was dissolved quickly, in 1956, following the “renewal” after the twentieth assembly 
of the Communist Party of the USSR, and due to the permanent establishment of “real 
socialism” in the satellite countries and their connection to Moscow�
96 They led to the creation of the Western European Union and the Brussels Pact, and to 
the inclusion of the Federal Republic of Germany in North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO)�
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Thus, there emerged a tightly bound, monolithic block of countries excluded 
from Europe in all aspects except for geography, heralding an impending “his-
toric victory” over Europe, or at least her political systems and her civilisation as 
these were practised by the countries of Western Europe� This victory was to be 
reached either through “inevitable war” (Moscow gave up on the “inevitability 
of war” in 1956) or through peaceful competition, in which “the forces of peace, 
progress and socialism” (as defined by many party declarations) would prove 
their superiority over the opponents� Without getting into too many details of 
this construct and its evolution after 1956, including the time of detente, Moscow 
wished to create its own “anti-Europe” through its sphere of influence� This only 
serves to underscore the situation in which Europe found herself as a result of 
World War II and the divisions which had followed�
3  The birth of the “Little Europe” in the shadow  
of its protector from across the Atlantic
The disasters and ruin of World War II, Europe’s division and the transfer of in-
fluence to external powers – these are not the only pieces of bad luck that befell 
the continent at that time� Shortly afterwards, many nations and territories of 
Africa and Asia began to free themselves from under Europe’s colonial domina-
tion� Undoubtedly, that was one of the reasons why countries of Western Europe, 
of whom many had been colonial powers, would take a keener interest in Europe 
herself� The process of decolonisation outside of Europe hastened and supported 
the process of European integration�
Decolonisation had begun just after World War II� Within the subsequent 
fifteen years, the Europeans would part with possessions which they had been 
gradually gathering through the previous three centuries or more� There were 
several reasons for the sudden implosion of this global, if diverse, system, start-
ing with the consequences of World War II� Soldiers conscripted from the colo-
nies had served in European armies and assisted “their overlords” in regaining… 
independence and freedom� That experience could not be taken away from 
them� The earlier failure of those “overlords” and their subsequent misery meant 
that much of their legitimacy was already lost� This was compounded by the 
blighting of their military and financial powers, a process which crippled their 
ability to enforce obedience in the colonies� The other reason was, of course, sup-
port for the process of decolonisation from the side of the superpowers which 
took the opportunity to replace the Europeans and extend their global influence, 
in line with their universalist message which they preached� This was true in 
particular in the case of the Soviet Union which, in addition to supporting the 
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process itself, offered a model of development which appeared to be a shortcut to 
making up lost ground in terms of civilisational and economic development� The 
Americans also supported decolonisation as it fit very well into their “freedom 
mission”� An apt demonstration of anti-colonial cooperation of the superpowers 
was their action against the intervention of Europe’s colonial powers – Great 
Britain and France – following the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956� 
Thirdly, keeping colonies ceased to be profitable in every sense – financial, politi-
cal and moral� Drawn-out conflicts impacted the finances of the colonial powers 
and angered public opinion� It would be more profitable to grant independence 
to the colonies while keeping political and, especially, economic influence, along 
the lines of the US influence in Latin America�
The process began already in 1945, with the dismantling of British imperial 
acquisitions in South Asia and the Middle East� India, the jewel in the imperial 
crown, gained independence in 1947, with independent Pakistan being carved 
out of the territory at the same time� Indonesia (East Indies) gained independ-
ence from Holland in the 1940s� At the same time, the nations of Indochina 
began their fight to free themselves from France� The humbling defeat of the 
French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 became a psychological turning point in 
the process: it was easier to divest of the colonies quickly, and without a fight� 
The Americans did not draw any conclusions from the defeat of the French and 
mired themselves in a bloody conflict which would last till 1973� Decolonisation 
of Africa began in earnest only in the second half of the 1950s� At the beginning 
of that decade only three countries were independent – Ethiopia, Liberia and 
what would later become the Republic of South Africa, where power was held 
by the whites� Later decolonisation ran its course quite easily, with the excep-
tion of the Kenyan uprising violently put down by the British and the drawn-out 
conflict in Algeria (seen by Paris as an overseas department of France herself)� 
The process of dismantling the French empire in West and Equatorial Africa was 
hastened by President de Gaulle who preferred to concentrate on healing France 
than on fighting lost causes�97 The year 1960 was therefore made “the Year of 
Africa”� The United Nation (UN) proclaimed the famous Declaration on grant-
ing independence to colonised states and peoples� A year later, the non-aligned 
states movement was formally launched� Moscow was quick to seek to extend 
97 It was precisely the costs and crises related to keeping a hold on the colonies 
(Indochina and Algeria) which were the nail in the coffin for the IV Republic� The 
creator of the V Republic, General Charles de Gaulle, was committed to independ-
ence for African states�
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its influence there, while the so-called Third World became an arena for rivalry 
between the West and the East�98
And so, in under twenty years following the war, an important attribute of 
Europe’s greatness and her place in the international order was taken away� 
Empires fell like houses of cards, as Great Britain, France, Holland, Belgium, Italy, 
Spain and Portugal lost their former possessions� In the case of Portugal, the last 
of its colonies were lost in the mid-1970s� London and Paris attempted to retain 
relationships and influence in their former colonies through various formulas, 
under the common banner of a Commonwealth� This, undoubtedly, allowed 
them to keep some of their imperial prestige (a common language, a type of mon-
etary community in the Pound zone or the Franc zone) as well as the influence of 
Europe as a civilisation�
The experience of two world wars, the division of Europe and protectorate 
of the United States and the loss of colonies encouraged the Europeans to take 
care of themselves, or to lay down such conditions for peaceful international 
relations as to give everyone a chance for economic and civilisational develop-
ment� The overriding motive was peace� “The contribution which an organised 
and living Europe can bring to civilisation is indispensable to the maintenance 
of peaceful relations� In taking upon herself for more than 20 years the role of 
champion of a united Europe, France has always had as her essential aim the 
service of peace� A united Europe was not achieved and we had war”� Thus spoke 
the French foreign minister Robert Schuman in Paris on 9 May 1950� His speech 
contained a plan99 proposed by Jean Monnet, another French politician deeply 
engaged in the creation of European unity� The core of the plan was the establish-
ment of the European Coal and Steel Community, in effect turning over these 
industries, crucial to building of armaments, to common, pan-national manage-
98 The concept of the “Third World” was used in the Cold War period of East-West 
confrontation to describe countries, mainly former colonies, exhibiting a lower level 
of economic development and where their model of development was not a combi-
nation of democracy and free market, nor was it “real socialism”� A large number of 
these countries, mainly in Asia and Africa, founded – at the conference of Cairo and 
Belgrade in 1961 – the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a loose coalition of countries 
avoiding identification with one of the main camps� See also: W� Roszkowski, op. cit�, 
pp� 138–154�
99 The text of Schuman’s Declaration (in Polish and French) in: P� Parzymies (ed�), In-
tegracja europejska w dokumentach [European Integration in Documents], Polski In-
stytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, Warsaw, 2008, p� 100 and subsequent pages� Full 
English text: https://europa�eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/europe-day/
schuman-declaration_en�
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ment� And so, on 18 April 1951 six countries signed the treaty – France, West 
Germany, Italy and the Benelux nations� The Kellogg–Briand Pact forbade war; 
the Schuman–Monnet plan made it impossible� This was a Copernican break-
through in the history of Europe, following many centuries of wars great and 
small which only served to weaken the Continent from the inside�
The movement for European unity had begun a few years earlier� Winston 
Churchill’s September 1946 speech provided some important impetus, as the 
former, and future, British Prime Minister referred to the “United States of 
Europe”�100 A lot of political activity by numerous, diverse political and ideologi-
cal groupings culminated in the European Congress at The Hague in May 1948� 
The fruit it bore, along with the formalisation of the movement itself, was the 
creation of the Council of Europe in May of 1949� Its founders intended it to be 
a unifying organisation for the free, western part of the Old Continent� It was 
given broad-ranging powers, reaching into important domains of international 
affairs, with the exception of issues of security which had already been assigned 
to the Atlantic Alliance� The Council had one significant weakness, however – it 
was a loose, coordinating forum� It had no integrative powers – which suited 
the British approach to European unity (“don’t let our freedom to manoeuvre be 
limited in the slightest”)� London was still betting on the “special relationship” 
with the United States and on imperial interests�
The countries of the Continent, whose experience of World War II was in-
comparably more painful than Britain’s, harboured traditions of thinking about 
European federalism� They decided not to wait for Britain with its “splendid iso-
lation”� Therefore, as soon as the Coal and Steel Community was in place, two 
more integrative projects appeared – European Defence Community (EDC) and 
European Political Community (EPC) (1952–1954)� The project moved along 
but the French, unilaterally, rejected the EDC in 1954 and the EPC automatically 
fell� At that time, incredibly, proponents of a united Europe, instead of giving 
up, proposed an even more ambitious project� A year after the rejection of the 
EDC treaty, work began on full integration along a common market model, al-
lowing for free trade of goods, services, capital and labour (the four freedoms)� 
The common market would have technocratic agencies (Commission), political 
mechanisms (Council, Assembly) and a judiciary (Tribunal)� It would also have 
a number of other mechanisms, serving the purpose of opening the member 
100 The idea of the United States of Europe had appeared in France in mid-XIX century, 
then returned in the late 1920s and early 1930s as the Pan-European Movement was 
gaining popularity�
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states and their nations to each other� The plan for this model was not only to 
prevent any hostile undertakings but also, importantly, to hasten the develop-
ment of European nations and return to them some faith in their own civilisa-
tion through the synergies and expansion of freedom which would follow� The 
British again refused to take part in European unification� The treaty creating the 
European Economic Community (EEC) was signed in Rome on 25 March 1957� 
A great day in the history of modern Europe�101
For a little over ten years, the Community was composed of the same six 
states, resulting in the EEC being referred to as “the six”, in addition to the “com-
mon market” and “little Europe”� Indeed, it had been “little” to begin with, but 
as it grew in strength, “little Europe” expanded its integration within the group 
and moved beyond it� From the beginning of the 1970s, it developed in three 
main directions: acquisition of new member states, political cooperation and 
development of trade relations with the outside world, including aid to less well-
developed nations� These are well-known matters, with extensive literature, so 
at this stage we will have only a few paragraphs, for the sake of gaining a proper 
perspective�102 The British quickly realised that they had underestimated the po-
tential of the integrative model initiated by “the six” and applied for membership 
at the beginning of the 1960s� President de Gaulle blocked it, believing the UK 
to be an American “Trojan horse”� He did not trust London’s intentions� Several 
years later, the UK applied again, and again de Gaulle slammed the door in their 
face� He did not wish to allow for any “diversionary tactics” employed against the 
accepted model of integration before it had had a chance to properly establish 
itself� The UK finally entered the EEC with Denmark and Ireland in 1973, fol-
lowing de Gaulle’s departure� In the 1980s, Greece, Holland and Portugal joined 
the organisation, following, in each case, the collapse of an internal autocratic re-
gime� The number of members of “little Europe” thus doubled but would remain 
at twelve until 1995�
101 The roots of this project, and the biographies of the founding fathers, are exception-
ally well presented in: J� Łukaszewski, Cel: Europa. Dziewięć esejów o budowniczych 
jedności europejskiej [Goal: Europe. Nine Essays on Building European Unity], Noir 
sur Blanc, Warsaw, 2002�
102 More detailed discussion to be found, for example, in: Z�M� Doliwa-Klepacki, Inte-
gracja europejska [European Integration], Temida 2, Białystok, 2003; K� Łastawski, 
Historia integracji europejskiej [History of European Integration], Adam Marszałek, 
Toruń, 2006; Integracja europejska w dokumentach [European Integration in Docu-
ments], in: P� Parzymies (ed�), PISM, Warsaw, 2008�
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In an effort not to remain closed off in a strictly technocratic or economic 
formula of integration, the late 1960s saw the emergence of efforts to give the 
Community political agency too� In October 1970, the foreign ministers of “the 
six” gathered in Luxembourg and announced the need for closer political coop-
eration� They saw such cooperation as necessary in the light of “a need to pre-
pare Europe for her duty towards the World, such as will inevitably arise out of 
her increased integrity and growing international role”� The ministerial declara-
tion demonstrated Europe’s yearning for a greater international role, which had 
been taken away by the war� The heads of diplomacy of those countries began 
to meet regularly and, starting in 1974 and at the instigation of the French, so 
did government leaders� Those meetings became a new institution of the Euro-
pean Community – the Council of Europe, signalling Europe’s readiness to enter 
international affairs� There were many ideas which suggested that the process 
ought to go further (for instance the famous Tindemans Report of 1975)103 but 
by the end of the Cold War only one uniform European Act was created, in 1986, 
setting down a more solid base for European political cooperation� In it, the 
members undertook to act as a “unified force in international relations or inter-
national organisations”�104
Europe was “little” but already in the 1960s and 1970s began to regain her 
former shine, due in large part to her economic success, a renewal and return to 
vitality following the destruction of World War II, an advantageous social model, 
stable democracy and development of human rights� Her culture also radiated 
outwards – Italian and French cinema, The Beatles, Edith Piaf and Charles Az-
navour conquered the hearts of audiences in many parts of the World� European 
literature was still favourite with the book reading public� Admiration for the 
graceful elegance of Vienna or Paris went hand in hand with recognition for 
103 The Belgian Prime Minister’s report, commissioned by the European Community 
summit in 1974, saw the EEC being transformed into EU� Section B, Point 1 states 
that, “European Union implies that we present a united front to the outside world� We 
must tend to act in common in all the main fields of our external relations whether in 
foreign policy, security, economic relations or development aid”� The report itself was 
not put in practice, in part due to strong opposition by London, by then an European 
Commission (EC) member� Its constituent parts would be, however, gradually inte-
grated into EEC and EU treaties� Polish text of the report in: P� Parzymies (ed�), op. cit� 
English original at: https://www�cvce�eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-
d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/63f5fca7-54ec-4792-8723-1e626324f9e3/
Resources#284c9784-9bd2-472b-b704-ba4bb1f3122d_en&overlay�
104 Text of the Act, ibid.
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European cuisines and the unequalled quality of wine from many of her regions� 
High culture was similarly esteemed� The World would have gladly welcomed 
Europe to the spheres of grand politics, but that would need to wait�
External relations of the EEC at the time were limited to preferential trade 
agreements with former colonies, mainly in Africa� Initially that had been a se-
ries of agreements signed at Yaoundé and later, from the mid-1970s, the Lomé 
conventions, renewed every five years, which included also countries of the Car-
ibbean and the Pacific� This category was to facilitate ongoing development of 
those nations on the one hand, and to keep them within Europe’s sphere of in-
fluence� Interestingly, Eastern Europe did not figure at all in the EEC’s external 
relations� When the region did appear, it was only in the context of ministerial 
conferences, sittings of the Council of Europe, mentioned somewhere between 
the issue of East Timor and the problems of Latin America� A “United Europe” 
was not envisaged, nor was any possibility of future membership for Central 
European states� The identity of Europe at the time covered only Western Eu-
rope� Official documents do not betray even a shade of hope that the Iron Cur-
tain would ever fall�
4  Attempts at dialogue between “East” and “West” and the 
sudden fall of the Iron Curtain
In the seventies, there was a break in the Cold War� It was a time of reconcilia-
tion and initiating contacts between nations who had been divided by the Iron 
Curtain� The overall division itself seemed stable so there was no fear of a risk of 
disturbing the strategic equilibrium� Without much resistance, both sides par-
ticipated in negotiations in 1972 leading up to the Conference on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe in 1973� Soon the entirety of these talks and agreements 
came to be known as CSCE also called in the West the Helsinki Process – after 
the location of the talks� On 1 August 1975, thirty-five countries of the East and 
West – from NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but also including neutral countries – 
signed the Helsinki Final Act� The document defined the principles of mutual 
relations and created the framework for cooperation in many areas, from the 
economy, through energy policy and transport to science and sport, as well as 
interpersonal relations� Moscow wished to thereby obtain ultimate recognition 
for what had been called in the party–government documents of the communist 
bloc the “Yalta-Potsdam territorial and political order”� In the West, the percep-
tion was rather the opposite – it was considered that with its articles concerning 
the respect for human rights and the openness of the communist countries to 
economic or interpersonal relations, the CSCE would serve the liberalisation of 
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the regimes in the East and their increased independence from Moscow� How-
ever, the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act did not seem to be 
overcoming the divisions of Europe�105 In the second half of the seventies, an 
anti-communist opposition developed behind the Iron Curtain – though illegal 
it was nonetheless already becoming publicly visible� The leading role in these 
opposition movements was played by the Polish opposition� Every few years in 
Poland there was an anti-systemic event culminating in its brutal pacification 
by the authorities� Ever since the signing of the Final Act, the democratic op-
position, though anti-systemic, enjoyed international legitimation which it was 
able to invoke� And Western countries acquired a means of exerting pressure on 
the East� The culmination of this new tendency was the revolution of Solidarity 
(1980–1981) which could be held in check only by the introduction of martial 
law� But the ideological failure of communism was complete: the army stood 
against a workers’ movement, born in the “Lenin” Shipyard�
After that it was downhill all the way� Though in the first half of the eighties 
there was a short-lived return to the atmosphere of the Cold War with dialogue 
and cooperation broken off, sanctions and militarisation� The Soviet Union was 
only temporarily able to take up the challenge� It was not able to substitute its – 
however powerful – military might for its deficit in legitimation� The deepening 
economic crisis in the Eastern Bloc made it impossible to sustain the basic mate-
rial needs of its societies� Communism lost in its competition with democratic 
and free-market countries across the board� Ultimately the system burnt out 
from the inside� No one could be in any doubt as to which model was the better 
one, which provided better for the material and spiritual needs of individuals 
and nations�
The fall of the communist bloc surprised everyone� At the end of the eighties, 
the outlawed Polish “Solidarity” regained some space for action, as the com-
munist government felt they would be unable to bring the country out of the 
deep economic and social crisis without their help� The striving for freedom was 
also apparent in other countries� In Central Europe the most symbolic figures, 
105 It is no coincidence that the chapter on the situation in Europe in 1979–1985 in: 
J� Kukułka Historii współczesnej stosunków międzynarodowych 1945–2000 [A His-
tory of Contemporary International Relations 1945–2000], Warsaw, 2001, is called 
Utrwalanie podziału Europy [Sustaining the Division of Europe]� The next chapter 
is: Nowe napięcia w stosunkach ogólnoeuropejskich (1980–1985) [New Tensions in 
General European Relations (1980–1985)]� However, the author identifies the sources 
of these negative phenomena exclusively in the “policies of NATO countries” which 
is a historical distortion (pp� 271–298)�
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besides the Polish electrician Lech Wałęsa, was the Czech intellectual Václav 
Havel� And the fomentation in Central Europe found its counterpart in the 
deeds of the young Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev who undertook to lead the 
USSR out of crisis and save communism by deeply reforming it� But it was too 
late for that – even assuming that it would have been possible to reform commu-
nism� The United States, under Ronald Reagan’s leadership, saw the opportunity 
to hasten the demise of the communist bloc – in what was essentially an ideo-
logical battle – and remove once for all a dangerous contender for global leader-
ship� Hence, the comprehensive programme of the administration intended to 
accelerate the collapse of communism (a more proactive version of keeping com-
munism in check)�106 At the end of the eighties, during the rise of a revolutionary 
spirit in Central Europe, the leaders and observers of Western Europe (those in 
the EEC) failed to notice that one of the main factors in the dramatic changes 
was the desire to return to a Europe of nations, to no longer be a region subject 
to a civilisationally foreign Soviet domination�
106 R� Kuźniar, Polityka i siła…, op. cit�, pp� 134–145�
Part II Attempted Return

5 European Breakthrough
1  The end of the European division – the fall of the  
communist bloc
The end of the division of Europe came about thanks to Solidarity� This was not 
the solidarity of the countries of the European Community with the nations of 
“younger Europe” (to use the phrase of Professor Jerzy Kłoczowski), but the “Sol-
idarity” which was born in Gdańsk out of opposition to non-European standards 
of social and public life and out of a Polish longing to reunite with Europe� Po-
land was also, in the eyes of the most important Europeans of the XX century, 
Charles de Gaulle, a “historical nation” of Europe, therefore one unable to accept 
communism or Soviet domination�107 In Poland, opposition to both was intense� 
Regardless of civilisational identity, there were historical roots in the myth of 
the country as the Antemurale Christianitatis, that is the last bastion of Europe� 
This mythology was further strengthened after World War I with the successful 
Polish–Soviet war�
The 1989 “Springtime of Nations”. At the end of the eighties, thanks to the re-
membrance of the revolution of the first “Solidarity” and the subsequent period 
of martial law, there was widespread pressure for a change of political system� 
Symptoms of the death throes of communism were perceptible in 1988, even if 
the authorities continued to put on a show of strength in the domains of propa-
ganda and state violence� General Jaruzelski and his circle were conscious of the 
fact that without engaging the opposition in public life, they would be unable to 
break through the deepening stagnation which threatened to lead to a further 
uncontrolled eruption of discontent� The authorities tested the readiness of the 
opposition, including Lech Wałęsa, to enter into some kind of pact with them� 
Evidence of these attempts was a television conversation between the leader of 
“Solidarity” and the head of the official trade unions, where Wałęsa’s arguments 
demolished his communist opponents in front of an audience of millions� There 
was no way back for the authorities, indeed they were forced to accelerate towards 
more comprehensive talks and compromises� The effect of this shift, together 
107 General de Gaulle headed the French government in 1944–1945 and had opposed 
the anticipated Yalta division of Europe, which was why he was not to be invited� The 
future President of France had the opportunity to become acquainted with Poland 
fighting alongside Poles against the Bolsheviks in 1919–1921�
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with the cool calculation of the democratic opposition, was the “Round Table” 
talks from February to April 1989� The agreement reached at the end of the talks 
assumed the legalisation of “Solidarity” (i�e� the opposition), compromises in the 
area of freedom of speech (freedom of the media) and the announcement of 
even bolder systemic reforms – concerning politics and the economy� The Polish 
Round Table soon became a symbol of the end of communism� The emotional 
course it took, its resolutions and consequences were the beginning of a second 
Springtime (in Polish: “Autumn”) of Nations in this part of Europe�108
On the 4th June 1989, as agreed at the Round Table, were the first (almost) free 
parliamentary elections since the World War II� “Solidarity” trounced the com-
munist parties in the elections,109 to the surprise of the opposition, the authorities 
and indeed the whole of Europe, in fact, everyone living between San Francisco 
and Vladivostok� The changes began to accelerate, setting in motion a geopolitical 
domino effect in Eastern Europe� For a start, the first non-communist prime min-
ister after World War II was Tadeusz Mazowiecki – taking office on the 12th Sep-
tember 1989� The dominant message of his foreign policy was “Back to Europe”�110
In Hungary, the situation had already begun to change, but in an evolution-
ary rather than a radical manner� The opposition there was not as determined, 
nor did the situation in the country seem as dramatically bad as Poland’s� In the 
spring of 1989, there was held a peaceful round table, but under the influence 
of events in Poland there was also an intensification in Budapest� In October, 
the communist party dissolved itself and the opposition successively took pow-
er� In Czechoslovakia, there was political and ideological stagnation following 
the military pacification by the Warsaw Pact in 1986� There was an interesting 
democratic opposition whose activity nonetheless failed to provoke wider so-
cial impact (the main effect being Charter 77)� This changed under the influ-
ence of events in Poland and Hungary� In the summer there was an increase in 
108 The first had taken place in 1848� M� Howard, The Springtime of Nations, “Foreign 
Affairs”, 1990, vol� 69, no� 1� Polish historians and commentators more often use the 
term “Autumn of Peoples”, which nevertheless ignores the original, metaphorical 
meaning of this phrase, instead connecting it literally with the season in question�
109 Out of the 161 places to the Sejm (the lower house) made available for free electoral 
competition, Solidarity candidates won all the seats and out of the 100 places avail-
able in the Senate (the upper house), they won 99�
110 “Return to Europe” was the motto of Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s speech to the Parliamen-
tary Assembly of the Council of Europe in January 1990� See also: T� Mazowiecki, 
Rok 1989 i lata następne. Teksty wybrane i nowe [The Year 1989 and the Following 
Years. Selected and New Texts], Prószyński Media, Warsaw, 2012�
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opposition activity and in November large-scale demonstrations began� Heading 
the opposition was the charismatic intellectual Václav Havel, who, having been 
released from prison and following the “abdication” of the communist party, was 
elected president at the end of December 1989� In November political unrest 
had also appeared in Bulgaria and in December the first changes in the system of 
wielding power had begun� The process of the removal of communists and the 
takeover by new, democratic forces lasted in Bulgaria until the summer of 1990� 
The initiator of change in Romania was the Hungarian minority there� The fall 
of Nicolae Ceaușescu’s regime was dramatic� The despot couple were shot during 
mass street demonstrations in Bucharest at the end of December 1989�111
It is true that post-communists remained in power in Romania for some time, 
but the system did ultimately fall definitively� In Albania, the dilapidated com-
munist architectonic (modelled on the early People’s Republic of China) started 
to fall apart� There too change was to have a brutal character�112
The scenario for transformation everywhere was quite similar� Opposition or-
ganisations or movements exert pressure for change� People abandon their fears 
and participate in mass demonstrations, sometimes accompanied by strikes� The 
demands for change become more and more precise and radical� The authorities 
struggle to offer the first, cautious compromises, but they quickly turn out to be 
inadequate� After further compromises there comes the moment of capitulation 
where power is handed over (by means of elections) and there is a change of 
political system� Of particular importance at this moment was Moscow’s pas-
sivity� Moscow more or less officially declared that the transformations were the 
internal concerns of individual countries� In the West, there has been a visible 
tendency to ascribe considerable merit to Mikhail Gorbachev, no doubt as a re-
sult of the “Gorbymania” which spread through the media there� Norman Davies 
writes in a more sober vein on this point: “Gorbachev’s role, though honour-
able, has been exaggerated� He was not the architect of East Europe’s freedom; 
he was the lock-keeper who, seeing the dam about to burst, decided to open the 
floodgate and let the water flow� The dam burst in any case, but it did so without 
the threat of violent catastrophe”�113 The new rulers in the now post-communist 
countries immediately declared their intent to “return” their countries to Europe�
111 Only two months before, Ceaușescu had called for armed intervention from the 
Warsaw Pact forces against Poland�
112 The course of these events, related to the fall of communism in Central and Eastern 
Europe, has found its best account in: J� Holzer, op. cit�, pp� 800–817; W� Roszkowski, 
op. cit�, pp� 367–424�
113 N� Davies, op. cit�, p� 1253�
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German reunification. The fall of the Berlin wall and the reunification of Ger-
many was of major significance for the subsequent geopolitical consequences 
of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe� Events in Poland which had 
taken place a month before, could hardly go unnoticed just across the border, 
that is in the German Democratic Republic (GDR)� Yet it was only in September 
1989 that movements for change appeared there – but quickly thenceforth gath-
ered speed – with the subtext of uniting with West Germany� Demonstrations in-
tensified� The catalyst turned out to the Budapest’s decision in May 1989 to open 
the Hungarian border with Austria to citizens of the GDR – that is providing a 
gateway to the free world� Tens of thousands immediately took advantage of the 
chance to leave� Warsaw and Prague were also routes to the West, visas being ob-
tained in the embassies of West Germany� Once the floodgates had been opened, 
it became impossible to hold back the flow� Changes quickly followed in the up-
per echelons of the GDR� No one as yet spoke of reunification, but Moscow once 
again let it be known that it would not intervene militarily� On 9 November, a 
high-ranking East German official, Günter Schabowski, spoke about opening the 
border with West Germany� Immediately crowds of people from GDR moved on 
the wall that had been erected by the communists in 1961 to divide the two parts 
of Berlin� Hundreds had died attempting to cross the wall� And now they drank 
champagne, danced on the wall and began to demolish it� The slogan “We are a 
nation” turned into “We are one nation”�
This dynamic development took not only Germans but also Soviet and West-
ern leaders by surprise� At first Moscow ruled out the possibility of unification, 
as did the French president François Mitterrand�114 Most sceptical of all was Mar-
garet Thatcher, the British prime minister – here in opposition to the more open 
Americans� This was the context where the initially cautious Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl was to become shortly the “Chancellor of Unification”� By 28 November 
1989, he had already announced his famous ten points defining the process of 
the unification of both parts of Germany� Despite various fears, also in Germany, 
the train of unification had departed and could no longer be stopped� Stations 
along the way were the negotiations in the form of “2 + 4” (both German states 
and the four powers who had formerly been occupiers)� Gorbachev acted as a 
break on the process – but not very effectively� Moscow was aware that it could 
not block this process, but, as was its habit, tried to sell its “agreement” for the 
highest price possible� The catastrophic economic situation of the Soviet Union, 
114 It was on the banks of the Seine that the saying (attributed to F� Mauriac) appeared: 
“I so love the Germans, that I rejoice at there being two Germanies”�
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however, had the effect that Moscow was rather open to compromise and it 
agreed to unification in return for enormous material support provided in vari-
ous forms by the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)�115
From June to August 1990, under the patronage of four global powers, a series 
of agreements between the GDR and the FRG were reached on the incorpora-
tion of East Germany into West Germany� By 3 October, the unified Germany 
was a reality and the German problem for Europe was over� This was a circum-
stance of great historical meaning� Ever since Germany’s prior unification of 
1870, German foreign policy had been destructive for Europe, sometimes being 
Europe’s main enemy (in the interwar period and after World War II Germany 
was the reason for Europe’s divisions)� As of 1990, German was the most pro-
European country of the Community and then of the Union� As Jerzy Holzer 
wrote, in the forty-five years after the end of the war, Germany also became “one 
of the European powers, indeed the most powerful European power, in virtue 
of its central location, its population and economic potential”�116 Which is why, 
with the growth of their capabilities and strengthened position, a new chapter in 
the history of Europe was to be characterised by the tension between “European 
Germans and a German Europe”�
The fall of the USSR. At the end of the eighties, the Soviet Union found itself in 
an open and deep crisis� The last leader of the USSR’s communist party, Mikhail 
Gorbachev, desperately sought a way out of the situation� He started out as the 
reformer of the system, but ended up being its undertaker� Almost until the end, 
he held onto the belief that both communism and the USSR could be saved� The 
terminal crisis of the Soviet Union was of a threefold nature: economic, political 
and national-cultural� The society of the USSR and the nations that comprised it 
were conscious of the ubiquitous inefficiencies and the advancing anachronism 
of the system� Attempts at reform only served to further reveal these inadequa-
cies� The bankruptcy of the official ideology deprived the system of its legitimacy 
and its capacity to mobilise the population, and the directions of reforms ruled 
out the possibility of a return to state terror as an instrument of oppression� In 
this situation there appeared internal movements within soviet republics to free 
115 More on this best found in: J� Holzer, op. cit�, pp�  818–833� See also: H� Kohl, 
Pragnąłem jedności Niemiec, Politeja, Warsaw, 1999; German original: Ich wollte 
Deutschlands Einheit, Propyläen, Berlin, 1996� This account provides an unparal-
leled insight into the efforts to unite Germany and the solution of various interim 
challenges along the way, for instance – the military status of a united Germany�
116 Ibidem, p� 833�
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themselves from the omnipotence of the centre – actually this was the desire of 
nations to achieve freedom and self-determination�
The first to go were the Baltic nations, which, like Poland, had fallen victim 
to the Hitler–Stalin pact� At the turn of 1988 and 1989, their soviet parliaments 
declared their sovereignty, though still within the framework of the USSR� A few 
other republics followed suit� Grassroots pressure and the lack of any reaction 
from the “centre” encouraged further steps, especially following the impulse of 
the Springtime of Nations from Central Europe� Declarations of independence 
were already announced in 1990� This provoked a nervous reaction from Moscow 
and the threat of sanctions� An unexpected ally to the nations seeking liberation 
from under the Soviet yoke (and the Russian yoke) was the rebellious leader of 
the fraction of the communist party who had lost their faith in the possibility 
of successful reform of communism and the preservation of the unity of the 
USSR – a Russian through and through by the name of Borys Jelcyn� He sought 
to lead Russia itself (!) out of the Soviet Union� And it was he and not “Gorby”, 
the darling of the West, who was right and victorious�
A somewhat melodramatic “August Coup”, intended by hardliners to over-
throw Gorbachev and block the collapse of the Soviet Union, was openly op-
posed by Yeltsin’s civil resistance� This attempt ended in fiasco and signalled 
the end of the USSR� Regardless of the attempted coup, by August the Baltic 
countries were already outside of the USSR� As in Central Europe, here too the 
snowball effect was proving unstoppable� Independence, though at first only 
very formally, was declared by further republics, each with its own specific cir-
cumstances� In the Caucasus, ethnic conflict returned; in Central Asia, party sec-
retaries became local despots in keeping with the tradition of “Asian despotism”� 
The coup de grâce was provided by Russia itself, in the person of Jelcyn� It was 
his initiative that in Białowieża Forest (Belarusian: Белавежская пушча), near 
to the Polish border, the effective dissolution of the Soviet Union took place� On 
the 8th December 1991, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus decided to 
form the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to replace the USSR� The 
Commonwealth was founded on the 21st December 1991, and a few days later, 
on the 25th December, the Soviet Union definitively ceased to exist� Alongside 
fascism it had been the other mortal threat to Europe as a historical political and 
cultural formation and had indeed been conceived as an alternative to Europe� 
Now it had fallen� However, neither this nor the defeat of fascism was Europe’s 
doing� Europe had been unable to prevent the appearance of this threat which 
grew on its own soil� Communism and fascism were defeated by powers and fac-
tors different from those Europe was able to muster� In the case at hand, it was a 
combination of the activities of the United States, national movements in Central 
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European countries who had been subjugated by the Soviet Union, as well as the 
“genetic” defects of communism itself�
The emerging independence of the countries of Central Europe and the ad-
vancing disintegration of the USSR made the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON or CMEA) a formality� 
After none too burdensome negotiations, it was decided that both organisations – 
key as they had been to the unity of the bloc and its subordination to Moscow – 
would be dissolved on the 1st July 1991� The process of the withdrawal of the Red 
Army from Central Europe would prove to be somewhat more complicated, but 
it too was completed in 1993� However, the end of Europe’s divide did not mean 
the automatic beginning of its unity� That turned out to be a separate challenge�
2 The framework for a new international order
An important context for understanding the opportunity for Europe represented 
by the end of its divide was the shape of a new international order� Certainly, 
the Cold War had ended, an end had come to the polarisation and division of 
East and West (in the sense of a geopolitical–strategic divide)� The concept of 
the “Third World” had also lost its raison d’etre, together with its separate po-
litical representation in the form of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)� The 
steel corset that was an all-encompassing polarisation of the world which had 
limited international relations for several decades since World War II suddenly 
fell apart� Still, there was no clarity as to what structure would come next� This 
lack of perspicuity was a side effect of the lack of a founding act which in the past 
had formed the basis of subsequent changes to the international order – at least 
for some time after the treaty in question� That had been the case in 1648, 1815, 
1920 and 1945, but after the sudden collapse of the East-West layout no clear 
geopolitical–institutional framework appeared for the new order�
The only thing that was relatively clear was the lead role of the United States, 
“inherited” in some sense following the implosion of its main rival for global 
hegemony – the Soviet Union� This situation has been aptly named by Charles 
Krauthammer as a unipolar moment�117 But even in this choice of words lay the 
suggestion of the fleeting, of the temporary – it was after all a “moment”� There 
was no doubt that the United States, however multifaceted its power and in-
fluence, was not capable of becoming the foundation, the stability of the new 
organisation of powers� At most it was capable of playing the role of a “regent”, 
117 C� Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, “Foreign Affairs: America and the World”, 
1990/1991�
Europe in the International Order90
influencing the shape of the main structure of the order to come�118 As the con-
viction in Washington strengthened as to the unique and essential nature of 
American leadership (from the second half of the nineties), opposition to this 
leadership grew in the world�
Without a doubt, alongside the obvious role of the United States, it appeared 
equally obvious that the West was to dominate in international relations� The 
course for a still united West was determined by: the role of the United States, 
the rapid growth of the role of the European Union (EU), the strategic ties be-
tween the United States and Europe (including non-EU Europe) and the spec-
tacular transformation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from a 
purely defence alliance into an instrument of security with global capabilities 
and ambitions� The new role of the Atlantic Alliance was apparent in the initia-
tion of cooperation with former Warsaw Pact countries, including Russia, as well 
as in operations going beyond Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, that is military 
operations aimed at maintaining peace and security beyond the boundaries of 
NATO� All of the aforementioned combined with cultural and economic might 
(globalisation!) made the West the centre of the world, though in a qualitatively 
different form than a century earlier� Freed from the barriers and limitations of 
the preceding order, the process of globalisation according to the pattern defined 
by what was to become the Washington Consensus119 seemed to have confirmed 
the new role of the West for many years to come�
The Rest of the World seemed to be absent from or at best playing an assistant 
role in the transformation “from an old to a new order”� It may be said that the 
formerly centralised international order based on the twin poles of the United 
States and the USSR fell apart� They not only had previously taken care of disci-
pline in their respective spheres of influence, but had also been concerned with 
the security and basic stability of regions over which they competed� The former 
Third World decentralised and regionalised, and one might have assumed that it 
would then return to its role as the periphery of the “centre” which would once 
again be the West (according to the pure model of I� Wallerstein)� Things did not 
118 Z� Brzeziński envisaged a role for the United States along these lines, especially in: 
Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century, Touchstone, New York, 
1995; The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, 
Basic Books, New York, 2016�
119 The Washington Consensus developed at the turn of the eighties and the nineties and 
subsequently became the dominant version of the neo-liberal economic doctrine, 
taken to be the theoretical basis for the globalisation processes imposed by the United 
States�
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turn out that way, but for a good many years after the end of the Cold War, the 
future of the majority (still the “Rest”) of the world was to remain unclear�
Shortly after the end of the Cold War, the idea of a “new world order” gained 
some currency; George H�W� Bush presented this conception several times, most 
extensively at the United Nations General Assembly of 1990� Simply put, it amount-
ed to a strengthening of the role of the United Nations (UN) thanks to the existing 
harmonious cooperation of big powers, including the use of regional organisations 
for security, prosperity and democracy� Bush was seconded by Mikhail Gorbachev� 
An implementation of this conception was the US-led coalition’s intervention in 
1991 against Iraq, who had earlier invaded Kuwait� Later, however, diverging inter-
ests became more and more apparent and Washington ultimately preferred to act 
alone�120 The “New Order” was disturbed by the phenomena predicted in the then 
much discussed works of Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington� While it is 
true that Fukuyama wrote about the “end of history”, he nevertheless assumed that 
before the fulfilment of his vision there would be a period in the world of ethnic 
and religious conflict, of terrorism and manifestations of the ambitions of world 
powers� Huntington postulated that a period of ideology would be followed by 
a return of the significance of cultural and civilisational differences – differences 
which would impact the shape and dynamic of international relations�121
The ensuing changes meant that Europe had the opportunity to regain an 
international position and to build – by means of earlier achievements and the 
new possibilities afforded by shared institutions – its place and role in the emerg-
ing international order� In the new circumstances, not only was emancipation 
from US guardianship and independent international identity, Europe could also 
move beyond its boundaries to shape the international landscape�
3 New political–institutional foundations of Europe
A shift towards deepening integration within the bounds of the European Com-
munity and a strengthening of its political dimension had been visible at least 
120 On the subject of this stage, moving from bipolarity to the new order, see, for exam-
ple: R� Kuźniar, Pozimnowojenne dwudziestolecie 1989–2010. Stosunki międzywojenne 
na przełomie XX i XXI wieku [The First Two Post-Cold-War Decades, 1989–2010. 
International Relations at the Turn of the XX and XXI centuries] Scholar, Warsaw, 
2011, pp� 71–88�
121 F� Fukuyama, The End of History?, “The National Interest”, Summer 1989; S� Hunting-
ton, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon & Schuster, 
New York, 1996� He had already presented the core idea of his conception in 1993 
in his The Clash of Civilizations?, in “Foreign Affairs”, Summer 1993, vol� 72, no� 3�
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since the mid-seventies� It is true there were more ideas and plans here than 
practical steps, but a significant manifestation was the acceptance in 1986 of the 
Single European Act� This alarmed Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher� Speaking 
in Bruges at the College of Europe in September of 1988, she determined to send 
a clear message of opposition to a strong, consolidated Community, one that 
would become an independent actor in international relations� The “Iron Lady” 
emphasised that the place of the Community was at the side of the United States 
and within the framework of a larger trans-Atlantic community� A short time 
later, there was, to use the language of international law, “a substantial change of 
circumstances” – the British Prime Minister was replaced�
Once again it was the French who took up the lead� To their mind, in view of 
events in Eastern Europe, a stronger Community and deeper integration were 
required� This could mean raising the entrance bar for candidate countries from 
Eastern Europe, until recently members of the communist bloc� Indeed, Presi-
dent Mitterrand was not a committed supporter of enlargement to include those 
countries� Already in December of 1990, the Intergovernmental Conference 
(IGC) of the European Commission (EC) took place, which surprisingly quickly 
drafted a new treaty – a turning point in the process of European integration 
and following the pattern initiated by the Schuman–Monnet plan and developed 
in the Rome Treaty� By 1991, the new treaty – the most important since 1957 
and later to be known as the “Maastricht Treaty” – was ready and was signed 
in February 1992� This was the beginning of the Community’s “decade of the 
treaty” and Maastricht was to become and remain a foundation stone of the new 
Community, or more precisely – the EU and the closer integration which had 
been sought for years in Europe�
The Maastricht Treaty distinguished two main pillars for the EU� The first was 
the already common market which now was to be complemented by economic 
currency unity� The successive implementation of this pillar was to lead to mon-
etary union� The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was based on conver-
gence criteria, that is the convergence of macroeconomic policies (reflected in 
basic indicators)�122 The second pillar envisaged by Maastricht was a common 
foreign and security policy, which was also to serve the shaping the international 
identity of the EU (more on this below)�123 Furthermore the consolidation of the 
122 The requirements were to sustain a low level of inflation, stable currency exchange 
rates in the period up to the adoption of common currency, a low level of budget 
deficit (below 3%) and public debt maintained within limits (low 60%)�
123 On the question of the treaty’s treatment of the functioning of the I and II pillars of 
the EU, see for example: Z�M� Doliwa-Klepacki, op. cit., pp� 55–113�
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institutional architecture of the EU was advanced, by which the five main bod-
ies of the EU were distinguished and their competencies defined: The European 
Council (comprised of heads of state or governments) as the political–strategic 
organ, Councils (comprising ministers from specific areas, managing the cor-
responding policies of the EU), the EC (as hitherto managing community policy, 
especially concerning the common market), the European Parliament (directly 
elected since 1979) and the Court of Justice�124
As a result of the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, a third pillar appeared in the 
EU – the domain of freedom, security and justice� At stake was the creation of 
legal and organisational foundations for the free movement of people and their 
settlement in any country of the EU, that is in practice, strict coordination and 
cooperation in the area of internal policies� On the occasion of the signing of the 
Treaty of Nice in December 2000, the Charter of Fundamental Rights was pro-
claimed� This began the process of the creation of an EU system of protection of 
human rights (independent of, though related to, the Council of Europe)� In the 
nineties, further decisions on the character of European integration were taken – 
integration was to be more all-encompassing� At the same time, midway through 
the decade, powerful machinery was initiated to handle the enlargement of the 
EU in phases� A large step was taken at the beginning of the XXI century, yet 
already in 1995 the “twelve” member states had become “fifteen”�125 Changes on 
this scale did not satisfy the appetite for integration, but only fed it� At the end of 
the nineties, there was an intensification of discussion on the final shape of the 
project for European unity (finalité), in particular the possibilities for giving the 
EU a federal structure�126
At the same time, the Community’s development through treaties in the nine-
ties, independently of its transformation into the EU, gave it something without 
which it could not have played a key international role – a mandate and instru-
ments based on treaties to participate actively in international life� Europe’s great 
potential and unique historical experience with relations with the external world 
could be turned into action, making the EU (and Europe) one of the pillars of 
the new international order, in accordance with the EU’s collective interests and 
values� Let us recall that the “twelve” was the first commercial powerhouse in the 
124 Formally the Court of Auditors also became a body of the European Union; however 
its role is strictly technical (as a kind of auditor)�
125 Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU on 1 January 1995�
126 On the subject of the development of the EU in the nineties, see also: K� Łastawski, 
op. cit., pp� 259–299�
Europe in the International Order94
world and was the second, following the United States, economic power in terms 
of gross domestic product (GDP)�
Title I, Article B, Paragraph 2, of the Maastricht Treaty is of basic importance 
here� It states that the goal of the EU is “to assert its identity on the international 
scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and secu-
rity policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which 
might in time lead to a common defence”� A key term appears here: “interna-
tional identity” – separation, autonomy and particular character, to be expressed 
through the active influence by the EU on the international scene� The scope of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), concerning all areas of foreign 
policy and security policy, is defined by Article 11 of the Treaty� As the text of the 
Treaty states, the goals of the CFSP are:
—  to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity 
of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter;
—  to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;
—  to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the prin-
ciples of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final 
Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders;
— to promote international cooperation;
—  to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms�
In the second point of Article 11, members states committed themselves to sup-
porting this common EU policy “actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty 
and mutual solidarity”� They were also to “refrain from any action which is con-
trary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohe-
sive force in international relations”� The following article, Article 12, details the 
means of realising the goals of Article 11� These means are:
—  defining the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and secu-
rity policy;
— deciding on common strategies;
— adopting joint actions;
— adopting common positions;
—  strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of 
policy�127
127 Z�M� Doliwa-Klepacki, op. cit�, pp� 93–95, 323–324, 495–499� The text of the Treaty 
is online at: https://www�cvce�eu/content/publication/1997/10/13/5a6bfc79-757f-
4d53-9379-ad23cc2cc911/publishable_en�pdf�
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This all amounted to a turning point in the position of the Community and its 
relations with the external world – of course, on condition that the Union, mean-
ing its members states, would want to make use of the spirit and the letter of the 
provisions of the treaties�
It was also important that the rotating leadership of the EU – the Council of 
Europe and the Councils those who represented the EU in matters of security 
and international policy – received key executive apparatus in the form of a fixed 
office – the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy (HR)� Doubts as to the EU’s seriousness in conducting the security and 
foreign policy envisaged in the treaty may have been exacerbated by the delays by 
the member states in appointing the said HR� The nomination finally took place 
in October 1999 when the position was taken up by the experienced Spanish 
politician Javier Solana (former General Secretary of NATO)� An unfortunate 
false start was made by the CFSP: within the framework of the first practical “ex-
ercise” of the joint policy, the subject was the French Balladur plan which led to 
a failed attempt to develop a useful pact for stability and security (in Central and 
Southern Europe)�128 A major addition to the resources for a common foreign 
and security policy was the “inheritance” from the previous Western European 
Union (WEU) of additional instruments and specific elements of that organisa-
tion’s mandate� On the basis of the Amsterdam Treaty, the process of integrating 
the WEU to the EU was initiated� At the beginning, the EU took over from the 
WEU the so-called Petersburg Tasks agreed in 1992, that is the “right” to carry 
out activities in the scope of humanitarian aid, crisis management, peacekeeping 
and emergency (“enforced”) peacekeeping� The last element most of looked “se-
rious” because it assumed implicitly the possibility of the use of military force�129 
From the material resources taken over, there was also the Western European 
Institute for Security Studies and a centre for satellite reconnaissance and a cen-
tre for threat evaluation�
It is worth recalling that relations external to the Community were maintained 
and developed all the while, regardless of the new international possibilities 
128 Balladur’s Plan – and later Pact – attempted to force potential member states to 
normalise their relations with their neighbours, especially with regard to borders 
and the rights of ethnic minorities� To a great extent, it was erected on the lack of 
knowledge of its authors and their desire to “raise the entrance bar” for candidate 
states� Negotiated according to rather anachronistic rules, it was signed in 1995 as a 
Pact on Stability and Security – and then was promptly forgotten�
129 In accepting this as an element of its mandate in June 1992, the WEU went beyond 
the Atlantic Alliance in terms of readiness for intervention out of its area�
Europe in the International Order96
afforded by the Maastricht Treaty – in particular in the scope of a common for-
eign and security policy� These ongoing external relations were maintained as 
before, by the EC in which for a long time there had been a separate commis-
sioner responsible for this area� These relations focussed on economic and trade 
matters, often in reference to a rich system of association agreements with less 
developed countries (usually former colonies) – part of the cycle of Yaoundé/
Lomé conventions� The Community also established several special arrange-
ments (with the United States or Russia), preferential and standard trade agree-
ments and in other areas as well� The EC and the European Commissioner for 
External Relations were still responsible for the work of EC missions in other 
countries (i�e� the diplomatic representatives of the Community) and in inter-
national organisations�130 The combination of the potential lying in both these 
sectors of the Union (external relations and foreign policy) made the Union into 
a potential “player” on the international stage�131
4 Enlargement, that is to say: unification
The EU – even after the strengthening of its institutional foundations and after 
giving the integration process a comprehensive character (not merely the com-
mon market) – still did not have the right to act in the name of the whole of 
Europe, even if it could represent the countries of “Old Europe” including the 
European powers and the most highly developed countries� The right of the 
countries of Central Europe, among them Poland, to join the Union did not is-
sue from the fact they had been part of Europe for a millennium, nor because of 
their wealth or military potential� Their right was more morally grounded: they 
had been cut off from a unifying Europe as a result of an unjust “judgement of 
history”, they unceasingly desired to “return to Europe” and in the end led to 
the abolition of the division of the continent� For all this these countries paid a 
heavy price�
The decision to extend integration, taken almost at the same time as the fall 
of the “Iron Curtain”, was not only the fulfilment of the dreams of many west-
ern Europeans, but also an instinctive flight forward from the poor cousins of 
“younger Europe”� The countries of Central Europe were in a state of poverty and 
130 More on this may be found in: Z�M� Doliwa-Klepacki, op. cit�, pp� 160–185�
131 S� Parzymies, Unia Europejska jako uczestnik stosunków międzynarodowych [The 
European Union as a Participant in International Relations], in: S� Parzymies (ed�), 
Dyplomacja czy siła? Unia Europejska w stosunkach międzynarodowych [Diplomacy 
or Power? The European Union in International Relations], Scholar, Warsaw, 2009�
5 European Breakthrough 97
economic underdevelopment as well as exhibiting a different political culture, 
whereas western Europeans had with the struggle of decades developed “their 
identity” together with the idea of integration, so their resistance and fear of de-
railing their own process of integration seemed justified� This is why in the “old 
Union” there pervaded a strong scepticism towards the potential enlargement 
in a foreseeable time frame� This scepticism was most evident in the attitude of 
France during Mitterrand’s presidency� His rather unclear idea of a European 
conference as something that would take the place of rapid integration was cat-
egorically rejected by the capitals of Central Europe� European countries repre-
sented at that time the avant-garde in terms of transformation and the pursuit of 
Union membership�
In spite of the scepticism they encountered, association agreements were ne-
gotiated quickly and signed in 1991� In the understanding of those agreements, 
the proposed programme of bringing countries closer to the EU was in fact the 
path to membership� “The old countries” of the Union had to quickly adjust their 
assumptions about the aspirations of Central Europe� The phrase a “return to 
Europe”, far from being an empty slogan, reflected the great European potential 
of those countries, manifested in the systemic changes, both political and market, 
which were surprisingly rapid and well grounded� Here was confirmation for 
Huntington’s intuitive idea that countries tend to form relationships on the basis 
of shared civilisational identity� Central Europe belonged to Western civilisation 
(Latin Christianity) and so it was easier to carry out the necessary shifts essential 
for EU membership� Indeed, the entire Community had emerged precisely on 
this cultural foundation� This was its strength and it was also to be the driving 
force of the nations who, after the collapse of the communist bloc, wished to be 
counted among the creators of the Community�
The pressure from “younger Europe” was so great that Western Europe had 
to quickly cast off the illusion that it might put off the enlargement process for 
“decades and decades”, as Mitterrand wanted� The shift in thinking on this matter 
unexpectedly led to the rapid formulation of a positive strategy� The first stage of 
this strategy to be presented were the so-called Copenhagen criteria announced 
by EU leaders in the Danish capital in June 1993� There were five such criteria: a 
market economy, the capacity to cope with market forces, agreement to the rule 
of law established by the Community, a stable democracy and the protection of 
human rights, and adherence by a future member to the integrity of the Union, 
that is respecting the logic of the ongoing process of integration� This degree of 
transparency on the part of the Union gave candidate countries, as well as the 
existing Union, an understanding of the steps to be followed� The relationship 
was analogous to that between the control tower (in this case the EC) and an 
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aircraft (candidate country)� And their cooperation was to result in a success-
ful landing at the airport … in Brussels� A key friend to the candidate countries 
in this stage was the distinguished chair of the Commission Jacques Delors (a 
French socialist and a practicing Catholic) who had the same vision of the Com-
munity as its founders� He was also responsible for the smooth handling of the 
“jump” in integration – that is the Maastricht Treaty� And there were other allies 
too, as more and more people came to believe in the success of this great opera-
tion – expanding the Union to the East� A key report was prepared in 1995 by 
the EU’s Reflection Group chaired by Carlos Westendorp y Cabezy� It concluded: 
we have to do with the most ambitious challenge for the EU for many years to 
come – the unification of Europe� German politicians played a great role in this 
process, Chancellor Helmut Kohl and European Commissioner for Enlargement 
Günter Verheugen, as did the new French president, the neo-Gaullist Jacques 
Chirac� One should not forget to mention the many officials of the Commis-
sion who may have been tough negotiators on the one hand, yet they were sym-
pathetic advisors to the governments of countries seeking membership� Their 
counterparts in the future member states were also often wonderful, to mention 
only a few Polish (and European!) names: Mazowiecki, Skubiszewski, Geremek, 
Kułakowski… The success aimed for was to be a joint success� Though these 
emotional and sometimes frustrating times saw the continued division into 
“we–they”, somewhere deep down everyone knew that we are all “we” and that 
this process of enlargement needed to be carried out without unnecessary delay 
but without that haste which might damage the delicate construction called the 
unity of Europe�
After necessary checks (“screening”) on progress being made and the gen-
eral condition of the state, the economy and the society of the candidate coun-
try, negotiations proper began in 1998� They included ten countries altogether: 
eight of the former “bloc” (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Lat-
via, Lithuania, Hungary and Slovenia) and two “southern” European countries 
(Cyprus and Malta)� When the negotiations moved forward, it was clear that 
enlargement was a forgone conclusion� The EU would not permit a project of 
such historical note to end in fiasco� And both sides faced challenges in prepara-
tion for accession� The EU had to prepare itself for enlargement, a process that 
quickly became known as the big bang enlargement� This preparation was begun 
by the IGC in Turin in 1996 and further advanced by the useful Amsterdam 
Treaty which nevertheless still required the subsequent Treaty of Nice to com-
plete the process� On the basis of a plan prepared by the Commission, another 
IGC took place, finishing with the Treaty of Nice (December 2000)� Above all it 
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regulated decision-making in the enlarged Union (division of votes into coun-
tries, the division of matters into those requiring unanimity and those requiring 
only a majority of votes)� At the same time the programme Agenda 2000 agreed 
the budget for enlargement� It was acknowledged that there would be costs, and 
considerable costs at that, since several poor countries (especially Poland) with 
revenues much lower than the EU average were to accede� As per the principles 
of solidarity, these countries were to receive large-scale financial support from 
various community funds� After all these decisions had been taken, the path 
to enlargement was clear though challenging� There only remained the last ne-
gotiation issues on the conditions of membership, which were not always easy 
negotiations (for instance in the case of Poland)�
The difficult negotiations, the most difficult in the modern history of each 
country entering the Community, were completed with success on 13 December 
2002 (the anniversary of the introduction of martial law in Poland, ending the 
revolution of the first “Solidarity”)� The signing of the Treaties of Accession was 
wonderfully organised at the feet of the Acropolis in Athens on 16 April 2003 – 
the signing fell during Greece’s presidency� The ratification process in the twenty-
five countries (fifteen plus ten) went according to plan and from 1 May 2004 
on, the EU counted twenty-four member states in its ranks� Three years later, 
together with the acceptance of large loans, Bulgaria and Romania, the number 
reached twenty-seven� Already at the negotiation stage, future members were al-
lowed to participate in various forms within the framework of the EU� Candidate 
countries participated on equal terms in the work of the European Convention 
which drafted the Constitution for Europe� Enlargement was deemed by all to 
amount to the unification of Europe, an event unprecedented in the continent’s 
1200 years of history (taking its birth to be marked by the year 800, the coro-
nation of Charlemagne as emperor)� From this point on, the EU not only had 
potential and instruments, but it had also a legitimate right to appear before the 
world as Europe�

6  The EU’s Impact on Its Neighbours: 
Influence by Osmosis
As the Community was developing, its neighbours seemed to wake up from 
a slumber� They quickly became lively in a variety of ways� Both the physical 
proximity and the gravity of its interests gave the Community or Union the op-
portunity to test itself in the role of an international power – as a collective sub-
ject aspiring to shape the international order� In fact, the self-definition of the 
EU’s international identity contained in the Maastricht Treaty required this� This 
challenging international role was all the more difficult in view of the fact that 
the EU’s neighbours were so diverse, including among others northern Africa, 
Turkey, the Balkans and the post-Soviet region� Each of these regions not only 
represented a separate geographical character, but also hid within itself its own 
history, a history that was full of potential traps and which included the history 
of its relations with Europe� The logic of the influence of the European Union 
(EU) on its surrounding regions will by assumption – an assumption not ex-
pressed directly – recall the process of osmosis� By the development of struc-
tured, all-encompassing relations with countries in the proximity of the EU, by 
reaching into their “interiors” – their societies, markets, cultures and politics – 
the EU hoped to spread its own values to those countries, to spread its models 
of social and political life, and, in a certain sense, make them more similar to 
the EU� If as a result they at least became more democratic and market oriented, 
the development, stability and security of Europe’s (the EU’s) “neighbourhood” 
would be served�
1 The EU and the Mediterranean region
The exceptional status of this region for the EU policy was clear to all� Here 
Europe feels “at home”� Key members of the Community have for many centu-
ries been symbiotically linked to the southern and eastern coasts of the Medi-
terranean – to Northern Africa, the Near East and Asia Minor� For the Italian 
peninsula, this cultural contact reaches back to ancient times – at least since 
Hannibal, Carthage and the Punic Wars� It was after all in this region that Europe 
“began” with Ancient Greece, Christianity and the Roman Empire which ulti-
mately brought the genotype of Europe to Gaul� After the birth of Islam, the 
relationship between the two coasts of the Mediterranean was almost constantly 
in conflict (the plundering expeditions of the Saracens, the Ottoman expansion), 
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conflict which nevertheless did not impede trade and mutual cultural exchange� 
In modern times, Europe has imposed on the majority of its southern neigh-
bours colonial dependence, thought this imposed dependence had a much more 
gentle character than for sub-Saharan Africa� The Mediterranean region is also 
the soft underbelly of Europe in terms of security� After the Cold War, this came 
to mean not security in the traditional meaning, but about issues such as ter-
rorism (related to the Middle East conflict) or illegal migration� The presence 
of authoritarian regimes, with their long-term fragility and the risk of a sudden 
middle-eastern conflict shifting from a “cold” to a “hot” war led to a heightened 
awareness and a readiness to act – either to prevent conflict or alleviate it� For 
some EU countries, this was an important region in economic terms (whether 
for trade or investment), and for almost all EU countries, it was an important 
source of oil supplies� The challenges were significant� In this region, the EU 
encountered Arabic and Islamic countries, non-states (like the Palestinian 
Autonomy), Israel, dictatorships and near-democracies, countries needing EU 
support and wealthy countries�
For all these and other reasons the Community (the European Economic 
Community [EEC]) rather early on turned its attention to the Mediterranean 
region which had already in the past included countries that for historical rea-
sons had found themselves on the periphery of Europe� In the sixties, the EEC 
had concluded a series of association agreements: with Greece (1961), Turkey 
(1963), Morocco and Tunisia (1969), and Malta (1970), as well as mature trade 
agreements with Israel and Lebanon� Some of these agreements anticipated sig-
nificant financial support from the Community and preferential trade terms for 
her partners� A new stage in the Community’s approach to the region started at 
the beginning of the nineties� On the one hand, this resulted from the appear-
ance of the European Union and the international ambitions that were built into 
its new mandate� On the other hand, an impulse was provided by the growing 
commitment of the EU to Central and Eastern Europe following the fall of the 
Iron Curtain� The countries of the region did not wish to lose their previously es-
tablished positions in relation to the EU’s external policy� This situation affected 
in particular the southernmost countries of the EU – France, Italy or Spain who 
at this point increased rapidly the number of initiatives addressed to their south-
ern neighbours�132
132 For more on this point, see: P�J� Borkowski, Polityka Unii Europejskiej w regionie 
Morza Śródziemnego [The Policies of the European Union in the Mediterranean 
Region], in: S� Parzymies (ed�), Dyplomacja czy siła… [Diplomacy or Power…], op. cit�, 
p� 303 and the following pages�
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The above circumstances meant that the European Council adopted an ambi-
tious programme in June 1994133 for just such a development of relations with 
countries of the southern and eastern coasts of the Mediterranean� (It was no 
accident that the 1994 Summit took place on the Greek island of Corfu, or 
“Kerkyra” in ancient times�) In effect, this was to lead to a sphere of peace, secu-
rity, stability and economic prosperity� Initially it was to be called the Mediter-
ranean Partnership� In the political sphere, there was to be dialogue concerning, 
among other matters, human rights, democracy, the rule of law, means of devel-
oping trust and security� In the end, the form for this was given by the Barcelona 
Declaration, a document adopted at the end of the founders’ conference made 
up of foreign ministers from the “fifteen” together with eleven countries from 
the Mediterranean region, including the Palestinian Autonomy� (The location 
of the meeting – Barcelona – in November 1995 was also decided by the fact 
of Spain holding the presidency at that time�) The Declaration established the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which quickly became known as the Barce-
lona process� Like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE), the Barcelona process was given a tripartite structure� The first part 
dealt with political and security issues both on the level of international relations 
and concerning the internal situation of individual countries, with reference to 
standards of democracy and respect for human rights� The second part included 
economic–financial matters, the basis for modernisation and economic growth 
in partner countries to the EU in the region, as well as the growth in employment 
(also a means of reducing internal tensions and the influence of radical forces 
in those countries)� The third part of the tripartite division concerned social, 
cultural and humanitarian issues� The EU representatives make no secret of the 
fact that a key goal of development of this region was the reduction of migratory 
pressures from the south�134
The realisation of this ambitious programme from the start met with seri-
ous problems� The countries included in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
were resistant to EU arguments in issues related to democracy and human rights 
which seemed unreconcilable with the social dimension of Islam� The govern-
ments of Arabic states exhibited a lack of willingness to implement recommend-
ed structural reforms which were intended to give economic growth a chance� 
133 At the summit in Essen half a year later, the EU adopted the strategy of enlargement 
to the east�
134 S� Parzymies, Zachód – dylematy otwarcia na Wschód [The West – Dilemmas of 
Opening to the East], “Rocznik Strategiczny” [“The Strategic Yearbook”], 1995/1996, 
pp� 81–82�
Europe in the International Order104
The same governments took no notice of the fact that, for example, the gross 
domestic product (GDP) of Finland with its population of 5 million was higher 
than the GDP of the 70 million strong Egypt, but these comparisons had con-
siderable resonance with their respective societies� The EU partners of course 
eagerly accepted financial help – amounting to 5 billion ECU for the period until 
1999� In security matters, a priority for Arabic countries was the containment 
of conflicts in the Middle East� The outbreak of the Second Intifada, in no small 
part the doing of Ariel Sharon, and the victory of Benjamin Netanyahu dashed 
hopes of a rapid peace agreement between Israel and Palestine� The impasse in 
this conflict provided the Arabic countries with a good pretext to become en-
trenched in their demands, without any wish to make compromises in other 
matters as well� Ultimately, in the EU’s approach to Arabic countries, stability 
took precedence over democracy and human rights� Nevertheless, it was the EU 
that began the process of organising international relations in the region accord-
ing to a definite project�135
The realisation of the great strategy of EU enlargement (negotiations com-
pleted in December 2002), which concerned two countries in the Mediterranean 
region – Cyprus and Malta – led the EU to seek a new formula for impacting 
its direct international environment� And it found one rather quickly� In the 
first half of 2003, the Commission presented a report entitled Wider Europe – 
Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern and Southern 
Neighbourhood� The programme sketched there covered sixteen countries, from 
Morocco to Belarus, but without Russia who did not feel well in that company� 
From the point of view of structure, this was a continuation of the tripartite 
structure from the Barcelona process: political, economic and social� However, 
the programmes now were profiled, dedicated to individual countries, adapted 
to their needs, capacities and expectations, and dealt with specific issues in trade, 
the growth of the market economy, migration, culture, human rights, transport, 
energy, telecommunication, investment and development support� This “neigh-
bourhood programme” did not include the prospects of membership�
Before this programme could get off the ground, Paris, and more particularly 
her hyper-ambitious foreign minister Nicolas Sarkozy, expressed the desire to 
go further and in February 2007 proposed the creation of a Mediterranean Un-
ion, which would only include countries in that region and not the whole EU� 
France was seconded in this proposal by Italy and Spain� Because Berlin – and 
not only Berlin – did not wish to allow the fragmentation of the EU along the 
135 P�J� Borkowski, op. cit�, pp� 316–325�
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lines of external “specialisation”, the representative of Europe in these initiatives 
remained the entire EU� After some modification, this initiative was inaugurat-
ed with pomp and ceremony at the Paris summit in July 2008, the host being 
(by then) President Sarkozy� The leaders of forty-three countries took part in 
the meeting from Europe, Africa and the Near East (including Egypt – Hosni 
Mubarak, Israel – Ehud Olmert and Syria – Baszar Al-Asad), as well as the heads 
of key international organisations, led by Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon� Form 
exceeded content, however, the increased institutionalisation of the new entity 
(biannual summits, annual meetings of ministers, a secretariat, joint presidency) 
gave the impression of a new level in the approach of the EU towards its south-
ern neighbours� In essence, the issue was one of the intensification of the ex-
isting programme of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) to the EU’s 
south, in all key aspects� The hidden logic of this policy remained unchanged: 
in exchange for economic and financial support, partner countries would make 
progress towards democracy and respect for human rights� Despite the higher 
status of this political programme it was doomed to failure� The governments of 
the south and east of the Mediterranean did not share European values and had 
no intention of adopting political, economic or social patterns of behaviour from 
EU countries�136 Subsequent stages of the Middle East conflict were to subvert 
the project� Before it had the chance to achieve some success, the “Arab Spring” 
broke out, which was surely the result of the impact of Europe as a model, but 
not of EU policy� The course of events and the consequences of the “Arab Spring” 
ultimately destroyed the EU’s neighbourhood policy in this area�
As long as the Community means a mere “common market”, whether of the 
“six” or of the “nine”, it could not make greater claims to be in a position to influ-
ence the Israeli–Arabic conflict� Of course, many efforts were made – after all the 
Community’s immediate neighbourhood was concerned, as well as its security 
and economic interests – but it retained only a supporting role here� The EC’s 
position on this conflict was sketched in the Venice Declaration of 1980, which 
was the European response to the Camp David Accords of 1979, which laid to 
rest the period of war and enmity between Egypt and Israel� The Venice Declara-
tion recognised the right of the Palestinians to their own state, confirmed by the 
recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole repre-
sentative of Palestine, and it supported a comprehensive solution to the near-east 
136 Ibidem, pp� 334–335; S� Parzymies, Wyzwania dla Unii Europejskiej [Challenges for 
the European Union], “Rocznik Strategiczny” [“The Strategic Yearbook”], 2008/2009, 
pp� 139–140�
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conflict� Perhaps for this reason Israel was strongly opposed to the participation 
of the Community (and more broadly: Europe) in the conflict resolution, as it 
perceived the European states as pro-Arab and anti-Israel� This was said to be 
due to the goal of securing stable oil supplies and the historical relations of some 
EC countries with the Arabic world, including the fact of their being a large 
number of Islamic inhabitants of Europe� The United States was also not inter-
ested in the EC’s participation, preferring to play the role of honest broker alone, 
leaving them with more room for manoeuvre� In any case, divisions internal to 
the EC (countries being divided into pro-Israel and more neutral) complicated 
the more active participation of the Community�
It was only with the initiation of the Middle East peace process at the begin-
ning of the nineties that the EU had the opportunity to be an actor in conflict 
resolution� Witness for instance the Madrid Conference of 1991 which was in-
tended to increase the tempo of the peace process� However, subsequent rounds 
of negotiations took place in the United States where understandings were con-
cluded, their patron being Washington� It is true that the EU even entered into 
the Quartet on the Middle East (the United States, Russia, the UN, the EU), but 
its role was limited to its general support for the overall process� The only signifi-
cant input from the EU was in providing a degree of stabilisation of the situation 
in the Middle East by supporting the Palestinian Autonomy (the budget of the 
Autonomy came mainly from EU donations) and financial–technical help for 
the Autonomy in fighting terrorism in its land� The general position of the EU 
on the conflict did not in essence change� The EU remained attached to the main 
Security Council resolutions concerning the Middle East conflict, especially 
items number 242, 338 and 425, which proclaimed the right of the Palestinians 
to self-determination and the principle of “land for peace”� The actual role of the 
EU in this process was more declarative, though for a certain time it even had 
a special envoy representing its security and foreign policy� In a sense, it was 
even good that the EU was not “at the table” for the negotiations and was not a 
party to the subsequent detailed accords, since from the end of the nineties this 
process stalled�137 Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who had been leading 
Israel for several years, is not an enthusiast of the peace process, and further-
more is a clear opponent of Europe’s participation� He and other Israeli politi-
cians have not spared the EU and Europe bitter accusations, aimed at keeping 
137 J� Zając, Role Unii Europejskiej w regionie Afryki Północnej i Bliskiego Wschodu 
[The Role of the European Union in the Region of North Africa and the Middle East], 
Warsaw University Publishers, Warsaw, 2010�
6 The EU’s Impact on Its Neighbours: Influence by Osmosis 107
Brussels far from the Israel–Palestine conflict� Thus far they have been successful 
in this endeavour�
2 Turkey – geopolitics, identity and Europe’s borders
The EU’s relations with Turkey took on a particular significance when Ankara 
raised the question of their membership in the EU� Turkey, it is true, had already 
concluded with the Community an Association Agreement in 1963, but the asso-
ciation agreements of the Community from that period – and there were many – 
did not hold out the promise of membership� In the eighties, more and more 
declarations appeared supporting the commencement of accession talks� The 
end of Europe’s division into East and West naturally gave priority to central and 
southern European countries, which had been blocked by their incorporation in 
the Soviet Bloc from participating in European integration from its beginnings� 
With the completion of the big bang enlargement, the issue of the Turkey’s mem-
bership returned inevitably to the table� Turkey’s accession had many support-
ers, who were even more convinced than in the case of enlargement to the East� 
Great Britain had a favourable attitude – suiting, as it did, its vision of the EU as a 
politically rather loose formation, more of a free market than a community – but 
Mediterranean countries were also on the same page, including Italy, Spain and 
Portugal� France and Germany were internally divided on this issue� The United 
States also supported Turkey’s membership (particularly strongly during the ad-
ministration of George Bush) and it exerted influence on the countries of the 
“new Union” who were closely related to the United States, especially Poland� 
Under the influence of this favourable atmosphere in several of its key capitals, 
the EU decided at the end of 2004 to begin membership negotiations with Turkey, 
and they began a year later, during the presidency of the pro-Turkish British�
Turkey’s membership in the EU cast clear light on the issues of the Com-
munity’s borders and its identity� While this had seemed a Turkish problem, it 
suddenly came across as a problem of the whole Union� A Turkey that was, for-
mally or informally, ruled by the military could not be considered as a candidate 
for membership� All the more impossible was consideration of a Turkey where 
standards of human rights, especially those concerning women, drastically de-
parted from European standards� The removal of military personnel from posi-
tions of authority, sustaining the secular nature of government, improvements 
in the sphere of human rights and sustainable economic development – all these 
improvements put Turkish membership back on the table� There remained, how-
ever, other more serious matters raising doubts about Turkey’s accession� For 
instance, is it geopolitically a part of Europe? The answer is negative since 97% of 
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the Turkish territory lies in Asia� The remaining 3% is a “leftover” from Ottoman 
conquests in the XV and XVI centuries� Turkey’s admission would amount to 
the exit of the EU from Europe and sharing borders with such “difficult” neigh-
bours as Iran, Iraq or Syria – that is direct and automatic involvement in security 
problems outside Europe� The argument that, thanks to Turkey, the EU would 
gain the capacity to have geopolitical influence on the countries of Asia Minor is 
valueless, ignoring, as it does, geographical and cultural factors�
However, it was civilisational issues that provoked the greatest controversy 
from the start� Turkey does not belong to European civilisation; what is more 
it has for centuries been in conflict with Europe� It even managed to remove 
“Europe” from its border areas with Asia Minor (Byzantium had after all be-
gun in the Roman Empire, at a time when the Turkish tribes remained deeper 
in inland Asia) and almost permanently took over the southern-eastern part of 
Europe� Turkey’s further ambitions were ultimately frustrated at the end of the 
XVII century in the well-known battle of Vienna� It is said that Europe is more 
of a cultural concept than a geographical one� It is clear that creations such as 
the Community could only arise on the basis of a civilisational foundation like 
Europe� The founding fathers did not hide their strong affiliations with Chris-
tianity (the majority were practicing Catholics)� Paradoxically, the main argu-
ment in favour of Turkey’s acceptance was the statement that the EU cannot 
merely be a club of Christian countries� This claim was unjustified, in fact just 
before deciding about membership talks with Turkey, there was a discussion of 
the Preamble to the Treaty establishing a constitution for Europe, a discussion 
which failed to agree on a reference to Christianity as one of the civilisational 
elements of Europe’s identity� Opinions were voiced in Turkey as well as else-
where that refusing membership would amount to religious discrimination� But 
this is moral blackmail, regardless of other membership criteria and the cultural 
foundation of European integration� There was a related doubt about Turkey, not 
often expressed publicly – its demographics in relation to other large countries 
in Europe� Turkey’s population is greater than Germany’s, which means that it 
would have the biggest say (in the mechanisms of decision-making) – a country 
which neither geographically nor in terms of civilisation belongs to Europe�138
On 3 October 2005, accession negotiations with Turkey were started� At the 
same time, Angela Merkel and President Sarkozy spoke against their membership, 
138 S� Parzymies, Unia Europejska 25 państw – supermocarstwo czy superpaństwo? [The 
European Union of 25 States – Superpower or Super-state?], “Rocznik Strategiczny” 
[“The Strategic Yearbook”], 2005/2006, pp� 132–135�
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in place of which they offered “privileged partner” status� The process of nego-
tiation itself was supposed to last at least until 2014 and it was besieged by so 
many reservations that it was practically doomed from the start� Negotiations 
began quickly, but equally rapidly, after only a few of the thirty-five points for 
negotiation had been settled, reached an impasse� The matter deserves a “Study 
in Intentional Fiasco” (the truth of which no one will admit to in public)� In the 
following years, this fiasco would provoke much emotion, but these emotions 
are really the result of political correctness and the “blackmail” of the claim that 
“The EU is not a club of Christian countries”� It had been a taboo before 2005 
to say that Turkey cannot become a member of the EU because of cultural and 
political factors� Straightforward communication would have avoided frustrated 
negotiations� Despite the above, Turkey remains a close partner, indeed exhibit-
ing model relations with the EU in many areas�
3  The post-Yugoslavian laboratory: from conflict to  
EU neighbours to EU members
The outbreak of war in Yugoslavia took the European Community by complete 
surprise� (We say mere “Community” because the EU still had no policy for se-
curity and defence�) The first exchange of fire, in connection with the announce-
ment of the secession of Slovenia and Croatia, took place in mid-1991, while the 
decision to found the Union was reached in Maastricht in December 1991� Sev-
eral years passed before the Union developed the institutions and forms of action 
required by the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)� 
Before that, the EU did not have the capacity to respond to a war which broke 
out on its very doorstep� The unilateral decision of Germany to recognise the in-
dependence of the two new Yugoslavian republics forced a similar position from 
the entire Community, at the same time not giving any chance for a negotiated 
dissolution of Yugoslavia� However, it turned out that the problem was not so 
much the breakaway of the ethnically coherent Slovenia and Croatia, but the fact 
that the ethnically and religiously diverse Bosnia and Herzegovina had the same 
intention� In the latter republic, the Bosnian Serbs were outnumbered two to one 
and so were set to lose in their opposition with the Bosnian Croats and Bos-
niaks (the latter being predominantly Sunni Muslim, the descendants of the long 
Turkish domination of the Balkans) who both wished to break away� The Bosnian 
Serbs did not take part in the referendum of winter 1992, but this did not affect 
the result as the other two groups were anyway in the majority� The EC recog-
nised the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted in the referendum� 
The mistake of the Community was to recognise the right of self-determination 
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of Croatians and Bosnians while refusing the same right for Serbs (they were not 
allowed to leave the rather artificial Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and, for 
example join with Serbians from Serbia)� War started� Its course was shocking: 
mass rape and murder, ethnic cleansing, over 100 000 fatalities� The diplomatic 
manoeuvres, with the participation of EU representatives, did not bring any re-
sults� At the same time, the EU did not possess any instruments by means of 
which to impose its will – for example the use of military threats towards the 
parties to the conflict� In their actions and crimes committed, the Serbs led the 
way, thanks to the support from the central government in Belgrade� It was only 
after a long delay that the French and English managed to convince President 
Bill Clinton to bring in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to impose 
a truce and force some kind of peaceful settlement� In 1995, NATO received the 
green light from the Security Council for the use of force and in the summer US 
air force began bombing, leading to a ceasefire after which peace talks became 
possible (the Dayton Accords, November 1995)� NATO forces were to guarantee 
the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, so America turned out to be an essential 
element in the peace process�
During the “Kosovo War” (spring 1999), once again the EU had nothing 
to say� While it is true that the Contact Group that negotiated the cessation of 
the conflict did contain representatives of the EU and its leading members, but 
when the government in Belgrade rejected the draft of a peace agreement, NATO 
carried out the military operation, once again led by the Americans� The EU 
supported this operation but had no influence on the course it took and it was 
precisely because of the unfortunate manner of its execution that this operation 
laid to rest the doctrine of humanitarian intervention�
However, the implementation of peace after the drawn-out and bloody con-
flict in the former Yugoslavia fell to the EU� And it should be admitted that the 
EU demonstrated here unusual initiative and expended considerable energy and 
means, in returning peace and stability to the region and in giving the nations 
there the prospect of a better future� The great opening of the EU’s engagement 
in the comprehensive stabilisation of the territory of the former Yugoslavia was 
the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe� It was first agreed in June 1999 in 
Cologne, at a meeting of EU foreign ministers and ministers of other interest-
ed countries (including the United States, Russia and Japan), and subsequently 
adopted in a festive manner at a great international conference in Sarajevo in July 
1999, with the participation of forty countries and the most important organisa-
tions from the United Nations (UN), the OSCE, NATO, the World Bank, among 
others� The Pact was a comprehensive programme covering issues of security, 
the economy, systemic–political issues, humanitarian issues and human rights, 
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infrastructure and regional cooperation� While it is true that the Sarajevo confer-
ence was impressive in terms of its attendance list and commitments undertak-
en, the creation of the programme adopted then fell to the EU, both financially 
and operationally�139
The comprehensiveness, the scale and courage of the EU’s approach to peace 
in the Balkans, all turned on the combination of a few elements that are crucial 
for the success of this kind of project: a stabilising mission after the conflict, 
agreements and activities for political stability and economic revival, and asso-
ciation agreements opening the prospect of accession and preparing candidates 
for accession� It was precisely in the countries of the former Yugoslavia (Western 
Balkans to use the accepted EU terminology) that the EU acquired experience 
in the CSDP that began in 1999� In the first decade after the conflict ended, the 
EU placed there a few missions of a military, law enforcement or civilian nature 
(often mixed in nature)� Among the most important missions were the mili-
tary mission EUFOR Althea deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the handover 
from NATO of responsibility for security in this country), Concordia (stabilisa-
tion in Macedonia) and EULEX in Kosovo (in the NATO protectorate run by 
the mafia, the development from the ground up of administration, the justice 
system, infrastructure for institutions and principles of democracy and respect 
for human rights, etc�)� Each of these operations has been costly – for instance 
the costs of EULEX reached around 165 million euro annually�140
A second pillar of the EU involvement was the financial–technical support 
aimed at political and economic stability and which was granted on the basis of 
bilateral understandings between the EU and individual countries formed out 
of the collapse of Yugoslavia� Recipient countries had to fulfil the terms of coop-
eration, including their readiness to adopt internal reform and, in some cases, 
to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
in The Hague� Alongside bilateral understandings for stabilisation and as-
sociation, the EU launched several multiparty programmes and encouraged 
regional cooperation with the participation of other international organisations� 
The programmes in the main aimed at the democratisation of the systems of 
139 S� Parzymies, Reformy instytucjonalne, rozszerzenie, wspólna obrona – trudne wyzwania 
dla Unii Europejskiej [Institutional Reform, Enlargement, Common Defence – Difficult 
Challenges for the European Union], “Rocznik Strategiczny” [“The Strategic Year-
book”], 1999/2000, pp� 130–132�
140 M� Mizerska-Wrotkowska, Polityka Unii Europejskiej wobec Bałkanów Zachodnich 
[EU Policy towards the Western Balkans], in: S� Parzymies (ed�), Dyplomacja czy siła… 
[Diplomacy or Power…], op. cit�, p� 299�
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these countries and structural reform which was to give independent economic 
growth a chance� This was also a costly undertaking� The flagship programme 
CARDS, which was only one of many, provided support in reconstruction, 
development and stabilisation� Its budget for 2000–2006 alone was 5�4 billion 
euros� The progress achieved thanks to these programmes allowed for the pas-
sage to a third form and stage of EU involvement – for peace and systemic trans-
formation in the Balkans� We should recall that the entire operation was not an 
easy one, as these countries were coming out of both communism and their past 
and were located on the periphery of Europe – economically and socially as well 
as geographically�
In Brussels and the capital cities of the Community members, it quickly be-
came clear that the most effective means of reaching stability and ensuring that 
democratic and market reforms were irreversible was the prospect of EU mem-
bership� Nothing would mobilise the governments and societies to reform as well 
as a promise of EU accession, which for those countries appeared to represent 
the adoption of the ideal social and security order for nations from a continent 
tired of wars� Painful memories of World War II in the former Yugoslavia, the 
dehumanisation and destruction, came back� Which is why, after a series of un-
derstandings on stabilisation and association (and their implementation) there 
came the time for consideration of the prospects of membership for those ready 
to work for it and fulfil the criteria (yes, the Copenhagen criteria) and additional 
expectations of the EU related to the events of the war and its consequences� Nat-
urally, first in line would be Croatia, after Slovenia the most developed republic 
of the former Yugoslavia� Fate had determined that Croatia would be on the 
“right side” of the conflict (unofficial opinions say that Croatia’s leader Franjo 
Tuđman and army equalled the Serbs in terms of both political instinct and their 
behaviour on the fronts, including atrocities committed)� Thanks to Western 
support, Croatian was quickly able to carry out the necessary reforms and al-
ready in 2005 began accession negotiations� From mid-2013, Croatia became the 
twenty-eighth member state of the EU� The “bait” of membership – especially 
when it became a real possibility as in the case of Croatia – brought about deep 
reform and the abandonment of nationalist ideas in Serbia� The case of Serbia 
was, however, more difficult� Serbia had lost the war and suffered severe conse-
quences as a result but was deemed by European public opinion to have been the 
sole author of the atrocities� Overthrowing the “bad guy” of the war, President 
Slobodan Milošević, in 2000, only took away some of the “odour” of Serbian 
misdeeds� For a long time, Serbia’s refusal to accept the military separation of the 
province of Kosovo from her territory (the NATO operation of 1999) remained a 
problem, as well as her inadequate cooperation with the Hague Tribunal – except 
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for the speedy appearance there of Milošević himself� Nevertheless, thanks to 
internal transformations supported by the EU, there opened up before Serbia the 
possibility of EU membership� In the middle of 2013, Brussels agreed to begin 
membership negotiations which were launched the following year� The remain-
ing three countries formed out of the collapse of Yugoslavia – Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia – could not count on the possibility of 
membership, though each for a different reason� But still, EU support prevented 
their decline into internal conflict or serious regress�141
The only failure of the EU – which was also the failure of the entire inter-
national community (the UN, the OSCE, NATO) – was Kosovo� Perhaps this 
was because this “country’s” founding myth had been falsified� It had emerged 
as an international protectorate (of the West), as a result of a NATO military 
intervention which took place without a mandate from the Security Council� It 
was thought that the Albanian majority (Islamic) in Kosovo – a minority in the 
cut-up Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of that time, dominated by Serbia – as the 
victims of the nationalist–expansionist Serbs, would be able to count on a right 
to revenge, huge financial support, tolerance for those in power accused of war 
crimes, tolerance for a system of corruption, a mafia-style system of rule and for 
the organised crime dealing in human trafficking and narcotics� Enormous finan-
cial support and countless technical missions brought no significant effect, yet 
the EU as a whole in 2008 recognised the declaration of independence of Kosovo, 
after which the support continued (and without which the country would imme-
diately become a failed state)� Being in practice an EU (and NATO) protectorate, 
the situation in Kosovo was similar to certain African states in the middle of the 
XX century� The permanent exodus of Kosovo inhabitants to EU countries con-
firmed the fiasco of this political experiment� It is an example, encountered more 
frequently for some time now in the EU, of a predominance of ideology (dogma) 
over a sober assessment of the realities of the situation, as well as an incapability 
of correcting errors, even when the costs of these mistakes are high�142
141 For more details: ibidem�
142 In view of the way Kosovo was created, there is no chance for general international 
recognition nor for membership in international organisations – beginning with 
the UN� Despite the small population (less than 2 million), enormous external sup-
port did not lead, for example, to a reduction of unemployment below 40% or the 
proportion of those in poverty below 33%� More on the circumstances of Kosovo’s 
emergence may be found in “Rocznik Strategiczny” [“The Strategic Yearbook”], 
1999/2000� See also: M� Mizerska-Wrotkowska, op. cit�, pp� 294–300�
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4 The EU and its attitude to Eastern Europe
The first stage and form of the post-Cold-War return of the European Community 
towards its eastern neighbours was the “great enlargement”, which occupied its at-
tention and resources after 2004� The 2004 enlargement covered ten countries of 
the region with Romania and Bulgaria joining a little later in 2007� However, in the 
nineties, the EU did not ignore “farther flung” neighbours, countries of the former 
Soviet Union and offered them support programmes for systemic transformation 
and the development of bilateral relations based on Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements (PCAs)� The huge TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth 
of Independent States) programme, realised in connection with countries of the 
former Soviet Union in 1991–2006, cost around 7�5 billion euro� The PCAs lasted 
many years, one being with Russia, and aimed to achieve an individual approach 
to the needs and the expectations of partner countries, though the diversification 
of their content was not always much in evidence� Though these PCAs did not 
envisage EU membership, what was understandable from a European perspective, 
they did include issues related to pro-democratic reform and respect for human 
rights� The latter was also a reason why post-Soviet “partners” did not greet this 
kind of cooperation with enthusiasm and in some cases the (more) authoritarian 
character of their governments made it impossible to implement the provisions of 
agreements – either in theory or in practice (this relates particularly to Belarus and 
the countries of Central Asia)� Even with the support of these agreements, the EU 
was not able to achieve much in the face of the baggage from the Soviet-Russian 
pas, particularly where this influence had been greatest�143
A neighbourhood of hope and frustration. A key step forward after the com-
pletion of enlargement was the adoption by the EU of the ENP� This policy aban-
doned the illusion that the same approach would work both for Eastern Europe 
and for Central Asia, for instance for Ukraine and for Tajikistan�144 The ENP 
was launched in 2004 and was dedicated only to six countries: Ukraine, Belarus, 
Moldavia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan� The ENP programme took into 
143 A� Szeptycki, S� Kardaś, Polityka UE wobec Europy Wschodniej, Kaukazu Południo-
wego i Azji Środkowej [EU Policy Towards Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucas and 
Central Asia], in: S� Parzymies (ed�), Dyplomacja czy siła… [Diplomacy or Power…], 
op. cit�, pp� 237–243�
144 A mistake of this sort was made at the beginning of the nineties by NATO in its ini-
tiation of the same program of cooperation with all countries of the former commu-
nist bloc (including those of the former USSR)� The principle of non-differentiation 
means for example, the same approach to Hungary and to Uzbekistan�
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consideration the need to diversify the approaches to particular countries� Nev-
ertheless, each cooperation plan included issues related to democratic institu-
tions, human rights, the rules of law, the opportunities for investment, economic 
cooperation, trade, energy, illegal migration, combatting terrorism and cross-
border cooperation� The six partners of the EU in the ENP, with few exceptions, 
remained sluggish in these domains – and they did not show much interest at 
first in changing� Nevertheless, the EU did manage to awaken some semblance of 
civil society in those countries and facilitating visa formalities and strengthening 
interpersonal relationship did lead to a growth in the inhabitants’ interest (e�g� in 
the case of Ukraine and Moldavia), especially among younger citizens (stipends 
for students!) in achieving closer ties with “Europe”�
The prescription for awakening these six countries from their general lethargy 
was the proposal by the EU of a new and more developed form of cooperation: 
the Eastern Partnership (EaP)� The Polish–Swedish proposal (R� Sikorski, C� 
Bildt) appeared in the spring of 2008 (in response to the French Mediterranean 
Union) and after some hesitation, especially in Berlin, gained the approval of 
the entire EU in June of that year� The war of Russia and Georgia in August 2008 
helped somewhat to convince those who had previously been indifferent that the 
EU’s project made some sense� The European Commission prepared a detailed 
programme and in May 2009 achieved the formal inauguration of EaP� The goal 
was clear – to separate off Eastern Europe from the blur of the previous neigh-
bourhood policy by significantly strengthening bilateral relations� This meant 
making EU countries aware that with Eastern Europe we are still dealing with 
Europe, assuredly a part of the same geo-political space – albeit in a somewhat 
different cultural–political form and painfully burdened by its past� This aware-
ness created other prospects for the development of relations with the EU than 
in the case of Algeria or Lebanon, which would never be part of Europe� With 
the EaP the principle of differentiation was underscored even more, and in re-
turn for reforms and opening up to the EU, programme participants could count 
on even greater generosity� In terms of issues, the EaP included similar areas to 
the ENP, though not all were implemented� The programme could not offer the 
prospect of membership (there were light years between the internal systems of 
these countries and EU standards), but association agreements and deepening 
trade zones could be offered� These understandings meant long-term relations 
with the EU and the opportunity for deeper and deeper entry into integration�145
145 A� Szeptycki, Sz� Kardaś, op. cit�, pp� 243–251; S� Parzymies, Partnerstwo Wschodnie – 
nowy instrument Europejskiej Polityki Sąsiedztwa [Eastern Partnership – A 
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In the EU, deprived as it is of geopolitical instinct, no one realised that 
what from  the perspective of Brussels might look like promotion of European 
standards – setting the foundations for sustainable economic growth or humane 
societies – for Moscow looked like geopolitical game-playing and an incursion 
into its sphere of influence, the former Soviet Union� This became spectacularly 
evident in the case of Ukraine� Acquiring its formal independence after the fall of 
the USSR, it remained a country and a society entirely dependent on Russia� At 
the same time Ukraine’s internal system became an example of a post-colonial/
oligarchical system, very much on the periphery of an empire, an example of what 
is termed “peripheral development”� The level of oligarchy in the state and econo-
my was even higher than in Russia – the interests of oligarchs clearly take prece-
dent over the interests of the state� This was accompanied by a low level of political 
class and an underdeveloped state instinct at all levels of organisation� The social 
awareness of being European was also at a low level – Ukrainians to a lesser extent 
identified with Europe� At the same time those governing Ukraine were rather ea-
ger to declare their intention of connecting with Europe, yet there were no reforms 
accompanying these intentions that might give them conviction and make them 
more realistic� The declarations were merely a form of public tender-offerings, 
typical for the mentality of the authorities in Kiev: whoever gives more – Brussels 
or Moscow – will gain our sympathy�146 This is why the EU’s efforts regarding 
Ukraine – at least for the first decade – recalled the toils of Sisyphus�
The year 2004 witnessed an unexpected turn of events when the authorities 
together with Moscow decided to tamper with the second round of the presiden-
tial elections� The first round had been won by Victor Juszczenko, perceived as 
pro-European, against Victor Yanukowych – considered to be the representative 
of Moscow and the oligarchs� The reaction to this culminated in the so-called 
Orange Revolution (several weeks of demonstrations on the main square in Kiev 
and in other cities)� With the strong support of Europe (Brussels, Strasbourg and 
certain other countries, in particular Poland), following negotiations there was 
agreed a third round of elections which Juszczenko won� In Kiev, promises of 
reform appeared and Brussels offered encouragement, including a resolution of 
the European Parliament recognising the aspirations of Ukraine and summoning 
New Instrument of European Neighbourhood Policy], “Rocznik Strategiczny” [“The 
Strategic Yearbook”], 2009/2010, pp�  149–52; see also: “Rocznik Strategiczny” 
2008/2009, pp� 140–143�
146 For more details, see the excellent study of A� Szeptycki, Ukraina wobec Rosji. Studi-
um zależności [Ukraine’s Attitude to Russia. A Study of Dependence], Warsaw Uni-
versity Publishers, Warsaw, 2013�
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the EU’s bodies to act in this direction� However, Ukraine was enveloped by an 
internal political struggle so radical that reforms and Europe were forgotten� This 
suited Moscow which torpedoed Brussel’s efforts and the rickety, inconsequent 
efforts of Kiev to carry out reforms establishing standards close to European 
standards in various areas of life�147 Despite Kiev’s poor progress, the EU decided 
to offer further incentives in the form of an offer to conclude an agreement for 
association and closer trade zone� This was announced at the EU–Ukraine sum-
mit in Paris in September 2008 (a month after the Russian–Georgian War)� The 
agreement did not mention the prospect of membership, what was to be ex-
pected in view of the internal situation of Ukraine� Surprisingly, the pro-Russian 
President Yanukovych (who had come to power following the failure of the lead-
ers of the “Orange Revolution” in 2010) somewhat accelerated reforms enabling 
the conclusion of the agreement� Soon, however, under pressure from Moscow – 
with Putin returning to the presidency and ensuring that nothing would change 
in the mafia–gangster manner of rule – reforms came to a halt� This was despite 
mounting efforts from the EU (which also turned a blind eye to a series of abuses 
of Yanukovych, the autocrat from the land of the Dnieper)� Georgia and Molda-
via also expressed a desire to come closer to Europe by means of similar associa-
tion agreements� The remaining three countries of the EaP – Belarus, Armenia 
and Azerbaijan – remained indifferent to the opportunity represented by the 
new form of cooperation with the EU�
Russia: from cooperation to confrontation. To capture in a few paragraphs the 
problem of the relations of the EU with Russia – bearing in mind their gravity, 
complexity and dramaturgy – requires simplification which is hard to accept, 
also for the author� However, the format of this work does not permit more at 
this point� It takes no effort of imagination to appreciate the multidimensional 
meaning of Russia for Europe and the EU including the latter’s international role� 
The history of this country demands attention, its enormous space, its potential 
in terms of natural resources and military resources, the variously interpreted 
fatalism of its destiny (failed attempts at modernisation according to the Western 
model) and the Soviet heritage� Today, when ordinary Russians (not only politi-
cians) think of the Soviet Union, there is a sense of gloom together with – what 
is hard for western Europeans to understand – nostalgia� This is confusing as it 
was precisely regular Russians who made up the mass victims of that totalitarian 
147 A� Sarna, Ukraina bez Kuczmy [Ukraine without Kuczma], “Rocznik Strategiczny” 
[“The Strategic Yearbook”], 2004/2005; idem: Ukraina: “eksperymentu” ciąg dalszy 
[Ukraine: “Experiment” Continued], “Rocznik Strategiczny” 2005/2006�
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regime� All this and more represented a great challenge for the EU� All the more 
so since Russia is a direct neighbour, well known for her caprice, special de-
mands, arrogance-perceived-as-a-virtue, being the bullying neighbour, being 
trigger-happy, the lack of respect for law and her own obligations and at the same 
time in possession of a certain facility with propaganda� On the other hand, it 
also came easy to Europe to accept Russia’s “special privileges”, revealing a will-
ingness to make concessions out of fear and admiration at the same time, no 
small number of “useful idiots” facilitated being either straightforwardly corrupt 
(operating in big business) or uncritically accepting Russia’s history-based nar-
rative� A recurring motif in this narrative was Russia’s alleged “humiliation” – 
whether referring to the collapse of the Soviet Union as a superpower, or to the 
West ignoring her interests after the Cold War (her declining sphere of influence, 
her status as a superpower)�
So, Russia represented for the EU an exceptional challenge and it is worth 
adding that both entities appeared on the international stage at the same time – 
the EU as the continuation of the Community and Russia as the legal and actual 
successor to the Soviet Union (the latter indeed inheriting the poor legal and 
political tradition of the Bolshevik state)� Both sides in their first few years of 
existence had to find their place on the world’s political map (first of all in the 
Euro-Atlantic sphere), whereas Moscow was still stuck in the illusion of her So-
viet past, whereby her only partner in global discussions was Washington� The 
EU’s approach to Russia was from the start characterised by a certain ambiguity, 
the more so in view of the simultaneous relations developing directly between 
Russia and individual EU members – sometimes those members were highly 
committed politically and economically (e�g� Germany or Italy)� This of necessity 
impacted the EU’s position towards Russia� The ambivalence was based on there 
being two different goals: on the one hand, Moscow was supposed to engage 
in “civilised” foreign policy and deliver improvements in systemic standards in 
the direction of greater openness, democracy and human rights; on the other 
hand, Russia was an opportunity for a “good deal”, especially in the area of en-
ergy resources and the opening of an enormous market not only to products but 
also to investment, especially infrastructure investment� In the EU there was the 
conviction that Europe was an attractive partner for Russia – both as a partner 
and a model of development� Sometimes the ambiguity in EU–Russian relations 
led to reality checks, for instance in the case of the two wars Russia conducted 
in Chechnya, that is within the area of the Russian federation (1994/1995, 1999)� 
In both wars, Russia had no scruples about committing numerous crimes, with 
the victims numbering in the tens of thousands� Both in foreign policy and in 
Russia’s internal politics, there were frequent cases of behaviour contrary to EU 
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expectations� Russia tried to avoid criticism or pressure from the EU, frequently 
adopting the position of an auctioneer – a global power who is able to choose its 
“friends” as those making the best offers – Europe can easily be exchanged for 
the United States or China� Depending on the circumstances, Moscow tried to 
select its privileged partners from among the powers of Western Europe – be it 
Germany, France or Great Britain� (When Paris and Berlin criticised Russia for 
the Chechnyan War, Moscow’s favourite became London and Prime Minister 
Blair�) Until the end of the time of Jelcyn, the EU could hold out hope for a future 
of healthy relations with Moscow and Moscow’s good faith in its approach to the 
EU (at least in accordance with the PCA of 1994�) At that time the “Opponent” 
of Russia was the “bad” NATO, which decided to enlarge by three countries of 
Central Europe, former satellite states of Moscow – so in response Moscow tried 
to preserve good relations with Europe�
In this spirit, the EU adopted a so-called strategic partnership in 1999 (still 
during Jelcyn’s rule), a programme which extended the formula of the earlier 
PCAs� At the same time, the EU condemned in quite strong terms Russian op-
erations in Chechnya, nevertheless recognising Russia’s right to combat terror-
ism, which, as is known, Russia did in its own rather specific manner� From that 
time on, EU–Russia summits were to take place systematically, twice a year� The 
Partnership covered four large areas: the economy; issues related to freedom, 
security and justice; international security; and scientific research, education 
and culture� Within the framework of these four areas there were around twenty 
specific – though still rather large – subjects, from energy to terrorism to the 
question of Russia’s membership in the World Trade Organization� The realisa-
tion of the programme was supposed to bring the two sides closer together in 
terms of standards in the various domains of politics, economy and law thereby 
changing Russia according to EU expectations, its norms and values� In Europe, 
faith in Russia’s transformation was so great that many experts and commenta-
tors claimed that in the more distant future Russia might join the EU�
The atmosphere and course of partnership between the EU and Russia started 
to slowly change after the transfer of power in Russia to Putin (president since 
2000)� In internal politics, Putin’s rule from the very beginning was marked by 
an increase in authoritarianism148 whereas in foreign policy – a growth in asser-
tiveness and a willingness to enter into confrontation, aided by the simultaneous 
148 M� Menkiszak, Rosja: zmierzch demokracji? [Russia: Twilight of Democracy?], “Rocz-
nik Strategiczny” [“The Strategic Yearbook”], 1999/2000 (especially the point “Era 
Putina” [“The Age of Putin”], from p� 155)�
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rise in oil prices in world markets (during the first decade of the XXI century, 
the price of oil grew by almost five times)� Putin had the goal of regaining for 
Russia the role of a superpower, at the same time questioning the position of 
the West�149 The EU–Russia dialogue quickly became a dialogue between two 
hard of hearing interlocutors� Statements were characterised by their being “for 
show” and the “agreements” reached were merely declarative� In the opinion of 
experts, the EU conception of strategic partnership with Russia quickly became 
mere wishful thinking�150 Instead of coming closer to Europe (becoming her 
“continuation” to the East), Putin’s Russia chose a path of creating an alternative 
union-community� This is Eurasian integration� Which is why Moscow reacted 
with hostility to the ENP and the Colour Revolution taking place in the territory 
of the former Soviet Union (Georgia 2003, Ukraine 2004) was perceived as the 
West’s conspiracy to besiege Moscow in her own territory� Putin also decided 
to reverse the earlier asymmetry in mutual dependence – from this point on, 
Russia was to have much greater significance to Europe (EU), because of the 
politicisation by Moscow of the supply of energy resources and an increase in 
military capacity� The only country Russia wanted to preserve close ties with 
was Germany�151 Putin’s Russia also began to present a vision of an international 
order that was contrary to the European vision� In Putin’s vision, power over-
rides the rule of law�152 Osmosis, as part of the logic of the EU’s approach to 
Russia, turned out to be ineffective�
149 The West handed Moscow pretexts to be offended who in turn justified their opposi-
tion to western domination by citing among other things the NATO intervention 
against Yugoslavia (Kosovo 19999) or the war against Iraq of 2003 (both lacked the 
authorisation of the Security Council)�
150 More on this in: S� Bieleń, Stosunki Unia Europejska–Rosja [Relations between the 
European Union and Russia], in: S� Parzymies (ed�), Dyplomacja czy siła… [Diplo-
macy or Power…], op. cit�
151 Helmut Kohl had been in the past the favourite western partner of Jelcyn, and later 
Gerhard Schröder was Putin’s, which might have been a conscious strategy on Mos-
cow’s part to draw out Germany from the rest of the West by offering them special 
relations and material benefits (conditions for making advantageous deals)� In part, 
this coincided with the interests of Germany (regarding their international role, 
greater room for manoeuvre and economic growth)�
152 See especially M� Menkiszak, Rosja: czas próby [Russia: Testing Time], “Rocznik 
Strategiczny” [“The Strategic Yearbook”], 2008/2009 (above all the point “Rosja 
jako agresywne mocarstwo rewizjonistyczne” [“Russia as an aggressive, revisionist 
power”], from p� 202)�
7 The EU on the Global Stage
After the end of the Cold War, Europe regained the opportunity to enter the 
world stage, especially in connection with the great enlargement of the European 
Union (EU) undertaken in 1993–1994� Europe’s programme of global activity 
resulted both from the past – the role Europe had played until World War II – 
and from the ambition written into the Maastricht Treaty, as well as from an 
awareness of the potential and the collective interests of this group of countries� 
The global activity of the EU developed along two lines: the geopolitical axis, 
that is in relation to states (powers) and regions of other parts of the world; and 
the normative-institutional axis, that is via the creation of universal norms and 
activity in international organisations with a universal character�
1 The EU and the “Rest of the World”
It is hard to find a clear common denominator to the relationships of the EU to the 
“Rest of the World”; there is such diversity in these relations� However, of greater 
importance are the motives for the EU’s activity here and the direction of devel-
opment of its relationships with various regions in other continents� The motives 
have been and continue to be rather obvious� The first motive has been the colonial 
past of a group of important EU countries, that is the continuation today of that 
presence of Europe in the world, though now in a new form, not having much to 
do with colonialism� The old colonial powers played something of the role of guide 
for the other countries of the EU and for the EU as a whole� The second motive 
is economic interest� This had always been a factor, but now is being realised in a 
different way – via the development of trade, via efforts to sustain traditional mar-
kets, via investment and especially via the search for natural resources and other 
products� The third motive is security� While it is true that overseas regions have 
not generally posed a direct threat to EU countries, economic interests themselves 
require stability, including the neutralisation or counteracting of threats in various 
spheres� This has also been required by the role to which the EU aspired from its 
inception� The fourth motive is the pursuit of a better international order� In the 
EU, it has been felt that the spread of European values embodied in slogans and 
standards of human rights, tolerance, democratic institutions or the rule of law 
would improve the situation of non-European countries and provide them with 
better prospects for development� The exact proportion of these various motives 
and their practical expression has varied depending on the region or group of 
countries in question, on their real situation and needs�
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To a certain degree, the EU’s policy towards the “Rest of the World” has been a 
continuation of external relations or other contacts from the time of the European 
Economic Community (EEC), as they involved trade and development support 
above all� From the founding of the Union, this policy was conducted within 
the framework of a common security and foreign policy (later adding common 
security and defence policy), with the key participation of European Commis-
sion (EC) in conducting external relations� The EU developed in this area an 
unusually broad range of programmes and contacts in the form of joint positions 
and strategies, understandings, missions of various kinds, strategic partnerships, 
political dialogue, associations of varying rank, trade agreements, support of 
various kinds and sometimes also sanctions� No other country or rather power 
(or group of countries) has been as active in relation to the “Rest of the World” as 
Europe� No one else devoted such large material and financial resources to this 
end� This fact completely contradicted the complaints or criticisms of the media, 
commentators or even “experts” that “Europe doesn’t do anything” in this or that 
matter or place� And this was activity à tous azimuts [= all-out or wide-ranging], 
to use the phrase from French security strategy at the time of de Gaulle� In this 
way the intention was to create the international identity of the EU in terms of 
treaties�
The EU’s Sisyphean labour in Africa. The foreign policy of the EU towards sub-
Saharan Africa, historically so-called “black Africa”, was the most difficult part 
of its relations with the world� The reasons for this difficulty were the cultural 
specificity of Africa, its ethnic–tribal variation which when combined with a cer-
tain type of culture, on the one hand, hindered the development of state organs 
that were normal in other parts of the world and, on the other hand, increased 
the tendency for outbreaks of destructive conflict� Furthermore, African govern-
ments used the undeniable consequences of colonialism as a pretext to demand 
constant support from the “white man” and to sustain an ongoing explanation 
for African incapacity and lack of effort� On top of that were Europe’s economic 
and security interests, the pursuit of which was also facilitated by the existence of 
stable, predictable and responsible authorities, those that respect human rights 
and elementary principles of democracy and the rule of law – all in the interest 
of local populations� The actions of the EU and certain individual EU countries 
(especially former colonial metropolises) were characterised by a low level of 
effectiveness, as their frequently positive results turned out to be highly fragile� 
Which is why from a European perspective this was a Sisyphean labour� The ac-
counts below of this “work” will be limited to covering the EU in an institutional 
sense, that is excluding the activities of individual (former) colonial powers�
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Before the appearance of the EU, relations with African countries had been re-
activated and the EEC carried out policy, which was also the “merit” of the as-yet 
not entirely former colonies, especially France� “Not entirely former colonies” – 
the writing of these relations into the Rome Treaty at the beginning of 1957 took 
place a few years before the “Year of Africa” (1960) when a large number of colo-
nies gained their independence� The formula used in the treaty was one of as-
sociation with overseas countries and territories, with the implicit responsibility 
of the EEC to engage in cooperation and broad-based support� To this end was 
created the European Development Fund� This was not founded out of altruism, 
though it was indeed beneficial for its recipients as well� EEC countries, and not 
only France, had economic interests in Africa� These connections also meant for 
EEC countries a certain prestige and international influence, as well as contain-
ing a non-trivial strategic imperative – the Soviet Union had begun its offensive 
in the Third World, and resistance to this was needed� At that time, the core of 
these relations was preferential trade for African countries, but with preferential 
treatment also for EEC countries� The overall result, which would have favoured 
the EEC due to its competitive advantage, was made more even by means of non-
returnable aid granted to African countries� When the overwhelming majority 
of African countries gained their independence, the new form these relations 
took were two conventions in Yaoundé (1963, 1969), whose point was similar: 
mutually preferential trade complemented by development support� At that mo-
ment the bilateral relations between the already former colonial capitals and the 
former colonies were still stronger than the relations with the EEC as a whole� 
In any case, the Community did not at that time have larger international ambi-
tions� The addition of Great Britain markedly increased the number of countries, 
former colonies and other dependent territories with which the EEC wanted to 
sustain special relations� First of all, in 1972, there was created a Generalised 
System of Preferences (GSP) for underdeveloped countries from various parts of 
the world and then, in 1975, there was introduced a new system of relations in 
the form of four subsequent conventions from Lomé, one concluded every five 
years� The same logic of relations was continued – reduced trade tariffs, devel-
opment support and non-returnable financial support� However, from the end 
of the Cold War on (in view of the lack of competition from the communist 
bloc), these conventions and relations came to emphasise respect for human 
rights, including the rights of women and the promotion of democratic princi-
ples, institutions and good governance� The Community also declared its respect 
for the sovereignty of its partners from the Lomé system and their freedom in 
marking out their path of development� In trade relations, a mechanism was 
built in to ensure the stability of the revenues for underdeveloped countries and 
Europe in the International Order124
their exports which were sometimes based on natural resources or agricultural 
monoculture�153
The end of the strategic division of the world into East and West modified the 
Community’s approach to Africa� On the other hand, it worsened the situation 
on the continent where internal conflicts continued and spread to neighbouring 
countries leading to the collapse of state structures which had emerged after the 
end of the colonial period and which for some time functioned well� Without 
limiting its support, the Community and its member states formulated expec-
tations in the domain of governance (i�e� “elements of democracy”), respect of 
human rights and security measures to be taken� This was the result of the passage 
from the EEC, an economic and trade group, to the EU with its stated ambition 
of shaping a better international order� Furthermore, the founding of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) limited the options for applying selective trade pref-
erences that would discriminate against other external countries� The EU’s new 
approach, not only towards Africa but also towards a much broader group of un-
derdeveloped countries was captured in the formula ACP (Africa, the Caribbean 
and the Pacific region), as presented in the Cotonou Agreement of June 2000� 
With the help of this agreement, the EU wished to respond to the marked stagna-
tion in development in this group of countries in comparison with other regions 
where, thanks to internal reform, self-determination and the possibilities created 
by the globalisation of the nineties, significant progress was achieved in terms of 
growth and joining the global economic system�
The Cotonou Agreement had the ambition of combining into one whole the is-
sues related to security (including various means of preventing armed conflict and 
uncontrolled migration), human rights and democracy, development aid aimed at 
combatting poverty (the EU signed up to the Millennium Development Goals of 
the United Nations [UN]), economic and trade cooperation aimed at the improve 
integration of those countries with the global economy and financial support in 
the event of sudden or cyclical drops in export revenues� The Programme from 
Cotonou, negotiated with the countries it was aimed at, was also intended to in-
cline – or perhaps force – the countries of Africa to achieve greater independence, 
to greater independent effort (e�g� reduction in tariffs to reduce protectionism, a 
reduction in easy, demoralising incomes for corrupt, local and nepotistic ruling 
groups)� In this way, it was hoped that the competitiveness of goods produced lo-
cally would increase, as happened in the Asian emerging economies� It was also 
153 K� Kołodziejczyk, Polityka Unii Europejskiej wobec krajów grupy AKP [EU Policy 
towards ACP Countries], in: S� Parzymies (ed�), Dyplomacja czy siła…, op. cit., 
pp� 383–387�
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expected that compliance with WTO regulations would increase� In 2005, the EU 
adopted its first Strategy for Africa, grouping the elements above into four cat-
egories: 1) peace and security, 2) economic growth, 3) social development (with a 
particular emphasis on education and health) and 4) respect for human rights�154 
In keeping with this strategy and influenced by their experiences with the imple-
mentation of the Cotonou Agreement, the EU decided to move on to a new form 
of cooperation with the countries of this region, cooperation on the basis of eco-
nomic partnership agreements� These were an individualised and more demand-
ing version of the Cotonou programme� At the EU–Africa summit in Lisbon in 
December 2008, the majority of African countries rejected this new formula as 
disadvantageous or risky (due to the potential loss of revenue from tariffs, the too 
low level of competitiveness – in practice trade benefits would accrue to the EU 
alone)� Only a part of the ACP countries, including Caribbean countries, decided 
to conclude these Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) agreements�155
The failure of this formula did not influence the EU’s interest in Africa� The 
European Development Fund was still in operation providing non-returnable 
development aid (only in the period 2008–2013 – i�e� during the economic crisis 
in the EU – this support amounted to around 23 billion euro)� The beneficiar-
ies thought this was too little, but the EU complained about the slight results, 
that is the inability of the beneficiaries to make good use of these funds� Not 
only did the EU demonstrate its interest in Africa’s situation, its security and de-
velopment by means of development support, including technical support, and 
stabilising missions carried out within the framework of the European Security 
and Defence Policy (ESDP), but it also participated in regular EU–AU (African 
Union) summits, organised since 2000 (the first being in Cairo; in 2014 in Brus-
sels the leaders of around sixty African and European countries took part, as well 
as the Secretary General of the UN) and on the whole focus on matters of secu-
rity, economics and migration� However, the EU cannot count its Africa policy 
among its overall successes� The failures on this “front” had an endogenous char-
acter, their sources being the specific nature of African culture, its low capability 
154 The adoption of this strategy towards Africa coincided with the resolutions of the 
G-8 summit in Gleneagles (Scotland) in 2005, where the G-7/8 countries considered 
African issues for the first time in history� The decisions of the summit envisaged 
significant debt reduction and increase in development aid, among other things� Four 
of the countries – France, Germany, the UK and Italy – out of the seven entitled to 
vote in financial–economic issues (i�e� without Russia) are EU members� In addition, 
the President of the European Commission participates in G-8 summits�
155 K� Kołodziejczyk, op. cit�, pp� 389–404�
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of mobilising its own mechanisms for growth and numerous, sustained armed 
conflicts that devastated previously stable countries leading them to fail as states� 
These states have undone their previous achievements and blocked chances of 
support not only form the EU but also form other organisations and countries� 
A particularly hopeless period in this respect was the nineties and the beginning 
of the new millennium (conflict in the Great Lakes region, in the Congo, So-
malia, Sudan, Chad and other areas�156 Only recent years have brought a reverse 
tendency which nevertheless remains fragile�
Latin America. For the international position of the EU, relations with Latin 
America have had, above all, the character of sentimental public relations� In 
these relations the EU was able to try out its own soft power� Security matters 
were of little consequence here and economic matters, though significant, were 
not of the greatest urgency� The EU’s interest in Latin America was mainly of a 
historical and cultural nature� Any political goals were connected with the sheer 
ambition of playing a global role, thereby shaping the EU’s international identity� 
While it is true that contemporary Latin America was “created” by the old Eu-
ropean powers – thereby sharing a cultural kinship – the early colonisation was 
followed by early decolonisation and the Latin America quickly came under US 
“protection”� Cultural relations with the countries of southern Europe – Spain, 
Portugal or Italy – have been preserved�
But until the end of the Cold War, Latin America remained under the custody 
of the United States� This happened because of US economic and strategic inter-
ests (counteracting the (perceived) USSR goals of provoking social and political 
revolutions to weaken the position of the United States “on their own doorstep”)� 
After the relaxing of the Cold War corset, this changed� Opportunities appeared 
for a stronger presence of “Old Europe” as well as other overseas regions� The 
newly founded EU was able to test its capabilities to play the role of a “global 
player” in a low-cost and low-risk context� There were several background as-
sumptions here� The countries of Latin America, while not very wealthy, were 
much more developed and stable than the countries of Africa – they were not in 
need of development or humanitarian aid� They also began to seek more room 
156 See J� Milewski, Afryka – półwiecze niepodległości. Czas wielkich wydarzeń i bilansu 
[Africa – A Half-Century of Independence. A Time of Great Events and a Summing 
Up], “Rocznik Strategiczny” [“The Strategic Yearbook”], 2009/2010; and R� Kuźniar, 
Pozimnowojenne dwudziestolecie… [The Two Decades Following the Cold-War…], op. 
cit�, subchapter “Afrykańska kronika kryminalna” [“An African Criminal Chronicle”], 
pp� 282–287�
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for manoeuvre, freedom from the US monopoly of influence in the region� There 
was much resentment in the region towards the Americans who had indulged 
in many dirty practices, from economic exploitation to support of bloody dicta-
torships� The EU was able to showcase its merits and try out its ability to attract 
other countries, to tighten relations and expand influences beyond its immedi-
ate vicinity and in confrontation with the traditional power in the region (the 
United States) as well as powers from Asia who had also headed off to “conquer” 
Latin America (both China and Japan)� It was also an opportunity to check the 
new set of instruments available in the common security and foreign policy� The 
weakness of the EU’s approach to Latin America was the aforementioned lack of 
natural urgency in these relations – normally issuing from geographical proxim-
ity or security issues� From the start this was a hindrance to the EU in building 
up a more serious strategy towards Latin America�
Initially, in the nineties, the EU was able to nurture the hope that the mere in-
tensification of contacts would be enough for Latin America to notice the EU’s 
charm and foster closer long-term ties� For many reasons, the model of integration 
from the EU could have become a road map for the countries and societies of Lain 
America, and the EU could thereby have become a privileged partner� The cultural 
similarity combined with mutual curiosity could have neutralised the distance rep-
resented by the ocean between the continents� Nevertheless, the EU as a whole 
did not have much more to offer its potential junior partner, certainly not enough 
to represent a credible alternative to the United States or to weaken the power of 
Chinese expansion� In view of the WTO regulations, the development of trade 
relations proceeded without preferential treatment for particular relations, as the 
countries of Latin America did not belong to the poorest or most underdeveloped 
countries� There were others more deserving of development support or aid� It is 
true that in the political domain, in 1999, a “strategic partnership” was launched 
and EU–Latin American summits were organised, but in view of the growing 
number of such “partnerships” and the lack of a clear idea of their particular con-
tent, they tended to remain a pleasant but merely diplomatic ritual� And this was 
the case here as well� The EU as a whole did not bring any important “added value” 
to the usual bilateral relations between the two regions�
At first there seemed to be more hope in the cooperation between the EU and 
sub-regional organisations who demonstrated a definite tendency to enter into 
economic integration, in particular Mercosur157 and the Andean Community 
157 Mercosur – the Common Southern Market was founded in 1991 by four countries: 
Argentina, Brasil, Paraguay and Uruguay� Its structure looked uncannily similar to 
the EEC, but in reality the level of internal integration fell way behind that of the EC�
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(Comunidad Andina/CAN)� Cooperation with Mercosur, which consciously 
imitated the EEC, came quickly, at the beginning of Mecosur’s existence, that is 
in 1992� Both groups began adopting common programme documents, and at 
the EU summit in Essen, a decision was taken to create a joint free-trade zone� 
Later talks in this matter ran aground on the issue of the export of agricultural 
goods� A free-trade zone of this kind would not be possible without changes 
in the common agricultural policy of the EC� Talks were postponed until the 
next round of trade negotiations with the WTO (called the Doha Development 
Round), and these talks, as is well known, foundered – above all because of 
discrepancies in positions on trade in agricultural and food products� The EU 
signed a cooperation agreement with the older Andean Community158 in 1993� 
Common issues were trade and combatting the narcotics business� The remote-
ness of the two continents and the specific nature of the issues facing the Andean 
states, as well as issues between those states themselves, meant that there was a 
gradual weakening in contacts between the Andean Community and the EU�
Asia, that is China. Historically speaking, Europe has been strongly present 
in Asia since colonial times as we have mentioned in earlier chapters� This was 
above all not only true of the colonial powers such as Great Britain and France, 
but was also true of Holland or Germany� The historical presence of Europe cov-
ered almost all of Asia (only Japan reserved independence), though China was 
much less affected in virtue of its huge area and population and also because of 
its civilisational uniqueness� When the European powers of Great Britain and 
France were victorious in the Opium Wars in the middle of the XIX century, this 
opened the Chinese market to trade with Europe,159 yet this did not amount to 
European domination over the Qing Empire� What the Chinese saw as their hu-
miliation in the Opium Wars in a subtle way came to burden European–Chinese 
relations in later times�
For the EU’s international identity, its policy towards China and developing 
relations with them was in a sense more important than relations with the rest of 
Asia (everywhere east of the Persian Gulf)� Of course, in 1996 the Asia-Europe 
158 The Andean Community was founded in (as the Andean Group) in 1969 and its 
mission was to become a common market group� However, in view of the difference 
between the member states, from Venezuela to Chile, their cooperation did not 
progress much�
159 Nota bene, the cause of the Opium Wars was the rigorous mercantilism of the Chinese 
authorities, which amounted to blocking European products from their market and 
insisting on payment for Chinese exports in gold or silver� Europeans had difficulties 
preserve a balance of trade, as would be the case in the XXI century�
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Meeting (ASEM) formula was initiated, that is the Asia–Europe Meeting, as a ve-
hicle to develop cooperation between the EU and East Asia� At that time ASEM 
included twenty-five countries� The cooperation focussed on three main areas – 
political, economic and sociocultural� Every two years there were meetings at a 
summit, and, independently of those meetings, meetings at a ministerial level� 
The formula seemed so attractive that there was pressure to extend its scope, 
and the twenty-five countries increased to fifty-one, including Russia, Kazakh-
stan and Mongolia� This was the same as the number of countries in the UN 
at its inception, but in the case of the UN the fifty-one represented the entire 
world� With ASEM’s meagre institutional structure, the formula must have lost 
its focus, ending up being yet another diplomatic ritual devoid of real political 
meaning� At the same time, China began with the Deng Xiaoping reforms at the 
end of the seventies and then from the beginning of the nineties headed towards 
its global destiny� The consequences of this new destiny – different from Mao 
Zedong’s “long march” – quickly became clear to the West including Europe� 
At the beginning, however, the illusion was cherished that China could be fitted 
into the West’s international order� It seemed that the EU wished to undertake 
just that – the growing power of China seemed to be an ideal candidate for the 
constitutional goals of the EU’s international identity: peace and security in ac-
cordance with the UN Charter, international cooperation and the spread of de-
mocracy and improvements in human rights�
In the EU’s approach to China after the Cold War, we may distinguish three 
phases: the nineties, a period leading up to the financial market crisis in the EU 
and today� Unfortunately, with the case of China it is most evident that interna-
tional role of the EU follows the pattern “take-off–culmination–decline”� Even 
the beginning was not good in this case, due to the dramatic event taking place 
shortly before the birth of the EU: the massacre at Tiananmen Square on 4 June 
1989 and the further repressions that ensued� Events in Beijing were in sharp 
contrast to the hope expressed by the changes in the communist bloc, further 
awoken that very day by the victory of the Polish “Solidarity”� Somewhat ear-
lier, it is true, the EEC and China had begun regular trade relations as a result 
of Deng’s reforms, but the final period of the Cold War was not conducive to 
expanding these relations to other areas� In view of the values the Community 
had espoused, it could not avoid strongly condemning the massacre in Tian-
anmen� The Community began expressing its critical attitude to the events in 
China and more broadly on the human rights situation there in the well-known 
“Chinese Resolution” presented at the beginning of the nineties in the Human 
Rights Commission of the UNO (United Nations Organisation)� Beijing consid-
ered this an unacceptable interference in its internal matters and an assault on 
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its prestige�160 At the same time, however, the EU – and particularly individual 
member states – tried to develop relations with China motivated by economic 
interest and the steady opening up of China to the world� Which is why the 
EU adopted an Asian strategy in 1994 and in the following years endorsed fur-
ther documents which reflected greater EU interest in China and the increased 
political significance of China and the external relations of the Community in 
general� Before the decade had come to a close, both sides were the second or 
third economic trading partner for the other, and the level of investments from 
EU countries in China was second only to the United States�161
From the start of the new decade (and new century) EU–Chinese relations 
entered a new phase, not only as a result of the successes of both sides, but also 
in view of a new institution in the form of annual summits according to the for-
mula of a “mature partnership” (document from 2003), thanks to which the EU 
and China were able to act to define areas of common interest and jointly face 
challenges� Indeed, the bilateral relations quickly gained tempo and developed 
thanks to the ongoing dialogue covering as many as twenty-four areas, from hu-
man rights to finance, transport, energy, science, culture, environmental protec-
tion� In this dialogue and attempts at cooperation, there was no lack of difficult 
issues such as atomic non-proliferation (the problem of North Korea), combat-
ting terrorism and organised crime� From the beginning of the more intensive 
phase of EU–China relations, there appeared the issue of the economic and trade 
interests of individual leading EU countries (Germany, France, Great Britain)� 
These separate relations weakened the EU’s overall position and ability to take 
a strong position towards Beijing when the need arose (e�g� when it came to the 
possibility of placing large orders for Airbus aircraft, the “Chinese Resolution” 
from the United Nations Commission on Human Rights was dumped and only 
(little) Denmark formulated a mild resolution on political freedom in China in 
its place� Denmark was principled but had little to lose)� We may say that from 
the nineties on, there began a race between EU countries for pole position in the 
Chinese market where things were of course mainly decided at a political level� 
Somewhat akin to “gold fever” there appeared “China fever”, a fight not for land 
with gold, but for contracts for export to China and investments there� European 
160 The campaign surrounding the resolution was accompanied by considerable media at-
tention and diplomatic manoeuvres at the UN forum� We may note that the resolution – 
in the face of opposition from non-western countries – was never adopted�
161 See J� Rowiński’s excellent chapter: Stosunki Unii Europejskiej z Chinami [EU Relations 
with China], in: S� Parzymies (ed�), Dyplomacja czy siła… [Diplomacy or Power…], 
op. cit�
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concerns and some individual governments seemed even to act contrary to the 
interests of their own markets and employees� The strongly mercantilist policy of 
China meant that the EU states started noting massive trade deficits with China, 
exceeding 150 billion euro annually with turnover exceeding 300 billion euro 
(e�g� in 2007, export from China to the EU was over 230 billion euro, whereas 
in the other direction – a little under 70 billion)�162 Independently of the issue of 
trade deficits, the development of contacts in other areas was important – the 
EU hoped to influence the evolution of the system in China in culture, tourism, 
science and education (including a huge level of student exchange and inter-
university relations)� Until 2008 more or less, both sides were able to count their 
cooperation a “success story”� This success was aided by the lack of geopolitical 
problems which were manifest in Chinese–US relations – for example the issue 
of Taiwan – or in Chinese–Japanese relations� Both sides supported a multi-polar 
international order (with differences of emphasis); both avoided the “unipolar” 
American approach� This difference in approach was particularly in evidence in 
the administration of George Bush and its pursuit of global hegemony, though 
here too the EU was not fully consistent (note the pro-American position of 
Great Britain)� The EU in any case claimed the role of a “global actor”, and at 
that time both sides favoured the model of the triad of poles (together with the 
United States) as the foundation of the new international order�163
The 2008 crisis represented an important turning point for the international 
position of the West and it also meant a strengthening of China’s position and a 
sudden weakening of EU power�164 (More on the consequences of this crisis for 
EU–China relations in the last part of this work�) As a result of China’s rising po-
sition and the internal issues and lower credibility of the EU, issues came to the 
fore which had previously been hidden: issues of human rights (though China 
no longer wished to discuss human rights and was increasingly in a position to 
avoid doing so); an embargo on weapons and military equipment, criticised by 
162 Despite considerable efforts on the part of the EU (and its member states) and the 
promises of China to balance this deficit, little had changed by 2014 when export 
from China to the EU reached a little over 300 billion euro whereas in the other 
direction the figure was 165 billion euro, out of which Germany represented 45%�
163 B� Góralczyk, Unia Europejska – Chiny: najważniejsze stosunki na globie? [The Euro-
pean Union – China: The Most Important Relations in the World?], “Studia Europe-
jskie” [“European Studies”] 2009, no� 2�
164 For more on this see: R� Kuźniar (ed�), Kryzys 2008 a pozycja międzynarodowa 
Zachodu [The 2008 Crisis and the International Position of the West], Scholar, Warsaw, 
2011 (especially the essays by E� Haliżak and J� Rowiński)�
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Beijing as a hangover from the Cold War; the lack of recognition by the EU of the 
Chinese economy as a market economy (China’s infringement of WTO regula-
tions); large trade deficits, provoking the accusation against China of systematic 
mass dumping (tolerated at least if not inspired by the government in Beijing); 
the infringement of intellectual property rights; illegal emigration from China 
(also to Europe), to which the Beijing government turned a blind eye; Europe’s 
worries over Chinese expansion in Africa� All these problems increased as the 
crisis went on and with the divisions within the EU following 2008�
2 The EU on the global stage – the normative aspect
From the moment of its emergence, the EU had the ambition of being a norma-
tive power and in this capacity of creating a better international order� This is a 
recurring motif of the speeches of EU representatives and high-ranking officials 
of member states on various occasion� This is grounded in Europe’s experience, 
in its unusual passage from a continent of wars to a continent of peace, precisely 
thanks to the appearance of the first Community after World War II (in 1951)� 
This ambition is also written into the Maastricht Treaty on the EU, in Articles 2 
and 11 which included statements, we recall, on the EU’s activity for the pres-
ervation of peace and international security in accordance with the UN Charter 
and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) docu-
ments (Helsinki, Paris) on the development of international cooperation and the 
support for the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights� In this 
way the EU built up its international identity through a common security and 
foreign policy� And it really was the case that after the Cold War the EU was that 
force – sometimes the only one – improving the international order, with great 
effort and considerable cost� As has been written, as a regional “post-historical” 
international order, the EU took it upon itself the role of signposting the way for 
the Rest of the World’s development� “Post-historical” – that is developing peace 
and prosperity without great ideological confrontations, without wars, follow-
ing a simple pattern: a combination of a more-or-less liberal democracy and an 
open market economy (see, e�g� F� Fukuyama and R� Cooper)�165 It is easy to point 
165 In his famous 1989 essay The End of History?, Francis Fukuyama predicted that after 
the Cold War, following the model of the EEC, there would be a “common marketisa-
tion” of international life (F� Fukuyama, The End of History?, “The National Interest”, 
1989, no� 16, pp� 3–18)� The well-known British diplomat Robert Cooper wrote that 
Europe (the EU) is a postmodern system of international relations, no longer having 
the use of force at its disposal – a fact which will affect its surroundings according to 
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out the four main areas of EU activity in the character of a normative power: 
economy–trade–finance, human rights, international security, environmental 
protection and climate�
Trade and the economy. In this area the EU felt at ease – after all it had been 
formed and operated with great success as the EEC – a common market� While 
still the EEC, it had become the world’s leading trade power, and since the time 
when ten more countries were added in 2004, it had also become the leading 
power in terms of size of gross domestic product (GDP) (exceeding the United 
States by 1–2%)� The Union in its basic version – as a Community – had the 
international-legal capacity to represent member states in the sphere of interna-
tional relations� It was after all the EC that represented the EU in world trade, in 
negotiating and concluding contracts in the WTO system and in bilateral rela-
tions� The goals of the EU in this area may be summarised in the following triad:
 – The improvement of conditions for one’s own economic growth and expansion;
 –  Establishing the rules for this area, making it stable, predictable, based on a 
contractual foundation, ideally multilateral;
 – Development support for the most underdeveloped countries in the world�
The EU has been an unusually active, collective member of the WTO since the 
latter’s founding� Indeed, it has played a key role, together with the United States, 
in transforming the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) into the 
WTO and in further liberalisation of trade within the framework of the WTO� 
The EU’s approach to this sphere had two tracks: firstly, liberalisation of trade in 
accordance with the provisions of the Uruguay Round (their realisation being 
in stages), and secondly the enforcement of rules by the mechanism of dispute 
resolution in the WTO� Within the framework of the WTO, the EU took part 
in the elimination of the majority of non-tariff limitations, especially in the area 
of agriculture, textiles and garments� It also participated in the liberalisation of 
the service sector, though simultaneously defending its own market with tariff 
instruments� At the same time, it attempted to monitor the respect for intel-
lectual property in the context of international trade (the Trade Related Intel-
lectual Property Rights [TRIPS] understanding), which was of course connected 
the logic of liberal internationalism (spreading democracy and human rights)� See: 
R� Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century, 
Atlantic Press, London, 2003� At the same time Cooper worried that the rest of the 
world would live according to the realist paradigm of the international order (the 
primacy of power politics)�
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to concerns about sustaining competitive advantage in relation to other world 
markets�166
The EU has within the WTO the opinion of an “effective player”, which is the 
result of its experience and size (combined GDP and value of trade)� The EC, 
which represents EU states in the WTO, is keen to resort to the mechanism of 
dispute settlement, especially against the United States (often in the matter of food 
safety or environmental protection in production processes)� This was also ap-
parent in the course of the round of negotiations begun in 2001 concerning trade 
liberations – the Doha Round� This was supposed to be a development round, 
that is the provisions were supposed to be conducive to the development of poor-
er and less developed countries� G-20, in representing less developed countries 
(LDC), demanded significant liberalisation in the trading of agricultural items� 
The EU did not greet this proposal with enthusiasm and this time, together with 
the United States, required the same treatment for trade in industrial goods� After 
a few years (in 2006), negotiations reached a stalemate and multiple attempts to 
revive them came to nothing� In general terms, the balance of the reduction in 
subsidies and tariffs after all stages of the negotiation: the triad EU–US–G-20 
(around 130 countries) did not satisfy everyone to a sufficient degree�167
The EU was also an active participant in international trade and in discus-
sions beyond the WTO system� Its capacity outside the WTO was above all 
thanks to bilateral and multilateral agreements with the majority of countries in 
the world as well as numerous sub-regional groups� These were, as mentioned 
above, various agreements on association, trade, cooperation and support for 
ACP countries, often with a preferential character� Facilitating access to EU mar-
kets and aid was directly tied to expected improvements in the situation of those 
countries in terms of human rights, good governance or specific democratic 
standards� In this way, there was an attempt to “civilise” other countries in the 
world in sense of adopting certain systemic patterns which, it was felt, would 
serve their development� There were also talks, without significant progress, on 
joint free-trade zones with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
Mercosur, the countries of the Persian Gulf and others� All the time the GSP 
166 K� Kołodziejczyk, Ekonomiczne aspekty polityki zewnętrznej Unii Europejskiej [Eco-
nomic Aspects of the External Policy of the European Union], w: S� Parzymies (ed�), 
Dyplomacja czy siła…, op. cit�
167 E� Haliżak, Niepewna przyszłość międzynarodowego systemu handlowego [The Uncer-
tain Future of the International System of Trade], “Rocznik Strategiczny” [“The Strate-
gic Yearbook”], 2003/2004; idem, Tendencje w handlu międzynarodowym [Tendencies 
in International Trade], “Rocznik Strategiczny” 2005/2006�
7 The EU on the Global Stage 135
was in operation for underdeveloped countries with a lack of diversity in export� 
Financially, the EU was (and remains) the world’s greatest source of development 
aid (around 60% of the world’s total)� Support is granted via the European De-
velopment Fund, as well as through the UN, OECD, WTO and HIPC (Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries), that is a mechanism for debt reduction for the poor-
est countries, agreed within the framework of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), World Bank and G-7�
EU efforts to improve the situation of all the poorest states in the world, what 
was called the “international division of labour”, did not have a merely moral mo-
tivation� The aim was also to return to the world a certain multi-polar balance in 
the context of the challenge of the near-hegemonic position of the United States 
at that time� An example of this effort was the Lisbon strategy adopted by the EU 
in March 2000� This was the EU’s response to globalisation which opened it to 
stronger competition, not only from the United States but also from new centres 
of growth, especially in Asia� Without an effective response, job losses might have 
followed, leading to poverty and social disturbance as well as the ultimate threat 
to the stability of democracy in EU countries� The Lisbon strategy assumed that 
the EU’s social model could be defended by preserving competitiveness through 
innovation due in turn to increased investment in R&D, focussed especially on the 
acquisition of competitive advantage in the so-called knowledge economy� The ap-
propriate investments, reforms and educational programmes were to help sustain 
economic growth, employment and society cohesion� There was an official decla-
ration that the EU would surpass the United States in the above respects within a 
decade� Ultimately this goal was not achieved but the effort was not wasted� There 
was a similar intention behind the creation in 1999 of a common currency – the 
euro� Of course, as mentioned above, this was above all a political project serving 
tighter integration within the Community, but we should not ignore its external 
significance� The euro was to be the EU’s “coat of arms” for external relations en-
suring a better place in the global economy, trade and finance� It was to bring seri-
ous changes in global finance, that is to bring an end to the near monopoly of the 
dollar in global financial markets� Until the financial crisis beginning in 2008, these 
efforts were very successful – it was precisely then that the euro became the first 
currency of international transactions and the second for reserves� The crisis weak-
ened the position of the euro and the trust placed in it, a topic we shall return to�
European speciality – human rights. If there was an area where the EU became 
for a moment a global power, it was human rights� This aspect of EU international 
identity was recorded in Paragraph 5, Article 11 of the Maastricht Treaty on a 
common security and foreign policy (intended precisely to serve the support for 
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democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and basic freedoms)� The 
fall of communism and the end of the Cold War, taken as a victory for the idea of 
freedom and human rights, created in the nineties (sometimes called the “decade 
of human rights”) an opportune moment for the EU’s offensive in this area�168 
Its activity for human rights moved in many directions and had many aspects� 
Firstly, let us recall the significance accorded by the EU to these issues in the 
process of enlargement to post-communist countries – human rights were one of 
the five Copenhagen criteria for membership� Secondly, the question of human 
rights was a key point in the programme of European Neighbourhood Policy, 
though in view of the cultural circumstances of the EU’s neighbourhood, the EU’s 
efforts were rather ineffective (sometimes not effective at all)� Thirdly, EU postu-
lates on human rights and democracy were present in relations with much more 
remote countries, in the new generation of partnership and cooperation agree-
ments (for trade and aid) with LDC, particularly at the beginning of the nineties�
The global stage par excellence for the EU’s activity for human rights was of 
course the United Nations� This engagement and the capabilities of the EU in 
this area became evident during the World Conference on Human Rights in Vi-
enna in June 1993� The ambitious programme adopted there – to a great extent 
the result of the efforts of the EU and her member states – became the bible of 
human rights for the period following the Cold War� The achievements of the 
Conference included establishing the office of UN High Commissioner for Hu-
man Rights and the principle that the level of respect for human rights in any 
country (especially when those rights are infringed) is a legitimate concern of 
the entire international community� (This principle does not contradict the prin-
ciple of non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states�169) From that 
moment on, the EU was seen to be unusually active at the UN Human Rights 
Commission� In the nineties, the EU represented the driving force of the Com-
mission, often acting as an icebreaker towards the indifference or resistance of 
groups of countries towards individual human rights’ issues� The work of the EU 
was dynamically coordinated by the rotating presidency� The EU also had the task 
of seeking allies for various positions and initiatives which were to become the 
subject of negotiation and finally resolutions of the Commission� The EU drafted 
the majority of its resolutions concerning the human rights’ situation in specific 
countries where serious infringements had taken place – politically most chal-
168 For more on this: R� Kuźniar, Pozimnowojenne dwudziestolecie…, op. cit., pp� 202–221�
169 Z� Kędzia, The Vienna World Conference on Human Rights: Failure or Milestone in 
Human History?, “International Geneva Yearbook”, 1994�
7 The EU on the Global Stage 137
lenging was the case of China� The EU’s strong suit was also subject-based resolu-
tions concerning among other things the death penalty, women’s rights, political 
rights and some social rights�170 It was active in using special procedures, above 
all concerning complaints (Procedure 1503)� The vast majority of rapporteurs (on 
specific topics or countries) were also working at the initiative of the EU or its 
members states; the EU not only initiated their appointment but also ensured 
them adequate funding� Since the EU is a bloc of countries with a large combined 
economy, it could take steps safely because any countries who felt “affected” by 
EU resolutions would be reluctant to resort to retaliatory measures�
The EU’s engagement was to have key significance for the creation of the Inter-
national Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague� Without the EU, the Court would 
not have been established, since it had powerful opponents hindering (directly 
or indirectly) the negotiations leading to its establishment – opponents that in-
cluded the United States, Russia and China� In the end, thanks to the persistence 
of the EU, the statute of the ICC was adopted at the close of the Rome confer-
ence in 1998 (with the United States, China, Iraq, Israel – an unlikely quartet – 
among the seven countries voting against)� In the treaty establishing the Court, 
a high bar of ratification was envisaged – sixty ratifications� Once again, thanks 
to the exceptional diplomatic efforts of the EU (persuading many countries in 
the world), obstacles were overcome quickly� The ICC began its activity� Other 
UN treaties which face a much lower threshold of ratifications sometimes wait a 
much longer period to come into effect�171
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention had its strong supporters in the 
EU, even if not unanimous support was often from leading countries� Alongside 
the United States and Canada, EU countries were the driving force for accepting 
this doctrine as a principle of international relations� The colonial roots of these 
practices hindered acceptance of this principle, as well as controversies surround-
ing the intentions and means of application and scepticism or opposition from 
many non-Western countries� The post-Cold-War laboratory for formulating 
and implementing the doctrine of humanitarian intervention was the conflict in 
Yugoslavia, with successful intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995) and 
a failed intervention in Kosovo (1999)� The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
170 J� Starzyk-Sulejewska, Stosunki Unii Europejskiej z Organizacją Narodów Zjedno-
czonych. Podstawy prawne i instytucjonalne oraz wybrane dziedziny współpracy [EU 
Relations with the UN. Legal and Institutional Bases and Selected Areas of Coopera-
tion], Scholar, Warsaw, 2015, pp� 217–224�
171 For example, the International Covenants on Human Rights required ten years to 
gather thirty-five ratifications�
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(NATO), with the sturdy support of Great Britain, France and Germany – that is 
the EU powers –, took the responsibility for the operational–military dimension 
of the doctrine, whereas the EU as a whole began specialising in the “civilian as-
pect” or in something which was called “humanitarian support” (support with-
out the use of force)� This role was much emphasised not only in the Balkans but 
also in other regions in the world� The critical reception received by the so-called 
humanitarian intervention conducted by NATO in Kosovo inclined sections of 
the international community to look for another formula for political–legal reac-
tions to dramatic humanitarian situations or long-term abuses of human rights� 
Once again, though the initiative came from the Canadian government, we owe 
the further steps and the successful conclusion to the decisive actions of the en-
tire EU and its main member states� As we know, the final shape for the principle 
of intervention is the principle of responsibility for defence, accepted at the UN 
Summit of 2005�172
International security. At this point we should mention a caveat: by interna-
tional security we are not concerned with the role of the EU in the domain of 
international security, in general, but only with reference to selected normative 
aspects in a global context� The EU is a valuable system of security for its mem-
bers and plays an important role regarding its regional neighbours, but these 
basic aspects of its activity for security have already been discussed and will 
be again in subsequent parts of this work� As we recall, the Maastricht Treaty 
granted the newly formed EU competencies in this area� These competencies 
were detailed in Article 11 on the goals of a common security and foreign policy, 
which included not only “to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways”, but 
also “to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with 
the principles of the United Nations Charter” and the documents of the OSCE� 
In the end, however, international security sensu largo did not turn out to be the 
EU’s “element”; the EU emphasised interest only with respect to a few selected 
issues, taking a comprehensive approach only to the security of its own region 
and the immediate international vicinity� The leading role in security matters 
172 The Canadian government initiated the establishment of a special international Com-
mission to deal with humanitarian intervention following the universally criticised 
NATO intervention in the former Yugoslavia, in response to the Kosovo situation, 
in 1999� The Commission prepared a report on the matter (September 2001), which 
became the starting point for a full reform project by the UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan (2005)� Further work was done at the General Assembly of the UN and the 
essence of the Commission’s work was adopted in a document at the UN 60th An-
niversary Summit (September 2005), becoming thereby a principle of the UN�
7 The EU on the Global Stage 139
belonged to the world powers (including two EU members) and organisations 
established explicitly for this purpose (the UN, NATO, the O/CSCE, etc�)�
Among the few normative and global security issues of interest to the EU was 
the ban on the use of force, with two exceptions envisaged in UN Charter (self-
defence and authorisation by the Security Council)� The EU as a whole was in 
this matter categorical and unambiguous – any international operation aimed at 
security must have a Security Council mandate� So it has been for all EU mis-
sions, though only a few have included the probable use of force� The principal 
position of the EU in this matter was most evident in the time of the dramatic 
dispute with the United States about the “means of solving the Iraq problem” in 
2002–2003� The EU as a whole supported respecting Security Council Resolution 
1441 of November 2002, including the primacy of the UN and its principles over 
any unilateral pursuit of military “solutions” (meeting of the foreign ministers of 
the EU in January 2003)� Unfortunately, just a short time later, a few countries of 
the EU broke ranks and supported the military operation of the United States�
The EU has not had the opportunity to participate in disarmament negotia-
tions� Before the EU had no competencies in this area, and then there was no op-
portunity because for many years there were no serious disarmament negotiations 
or arms control negotiations (besides START in US–Russia relations)� The EU, 
not as a side or a “front” but as a group of countries, did however make its mark 
in the context of two headline issues and understandings which did have relate 
to disarmament� We refer to the Mine Ban Treaty of 1997 and to the 2007–2008 
Convention on Cluster Munitions� In both cases, a large group of member states 
played a significant role in bringing these initiatives to a successful finish� Without 
EU support – as in the case of the ICC – success might have been impossible due 
to the resistance of world powers (including Russia, China, the United States) and 
other states not enjoying the highest opinion in the world� The EU was, however, 
formally present – alongside France, Germany and Great Britain – in negotiations 
concerning the limits to Iran’s nuclear programme� The EU foreign ministers ad-
dressed this matter and presented a compromise proposal to solve this problem 
(by way of diplomacy, in contrast to Washington which constantly repeated that 
“all options are on the table”, meaning the readiness to resort to military force)� 
The High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana 
was particularly active, frequently representing the EU in meetings in this area and 
sometimes putting forward proposals on behalf of the Security Council�173
173 See, for example: “Rocznik Strategiczny” [“The Strategic Yearbook”], 2006/2007, 
p� 132�
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The EU’s engagement in the so-called global war on terror was characterised 
by an emphasis on international law, above all when considering the use of force 
and the manner of its use, as well as banning torture (in both matters there were 
ongoing disputes with the United States)� However, regardless of this dispute, 
the EU was an active participant in international efforts to combat terrorism� 
Numerous bi- and multilateral understandings and agreements, many under the 
auspices of the UN, covered the practical cooperation of secret services and po-
lice, blocking the financing of terrorist activity or counteracting their attitudes 
or ideas�
In the middle of the last decade, the EU was occupied with the problem of the 
reform of the UN, above all the Security Council, for around two years� Every 
so often the UN goes back to this issue in view of the drastic underrepresen-
tation of new powers or regions in this main organ of the UN responsible for 
peace and international security (in the case of Africa we are talking about the 
entire continent of over fifty states)� The reform of the Security Council would 
have to begin with its enlargement to include new permanent members� Almost 
everyone in the UN agrees that this is the right step� The EU as a whole has not 
taken up a clear position in this matter, but the matter does affect the EU di-
rectly in two ways, the first of which being Germany’s possible permanent mem-
bership of the Security Council� Germany’s aspirations are generally met with 
understanding both inside and outside Europe, in the context of the possible 
reform of the Security Council to include a greater number of states� It might 
have seemed that a good moment was the general reform of the UN prepared 
by the Secretary General before the Jubilee Summit of 2005� Germany was con-
sidered for permanent membership of the Security Council along with four to 
six other countries which had also sought membership� The German candidacy 
was supported by two other permanent Council members from the EU – France 
and the UK� However, an opposed coalition was set up by … Italy, the coalition 
being mainly comprised of non-EU states� Italy was concerned that its position 
would be weakened in the event of German membership of the Security Coun-
cil� Italy’s behaviour was that of the proverbial “dog in a manger”, and though 
unpleasant for Germany (both countries being members of the EU and NATO 
and the countries had been World War II allies), it was not a decisive factor in 
the final fiasco� The enlargement plans were scuppered by US opposition�174 The 
174 In the event of Security Council expansion, Germany was a certainty – alongside 
Brazil, India and Japan – for permanent-member status� This quartet was to be joined 
by one or more members from Africa�
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second aspect of the Security Council reform which directly affected the EU was 
the idea – appearing in various expert or political circles in the EU – that the EU 
itself might become a permanent member of the Security Council� This odd idea 
actually acquired a measure of support and recognition, including the support of 
the European Parliament� It was a strange and misguided idea for at least three 
reasons� Firstly, it would require a deep revision of the UN Charter to allow for 
membership of non-states such as international organisations – and such a revi-
sion was practically impossible� Secondly, it was tied to the idea that France and 
the UK would give up their seats for the EU� Thirdly, it would be hard to imagine 
the EU formulating a position at the Security Council, since there are already 
such deep divisions in the EU, exhibited for example by the Iraq War (2003) or 
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine (2014)� In the end, the initiative fell away for 
the same reason as the question of German membership – the opposition of the 
United States to the reform�175
However, the EU did achieve success in its efforts to create an organ within 
the UN responsible for failed states� The phenomenon of failed states appeared 
after the Cold War and by the end of the nineties represented a serious interna-
tional security problem�176 Kofi Annan decided to address the issue in the afore-
mentioned reform programme of the UN� The EU, taking into consideration 
its international ambitions and the colonial past of its largest members, was a 
natural choice in the area of failed states within the framework of the UN� In 
the final negotiations, the EU strongly supported the idea of setting up a new 
Peacebuilding Commission as the UN’s antidote to the problem of failed states� 
When this idea came to be realised, on the basis of the final summit document of 
2005 and later Security Council decisions, the EU took care of the Commission 
and its operations as its main supporter and sponsor; the EU took part in all the 
sittings of the Commission�177 Once the Commission began its work, it appeared 
that the EU was the most involved participant in its tasks, especially in its peace 
175 More detailed discussion may be found in: J� Starzyk-Sulejewska, op. cit�, pp� 262–274; 
J� Symonides, Organizacja Narodów Zjednoczonych: geneza, podstawa, cele i zasady 
funkcjonowania [The United Nations: its Genesis, Foundations, Goals and Operat-
ing Principles], in: J� Symonides (ed�), Organizacja Narodów Zjednoczonych. Bilans 
i perspektywy [The United Nations. A Summing Up and Perspectives for the Future], 
Scholar, Warsaw 2006, pp� 47–51�
176 More on this in: S� Bieleń, Państwa upadłe [Failed States], in: J� Symonides (ed�), 
Organizacja…, op. cit�
177 Formal membership of the Peacebuilding Commission was limited to specific groups 
of UN member states�
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missions in several countries (above all in Africa)�178 The Commission in some 
sense replaced the earlier United Nations Trusteeship Council and the functions 
of the two organs were very similar so the combined experience of the Trustee-
ship Council and the EU was extremely valuable�
In the European Security Strategy adopted in December 2003, the EU took 
on the task of creating “An international order based on effective multilateral-
ism”� This was to mean the strengthening of international institutions and legal 
principles as well as global and regional international organisations, especially 
the UN� When the Strategy was adopted, the EU took seriously the resulting 
responsibilities�
Climate change. The protection of the earth’s climate was the next key area of 
EU involvement on the global stage, an area affecting the entire international 
community, if not, to put it with more pathos, the whole of humanity� At the 
same time, it was in this area that the EU was quickly to learn that the “balance 
of power” in the world had changed and not in the way the classical understand-
ing of that phrase would have envisaged� The seventies witnessed a rise in global 
awareness of climate change� This was partly due to globalisation processes in 
themselves which led to economic growth in large and hitherto weak countries 
such as China, India or Brazil� These countries – but not only they – entered into 
a stage of industrialisation (paradoxically in parallel to the West’s de-industriali-
sation)� This growth led to increased CO2 emissions� On the other hand, thanks 
to the efforts of a more aware section of world public opinion and the activities 
of various non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – quickly followed by the 
UN – the problem of global warming became a subject of international discus-
sions and conferences� The year 1997 was announced to have been the warmest 
year in the recorded history of the earth� And subsequent years were to see new 
records� In the international community, there was quickly achieved a consensus 
that the global warming is increasing and it has a human-made character (hu-
man activity is at least a contributing factor)� Consensus was also reached on the 
consequences: agriculture will be affected, as will access to water and food all 
leading to mass migration� The melting of the glaciers and the polar ice-caps will 
cause rising sea-levels which may render populated areas uninhabitable – certain 
islands being particularly under threat, their populations facing relocation to the 
mainland�179
178 J� Starzyk-Sulejewska, op. cit�, pp� 303–325�
179 D� Brodawka, Zmiany klimatu jako nowe zagrożenie bezpieczeństwa [Climate Change 
as a New Security Threat], Fundacja Studiów Międzynarodowych, Warsaw, 2009�
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The EU’s more intensive activity in this area commenced with the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol (complementing the framework convention of 1992)� The Protocol con-
tained certain obligations in the area of CO2 emissions, which were nevertheless 
assessed as inadequate to stop observable climate change� It was estimated that the 
emission limits would be exceeded by around 2030 (representing an average rise 
of 2 degrees Celsius in the earth’s temperature from the 1990 level)� Since 1997, 
the EU has been the main driving force for the adoption of more far-reaching 
commitments� Besides limits for EU states, global limits are of course also at is-
sue� The basic arena for the ongoing battle has become the annual climate confer-
ence organised by the UN� Similarly to the case of the WTO, a triangle has been 
established: the first “corner” consisting of the EU, the UN’s IPCC (the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change) and a large army of experts and NGOs; the 
second corner is made up of a group of large countries acting as “brakes” on the 
process – the United States, China, India and others; the third corner is a group 
of less-developed “complainers” hiding behind the backs of the second group, but 
who might agree even to significant new limits if they were provided with some 
form of financial incentive for their countries and local elites� The Kyoto Protocol 
was to elapse in 2012, so first of all the EU sought to ratify an ongoing version 
of the Protocol and then to extend the commitments of signatories� The EU’s ef-
forts were sometimes described as a cunning effort to hit the competitiveness of 
emerging and rival markets� Some legitimation of the EU’s efforts was given by 
the Nobel Peace Prize awarded in 2007 to the Climate Panel�180
The determination of the EU and certain other participants of international 
relations, coinciding as they have with a broadly favourable international pub-
lic opinion, made success seem likely� It was assumed that further conferences 
would bring the global community closer to the necessary decisions� However, 
the process suddenly fell apart at what was to be the culminating phase in 
Copenhagen, in December 2009� The conflict surrounding the size of emission 
reductions and the corresponding timetable turned out to be insurmountable� 
From the perspective of the EU’s international standing the problem was even 
more serious� Here was the EU’s great project (the reduction of emissions from 
their 1990 levels by 30% by 2020 and by 50% by 2050), and it had fallen apart be-
cause of a secret deal struck between the United States and China (the two main 
polluters of the earth) without the knowledge of the EU� Chinese nationalism 
180 The Climate Panel shared the prize with the former vice president of the United 
States, Al� Gore, also an active personality for many years in this domain� A� Giddens, 
Polityka zmiany klimatu [The Politics of Climate Change], “Dziennik� Gazeta Prawna”, 
9 November 2009�
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and American egoism combined to conquer Europe’s defence of the world’s 
interests (the plan of reduction was accompanied by financial support for un-
derdeveloped countries to develop their technological readiness to achieve the 
commitments)�181 Washington and Beijing’s rather ostentatious disregard of the 
EU and its material and diplomatic efforts was a clear signal as to where the lim-
its of the EU’s international role lay�
181 S� Parzymies, Unia Europejska wobec kryzysu finansowego i groźby zmian klimatycz-
nych [The European Union Responds to the Financial Crisis and the Threat of Climate 
Change], in: “Rocznik Strategiczny” [“Strategic Yearbook”], 2009/2010, pp� 154–156; 
K� Niklewicz, Psują klimat [They are messing up the climate], “Gazeta Wyborcza”, 
19–20 December 2009�
8  The EU as a Global Actor?  
A Lost Opportunity
The description of the European Union (EU) as a global actor might only have 
appeared explicitly in the EU narrative at the end of the nineties, but all its actions 
from the Maastricht declaration on were moving in this direction� The attainment 
of the critical mass necessary to make the European dream of greatness – the 
vision of a global power – a reality became discernible at the end of the last decade 
of the XX century� At that time, the EU’s development and its successes, as well 
as changes in the international situation, seemed to indicate this as a possibility 
or even an unavoidable necessity� Aside from the internal integration that the EU 
underwent during the nineties (in terms of international relations and security, 
economic and monetary union including the introduction of the euro, the area 
of freedoms, security and justice),182 the start of the next decade provided three 
strong arguments for considering the Union to be a power� The first was the suc-
cessful expansion of the EU to include ten new member states, which had been 
thought of as the main challenge facing the EU and whose success was rightly 
considered to constitute the “unification” of Europe� The second was provided by 
a new form of integration: the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – 
the EU’s answer to the war in the Balkans� The third was the endeavour to place 
the EU on a firmer institutional footing by signing a treaty that would consolidate 
it, also an expression of its ambitions in terms of international relations�
From the end of the nineties, the EU began to explicitly define itself as a global 
power (and to be considered as such by others), and as one of the three pillars 
supporting the new, global international order� Countless texts on the topic have 
been published and the very term has come to be part of the EU narrative� Tony 
Blair, the British prime minister and one of the most eloquent and interesting 
European leaders of that era, said in Warsaw on 6th October 2000 that Europe 
remains “a unique combination of that which is intergovernmental and which is 
transnational” and “thanks to its economic and political strength can be a super-
power – a superpower, but not a superstate”�183 While the EU was getting ready 
to put on the “heavy armour”, resistance came from an unexpected quarter� Its 
182 Z� Czachór, Zmiany i rozwój w systemie Unii Europejskiej po Traktacie z Maastricht 
[Changes and Development in the European Union System after the Maastricht Treaty], 
Atla 2, Wrocław, 2004�
183 S� Parzymies (ed�), Integracja europejska…, op. cit., Warsaw, 2008, pp� 430–431�
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attempt to become a global player was opposed by its closest partner – who had 
previously played the role of the protector and leader of the West – the United 
States�
1 The younger brother does not abandon his elder sister
The United States had become Europe’s protector unexpectedly, despite their ear-
lier doctrinal attitude to the Old Continent� Ideologia Americana meant a wide-
ranging isolation of “New World” politics from Europe’s rotten ways, left behind 
by the generations that built America’s greatness�184 This was the way things stood 
for the whole of the XIX century and it continued to hold between the world 
wars� After all, America declined to join the League of Nations using the excuse 
of not wanting to get involved with the internal affairs of Europe – affairs that 
were so full of intrigue, nationalist squabbles and vying for primacy� In truth, 
Washington did not want to limit its options by accepting the restriction con-
tained in the League’s Covenant� It should also be noted that America entered 
the two world wars in Europe not in the name of the righteousness or security 
of one of the parties but because it was attacked�185 That it took on the leader-
ship role in the West as a result of World War II was quite natural and happened 
under the banner of the Atlantic Alliance that was born at that time and whose 
foundation became the Atlantic Charter signed by Roosevelt and Churchill, the 
leaders of the main English-speaking Allies, on the 14th of August 1941� Even if 
the reason why Western Europe became an American protectorate during the 
Cold War was far from “normal” (i�e� the threat of communism), it led to the 
formation of quite natural and comprehensive links between these two branches 
of that civilisation� On the basis of a shared model of economic, social and politi-
cal development, as well as of the values that justified it, there arose an objective 
interdependence which both parties wanted to strengthen and which had no 
analogue in any other part of the world� Its strength extended to all areas of life: 
economy and trade, policy and strategy as well as culture� The Atlantic Alliance 
became the share space in which they existed�
The end of the Cold War appeared to presage a simple continuation of this 
harmonious cooperation – with victory over the shared threat a confirmation of 
its logic� It was to be expected that the Europeans would recover some freedom 
of movement on the international scene, given that the immanent threat was 
gone� Both parties, the Americans and the western Europeans, worked together 
184 T� Żyro, Ideologia Americana, Łośgraf, Warsaw, 2002�
185 By Germany in World War I and by Japan, an ally of Germany, in World War II�
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to “finish up” issues connected to the end of the Cold War: including German 
unification (most importantly), support for change in political systems in Central 
European countries and assistance with the fall of the Soviet Union� Cooperation 
between Western Europe and America was also mostly trouble free when it came 
to the war in Yugoslavia� In 1990, at the end of the Cold War, the parties signed the 
Transatlantic Declaration that announced the development of close relations in 
security, trade and the support for democracy� In Washington, it was understood 
that relying on Europe and having her as a junior partner helped to strengthen 
America’s global position� This belief was well expressed by Richard Holbrooke – 
the number three in the State Department – in an article published at the time in 
“Foreign Affairs”, entitled America: A European Power�186 America was to watch 
over European integration, the spread of stability and democracy to the former 
communist bloc, and to stabilise relations with a post-Soviet Russia� This suited 
the Europeans even in the mid-1990s� The New Transatlantic Agenda signed in 
December 1995 reflected the widely shared interests of both the parties, with an 
attempt to draw the EU into increasing its contribution to the Western leadership 
of the world� In short: an America supported by Europe� This was also the case for 
security issues, where both sides were looking for a convenient formula allowing 
greater autonomy and increased efforts from Europe� At that time, this kind of 
formula was provided by the idea of the European Security and Defence Identity 
within North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was to find its practi-
cal expression in the form of the Combined Joint Task Force – to be used by the 
Western European Union with the permission of the Atlantic Alliance in situa-
tions in which the United States did not wish to participate in a military operation�
Throughout the nineties, EU confidence rose as did its sense of self thanks to 
cooperation in foreign affairs and security while the United States saw a growth 
in triumphalist tendencies which wanted to make permanent the “unipolar mo-
ment” that was symbolic of the decade� The growing strength of the EU caused 
disquiet in the United States both in terms of its implications for America’s un-
questioned leadership and for the unity of NATO� A discrepancy was revealed 
in views of the transatlantic community and its role in the international order� 
In the months before the new strategic plan for the Alliance was signed in April 
1999, the Americans became openly confrontational, wanting to put as much 
focus as possible in the new document on the idea of a global alliance whose 
main instrument would be out of area operations (i�e� outside of Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty) – an idea of an alliance that could intervene anywhere in the 
186 America: A European Power, “Foreign Affairs”, March/April 1995�
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world and without necessarily having support from the United Nations (UN) Se-
curity Council�187 Europe was split on this idea� Many of the allies were opposed 
to the idea as an instrument of Pax Americana – an expression of American 
unilateralism that came to the fore towards the end of Bill Clinton’s second term� 
The calls for a benign sheriff or the indispensable nation (M� Albright) coming 
out the United States sounded ominously like hyperpuissance (H� Védrine) in 
Paris� France was not alone in feeling troubled� The sense of anxiety grew with 
the arrival in the White House of George W� Bush’s Republican team, who saw 
NATO as a tool box from which one could pick and choose what was needed at 
any given moment� With Washington doing the choosing of course� At this time 
the EU was advocating a world which, although maybe not quite multipolar, 
would be balanced and based on institutional multilateralism so that the use of 
direct military force would become gradually less necessary� G�W� Bush and his 
associates saw things totally differently�188
2 Security disputes
War with Iraq� Already in the nineties, during the time of Bill Clinton’s presi-
dency, there were conflicts between the EU and Washington regarding security 
agreements of worldwide scope� The EU nations which took part in negotiating 
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty supported due diligence in deter-
mining the details of the agreement while Americans were putting on the pres-
sure and loudly rebuking those they saw as slowly down work on the agreement 
(i�e� France)� In the end, all the EU states signed and ratified the Treaty while in 
Washington it failed to pass through the ratification stage due to the lack of sup-
port from the administration and until today has not come into force�189 The cre-
ation of the International Criminal Court ended similarly� Both the Europeans 
and the Americans were quite active in the negotiating process but, while the for-
mer actually wanted it to be created, the latter wanted to ensure that it was creat-
ed but in such a way as to be largely ineffective� In the end, the Court was created 
(Rome 1998) but G�W� Bush withdrew from the agreement that his predecessor 
187 R� Kupiecki, NATO u progu XXI wieku [NATO at the Turn of the XXI Century], 
ASKON, Warsaw, 2000, pp� 87–116�
188 R� Kuźniar, Pozimnowojenne dwudziestolecie…, op. cit�, pp� 118–123�
189 Independently of that, the hastiness of the United States and technical support for 
China in terms of computerised methods for maintenance of nuclear capability led 
to India’s “rebellion” which resulted in it acquiring nuclear weapons, followed by 
Pakistan�
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had delayed signing� Washington wanted to make sure that the American mili-
tary or political leaders responsible for the use of force abroad could never be 
sent to The Hague� Both these examples show the growing discord between the 
United States and EU regarding significant international security issues� These 
differences became most visible in practical terms in relation to the fight against 
terrorism� What was for the United States a global war on terror that called for 
the use of the military and the abrogation of international law, including the UN 
Charter and the Geneva conventions (in the case of Guantanamo, for example), 
was thought of by the Europeans in terms of tackling terrorism with the use of 
specialised services and within the framework of national and international law� 
The Europeans accused Washington of a “simplistic view of the war on global 
terrorism” (Védrine, again)�
Equally significant differences driven by the vital security interests of America’s 
European allies appeared even within the EU in relation to the American Ballistic 
Missile Defence project� They concerned the early version of the project from the 
late nineties and the period of the G�W� Bush administration� The essence of the 
project was to provide a missile shield for US territory as well as for large military 
US bases abroad and the military operations carried out there� This would mean, 
however, establishing distinct security standards within the territory of the At-
lantic Alliance and would threaten the Alliance’s internal unity� The security of 
the United States, hidden behind the shield, would have become detached from 
that of Europe� In addition, the Europeans feared that steps taken by the United 
States in this direction, including its withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty190 would lead to a breakdown of the system of arms control agreements 
which could provoke Russia to increase spending on weapons with deleterious 
effects for the security of neighbouring Europe�
The security conflict between Europe and America came to a head because of 
the Iraq war� As became quickly apparent, the purpose of the war was to ensure 
America’s position of global hegemony, with Europe in the inferior position of 
a vassal in transatlantic relations� When G�W� Bush declared in the first half of 
2002 that the United States intended to intervene militarily in Iraq, it seemed 
at first that this was a continuation of the war against terrorism, responding to 
the September 11, 2001, attacks and whose first stage had been the interven-
tion in Afghanistan aimed at the headquarters of the organisation responsible 
for the attacks� The Europeans were united in declaring “We are all Americans” 
190 The agreement signed by the United States and the USSR in the seventies limiting 
antimissile facilities to one for each of the superpowers�
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(Le Monde title)� Although the United States did not seek NATO support, due 
to their experience in Yugoslavia in 1999 and even though the 11th September 
attacks were considered to fall under Article 5, Europe gave strong diplomatic 
support for this intervention starting in October 2001� Shortly afterwards, how-
ever, in January 2002, Bush declared the existence of an Axis of Evil in which he 
included Iraq, Iran and North Korea� This move indicated Washington’s warlike 
intentions for whom the Afghanistan campaign was too small to satisfy its ambi-
tion and capability of becoming a global hegemon�
From spring 2002, the US administration stopped was about its aim of a mili-
tary solution to the Iraq problem� It accused Hussain’s regime of hiding weapons 
of mass destruction and supporting terrorism (i�e� of sustaining relations with 
Al-Qaida, which carried out the 9/11 attacks)� Washington tried to convince its 
European allies to join the war� The EU as a whole and most of the members states 
were opposed, as was the overwhelming majority of the international community� 
The Bush administration was surprised by that reaction and took the matter to 
the Security Council, counting on its support for the use of force� The UN Secu-
rity Council, however, introduced a strict weapons control regime with an inves-
tigative mission, while preserving the right to determine how to resolve the issue� 
No one had the right to intervene without its consent� America made no secret of 
its intention to ignore the Council’s decision� It became clear that for Washington, 
the war against Iraq was intended as a demonstration of hegemonic power to be 
witnessed by the rest of the world and not a continuation of the war against terror-
ism or an attempt to take control of supposed stores of weapons of mass destruc-
tion� The administration’s intentions were clear if you considered who was there 
in the administration at the time – representatives of arms and petrol industries, 
advocates of the use of force unimpeded by law and neo-conservatives proclaim-
ing the necessity of global military hegemony for the United States� Policy docu-
ments have only confirmed this interpretation� A particularly clear manifesto for 
military unilateralism and the pursuit of American hegemony was contained in 
the US National Security Strategy, announced in September 2002� This astonish-
ing document marginalised Europe and relations with European allies�
The problems connected to the Iraq war started for Europe when the Americans, 
irritated by the doubts and objections voiced by many of the EU states, decided to 
use the “divide and conquer” strategy� The distinction between a New and an Old 
Europe was invented� New Europe was deemed to be made up of dynamic and 
brave “new democracies” – such as the very pro-American Poland – that were 
candidates for EU membership and about to join, with negotiations having closed 
in December 2002, as well as other states, primarily Great Britain – traditionally 
close to the United States – and Spain� It was they that supported the United States 
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in its pursuit of war, as expressed in the letter of the eight signed on 30th Janu-
ary 2003� In this letter, the leaders of eight nations, including Great Britain, Po-
land and Spain, expressed support for Bush’s policy on Iraq�191 The letter broke 
ranks with the EU even though just three days earlier, on 27th January, the foreign 
ministers of the EU and of the countries that had just completed accession ne-
gotiations adopted a declaration setting out the EU position on the matter� The 
declaration reiterated EU support for resolution 1441 RB which established that it 
was the UN Charter and Security Council that would have the main role in solv-
ing the Iraq problem� The Americans didn’t just break EU unity; they decided to 
alter its internal balance of power by attacking the Paris–Berlin axis, both those 
capitals – along with Moscow – having opposed the Security Council resolution 
authorising the use of force in Iraq� As the then Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice colourfully summed it up, “Punish France, ignore Germany, forgive Russia”� 
One could conclude that it was the United States that was the main beneficiary of 
EU enlargement – its new members’ attitudes were strongly pro-American and 
disloyal towards Europe�
The position taken by the EU – the “Old Europe” – was mocked in Of Para-
dise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order, a much cited and 
colourful essay by Robert Kagan, a neo-conservative spin doctor for the Bush 
administration� According to that essay, Europe was an island of illusionary hap-
piness, made lethargic by peace and well-being, while the United States was the 
superpower full of civilising vitality that provided Europe with security and con-
ditions for development� The Americans were the hunters who brought home 
the game – Iraq in this case – so they came from Mars, while the Venusian Eu-
ropeans were content to be consumers and waiters� It would be a while before it 
became apparent how much of a poisoned trophy Iraq was� Until that time, these 
kinds of comparisons worked on the imaginations of many, especially in coun-
tries which feared Russia’s geopolitical ambitions� European unity as a precondi-
tion for realising the EU’s international ambitions did not stand the test that Iraq 
represented, with the short-term ambitions and interests of individual member 
states – mainly Great Britain, Spain and Poland – winning the day� And Europe 
was twice the loser� Firstly, it was unable to stop the United States from an act of 
aggression that led to disastrous results not just for them but for the whole West-
ern world� Secondly, it became divided and the effects of these divisions were to 
191 The letter was inspired by “Wall Street Journal’s” editorial team and taken up by 
Spain’s prime minister, J�M� Aznar, who convinced the other seven signatories to 
join him� For more see: “Financial Times”, 26–30 May 2003�
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last a long time� There was to be a lack of mutual trust and loss of faith in Europe’s 
ability to unite in the face of adversity� The willingness to undertake unilateral 
action will become apparent more often�
3 European forces – a reality check
The moment the EU was formed – with the objective of defending its own secu-
rity and the interests of its member states and the commitment to build its own 
identity in international affairs by influencing the international order – the need 
for it to be equipped with its own military capacity also arose� Credible joint for-
eign and security policy could not exist for long without military support� That 
the issue was taken up at the end of the nineties was, on the one hand, the natural 
consequence of endogenous efforts in this direction, with roots going back to the 
1952–1954 project for a European Defence Community and the 1954 formation 
of the Western European Union that later became moribund� On the other hand, 
a strong argument for moving from talk to action was provided by the experi-
ences in the former Yugoslavia in the nineties� It was because of what happened 
there that the Europeans were forced to listen to how helpless and incapable of 
reacting to these kinds of crises they were� In that conflict, Europe had to rely on 
the United States, whose position determined whether and how NATO forces 
would be used� In the first phase of the conflict, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Washington long delayed with the decision to use force despite encouragement 
from London and Paris� Once used (in 1995), however, it led to a good result� 
In the final phase of the conflict, in Kosovo in 1999, the Clinton administration 
did not have to be convinced� It might even seem that the Americans enjoyed 
their earlier experience� The operation in Kosovo was carried out with European 
support but under the US rule and in a way that did not serve Europe’s aims 
well, or the idea of humanitarian intervention in general� For the Europeans this 
was an argument for building up military capacities that were independent of 
the United States� They could serve not just to stabilise the situation or react in 
a crisis in the vicinity of the EU but also to demonstrate its independent role in 
international affairs�
After the failed effort to reactivate the Western European Union and the 
attempt to create a European security and defence identity within NATO – which 
anyway would not live up to EU ambitions – another solution was decided upon� 
As a result of a joint French and British initiative, taken up in December 1998,192 
192 In particular the meeting in Saint-Malo between President Chirac and Prime Min-
ister Blair, at which it was decided to put forward an initiative to create within the 
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the next few meetings of the European Council (starting with Cologne in June 
1999) took steps to create the ESDP as an instrument for the pursuit of the Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy� Initially it was decided to: 1) set aside military 
forces and provide them with the necessary equipment, 2) create the political 
and military bodies to serve ESDP and make decisions regarding potential use 
of the forces and 3) put together technical capabilities for analysis, intelligence, 
strategic studies and planning, among other things� The size of the forces was set 
at 60 000 soldiers who could be sent within sixty days to a crisis area in order to 
carry out a “Petersburg task”, i�e� peacemaking or peacekeeping, stabilisation or 
humanitarian aid requiring military protection� In practice, many more would 
be required to maintain continuous operations� However, member states rela-
tively quickly offered forces for the ESDP – a total of 100 000 soldiers, 100 ships 
and 400 planes� It should be noted, however, that the term “defence” in the name 
of this policy was misleading since it concerned out of area operations and non-
traditional defence of EU countries from external aggression� The member states 
were not yet ready to give the EU the role of collective defence�
Even such small-scale pioneering moves met with resistance from the United 
States, starting with Bill Clinton’s administration� Washington took very seriously 
the threat that Europe could become politically and strategically independent, 
leaving the United States without a follower� There was also the worry, shared by 
Washington and some of the new EU and NATO members that were previously 
in the communist bloc, that the developments in EU policy could threaten the 
unity of the Atlantic Alliance due to issues of split loyalty and differing prefer-
ences as which of the two security systems to make use of or rely upon in a given 
situation� The position of the United States was spelled out by the then Secre-
tary of State Madeleine Albright in terms of “the three D’s”: no delinking ESDI 
from NATO, no discrimination and no duplication� This meant no diminution of 
NATO’s role in Europe’s defence, no discrimination during the creation of the 
ESDP against European NATO states that are not EU members and no duplica-
tion of NATO’s capabilities and tasks� Of course, if these directives were followed 
literally, the creation of a European defence capacity would have been impossible 
EU “the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the 
means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to inter-
national crises”� This was connected to the aim of the EU playing “its full role on the 
international stage”�
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from the start, particularly since the ESDP was also opposed by such candidate 
states as Poland�193
The creation of the ESDP went more smoothly in the institutional sphere and 
“on paper”� There were more problems with real military capabilities despite devel-
opments that spoke in favour of their creation� This was because on September 11, 
2001, an event occurred that was in a way foreseen by President de Gaulle in 
the sixties, which was the reason he had taken France out of the integrated mili-
tary structures of the Atlantic Alliance in 1966� The issue was the threat that the 
whole Alliance could be drawn into a military conflict, a war, as a result of a US 
military intervention somewhere else in the world� Were it to possess independ-
ent military capacity, Europe would not be reliant upon the United States for its 
defence and would not be, as a result of that reliance, automatically drawn into 
“American wars”� Substantial differences in opinion accompanied the first steps 
towards the ESDP, which when combined with the conflict between America and 
Europe regarding the war in Iraq, opposed by the societies of all of the EU states, 
even Great Britain� Of course, the issue was not just with the relation between 
ESDP and NATO or the United States, but also with the functions and size of the 
EU’s military capabilities� Whether they were to serve as forces assisting humani-
tarian aid – a beefed-up Red Cross – or if they should be capable of rapid, effec-
tive military operations even in areas distant from Europe, as a kind of European 
Foreign Legion� The European morale in this respect was lifted for a short while 
by the first and highly successful ESDP operation carried out in the Congo in the 
spring of 2003 on the basis of a resolution of the UN Security Council, with even 
Washington surprised and appreciative� Operation Artemis undeniably stopped 
the crisis in that part of the country from developing into large-scale genocide� In 
the same year, the EU took over from NATO Operation Amber Fox whose func-
tion was to prevent conflict in Macedonia and stabilise the country�194
The relative success – in the face of some opposition – of the development of 
a European security and defence policy meant that the EU was ready to adopt a 
European security strategy, which should be seen as the first complete and au-
thoritative expression of the idea of an international entity contained in the EU’s 
founding treaty� Already telling is the very title of the document signed during 
the EU summit in December 2003 – European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe 
193 For a discussion of the development of the ESDP at that time see, in particular, the 
texts by J� Barcz, J� Czaputowicz and K� Miszczak in the quarterly “Polska w Europie”, 
2003, no� 2� See also the text of Secretary Albright’s remarks to the North Atlantic 
Council ministerial meeting, Brussels, December 8, 1998�
194 For more detail see: R� Kuźniar, Polityka i siła…, op. cit�, pp� 223–238�
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in a Better World� Equally telling is how the EU came to define itself within it: 
“As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the 
world’s Gross National Product (GNP), the European Union is inevitably a glob-
al player… it should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and 
in building a better world”� That is a bold declaration, but at the time the EU had 
every reason to see itself in such a role� In practice, it intended to act in two areas: 
firstly, to improve stability and security in its immediate neighbourhood (with 
particular attention to ending conflict in the Middle East – in contrast to the un-
willingness to consider engaging with crises in Eastern Europe that was already 
apparent at that time); secondly, to create an international order based upon ef-
fective multilateralism (which would include strengthening international insti-
tutions and the rule of law as fundamental to that order)� Within the EU, it was 
understood that to fulfil that role it would have to be more active, more capable, 
more coherent� The document also talks about the development of a broad range 
of instruments that were political, diplomatic, military or based on trade and de-
velopment aid, as well as of the need to create a strategic culture that would make 
it possible to carry out early, rapid and, if needed, robust interventions� From 
today’s perspective, it is hard to imagine that the EU was so full of optimism and 
faith in its capabilities� For example, a “balanced partnership” with the United 
States was predicted, and among the powers that the EU intended to work with 
because they “share our values and aims” were China and Russia! Regardless of 
later developments, it should be noted that the document is a reflection of its 
times and of Javier Solana, who was at that time the EU’s High Representative for 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy and had the right to claim that “Euro-
pean security strategy is a key point in Europe’s development”�195 At that time, the 
EU could justifiably be considered one of the corners of the golden triad – the 
triangle constituted by North America, East Asia and Europe – the geopolitical 
structure that carried the whole international order�
4 Europe’s constitutional fiasco
The nineties witnessed a series of EU successes that served to strengthen and 
widen European integration� This convinced some nations and groups whose 
aim was to strengthen EU institutions to take up the idea of consolidating EU 
agreements in the form of a grand, solemn treaty, which in the private dreams of 
some was to be the European Constitution� These dreams had a long tradition, 
195 J� Solana, Droga Europy do bezpieczeństwa [Europe’s Road to Security], “Rzeczpo-
spolita”, 12 December 2003�
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and the author of perhaps the most ambitious constitutional project for Europe, 
going all the way back to 1831, was Wojciech Bogumił Jastrzębowski, a Polish 
naturalist scholar who participated in the November 1830 Uprising� The drive 
towards these kinds of ideas began during the first decade of the XXI century, 
not just with the intention of consolidating EU treaties but also with the broader 
desire to put Europe on a new, solid institutional footing and to demonstrate its 
self-assurance and aspirations on the international scene� For this reason, the 
meeting of the European Council in Laeken in December 2001 had no trouble 
to call another European convention – the previous one having put together the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights – whose job it would be to prepare such a grand 
treaty� The convention was to be headed by a politician not only of grand intel-
lectual statue but also of significant organisational ability – France’s former presi-
dent, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing�
The make-up of the new European convention was particularly broad and 
democratic – apart from government representatives it included parliamentar-
ians, with some selected from opposition parties, as well as members of the Euro-
pean Commission and Parliament� A powerful social forum that brought together 
non-governmental organisations, unions and business representative worked 
alongside the convention and cooperated with it� The convention openly listened 
to critiques, made diagnoses, selected problems and proposed approaches to solu-
tions� The President and other participants used the term “constitution” from the 
beginning although it caused doubts among many as it was felt that the term only 
had application to states� After more than a year the document was ready� In July 
2003, Giscard d’Estaing presented the fruit of the convention’s labours to the lead-
ers of the EU gathered in Thessaloniki – the final document bore the more widely 
acceptable title of a Treaty Establishing a Constitution, even though in Article I-1 it 
stated that it was the constitution establishing the EU� For a short time, the project 
became the subject of discussion at an intergovernmental conference and was to 
be accepted at the meeting of the European Council in December 2003� This did 
not happen because its approval was blocked by a country that was not even a 
member state at that time – Poland� Not long after, and in part because of this, the 
government in Poland fell and Warsaw changed its mind� In the end, the constitu-
tional treaty was signed nearly a year later in October 2004�
The value of the treaty lay in how it strengthened the EU’s institutional ef-
fectiveness and ability to coordinate economic initiatives, as well as in the way 
that it ensured continuity by introducing permanent leadership in the Council 
and the European Council in place of a six-monthly rotation� From our point 
of view, the most important element was a potential strengthening of common 
foreign and security policy by integrating it with the ESDP and creating the 
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post of European Foreign Affairs Minister� In addition, the European Defence 
Agency was created to oversee the development of the European military sector� 
Future developments in security and defence policy could, in accordance with 
the treaty, lead to the creation of a joint EU defence system – a traditional alli-
ance – which would require a unanimous decision by all of the members, which 
even then looked like a remote possibility� The EU could, however, immediately 
undertake missions aimed at peacemaking and peacekeeping, conflict preven-
tion, crisis management or stabilisation, as well as missions with humanitarian, 
disarmament or antiterrorist objectives� The solidarity clause was to play a role 
similar to that of the Atlantic Alliance’s Article 5, which introduced the obliga-
tion to provide mutual assistance between member states in the event that one 
should suffer a terrorist attack, or a natural or humanitarian disaster�
Reading the articles of the European Constitution gives the impression that 
one is witnessing the birth of a global single actor which, akin to the United States 
or China, is not just capable of articulating and defending its interests but can 
also influence international affairs and the development of the world order� After 
all, this actor was to gain a solid institutional grounding, the ability to sign agree-
ments, to carry out real foreign and security policy which would have its own 
diplomatic core and a “telephone number” – in response to Kissinger’s famous 
question “Who do I call if I want to call Europe?” At the same time, to make things 
complete, the constitution formally gave the EU symbols that had previously been 
reserved for states: a flag, an anthem, a holiday, a currency and a motto�196
However, the constitutional treaty was not ratified and this was not due to 
the objections of Poland or any other nation suspected of a deficit in pro-Europe 
solidarity but due to it being rejected in a referendum by countries of the Old, 
or even very old, Europe – France and Holland in May and June of 2005� For 
Europe this was shocking, even though the main reasons why the constitution 
was rejected were not the contents of the constitution but the internal problems 
of those countries, particularly immigration� The shock was so great that a time 
to reflect was announced� The failure of the treaty came at a bad time for Europe 
in general, a time of disagreements on Iraq, difficulties with accommodating 
large-scale enlargement, significant differences on Turkey (with the subtext of 
the future of Islam within the EU) and weak leadership: Tony Blair compromised 
by the war in Iraq, Gerhard Schröder with business entanglements with Russia, 
the burnt-out political retiree Jacques Chirac and Silvio Berlusconi who seemed 
196 In that order: twelve stars on a blue background, Beethoven’s Ode to Joy, 9th May (the 
day the Schuman Plan was presented), the euro, “United in Diversity”�
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to have permanently just walked off the cabaret stage� Angela Merkel was just 
beginning her career� The dire description and prognosis made by the respected 
Irish former EU Commissioner, Peter Sutherland, was accurate – “Since the dis-
astrous referendum in France […] the EU has been directionless and politically 
damaged in a fundamental sense”�197
It turned out to be possible to pick up the pieces of the broken crockery and 
put the vase back together – in the form of the Lisbon Treaty� A change of lead-
ership helped, especially the Merkel–Sarkozy duet� The Paris-Berlin Axis was 
revived for a moment with good results� It also helped that in March 2007 the 
fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty of Rome was celebrated in Berlin, during which 
time agreement was reached on the “small treaty” (as opposed to the constitu-
tional one)� After difficult negotiations, the project was accepted in Brussels in 
June and, after another intergovernmental conference, it was signed in Lisbon in 
October 2007� The Lisbon Treaty consisted of two parts (the EU treaty and the 
treaty concerning how it was to function); it was a slimmed-down, simplified 
version of the constitutional treaty� All signs of the EU’s “constitutional turn” 
were removed including relevant symbols198; the minister of foreign affairs was 
renamed “the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy”; and the role of the national parliaments was strengthened in the con-
text of the principle of subsidiarity (that social and political issues be resolved at 
the most local level practicable)� It also included a green light for a multi-speed 
Europe, the option for increased cooperation strengthening the integration of a 
smaller group of more committed countries, including matters of foreign and 
security policy�199 The vase was almost broken again, this time by the Irish ref-
erendum in June 2008� However, once the financial crisis of 2008 came to affect 
some EU countries, the problems with the Emerald Isle’s bloated banking system 
came to light, the Irish quickly changed their tune and the treaty was accepted in 
a second referendum� The example of Ireland showed how fragile the structure 
of the union was� It also revealed that a mere half a percent of the EU population 
197 P� Sutherland, A Direction for Europe, International Herald Tribune, October 21st 
2005; also P� Hassner, Polityka frustracji [The Politics of Frustration], “Reczpospolita”, 
5 August 2005�
198 Almost twenty countries decided to maintain the symbols as a sign of their support 
for European unity� Poland was not among them, unfortunately�
199 J� Barcz, Unia Europejska na rozstajach. Traktat z Lizbony: Dynamika i główne kie-
runki reformy ustrojowej [The European Union’s Parting of Ways. The Lisbon Treaty: 
Dynamics and Main Directions of Systemic Reform], Instytut Wydawniczy EuroPrawo, 
Warsaw, 2010�
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could reverse difficult reforms necessary for the EU’s effective functioning, so 
that the more democratic the EU became the less capable it was of making im-
portant decisions regarding its internal affairs and its relations to the rest of the 
world� The vase, although made of precious materials, was not as strong as in 
the beginning, when made from a single mass� In the case of the EU, the basic 
problem became the weakness of its political “glue”�

Part III The Twilight of Europe as an 
International Actor

9  The 2008 Crisis and the Beginnings  
of a Post-Western International Order 
“Every political system which takes its principles to the extreme destroys itself�”200
Gonzague de Reynold
The height of Europe’s power in the world and its ability to shape the interna-
tional order was in the beginning of the XX century� This was true whether we 
consider the extent of its colonial or imperial sovereignty or its position in the 
League of Nations� From World War II to the end of the Cold War in 1989–1990, 
a divided Europe under the protection or domination of the two external super-
powers was not playing an independent role in the bipolar international order� 
It was an order defined by East-West antagonism and the rivalry between the 
United States and USSR, in which the West and the United States might have had 
the upper hand but the divisions, including those within Europe, were immov-
able� After the end of the Cold War, we had an almost-two-decade-long period 
of Pax Americana, during which America played the role of a regent – a mighty 
regent but a regent nonetheless – during the process of the passage from a period 
of Western domination including the rebirth of Europe, to a period where the 
international order was more balanced� This new order, thus far undefined in 
terms of name or main characteristics, will certainly feature the full inclusion of 
“the Rest of the World”, with the emerging powers that represent it coming first�
This change was foreseen by Fareed Zakaria, the well-known Indian-Ameri-
can political theorist and publicist, in his book The Post-American World, pub-
lished in May 2008, only a few months before the turning point�201 The author 
did not surmise that in only a short time the world would change even more, to 
become “post-Western”� The rise of the “Rest of the World” out of the shadows of 
the West has come not just at a time of crisis in the United States and in its global 
role, but during a profound, chronic crisis in Europe� Since 2008, the whole of 
the West has been on the defensive, pushed back by other states who are strong 
enough to force their points of view regarding the world order� This is just the be-
ginning of this process and it is hard to predict in every detail how it will develop, 
but one thing is sure – we have entered a post-Western world order�
200 The quotation was translated from its Polish language version, cited by 
J� Woźniakowski, Góry niewzruszone, Znak, Kraków, 1995� 
201 F� Zakaria, The Post-American World, W�W� Norton & Company, New York, 2008�
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1 Crisis of the West, crisis of Europe
Oswald Spengler’s 1917 book, The Decline of the West, has been the object of 
much criticism, and not just because of its frequently cloudy arguments and 
hermetic language� Nevertheless, the view of the development and decline of 
civilisations, particularly Western civilisation, deserves to be treated seriously� 
Neither Spengler’s contemporaries nor later critics of his interpretation of the 
story of the West are strengthened in their criticisms by the “tiny fact” that he 
managed to fairly accurately predict the end of the second and final phase of the 
West’s greatness on the world stage – around the year 2000� Spengler claims that 
every great culture at some point enters the “civilisational phase” of development 
characterised by its size and its expansion into its surrounding territory, which 
then leads to the downfall of that culture and the geopolitical formation within 
which it formed, and which carried the culture� The “cultural phase” is, accord-
ing to Spengler, a phase of spiritual and metaphysical development that confers 
upon it internal strength� The “civilisational phase” consists of the material ex-
ternalisation and expansion of that culture� However, during the civilisational 
phase, the culture burns out and declines�202 In the ancient era (which included 
for Spengler both Greece and Rome), Greece was the cultural phase and Rome 
the civilisational� The fall of Rome after a period of material greatness and ex-
pansion meant the end of the ancient era that preceded the West� Spengler does 
not use the concept of European civilisation but of “Western civilisation” which, 
according to him, is the combination of Western-European and American cul-
tures� According to his interpretation, the West’s cultural phase was Europe up 
to the end of the Enlightenment in the XVIII century – the time of the growth of 
the West’s spiritual strength� “Chaeronea and Leipzig were the last battles fought 
about an idea”, Spengler writes� Afterwards came the civilisational phase, the pe-
riod of Western material expansion and imperial conquest� During that period, 
the United States came to the forefront of the West� The imperialist expansion 
of the West is the omen of its downfall� Of course, such expansion is also the 
202 There are of course many more conceptions of civilisational cycles that lead from 
birth to disintegration� They are ably compared by Niall Ferguson in his opus Civi-
lization: The West and the Rest, Penguin, London, 2011� He begins his comparison 
by proposing Thomas Cole’s series of five paintings, together called “the Course of 
Empire”, as illustrative of the life cycle of civilisation� The individual painting, in order 
they appear in the cycle, are called: The Savage State; The Arcadian or Pastoral State; 
The Consummation of Empire; Destruction; and Desolation� N� Ferguson, op. cit., 
pp� 295–296�
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realisation of the developmental capabilities of each mature civilisation  – its 
destiny and fate, it might be said� Such was the West’s fate and the finale of its 
upward struggle� Spengler wrote about “the metaphysically exhausted soil of the 
West” in 1917� The phase of expansion can last a long time but is inevitably fol-
lowed by decline� What is interesting is that the West’s expansionary phase runs 
from year 1800, the time of the Napoleonic wars, till the year 2000, that is con-
temporary for us but distant from the year 1917�203
It is a coincidence, of course, that it was in 2001 that the terrorist attack oc-
curred which led America into the war which turned out to be a trap� It is a 
coincidence that it was in 2008 that the great financial crash occurred which sent 
the West into a profound economic crisis presaging its global downfall� What is 
more, the financial crash in the United States and Europe is not the only event 
that justifies the choice of that year� We can disagree with Spengler completely or 
just in details, but the West came to the limits of its expansion at the end of the 
XX century� From there, one may ask what the meaning of this fact is, the mean-
ing for the West’s role in the international order�
I consider the year 2008 as a quasi-Spenglerian end-date for the West’s and 
Europe’s position in the international order for two reasons�
Firstly, for political and strategic reasons� In 2008 the West, in the form of 
the United States, suffered a significant loss of face over its rivalry with Russia 
in Georgia� In previous years, Georgia witnessed political changes which were 
meant to lead it to membership in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
and the European Union (EU)� Both those organisations indicated that this 
membership could commence in the foreseeable future� Special relations be-
tween the United States and Georgia developed, with many US military advisors 
present in Georgia, training Georgian troops� But in August 2008, the president 
of that country allowed himself to be provoked by Russia into taking military 
steps against the separatist province of South Ossetia, which was supported by 
Russia, thereby giving Russia an excuse to respond with overwhelming military 
power� The United States decided against providing any military support to a 
country that seemed, and desired, to be an American protectorate� The 2008 
Caucasus war showed the limits of the West’s strategic capabilities, even though 
the truculent G�W� Bush was US president at the time� In the end, it was the EU 
that gave Georgia some succour� It came at the same time as another important 
“signal”� The year 2008 was the bloodiest year in Afghanistan since the beginning 
of the West’s intervention in that country (in late 2001), leading to discussion of 
203 O� Spengler, The Decline of the West, Alfred A� Knopf, New York, 1926, pp� 1–50�
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the need to change strategy in favour of withdrawal despite not having achieved 
the stated goals� Furthermore, in 2008, the Republican Party lost the presidential 
elections, which meant the United States would not continue military operations 
in Iraq� The Americans, themselves, decided that it was wrong to have got into 
that war both because it was so expensive economically and in terms of inter-
national standing and because it was a failure in terms of ethics and image� The 
Shock and Awe that was aimed at Saddam Hussein’s Iraq ended up with shock 
and shame for the United States�
Secondly, 2008 was even worse for the West in economic and cultural terms� It 
started with the financial and mortgage crisis whose early signs were already vis-
ible in 2007 and which was precipitated by subprime loans granted to low-credit-
standing borrowers as well as the toxic financial instruments of indeterminate 
content that were sold as securities by Wall Street illusionists� The day 15th of 
September 2008 is considered the dramatic start of the crisis as this was the day 
that Lehman Brothers, one of the oldest and most prestigious financial firms in 
America, went bankrupt� After that more bankruptcies followed, the govern-
ments responding with exceedingly expensive programmes to save the banks, 
investment funds and manufacturers who had collapsed� Soon after that, the cri-
sis spread to Europe, where it had a different cause – excessive government and 
private debt, the result of funding private and social spending on credit and the 
issuing of bonds that proved too expensive to buy back or pay off� This revealed 
a basic problem with the banking system – a deliberate lack of care in approv-
ing loans – as well as a problem shared by many governments – a deliberately 
reckless approach to public spending financed by loans to be paid back by future 
generations� The financial systems of EU member states were not able to support 
a lifestyle modelled on the United States� Financial markets profited by speculat-
ing wildly and thereby increasing chaos and uncertainty� Some of the EU states 
faced the prospect of bankruptcy (Greece should have declared bankruptcy im-
mediately) and nearly all faced years of crisis, recession and stagnation� The steps 
taken in Europe consisted mostly in belt-tightening budget costs that led to in-
creased economic recession as well as in issuing new bonds that increased debt, 
which would now be much more expensive to buy back in the future�
Experts were agreed that this was the biggest financial crisis in the Western 
world since the Great Depression at the end of the 1920s�204 The earlier crash led 
204 W�M� Orłowski, Kryzys finasowy a pozycja Zachodu [The Financial Crisis and the Posi-
tion of the West], in: R� Kuźniar (ed�), Kryzys 2008 a pozycja międzynarodowa Zachodu 
[The 2008 Crisis and the International Position of the West], Scholar, Warsaw, 2011�
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to a worldwide crisis while the 2008 crisis was limited to the West, which was 
indicative of the changing role of the West in the world’s economy� A growing 
failure to maintain responsibility on the part of citizens, governments, banks 
and investment funds served as the cultural context for the crisis, a response to 
the increased need for consumption that outpaced growth in efficiency and per 
capita production� Mass culture, reduced ever more to the function of advertis-
ing, came to promise the fulfilment of all expectations� Both governments and 
banks tried to meet those expectations�
The events of 2008 and their consequences were a crisis in the broadest sense – 
a transition between long-term cycles or great, historical economic systems� Ber-
nard Rosier and Pierre Dockès call them “moments of paroxysm”� According to 
their definition, these are “temporal nodes, multidimensional escapes and break-
downs” within which “the economic, social, ideological and political elements of 
our modern world intermingle”�205 The year 2008 would not be crisis in this sense 
or a particular end point for Europe’s position in the world order were it not 
for secular tendencies that have for decades been eating away at Europe’s posi-
tion in the global arrangement of powers� Meinhard Miegel, a foremost German 
economist, said at the time, “The rich West has reach the limits of its capabilities 
when it comes to generating economic growth”� According to him, this happened 
because of changes in three fundamental factors that had been the source of the 
West’s success for the previous hundreds of years�
Firstly, Miegel claims that the West’s access to cheap and easily obtained natu-
ral resources – that is those on its territory – had finished� It should be noted 
that today only 0�3% of the world’s oil and just 0�8% of the world’s natural gas is 
to be found in EU territory�206 The problem facing the West, including Europe, 
is its profligate use of natural resources, water, energy and food as compared to 
other societies� Furthermore, and putting it bluntly – the West’s (Europe’s) abil-
ity to parasitise the rest of the world is coming to an end�207 This will also have to 
change, and this change will put us back on the same level as other parts of the 
205 B� Rosier, P� Dockès, Cykle ekonomiczne, Kryzysy i przeminay społeczne – perspektywa 
historyczna, PWE, Warsaw, 1987, p� 22� French original: B� Rosier, P� Dockès, Rythmes 
économiques. Crises et changement social, une perspective historique, La Découverte/
Maspero, Paris, 1983�
206 R� Ulatowski, Geoekonomia surowców energetycznych [The Geo-economics of Energy 
Resources], Rambler, Warsaw, 2014, pp� 39–59�
207 Z� Bauman, Panika wśród pasożytów, czyli komu bije dzwon [Panic among the Para-
sites, or: For Whom the Bell Tolls], “Gazeta Wyborcza”, 2–3 October 2010 (discussion 
concerning issues raised within H� Welzer, Wojny Klimatyczne [Climate Wars])�
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world� Secondly, “we are getting older and there will be fewer of us”� Thirdly, “we 
have changed mentally� Our grandfathers were willing to work harder for less� 
We are content”� So the West must get ready for life without growth,208 a reality 
that cannot fail to impinge on its global position� Miegel related all of these fac-
tors to the West as a whole but they all are even truer of Europe (and to a lesser 
extent, the United States)� But they were not the only factors behind the amazing 
rise of the West and its world status since the middle of the previous millennium� 
Among them were also political institutions and creativity (inventions and basic 
scientific research)�209 And they too – political institutions especially – have 
ceased to ensure Europe’s development and advantage over the rest of the world 
enjoyed during previous centuries�
Among the secular tendencies, Europe’s demographic situation is particularly 
problematic� Europe now accounts for less than 7% of the world’s population and 
that number is falling rapidly� The birth rate on the “Old Continent” (from now 
on the term will apply also to the inhabitants as well as the region) is much less 
than 2%, in many cases only 1�5%, which is less than that is necessary for main-
taining the generations at a constant level� The shrinking population goes with 
an ageing one, especially among those from Europe� The term “Europe’s demo-
graphic suicide” has come to be used to describe this situation�210 This is caused 
by cultural trends (discouraging (large) families), legislative trends (limiting the 
number of births) and economic trends (women joining the workforce, which 
is an attractive alternative to motherhood but includes pressures, especially in 
corporations, not to have children)� Migration has been the European solution 
for the lack of people at a working age� According to some estimates, by 2030 
Europe may be short of more than 20 million workers�211 Considering migra-
tion solely through an economic lens – as a solution to labour shortages – is a 
208 M� Miegel, Nikt nie chce płacić za obietnice sprzed kryzysu [No One Wants to Pay 
for Pre-crisis Promises] (interview with R� Woś), “Dziennik – Gazeta Prawna”, 3–5 
September 2010�
209 N� Ferguson, op. cit., pp� 244–245 (according to Ferguson, other factors included 
political rivalry, medicine and a consumer society)�
210 G� Wiegel, Katedra i sześcian. Europa, Stany Zjednoczone i polityka bez Boga [The 
Cathedral and the Cube. Europe, the United States and Politics without God], Fronda, 
Warsaw, 2005�
211 To bring those 20 million workers from Europe it would be necessary to settle around 
80 million people, given an average family of worker plus three dependents� This does 
not seem possible, but it does give some idea of the size of the cultural changes that 
Europe would undergo in order for migrant workers to replace the disappearing and 
ageing Europeans� See: “Gazeta Wyborcza”, 7 December 2015�
169
serious mistake as it ignores the issue of social cohesion and cultural security, as 
can be seen in some countries of Western Europe� It also ignores the long-term 
consequences in terms of cultural changes on the continent which could affect 
Europe’s identity, including in the international sphere�
Demography is strongly connected to issues of morality and ideology� As we 
have seen, it is commonly thought that one of the reasons for the rise of Europe 
and its international position is a specific ethos whose roots lie in Christianity, 
the achievements of Roman civilisation, the late Middle Ages, Renaissance and 
the Enlightenment, all enriched by the spirit and effort of industrial capitalism� 
We can repeat after Huntington – Culture does matter� The cultural precondi-
tions for Europe’s strength and position have undergone rapid change in the last 
few decades� Not just in terms of the erosion of the European ethos, decreasing 
respect for it or even declining familiarity with it� Primarily, the change has con-
cerned the propagation of hedonistic consumerist attitudes in mass culture and 
mass social behaviour� European societies for the most part appear to demand 
that their expectation of such a way of life be met, no matter the consequences 
for themselves� Media of all sorts – including the Internet, the local press and 
television stations – play a role in this well-recognised transformation of citizens 
into consumers, with cheap entertainment that encourages unrestrained con-
sumption and squeezes out informational and educational programmes�
The cultural process underway appears to be leading to the primacy of the in-
dividual, the group and the minority interests over common interests� For some 
time now, the evolution of human rights and basic freedoms in Europe appears 
to be heading in that direction too� It involves a complete rejection of natural 
law in favour of a contractual, transactional understanding of basic human dig-
nity� The relationship between cultural foundation and human rights is lost to 
view, a situation which – when combined with the individualist interpretation 
of those rights – may lead to the erosion of the cultural foundation� The problem 
of the relationship between society and the individual, between common good 
and individual needs is examined well in the works of Jacques Maritain�212 We are 
212 As one of his commentators writes, the point is to “find an optimal balance” between 
the needs and common good necessary to maintain a particular community (its 
cohesion and development) and “the needs of the individual that seeks within soci-
ety the conditions for its own development without sacrifices, assimilation and the 
favouring of one element over another”� F� Compagnoni, Prawa człowieka. Geneza, 
historia I zaangażowanie chrześcijańskie, WAM, Kraków, 2000, p� 154, footnote� Ital-
ian original: F� Compagnoni, I diritti dell’uomo Genesi, storia e impegno cristiano, San 
Paolo Edizioni, Rome, 1995�
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currently witnessing an imbalance between them, in favour of the unrestrained 
self-realisation of the individual� No one can deny the Europeans the right to this 
version of human rights and freedoms but it would be well to help them realise 
what the long-term consequences may be� Of relevance here is also the observa-
tion made by George Soros, that “the most perfect of markets may become a ma-
chine destroying social bonds, if it is not bound by a cultural and ethical corset”�213
Soros is rightly thinking of the financial and market-based aspect of the West’s 
crisis which, for various reasons, is affecting Europe more profoundly than other 
parts of the West� The unrelenting commercialisation of ever more sectors of 
social and individual life is leading to the primacy of money in both cases� Paul 
Dembiński, in his excellent analysis of the role of finance in Western society 
and economy, uses the term “financialisation” by which he means “the spread 
of a financial way of thinking in social life” or, to put it in other terms, “pro-
found changes in social life under the influence of the rapid growth of financial 
markets”� In his view, financial rationality is becoming the organising principle 
of the social system and interpersonal relationships are turning into financial 
or trade-like transactions – a sign of the totalising nature of financial markets� 
In Dembiński estimation, “financialisation” impinged on the essence of what it 
means to be human, penetrating all spheres of economic, social and also, with 
time, political life�214 It thereby alters the traditional place of culture within those 
spheres� Dembiński’s position is in harmony with Spengler’s (views put forward a 
hundred years ago)� As Spengler put it, “Through money, democracy becomes its 
own destroyer, after money has destroyed intellect”� The dictatorship of money 
will deform economic life and its primacy conquer law, morality and politics� 
These are, according to Spengler, the signs of the decline of Western civilisation, 
similarly to the case of Ancient Rome�215 The financial crisis that appeared in 
2008 and its many consequences that affect, among other things, Europe’s inter-
national standing, only confirm how right Spengler’s intuitions were�
213 After P� Dembiński, who paraphrases George Soros in: Finanse po zawale. Od eufo-
rii finansowej do gospodarczego ładu [Finance after a Heart Attack. From Financial 
Euphoria to Economc Order], Studio Emka, Warsaw, 2011, p� 189�
214 Ibidem, pp� 13–23, 174–175, 184–191� However, the whole work is recommended�
215 O� Spengler, op. cit., p� 463: “Here also money triumphs and forces the free spirits 
into its service� […] A more appalling caricature of freedom of thought cannot be 
imagined� Formerly a man did not dare to think freely� Now he dares, but cannot; 
his will to think is only a willingness to think to order, and this is what he feels as his 
liberty�” O� Spengler, op. cit., p� 464: “Through money, democracy becomes its own 
destroyer, after money has destroyed intellect”�
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Cultural factors may make it more and more difficult to make the necessary 
adjustments which are required to sustain the general vitality of European civi-
lisation as a foundation of its international role� Examples of cultural factors in-
clude women’s liberation versus the demographic decline of Europe and political 
correctness versus the freedom of speech required to tackle difficult questions� 
Necessary adjustments will be blocked in view of the interests of variously de-
fined minorities and culturally imposed limitations on freedom of thought when 
we are in search for the optimal solutions to small crises, as well as a deep crisis� 
This situation is the effect of what was once called the culture of connivance, that 
is silent acquiescence in the face of dangers or the deliberate ignoring of threats, 
ultimately limiting one’s capacity to undertake correctional action� This can be 
seen both in the internal life of European countries and in their external rela-
tions� The sum of cultural–civilisational changes in Europe in recent decades 
allow one to draw the conclusion that can be expressed in the English phrase: 
too soft to survive�
2 The return of the “Rest of the World”
Fareed Zakaria writes of a “Post-American World” in response to the evident 
rise of the rest of the world onto the global stage (and not as a result of the 2008 
crisis, which erupted a few months after Zakaria coined the phrase)� The use of 
the word “return” in this context is perhaps not ideal as the rest of the world had 
not in fact been an actor on the world stage before� The “international stage” was 
built by Europe and then taken over by Europe and the United States together – 
that is by the West� The Rest of the World was – with minor exceptions which did 
not impact the big picture – the mere object of western international activity� The 
Rest subsequently developed into the Third World, dependent on the West� This 
began to change, slowly but inexorably after the Cold War� The sources of this 
change lie in the same three tendencies which are currently working to Europe’s 
disadvantage: demography, natural resources and culture – but of course there 
are other factors as well�
As far as culture is concerned, it is worth heeding the words of the Singapo-
rean professor Kishore Mahbubani, who is rightly credited with being the main 
theoretician of the Asian growth model (the “miraculous growth”) which he per-
ceives as being closely related to Asian values� Mahbubani has been saying for 
years that, “the XXI century will be the Age of Asia”� In his main publication of 
2008 and in several other statements, he has said that (Eastern) Asia has been 
developing faster than the West and the coming decades will see the surpassing 
of the West� This is not due to the discovery of a unique development model but 
9 The 2008 Crisis and the Beginnings of a Post-Western International Order 
Europe in the International Order172
is because Asia has learned to successfully employ the Western model, while ap-
plying it to specific local cultures� Altogether this results in faster and more stable 
development than the West� Asian people have taken on elements of the West-
ern model in a creative way, elements such as the free market, the rule of law, 
the basics of democracy (or rather meritocracy and representative government), 
technological progress, universal education and a culture of peace� They have 
rejected, however, western liberalism as it appears in the highly individualistic 
version of human rights and basic freedoms, especially personal and political 
freedoms� Of course, these changes have been accompanied by an exceptional 
work ethic, a kind of social discipline and respect for one’s own culture�216 In 
view of Chinese and other Far Eastern success stories of the last two decades, 
considering the use Eastern Asia has made of globalisation and the support from 
China to the United States during the 2008–2009 crisis, Asian people have no 
reason to consider the Western model of development as superior to their own� 
In many non-Western countries the term Beijing consensus has become popular 
(as an alternative to the Washington consensus), as a term better suited to their 
cultures and development requirements� The return of the Rest of the World has 
a solid basis in its cultural and economic foundations�
The culturally generated crisis of the Western development model, and the 
parallel successes enjoyed by its modified versions in non-Western countries, has 
led to the decline of the Western model� This is particularly so when modified 
models are combined with global demographic tendencies� There are three such 
global demographic tendencies that should be pointed out at this point� The first 
is the ageing populations not only of the “first world” – that is the West – but 
also, with a slight lag, of China and East Asia� The second is countries such as 
Turkey, Mexico, Brazil, Indonesia, Vietnam (and China until around 2030) will 
be dynamically growing both demographically and economically� The third, ten-
dency will be represented by those countries growing demographically but poor-
ly economically, those who are unstable politically where urban explosions are 
common (mainly Africa and Arabic countries)� In the latter group of countries, 
inequality of earnings and of opportunity will grow and this represents a serious 
threat to Western countries in terms of terrorism and uncontrolled migration� 
These three tendencies when combined will force changes at the level of global 
governance to the advantage of non-Western countries and to the detriment of 
216 K� Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to 
the East, Public Affairs, New York, 2008; see also idem: Azjatycka ekspansja [Asian 
Expansion], “Dziennik” (Supplement: “Europa”), 28 April 2008�
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Europe’s position�217 We may add to this the migratory “counter-attack” (in Toyn-
bee’s sense): during the West’s expansion “white man” emigrated to conquer ter-
ritories and spread his civilisation�218 For some time now, the tendency has been 
the reverse – culminating in the exodus of 2015� The rising flow of people to 
Europe from non-Western countries, also for economic reasons (Europe having 
sustained its level of growth), will blur its civilisational identity and affect its in-
ternational position and EU foreign policy, especially towards Arabic countries 
and the Islamic world�
Even if Europe can hold on to its assets and its absolute potential, the long-
term global trends represent an unstoppable growth in the productivity and the 
financial, social and cultural potential of the rest of the world� Only in terms of 
military might will the rest of the world remain behind Europe (not to mention 
the United States)� We may also anticipate that the aforementioned processes of 
growth, demographics and migration – unfavourable for Europe/the West and 
favourable for the rest of the world – will blur the differences between parts of the 
world, lessening the chance of a permanent alliance or anti-European coalition� 
Discrepancies of wealth will remain for some time and will have their bearing on 
international relations� Yet regardless of the dynamics of these processes and the 
form they take in various circumstances, Europe has moved onto the defensive, 
limiting its ambitions to the protection of its heritage� Indeed, this situation ap-
plies to the whole of the West which has lost power and initiative – there is no 
new grand design� The West has lost the capacity to impact the Rest of the World, 
to influence it in a creative manner� Invoking the universality of certain values 
and principles is in this context conservative; it does not result in any model or 
message which could be taken up by the rest of the world�
3 Signs of a new order
The signs of a new, post-Western international order are more and more nu-
merous and evident from a geopolitical perspective� The normative–institutional 
217 J�A� Goldstone, The New Population Bomb: The Four Megatrends that Will Change 
the World, “Foreign Affairs”, January/February 2010�
218 A�J� Toynbee, Civilisation on Trial, OUP, New York, 1948, pp� 185–187� However, 
Toynbee considered the spiritual counter-attack (which threatens our cultural iden-
tity) to be much more powerful than the physical one� Russian communism was a 
case in point� It came from the West (from Marx)� An earlier case was that of Islam 
(the expansion of the Ottoman Empire)� He defined our civilisation as Greco-Roman, 
Western or Western-Christian�
9 The 2008 Crisis and the Beginnings of a Post-Western International Order 
Europe in the International Order174
dimension is always the last to appear, only doing so after a new balance of pow-
ers has been fully established� Of course, the current geopolitical changes can 
be felt in the context of the most universalist of the multilateral institutions: the 
United Nations (UN)� We are witnesses to the weakening of the Security Council 
due to its not being representative, a fact which seriously undermines its legiti-
macy� In 2004–2005, there still took place in the UN a great discussion on how 
to reform itself and expand its composition with new permanent members� The 
European permanent members – France and the UK – had agreed to the intro-
duction of a few new, non-Western members to the Security Council� As we 
saw above, there was even talk of replacing the European powers with a single 
collective member – the EU� Only the United States was strongly opposed to any 
expansion of the composition of the Security Council� On the occasion of the 
seventieth anniversary of the founding of the UN in 2015, there was no longer 
a word uttered about the reform of the Organisation – not only of the Security 
Council, but also of any UN structure or manner of functioning� It was especially 
the European nations that avoided reform – though as a rule it has been they 
that have been keen to “save the world” – since they were aware that opening 
the question of the UN Charter and subjecting it to an attempted revision might 
well end in disaster from a western point of view (the “West” being mainly Euro-
pean)� It was the West’s vision of an international order that had been embodied 
in the original UN Charter of 1945 when the “Rest of the World” still had little 
say in international relations�
The same goes for other aspects of the UN’s activities, especially in the area of 
human rights� Although in 2005 the Human Rights Commission was renamed 
the Human Rights Council – following the motion of the European states – and 
the higher status implied, the issues surrounding human rights have ceased to 
be visible� There are of course several reasons for this downgrading of human 
rights, but the basic cause is the crisis of the EU and its weaker legitimation at 
the UN� From a cultural–civilisational perspective, that is from a values’ perspec-
tive, Europe (the EU) has ceased to be the point of reference� We already have a 
situation of a plurality of values against a cross-cultural background and in the 
coming decades this will only increase� The position of human rights will weaken 
not only at the UN but in international relations in general� This is happening 
not only because of China which is against discussing human rights in bilateral 
or multilateral meetings, but also because of high-profile failures in this area (viz� 
the “Arab Spring”) as well as the approaches taken to security matters, in particu-
lar the war on international terrorism�
More visible are the geopolitical aspects of global change happening before 
our very eyes, including the direct institutional consequences� The basic fact here 
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is the new and growing position of China� Let us recall first of all that in 1990 
China was not among the top ten countries in terms of gross domestic product 
(GDP) and yet by 2011 it had achieved a strong second place� Economic forecasts 
indicate that more or less in the years 2025–2030 China will overtake the United 
States and from then on and “until the end of time” it will be the unquestioned 
Number One in the world economy� It is already the leading trade power (as 
an individual state) impacting export and import across the world and thereby 
influencing the world economy in general� As a result, China has acquired influ-
ence on the policies and politics of countries in their own region and also, step 
by step, in Europe�
Of course, China is lacking in too many key areas to be able to take on the 
role of global leader at present (and in any case it does not seem to be any hurry 
to do so)� The best estimates are that China will only match the United States 
in military might by around the middle of the current century (around 2050)� 
China is not in possession of much in the way of the capacity to form coalitions, 
especially in its own region where it inspires fear rather than willing cooperation� 
And besides trade relations, there is not much that connects China with coun-
tries beyond its own region� It is hard to imagine China standing at the head of 
something like NATO or Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in Latin 
America or in Africa� China lacks much in the domain of soft power� Despite its 
great history of civilisation, China has not been able to create either a mass cul-
ture or a high culture (in music, film or literature), one that might shape the sen-
sitivities, imagination or aesthetic tastes of countries of other parts of the world� 
China is a place “to do business”, not a place where great debates are initiated or 
where ideological or cultural trends find their beginnings�
Regardless of these shortcomings, China’s demographic superiority, the scale 
of its economy, its gigantic financial reserves (also number one in the world), 
their trade and investment expansionism and their model of economic develop-
ment for non-Western countries – all these factors have meant that the West has 
ceased to be the only point of reference in various regions of the world, espe-
cially in Latin America and Africa� Paradoxically this affects Europe more than 
the United States� Although Europe (the EU) began in the nineties to compete 
with the “American way of life”, the 2008 crisis hurt Europe more deeply and 
Europe’s light has dimmed� For the time being, its standard of living and level of 
development still retain a measure of attractiveness for hundreds of thousands of 
immigrants and refugees coming each year� Now, in 2015, China established an 
investment bank with fifty-seven (!) states as founding members, including the 
majority of Western states – even though the bank is perceived as a threat to the 
position of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (read: 
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“the USA”)�219 China has begun work on a transport–communication axis to Eu-
rope known as the “New Silk Road” and it has strategically “taken over Russia” 
(taking advantage of the anti-western course of President Putin)� These events all 
make one take very seriously the leadership aspirations of Beijing�220
In the global geopolitical configuration sketched above, China could play 
a variety of roles� It might, firstly, be perceived as an alternative to the United 
States, that is the global Number One� Somewhat more broadly, we might see 
China together with its sphere of influence in East Asia as an alternative to the 
West� The question then arises as to the nature of this potential leadership: from 
hegemony (Pax Sinica) to leader (like Germany at present in the EU)� Secondly, 
China may, in the XXI century, become the advocate of the “Age of Asia”, that 
is the replacement of the Atlantic (in its role from the XIX to the XX centuries) 
with the Pacific� The United States would become China’s junior partner, as Eu-
rope had been for the United States� In this model, the Rest of the World, now 
including Europe, will find itself at the periphery of the global order� Thirdly, 
China might become a pole of a new axis organising the international order: 
China–United States, replacing the recent bipolar pairing of East-West� The 
phrases “Chimerica” or “G-2” have been in use for some time already; however 
the second expression is incorrect since the “G” stands for “group” and so should 
include several members, or at least three�
In each of these scenarios – and one or other or a combination is sure to 
come to pass – the Europe of the EU is pushed into the background� A global 
triangle including the EU, a quite credible possibility at the beginning of the XXI 
century, is no longer realistic� The disappearance of Europe (the EU) from the 
map of global power structures in the coming two or three decades is still so 
surprising because only a few years ago, at the beginning of the present decade 
(in 2011–2013), Europe’s power was comparable to that of the United States and 
China� According to a research by Professor Mirosław Sułek, the overall power 
of these three global actors, measured on the basis of several factors (military 
power, GDP, population, area, military budget, number of soldiers), is as follows: 
United States – 5161, EU – 5436, China – 4642� Using so-called strategic matri-
ces, one can measure a larger number of factors, including qualitative factors: 
governance, territory, natural resources, population, culture and religion, sci-
ence and education, armed forces, foreign policy in a geopolitical context� And 
219 The bank’s official name is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)� Its 
founding capital is 100 billion USD (half the capital of the World Bank)�
220 B� Góralczyk, Przebudzenie smoka. Powrót Chin na scenę globalną [Waking up the 
Dragon. China’s Return to the Global Stage], Rambler, Warsaw, 2012�
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in this model Professor Sułek’s research gave the following results: the United 
States received 8�14 points, the EU – 7�67 and China – 7�32� In the short term, 
the power of the EU may even rise a little, but after 2030 it will give way to the 
growth of China’s power (and other non-Western “rising powers”)�
Besides the unfavourable long-term development tendencies, some of which 
we have discussed above, the problem of Europe turns on the fact that it is not a 
country, so its power has a nominal character merely being the sum of the pow-
ers of its member states� The coherence of the EU cannot be compared to the co-
herence of individual countries (their level of internal integration), so its power 
cannot be utilised in politics and external relations in an analogous manner�221 
A collective’s real power is even less than its nominal power, not only due to the 
lower level of internal coherence, but also because of differences or conflicts of 
interests which make fast and effective decision-making impossible� This limits 
the extent to which Europe may fulfil its potential� Difficulties in finding a com-
mon denominator for key decisions have been very evident in the EU especially 
with reference to external relations rather than in internal cooperation� This 
situation is a result of the history, geopolitics, experience, traditions and varying 
ideas and political programmes of individual members states whose number has 
dramatically increased since 2004 (from fifteen to twenty-eight)�
Pushed out – or perhaps resigning – from the role of one of the poles of the 
global triad, the EU will have to find its place in a more complex geopolitical 
configuration which will form out of the present international order� This con-
figuration includes BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), the 
group of states which was in fact initiated externally, it first of all being a unit in 
the reports of the American banking house Goldman Sachs, at the beginning of 
the XXI century� In the beginning it was “only” BRIC – Brazil, Russia, India and 
China� In 2010 the Republic of South Africa was added� In 2013 their collective 
share in the world’s GDP was 21% while their share in the world’s population was 
over 43%� They are also geographically large countries rich in natural resources� 
“Called up to the blackboard” by Goldman Sachs, the countries of BRICS be-
gan to meet at the level of their leaders, meetings which resembled somewhat 
the meetings of the wealthy North (or rather West) G-7/8� Much divides these 
countries from one another, but there is a clear desire among them to limit the 
position of the West (the United States and the EU) in international politics� In 
221 For more details, see: M� Sułek, USA, UE i Chiny – trzy bieguny w globalnym ukła-
dzie sił [The USA, the EU and China – Three Poles in the Global Balance of Power], 
“Rocznik Strategiczny” [“The Strategic Yearbook”], 2013/2014�
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the end, BRICS will probably not become an anti-western coalition, even if that 
were Russia’s intent� But it remains an indication of the fact that we are entering 
a post-Western international order�222
A similar role in this process is played by G-20, which since the 2008 crisis 
has been meeting at the level of heads of state and government� G-20 arose as 
the expansion of G-7/8 (though the latter continues to meet alone, since 2014 
without Russia) – expanded by adding non-European countries� The idea was 
to include “emerging markets” into the mechanisms of global governance� Be-
sides the obvious powers, countries such as Argentina, Indonesia, Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia and Mexico were also included� And among these 20, there is also place 
for the EU (alongside the countries already present in G-7: Germany, the UK, 
France, Italy), the EU representing all its members� As of now the effectiveness 
of G-20 is highly debatable, but everything suggests that this formula will take 
on an increasingly institutional structure and play an ever-greater role in global 
finance and the process of stabilising global economic growth�223 The interpre-
tation of the place of the EU among the group of twenty actors, among which 
four are also member states, is ambiguous, so we should leave this issue at this 
point� It is however evidence of the relativisation of the EU’s place in the global 
balance of powers, especially considering that at the G-20 Summit in Evian, the 
host, President Sarkozy, tried to persuade the much less developed and poorer 
(per capita GDP) countries of G-20 to offer aid to the eurozone, threatened, as it 
was, with collapse�
So the evolution underway in the international order, regardless of the mis-
takes and the weakness of the EU itself, has lessened the opportunities for the 
EU to play the role anticipated for it only ten years before� Growing geopolitical 
pluralism, decentralisation and regionalisation in the context of this order will 
turn the EU – if it does not manage to make out of its “combined potential” the 
usefulness possessed by traditional geopolitical actors – into one of the scraps 
making up the global patchwork� The 2008 crisis and its extensive consequences 
have quickly and dramatically revealed the incapacity of the EU to take effective 
action influencing its immediate geopolitical neighbourhood which suffers the 
impulses and changes appearing in the entire global environment� This refers in 
222 J� Zajączkowski, BRIC dziesięć lat później, czyli Anty-Zachód w rozsypce [BRIC 
Ten Years on, or: Anti-West], “Rocznik Strategiczny” [“The Strategic Yearbook”], 
2013/2014�
223 S� Para, Perspektywa G-20 jako instytucji sterującej gospodarką światową [The Pros-
pects for G-20 as an Institution Steering the Global Economy], “Rocznik Strategiczny” 
[“The Strategic Yearbook”], 2010/2011�
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particular to North Africa (the “Arab Spring”), the conflict in the Middle East, 
Turkish politics and Eastern Europe, and above all, Russia which has rejected 
closer ties with Europe, preferring instead a more confrontational approach, de-
veloping instead an alternative “Union” – a Euro-Asiatic Union� At the same 
time, Russia has turned out to be quite effective in breaking up the EU’s unity 
and incapacitating it from action in the area of foreign policy, security and de-
fence� The irony is that the EU’s impotence and the atrophy of her security and 
defence policy came at a time when the United States, following the election of 
President Obama, ceased its sabotage of the EU in the latter’s pursuit of a key 
international role�
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10 Crisis as an Ending
Any crisis may be approached in an optimistic spirit by perceiving it, in what 
is said to be a Chinese tradition, as an opportunity – a moment to repair or 
rebuild a fragment of social reality� Everyone who has been concerned with Eu-
ropean integration has in their mind the words of Jean Monnet: “Europe will be 
forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises”� 
The course of the European Union (EU) crisis in the years from 2009 to 2016 
suggests that Europe has not “passed the test” – it does not seem to have offered a 
response which represents an opportunity, a chance to repair faults, to revitalise 
the project of European unity as the founders intended at the turn of the forties 
and fifties of the last century – Monnet among them� This inadequate response 
is due to the fact that we are not really dealing with a crisis of the Union (one 
crisis) but with a Union (Europe) of many crises� There has not been a situation 
like this since the establishment of the first community in 1951� The status of the 
EU in this crisis is analogous to a serious illness in the body (e�g� a major heart 
attack)� When an illness of this kind occurs, other illnesses or weaknesses in 
the body become manifest, though they had been hidden and unnoticed before� 
These secondary illnesses might not be dangerous in themselves, especially with 
an overall state of good health – a strong healthy system can keep them under 
control and fight them off naturally� But after a heart attack�
1  Struggle with the financial–economic crisis  
(i.e. the EU is busy with itself)
The distinguished economist Professor Witold Orłowski gave a pithy statement 
of the essence of the financial–economic crisis� (It directly affected the eurozone, 
but ultimately the entire EU was impacted, though only some of the countries in 
each group were deeply affected�) The first point of Orłowski’s analysis was that 
a few countries in the eurozone stood on the verge of bankruptcy� Secondly, the 
crisis revealed the loss of competitiveness of those countries’ markets and the fall 
in competitiveness of a few other markets as well� Thirdly, problems reached cri-
sis point because of a lack of supervisory-preventative mechanisms (crisis man-
agement)� Fourthly and finally – and perhaps the most challenging issue for the 
future of the eurozone – the crisis exposed the gulf in economic culture between 
the countries of the South and North of Europe, between traditions of doves 
and hawks in monetary policy� These traditions had not been united despite the 
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introduction of the common European currency�224 The countries known by the 
unflattering acronym of PIGS – Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain – found 
themselves in a particularly difficult situation, with PIGS becoming PIIGS as 
Italy joined them� Strict austerity programmes quickly brought positive results 
in all the countries so named, with the exception of Greece� Greece had become 
a specialist in avoiding and abusing EU regulations, including in particular regu-
lations governing monetary–economic union: budget limits, public expenditure 
limits, regulations on national insurance and taxation, in short: living beyond 
their means, at the cost of the remaining eurozone countries, especially the 
wealthiest� The level of demoralisation of the Greek political elite and Greek so-
ciety was so great that Greece– seeing that the time of cheating is coming to an 
end – turned its anger against those who had been supporting them and who 
could still save them� The spectre of “Grexit” appeared – the exit of Greece from 
the eurozone� Greek citizens most of all protested against the idea of Grexit at the 
same time portraying Angela Merkel as a Nazi, even though it was she who was 
most involved in saving Greece� It needs to be added that this “help” was also in 
the interest of German private banks which financed the Greek “living beyond 
their means”; the bankruptcy of Greece meant loss of capital for those banks� In 
the European press, the nations of Southern Europe have been accused of being 
lazy and spendthrift, while the northern nations are tight workaholics� It is inter-
esting that both have been accused of bringing about the crisis in the eurozone: 
one group has imposed monetary–economic discipline in a dictatorial fashion 
while the other group is lax�
In 2009, the gross domestic product (GDP) for the EU as a whole dropped 
by four percentage points (with Poland alone sustaining positive economic 
growth); escaping this crisis required many undertakings painful for countries 
in both the aforementioned groups� All the steps were negotiated with the par-
ticipation of member states, the Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)� Which is why the process of find-
ing solutions and taking decisions took longer than public opinion expected� The 
ensuing tension gave the impression that not only the eurozone but the entire EU 
could collapse at any time�
There were three kinds of response deemed necessary� The first was the nego-
tiation of the sharing of the costs of the crisis between debtors and creditors – that 
is between those who had taken out loans to cover public debt so as to sustain 
224 W� Orłowski, Jak podzielić ból [How to Share the Pain], “Gazeta Wyborcza”, 23 April 
2012�
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levels of public service beyond what the national income would permit and those 
who granted loans turning a blind eye to the creditworthiness of the borrowers� 
This was somewhat akin to the situation of subprime borrowers in the United 
States, only at the level of governments� Secondly, there was a need to create con-
ditions for renewed growth for those countries who were mired in debt� This was 
achieved by a series of expensive bailouts, aid for the banking sector to preserve 
the liquidity of the finance system of those countries� The bailouts helped keep 
heads above water, but came at the cost of increased internal debt, a burden on 
future generations and a reduction in future growth potential� Thirdly, it was 
necessary to find a long-term solution to the malfunctioning eurozone to avoid 
future crises and crashes� All these elements were summed up as follows: firstly, 
save Greece from bankruptcy; secondly, bailout packets and mechanisms and 
thirdly, a “life jacket” for the eurozone�225
The discussions to reach agreement on all these solutions were carried out in a 
tense atmosphere, with the hysteria of the financial markets (including predatory-
speculative trading on the value of securities), the games played by ratings agen-
cies which had previously provided unreliable evaluations, often consciously, 
thereby contributing to a false economic picture which in turn contributed to the 
crisis� The climax of the Greek crisis in 2010 was a real thriller – it seemed just 
a question of time before the first country left the eurozone, presumably bring-
ing others in their wake� And just such a scenario was anticipated by several 
experts�226 There was a serious threat to the eurozone itself, which by saving itself 
had to take care not to break up the EU (or to introduce an institutional divide 
within the EU)�227
The bailout went as follows, in keeping with the challenges facing the EU 
and the eurozone� Firstly, a temporary instrument called the European Finan-
cial Stability Facility (EFSF) was created� It was intended to protect threatened 
countries from bankruptcy, especially Greece, and it was active until the end of 
2010� Next, the European Stability Mechanism was set up, which required the 
amendment of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), in this embodiment 
225 Ibidem� Foreign authorities were of a similar opinion – for example N� Ferguson or 
N� Roubini�
226 In Poland, for example S� Kawalec, E� Pytlarczyk, Rozwiązać strefę euro [To Disband 
the Eurozone], “Gazeta Wyborcza”, 11 April 2012; see also: A� Słojewska, Scenariusze 
rozpadu strefy euro [Scenarios of the Collapse of the Eurozone], “Rzeczpospolita”, 18 
April 2012�
227 See for example: R� Kuźniar, Euro uratowane – ale co z Unią [The Euro Is Saved – But 
What of the EU?], “Rocznik Strategiczny” [“The Strategic Yearbook”], 2012/2013�
Europe in the International Order184
the mechanism was already an international organisation with its seat in Lux-
embourg� Its goal was to grant aid to countries threatened with loss of the sta-
bility of its public finances� The ESM was equipped with enormous capital for 
loans – around 700 billion euro (also due to its emissive power)� Finally, in March 
2012, there was signed the so-called fiscal pact, that is the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG)� The 
treaty is intended to counteract at a structural level the debt and public finance 
deficits in member states� The treaty established norms which could not be vio-
lated, response procedures (and pre-emptive measures) as well as sanctions for 
infringing agreed precautionary barriers�228
The real “hit” in saving the eurozone was 2012s unconventional decisions of 
Mario Draghi and the ECB he headed� “Super Mario” first decided to guarantee 
for three years the possibility of obtaining unlimited loans by large and unstable 
commercial banks (to sustain their credit rating)� His risky decision to buy an 
unlimited amount of government bonds on the secondary market was consid-
ered a breakthrough� It undermined large-scale speculation, calmed the hysteri-
cal “financial markets” and removed the spectre of bankruptcy from the weakest 
countries of the eurozone�229 At the same time, work began on EU banking, that 
is the creation of joint supervision mechanisms for the largest banks of the euro-
zone (and not only supervision was envisaged, i�e� caution, but also mechanisms 
ensuring liquidity)� These steps thankfully were effective, though the EU had to 
devote almost all its collective energy to them (there were countless meetings of 
heads of state and government and ministers of finance)� This situation contin-
ued, with occasional breaks, practically until June 2015 when it was once again 
necessary to save Greece from bankruptcy and from its exiting the eurozone� “In 
the meantime”, the EU also had to save the Cypriot banking system�230
228 P� Borkowski, Kryzys – światełko w tunelu [Crisis – The Light at the End of the Tunnel], 
“Rocznik Strategiczny” [“The Strategic Yearbook”], 2012/2013�
229 J� Almunia, Gdyby nie ratować banków [If We Did Not Save the Banks] (a conversa-
tion between the vice president of the European Commission and L� Baj), “Gazeta 
Wyborcza”, 29–30 September 2012�
230 The Cypriot banking system was bloated out of all proportion because of the needs of 
servicing the local economy� It had been colonised by Russians (money-laundering 
and tax avoidance)� It would have collapsed were it not for the EU’s intervention� To 
avoid collapse, Cyprus agreed to adopt an austere bailout package prepared by the EU�
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2 Political–institutional crisis
A financial–economic crisis as deep as this one had to provoke political prob-
lems and these quickly turned into a political–institutional crisis of the EU� Its 
manifestations included the legitimation problems of EU organs and their com-
petencies and decisions, the return to the nation state in the EU’s functioning, 
the prospect of deepening integration in the eurozone, that is the possibility of 
a multi-speed Europe� There also appeared the question of the federalisation of 
the EU, i�e� the optimal degree of its integration in terms of its capacity to solve 
the problems facing it (meaning the problems facing its members states), and not 
the problems which it created itself – as in the digs of some commentators, not 
entirely unfairly�
The fiscal pact was undoubtedly itself a step towards deeper integration, espe-
cially in the eurozone� It introduced a broader area of coordination in economic 
and social policy� The conviction strengthened that the eurozone would require 
more coordination in the long term, as well as adjustments in taxation, social 
benefits and – what was most challenging but within the realm of possibility – 
an increased redistribution of incomes between markets as diverse as Germany 
and Greece (diverse in terms of their competitiveness and economic culture)� 
Such extensive solidarity would, it was felt, lead inevitably to a separate budget 
and quasi-government for the eurozone� In connection with these challenges, 
the president of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy prepared a 2012 
report entitled Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union� Formally, it 
included proposals for the entire EU but in practice was designed for the euro-
zone� Deeper cooperation was envisaged in four main areas: financial, budgetary, 
economic and political� The financial area included above all the banking sector, 
as mentioned above� The budgetary issues included assurances of healthy fiscal 
policy, including the element of joint handling of debts and financial support, in 
return for reforms� In the economic sphere, the intention was to ensure growth, 
employment and coherence, thanks in part to a thoroughgoing convergence of 
the eurozone’s markets� The proposals for the political sphere were not only about 
decision-making capacity but also about creating for these decisions mechanisms 
of democratic legitimation, which might imply the creation of a separate (sepa-
rate from the European Parliament) parliament for the eurozone countries�
Van Rompuy’s plan did not emerge in a vacuum� The crisis had prepared the 
groundwork for the discussions on the further federalisation of the EU on the 
one hand, and on the lack of democratic legitimation on the other� For many 
politicians and experts, it was clear that effective responses to the problems fac-
ing the EU – from internal challenges to the stability of the euro in the context 
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of cultural–economic diversity in the eurozone – require deeper integration� At 
stake was a so-called federalist or community breakthrough or leap� Something 
akin to Rome 1957 or Maastricht 1992, that is the passing of another major por-
tion of member-state powers to international organs, in the name of greater 
solidarity and the achievement of other EU goals� The practical consequences 
might be the increased redistribution of earnings, an energy union or joint bor-
der security for the EU (member states)� It might have seemed that the route 
to such a breakthrough or to a true, tighter federation within the EU would be 
the fiscal pact perceived as the foundation for the new institutional architecture 
of the “core” of the EU, around which the European periphery would function, 
according to any logic chosen: whether of various speeds, diverse geometry or 
concentric circles�231 Articles by French authors in the press encouraged these 
hopes, in “Le Monde” and “Financial Times” appeared texts with titles such as 
“The EU is dead – long live the eurozone!” or “Thank-you My General, Good 
morning Jean Monnet”232 (de Gaulle was a supporter of the intergovernmental 
approach, Monnet – the community approach)� These articles were insincere or 
at least premature since it was France that was to become at that moment the 
defender of the interests of individual states and their sovereignty in the process 
of integration� For the French, or at least a large portion of French society, this 
was in fact a means of getting rid of the UK from the leadership of the EU, and 
perhaps from the EU altogether, a goal which did not, however, suit Berlin�
On the other hand, some – such as the director of the European Council on 
Foreign Relations Marc Leonard – were aware that “what is necessary is not 
possible”� He meant deeper integration as a condition of sustaining the vitality 
and coherence of the European project (and even its mere survival) for which 
there is currently no political understanding and support in the EU�233 Federal-
ists, such as vice president of the European Commission Viviane Reding, have 
even spoken of the historic opportunity to realise the vision of a United States of 
231 J� Pawlicki, Unia kilku prędkości [Multi-speed EU], “Gazeta Wyborcza”, 27 October 
2011 r�; J�-C� Piris, An EU Architect Writes: Time for a Two-Speed Union, “Financial 
Times”, 4 November 2011; J�-J� Mevel, Le scénario d’une Europe à plusieurs vitesses, 
“Le Figaro”, 5 December 2011�
232 P� Ricard, L’UE est morte, vive la zone euro, “Le Monde”, 15 October 2011; T� Klau, 
Merci mon Général, bonjour Monsieur Monnet, “Financial Times”, 19 October 2012�
233 M� Leonard, Il faut briser le cercle vicieux du déclin de l’Union européenne, “Le Monde”, 
30 August 2011�
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Europe�234 However, careful observers such as Professor Andrew Moravcsik from 
Princeton have claimed that the process of European integration has achieved a 
natural plateau for the foreseeable future� The approach of ever-closer union must 
be held back, as there is no social mandate for an all-encompassing, European 
federal state� Despite this fact, Moravcsik believes that, “The EU will remain the 
most successful example of voluntary international cooperation in history”�235 He 
forgot to add that nothing can be given once and for all�
The heart of the matter is not the disputes between the supporters of vari-
ous conceptions of European integration, disputes which have been carrying on 
since the turn of the forties and fifties when the European Council sufficed for 
some, but others wanted to go further and establish the European Coal and Steel 
Community� This dispute continued right up until the Lisbon Treaty with politi-
cians and experts involved in the entire process� With few exceptions, the initia-
tive has been taken by the supporters of the ever-closer union, invoking the logic 
of Walter Hallstein comparing European integration to riding a bike: if you do 
not wish to fall, you need to keep pedalling� Since the 2008 crisis, many maxims 
of this kind have been subjected to critical analysis� Since that time, progress in 
integration, the permanence and shape of the European project have ceased to be 
the exclusive domain of politicians, diplomats and thinkers� Deeper integration 
has evidently lost support from the nations and countries of the EU� Demonstra-
tions and electoral decisions have made this clear� In times of crisis, there has 
been a return to the nation state as the most credible locus of institutions of rule 
in difficult circumstances� A significant section of public opinion has begun to 
perceive the EU not so much as ineffective as the very source of European prob-
lems or at the very least a barrier to their solution� Alongside eurosceptic parties 
and milieu, there has appeared, for the first time since the fifties, groups openly 
hostile the EU, groups demanding its liquidation� They were not yet able to com-
mand majorities in opinion polls, but they were able to rely on 5–20% support in 
some countries as well entering national parliaments and the European Parlia-
ment in some cases� This phenomenon affected both “old” and “new” EU coun-
tries (e�g� France, Holland, the UK, Greece, Poland and Hungary)�
And then for the first time in the history of the Community, a member state 
has decided to leave – the UK� In times of crisis, the UK has decided to take 
advantage of a weak EU and reject its previously endorsed commitments which 
234 V� Reding, Stany Zjednoczone Europy [A United States of Europe], “Rzeczpospolita”, 
13 December 2012�
235 A� Moravcsik, Europe after the Crisis, “International Herald Tribune”, 22 April 2012�
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had become uncomfortable� As one might have imagined, the British blackmail 
(“Either the agreement of all remaining members, or we are leaving…”) only 
deepened the general crisis of the EU� The spectre of so-called Brexit – following 
the pattern set by “Grexit” – has started a chain reaction where other countries 
have begun demanding the same�
The socially hard-hitting austerity measures, also referred to as a “weight-loss 
programme” brought again to the fore the question of the democratic legitima-
tion of the EU� The decisions to accept these measures in exchange for support 
from the EU were reached in the course of negotiations between the affected 
governments and the EU organs or eurozone organs� The nations in question 
were merely informed� “A divided Europe looks into a Greek mirror� This is the 
meaning of the drama: the less democracy, the better for the markets”, wrote 
Jürgen Habermas commenting the violent demonstrations in Greece�236 The EU 
countries from “the North” in 2011 imposed the rejection of a referendum by 
Athens on the acceptance of the drastic budget cuts – as a condition of further 
support� The referendum was a bad idea, a populist idea – after all, similar ref-
erenda could be organised in the supporting countries (e�g� in Germany or Hol-
land), and Greece, which had previously driven its economy into the ground, 
would have been left alone with its troubles� As evidence of this situation, we 
may take the referendum that did come to pass in spring 2015 where Greeks re-
jected the terms of proposed aid and the populist government decided a moment 
later to adopt even stricter conditions to save Greece from otherwise inevitable 
bankruptcy and its exit from the eurozone�237 Of course, in this case, not the EU 
but the democratically elected governments were to blame� It was they who, in 
the course of globalisation, not only allowed financial markets to break away 
from their economies, but also allowed for living beyond the society’s means, 
including tax cuts which could not be sustained in tandem with costly social 
benefits and other elements of their welfare state� Low taxes were a point of neo-
liberal doctrine and the politics of individual states and not of the EU� The EU 
was perceived as a locus of wealth but now it could no longer afford to carry the 
promises inter alia implicit in the welfare states of its members� On the other 
236 J� Habermas, Nie o taką Europę szło [That Was Not the Europe We Wanted], “Gazeta 
Wyborcza”, 19–20 November 2011�
237 The spectacle of Greeks dancing after the “victory” in the referendum was a sorry 
sight� It recalled Zorba the Greek dancing after his “beautiful catastrophe” which 
he himself caused� Greece brought on itself its economic catastrophe� Slogans of a 
“proud nation” from the populist Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras were of no use in 
tough negotiations with Brussels� They only proved the infantilism of their approach�
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hand, it was essentially the nation states which were in possession of the mandate 
for sometimes severe austerity measures� In hard times it is easier for (national) 
governments to gain the social support needed for tough decisions and reforms� 
The pro-European rhetoric and the competencies of the EU organs in Brussels 
were easier to digest in better times� This was aptly put by Olaf Osica who wrote 
in 2011 that, “the way the crisis is experienced by various states, tends more to 
increase national identity in a divided Europe than to lead to the beginning of a 
new sense of being European”�238
The crisis revealed the European project to be like La Fontaine’s fable “The 
Milkmaid and Her Pail” where the milkmaid’s daydreams are spoiled by her 
spilling the milk she already has, while walking to the market� The EU has an am-
bitious vision for the future, but these dreams are easily broken by national iden-
tities which impact individual countries in their attitude to deeper integration, in 
their readiness for the federalisation of the EU� And it even turned out that some 
founding countries were not exhibiting enthusiasm to divest themselves of the 
attributes of sovereignty� Which is why with each passing year, the crisis came 
more and more to shake the balance between the competencies of community 
organs (transnational) and international organs – to the benefit of the latter� This 
came about under the influence of the big powers, especially Germany� The trend 
initiated by Berlin was noticed by experts and politicians and Piotr Buras, the 
director of the Warsaw Office of the European Foreign Affairs Council, called it 
a “silent revolution in the EU”, that is a “new intergovernmentalism” in steering 
the EU’s “nave”�239
The deepest crisis in the history of the Community coincided with the terms 
in office of weak and often not even serious leaders� In France, the president was 
the hyperactive, capricious and egocentric Nicolas Sarkozy, while Italy was run by 
a character straight out of burlesque – Silvio Berlusconi� The man was known as 
“Bunga” after his private, obscene parties (the term’s real meaning being known 
only to the invited)� Then the colourless socialist Zapatero drove Spain into eco-
nomic crisis� The conservative prime minister of Great Britain decided to gamble 
the membership of his country for special status in the Community� His whole 
behaviour was evidence that he did not attach great importance to the condition or 
even the continued existence of the EU� David Cameron’s Great Britain seemed to 
coexist almost alongside the EU, and the reform of the eurozone – whose survival 
238 O� Osica, Unia stanu wyjątkowego [EU State of Emergency], “Tygodnik Powszechny”, 
13 November 2011�
239 P� Buras, The EU’s Silent Revolution, Policy Brief, ECFR, September 2013�
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London seemed count on – was important to the English because and only be-
cause the City’s interests were also at stake� In several other EU capitals, leaders 
were weak on the economy and weak from the social instability of their countries� 
To strengthen their position or preserve their power, they tried to consider their 
national interests, ignoring at the same time the interests of the EU as a whole�
The exception was Angela Merkel� Thanks to the health and power of the Ger-
man economy, as well as the role Germany played in saving the eurozone, it quickly 
became the undisputed leader of the EU� Not always quick in action but stubborn 
and consistent Germany has gained authority and even the nickname the “Em-
press of Europe”� The chancellor compares well with her rather bland colleagues 
from the other main countries from “Old Europe”� Besides that, external powers 
(the United States, Russia, China) attest Germany’s leadership – when they address 
a question to Germany, it is understood they are addressing the whole of Europe� 
This suited Berlin’s growing tendency towards unilateralism, in any case a feature 
of other EU powers (e�g� France and the UK’s actions against Libya without consid-
eration of the position of other EU states)� It was clear that in external relations the 
EU powers prefer to act independently without being straightjacketed by a strong 
EU position� The previous axis of Paris and Berlin became a distant memory and 
summits were more a matter of nostalgia and habit than meetings for the prepara-
tion of serious proposals� An extreme example of the crisis of EU leadership was 
the aforementioned and embarrassing spectacle of Sarkozy with his begging bowl 
at the 2001 G-20 summit in Evian, where he was chair� The EU’s refusal of support 
was partly an expression of the conviction of the wealthier members that “Europe 
is rich enough to manage”, but more significantly, it was a way of punishing France 
for their breaking ranks in their actions against Libya a few months prior to the 
summit� Paris’ requests had a poor effect of the image of Europe which was no 
longer able to be the model nor the mentor� The joint effect of all these and other 
factors was the drift of the Community – both internally and in external relations – 
and a more evident weakness, lack of unity, powerlessness�
Researchers and experts are only too keen to extend (or change) the catego-
ries of crisis the EU has been experiencing since 2009� For example, Professor 
Bogdan Góralczyk writes about the crisis of leadership (or vision), the economic 
crisis, institutional crisis (“deficit of democracy”), the crisis of basic values and 
the security crisis – a total of five different crises�240 Donald Tusk, the president 
240 B�J� Góralczyk, The Crises of 2008 and 2014 and the New Role of the European Union 
on the Global Scene, in: B�J� Góralczyk (ed�), European Union on the Global Scene: 
United or Irrelevant?, Centre for Europe, Warsaw, 2014, pp� 233–246�
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of the European Council, also spoke about five crises at the end of 2015: Russia, 
migration, terrorism, Greece and Brexit (it being clear that some of these are 
short- or medium-term challenges241)� And there was no mention here of the 
demographic crisis which in the long term may have much more catastrophic 
effects than any of the other crises� Paweł Świeboda, a penetrating expert on 
integration, made a sharp observation in his report Europa: plan przetrwania 
[Europe: Survival Plan] where he claims that during the last fifty to sixty years, 
Europe has prepared itself mainly to repel external threats, where suddenly there 
has appeared an internal crisis threatening the EU’s existence, one towards which 
the EU appears to be rather defenceless�242
241 D� Tusk, Chrońmy granice Unii [Let’s Protect the EU Borders] (in conversation with 
T� Bielecki), “Gazeta Wyborcza”, 3 December 2015�
242 P� Świeboda, Opening report during the session Europa, przyszłość, solidarność 
[Europe, the Future, Solidarity], organised within the framework of the European 
Forum for New Ideas in Sopot in 2011�

11 Crisis of the International Role of the EU 
1 Foreign policy weakens, security and defence disappear
The comprehensive crisis – both financial and economic and political-insti-
tutional – could not fail to impact the international standing of the European 
Union (EU)� Paradoxically this happened just when – as a result of the provi-
sions of the Lisbon Treaty – the EU had decided to strengthen the tools at its 
disposal in security, defence and foreign policy� Most pertinent is of course the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) which was set up to support the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR)� Let 
us recall that the treaty nominally raised the status of the High Representative, 
as they are also the vice chair of the Commission and the chair of the Foreign 
Affairs Council (meetings of foreign ministers of the EU states)� The European 
Service was conceived of as an EU foreign ministry� However, the idea that the 
head of foreign policy would be called a “Minister” did not gain acceptance (the 
assumption of the Constitutional Treaty), so the prestige attached to the Service 
was reduced� This can be seen in the title itself of the department – “External Ac-
tion Service” – avoiding the phrase “foreign affairs”, “international relations” or 
“external relations” – only “external action”� This was an indirect way of reducing 
the status of the High Representative as well, and the foreign affairs’ policy con-
ducted by the High Representative also came down in prestige among EU policy 
matters� This nomenclature revealed the fact that the EU does not really conduct 
foreign policy, but only external “action”� Indeed, this assessment has been con-
firmed by the subsequent functioning of the Service since its establishment in 
2010� It is true that the Service’s budget is rather impressive at around 1 billion 
euro in 2015, and it has a staff of around 5000 officials (diplomats) and foreign 
offices (“embassies”) in almost all countries in the world� But it is precisely in the 
period following 2010 that any common foreign and security policy (and defence 
policy too) enjoyed a period of stagnation�
The weakening of EU policy in this area can already be seen in the nomina-
tions to the position of the High Representative� The first nomination following 
Lisbon was the British woman Catherine Ashton, she being followed by the Ital-
ian Federica Mogherini� In both cases, we were presented with figures who, not 
to put the matter more bluntly, were not very strong personalities in the EU and 
who did not represent significant experience or knowledge in the areas they had 
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been entrusted with�243 In the period preceding every nomination to the posi-
tion, on the “market” of possible names there would appear strong candidates, 
after which the opinion would prevail that the largest EU states would not permit 
this position to be occupied by a strong figure since this might lead to the EU 
having a clear foreign policy� The EU powers preferred to keep all options open 
in this area, including their ability to exert pressure on the High Representative� 
During the term of Catherine Ashton, it must be said that the external action 
service was developed, but her successor then did all she could to remain as 
invisible as possible� Yes, one is happy to make declarations about the rights of 
bisexual and transsexual individuals, which is more the responsibility of human 
rights organisations, but we do not see the High Representative getting involved 
on behalf of the EU in resolving the conflict in Eastern Europe or Syria� Without 
any qualms, the Union powers undertake unilateral actions whose consequences 
affect the whole of the EU� This is what happened in the case of the way Paris 
and London acted in Libya, how Paris acted in Syria, Berlin in Turkey, or the 
way Paris and Berlin acted towards Ukraine and Russia during the 2014/2015 
conflict� Neither the first nor the second High Representative had anything like 
the recognition or influence that was enjoyed by their predecessor, Javier Solana 
(Spain’s former foreign minister and former secretary general of North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization [NATO]) whose EU position was formally of considerably 
lower prestige and narrower scope� There is no lack of individuals (advisors and 
diplomats) with extensive knowledge and experience inside the EEAS, but the 
scope of its activity is determined by the Foreign Affairs Council, which does not 
want the High Representative to play a clear leadership role� The differences in 
the interests of the member states that have become visible during the last few 
years, the unilateralist approach taken by the most powerful and the primacy of 
the intergovernmental method (the quiet revolution) do not leave a lot of space 
for a strong EU foreign policy�
Its decreasing significance is particularly visible in terms of the EU’s gradual 
abandonment of a joint security and defence policy that came to look promising – 
thanks to much effort and despite much opposition from the United States 
among others – several years after it was first established in 1999�244 At that time, 
243 In the corridors of Brussels, well-informed leaders made no secret of the fact that 
the criteria of selection had been gender and the “principle” that each large member 
state must receive some key position�
244 R� Kuźniar, Wzlot i upadek Europejskiej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony [The Ups 
and Downs of European Security and Defence Policy], “Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe” 
[“National Security”] 2014, no� 4�
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European leaders considered the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 
as a vital, missing piece of the plan to allow the EU to become a global power 
or, indeed, a global superpower (T� Blair)� Just a dozen years later, the ESDP had 
become a shadow of that promise and those aspirations� It is enough to point out 
that the EU first quickly gave up on forming its own army, that was to number 
60 000 soldiers – a decision that should be considered rational – only to later cre-
ate a series of battle groups (of about 1500 men each) that existed mostly on paper 
and which were never used, so that in the EU security narrative they became the 
proverbial Loch Ness monster� As the Polish analysts, Marek Madej and Marcin 
Terlikowski, wrote in 2013, the ESDP saw the entrenchment of “a previously ob-
servable trend towards a concentration upon technical missions that were limited 
in scale and scope and most often were purely civilian in character� It means that 
most of the CSDP have been auxiliary and subsidiary in form”� [Polish original: 
“zauważalny już wcześniej trend ku koncentracji na misjach technicznych, ogra-
niczonych w skali i zakresie zadań, przeważnie o charakterze czysto cywilnym 
[…]� Nadaje to większości misji WPBiO status pomocniczy i uzupełniający”�] The 
authors based their opinion on observations of the sixteen EU missions that oc-
curred at that time, most in Africa� A proliferation of small missions (numbering 
no more than a few dozen people), which were civilian, advisory or teaching in 
character and politically insignificant, was considered by them as indicative of 
loss of faith within the EU that the ESDP could be of use in the context of the EU’s 
more serious security concerns within Europe�245 The EU’s complete withdrawal 
from this sphere was apparent given its inability to even consider sending a battle 
group to Libya or Syria, as well as to set up a peacekeeping force in the Donbas 
region (as Kiev’s requested in the spring of 2015)�
European leaders were afraid to even start an internal discussion on the topic, 
similar to the discussion regarding European security and defence, which led 
to a delay in the work on a new EU security strategy� The previous, and thus far 
only, security strategy was adopted in 2003, with a review of its implementa-
tion having been carried out in 2008� Meetings of the Council of Europe regard-
ing security and defence took place extremely rarely – no more than once every 
year and a half – with the December 2013 meeting deciding that a new strategy 
would be prepared by the end of 2015, which did not happen� Opposition by the 
Council’s European leaders was hard to understand given that lively discussions 
245 M� Madej, M� Terlikowski, Wspólna Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony – czas strategicz-
nego bezładu [A Common Security and Defence Policy – Time for Strategic Disorder], 
“Rocznik Strategiczny” [“Strategic Yearbook”], 2012/2013, pp� 239–243�
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were taking place and projects for such a strategy were being prepared in vari-
ous analytical-research circles� Sven Biscop, who is a Belgian expert in the area, 
prepared several serious reports as well early versions of a new EU security strat-
egy, without response�246 From today’s perspective (2016), the excellent Future 
of Strategic Europe published just four years earlier sounds like political fiction, 
even though it was written by Nicole Gnesotto – one of the top specialists in the 
field on the Old Continent� At one point, the frustrated author writes, “The EU’s 
security and defence strategy remains a policy of managing others’ crises”�247 The 
Polish translation of the word management (“zarządzanie”) is inadequate in the 
Polish version but it may be unconsciously revealing the nature of the problem: it 
suggests the administration of the problems rather than taking control�
In practice, the EU’s external relations with partners in distant corners of the 
world looked better, as they created the impression that the model of relations 
worked out earlier was being continued� Things looked much worse in terms of 
the EU’s immediate surroundings, which turned out in recent years to be resist-
ant to attempts to shaping it using a joint foreign and security policy� Develop-
ments indicated that the EU had lost the ability to effectively influence what was 
happening just outside its borders� At the same time, the 2012 High Representa-
tive’s annual report states that the EU is expanding its international actions in 
two directions: 1) to develop democracy, stability and welfare in its neighbour-
hood; and 2) to maintain strategic partnerships with key actors outside Europe�
In relations with the United States – following a period of struggles with 
America’s hegemonic ambitions and its global war on terror as well as the EU’s 
efforts to become a global actor – a friendly détente was reached� This did not 
mean, however, anything like the parity or partnership with Washington that 
the EU was hoping for� The causes, of course, were the EU’s growing divisions 
and internal crisis� However, Obama’s turn towards Asia was an important ad-
ditional reason� President Obama spent the first two years in the White House 
focused on developing relations with the main Asian countries as well as on in-
creasing America’s presence in that part of the world� It was the frequency of 
his meetings with Chinese leaders at that time that led to talk of G-2, a new 
global axis� In relation to Europe, the analysts and commentators who were 
246 S� Biscop, Peace without Money, War without Americans – Can European Strategy 
Cope?, Routledge, Aldershot, 2015�
247 N� Gnesotto, L’Europe a-t-elle un avenir stratégique?, Armand Colin, Paris, 2010� The 
author was the director of the EU’s Security Institute in Paris�
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paying attention – including C� Grand and R� Cohen – saw something like be-
nign neglect,248 an approach that was not affected by displays of pro-American 
feelings made by the new generation of European leaders such as Sarkozy and 
Merkel� Regardless of whether Obama really felt more global than Western, he 
and his government deemed the EU to have achieved maturity and independ-
ence in the international sphere, so it had to manage alone, especially given that 
there did not appear to be any major threats to American interests on the Old 
Continent� “Europe is no longer the major strategic concern of USA’s foreign 
policy”, declared C� Ashton in her first report� But then a number of European 
capitals began to show signs of feeling lonely and abandoned� The Europeans be-
gan to manifest how much America’s presence was needed by them for a variety 
of reasons�249 These displays of immaturity surprised even Europeans commen-
tators, who began to talk about Europe’s “retirement” (Ivan Krastev) or relega-
tion to the second league: “the European spirit has failed, European passions 
are extinguished”, argued Pierre Hassner nostalgically�250 It is sometimes thought 
that Washington’s patronising attitude towards Europe was due to its inability to 
cope with even such militarily insignificant operations as Libya in 2011�
The EU–US relations became emotional once more due to two completely dif-
ferent events� The first was Edward Snowden’s revelations regarding the extent to 
which American services were listening in on, among other, the leaders of the EU 
countries – their closest allies� Berlin, and especially Merkel, objected strenuous-
ly� The PRISM programme seriously undermined confidence in relations between 
Europe and the United States, especially because the Obama administration was 
unable to behave the right way after the problem was revealed and Europe reacted 
to it� The second event is rather positive in character, but it is not certain whether 
it will come to pass� The matter concerns the negotiations begun in 2013 to cre-
ate the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership� Upon the signing of the 
248 R� Cohen, Europe and Benign Neglect, “International Herald Tribune”, 6 September 
2010; also D�J� Kramer, Obama traci Europę (in conversation with A� Leszczyński), 
“Gazeta Wyborcza”, 19–20 June 2010�
249 This was felt most strongly in the countries of the “New Europe”, many of whose past 
politicians (presidents, ministers etc�) sent a letter to Obama in July 2009 asking him 
not to turn away from this region, particularly given the potential threat from Russia� 
Text of the letter in: “Gazeta Wyborcza”, 19 July 2009�
250 P� Hassner, Europa spadła do II ligi [Europe Has Dropped to the Second League] 
(a conversation with L� Włodek-Bernat), “Gazeta Wyborcza”, 18–19 September 2010; 
I� Krastev, Europa: mocarstwo na emeryturze [Europe: A Big Power on Retirement] 
(speaking with D� Pszczółkowska), “Gazeta Wyborcza”, 18–19 December 2010�
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agreement – which was optimistically and inaccurately predicted for 2015 – not 
only would the relationship between two sides of the Atlantic become closer, but 
the position of the West in international trade would also become strengthened� 
Even in early 2016, it was not clear, however, whether the agreement would be 
finalised�251 The war between Russia and Ukraine, as well as Western reactions 
to it, did not significantly help to bring together Europe and America apart from 
enlivening the Atlantic Alliance’s stance towards the East� The president of the 
United States was still not keen on participating in US–EU meetings�
In terms of Asia, the period of crisis only seemingly failed to make much im-
pact� Seemingly, because EU–Asia relations rarely included matters of global sig-
nificance that would influence the international order or even matters of lesser 
significance that would raise emotions (unlike relations with the United States)� 
But only seemingly because of the EU’s most significant Asian partner – China� 
The partnership concerned economic matters of trade and investment� And both 
the parties were each other’s largest or second-largest partners in terms of sales� 
Political relations served to maintain economic contacts� But Europe’s financial 
and economic crisis as well as its lack of unity in foreign relations significantly 
lowered its status in China’s eyes� China had been interested in a partnership, on 
its terms, with a unified Europe, but since the EU was not able to achieve that, 
China started to favour relationships with the main European powers, treating 
relations with the EU as a diplomatic ritual that involved biannual meetings be-
tween the parties� Beijing noticed that the EU powers were competing among 
each other for its favours and contracts� Germany and France were the first off the 
blocks in this competition, but they were soon joined by the UK, whose political 
stance towards China was close to America’s� The EU’s minor members followed 
this example�252 A weak EU was unable to react decisively to trade practices that 
were dishonest and in conflict with the World Trade Organization (WTO) regu-
lations�253 In effect, the EU ceased to be treated as a particularly difficult or de-
manding partner� It gave up its prior, principled stance regarding human rights, 
was not interested in geopolitical or security matters within Eastern Asia and 
251 A� Jarczewska, Transatlantyckie Partnerstwo Handlowo-Inwestycyjne (TTIP) – szansa 
na nowe otwarcie w stosunkach USA–UE? [Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part-
nership (TTIP) – Opportunities for a New Opening in US–EU Relations?], “Rocznik 
Strategiczny” [“The Strategic Yearbook”], 2013/2014�
252 See more in: J�M� Fiszer (ed�), Unia Europejska – Chiny. Dziś i w przyszłości [European 
Union – China. Today and in the Future], ISP PAN, Warsaw, 2014�
253 The main concerns were dumping, lack of access to its own markets and an artificially 
low yuan�
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did not try to influence Beijing’s policies regarding any issues apart from climate 
change: which suited the Chinese just fine – but also meant that they did not see 
the EU as a global actor intending to shape the international order� At the same 
time, China was not interested in Europe’s problems in the Middle East or in its 
relationship with Russia following Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine� A weak EU 
served the economic interests of China and its efforts to increase its own inter-
national standing� This was, of course, closely connected to the failure of the EU’s 
common foreign and security policy as well as the abandonment of its ambitions 
in the sphere of security and defence�254
The EU tried to compensate for its weaker position in relation to China by 
developing multilateral relations with the nations of Eastern and Southern Asia� 
This was the aim of the dialogue concerning global economic and security mat-
ters that was carried out at the annual Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM)� The fact 
that around fifty countries were involved in these meetings meant they were 
purely deliberative in character, but even so it was of course better that they do 
take place�255 More constructive perhaps were the meetings between the EU and 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries� Free trade zone 
agreements were signed with some of them, with the assumption that with time 
the zone would come to include all the member countries of both organisations� 
During these meetings, the EU showed greater interest in matters of security in 
Southeastern Asia, particularly given that the ASEAN countries created their 
own Regional Forum dealing with this very issue and it is a clear attempt to draw 
upon European (EU and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
[OSCE]) experience in that area: indeed, the EU participates in the work of the 
Forum� The EU’s problem in its relations with China, ASEM and ASEAN was 
that while those countries were taking a Realpolitik approach, the EU defined 
itself as a normative power� At that distance and without military (security and 
defence) potential it was hard to command respect and influence the countries 
of that region, especially given that at the same time the EU was losing it ability 
to influence its immediate neighbourhood�
254 K� Miszczak, Unia Europejska i Chińska Republika Ludowa – partnerzy globalnego 
bezpieczeństwa? [The European Union and the People’s Republic of China – partners 
in global security?], “Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe” [“National Security”] 2014, no� 4�
255 However, the ASEM meeting in Milan in October 2014 was completely dominated 
by the meeting of Western European leaders with Putin regarding Ukraine that was 
organised on the sidelines�
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2 Towards the Mediterranean – a good start to a bad thing
The region of the Mediterranean – its southern and eastern coasts – became in 
the 2010s the stage for a momentous EU failure, one which may yet culminate 
in disaster� Ironically, this happened in a region in which the EU and some of 
its member states, including all the major ones, were actively pursuing a secu-
rity and development policy� One might have thought the aforementioned sup-
port programmes, carried out mainly as part of the Barcelona process and its 
various mutations, would bring about the desired outcomes: economic growth, 
increased social justice, political modernisation and protection of human rights 
and basic freedoms – all within the context of greater openness to the external 
world and the global developmental processes� Since Europe’s long-term engage-
ment was not bearing the expected fruit, the EU was often accused of hypocrisy 
and legitimation of authoritarian Arab regimes, which was unfair insofar as it 
would have been impossible to pursue any policies with regard to those countries 
without maintaining contacts with their governments� Of course, the policies of 
some EU countries, particularly those with a colonialist past in the region, could 
be thought of as providing support for local regimes: as in the case of France and 
Tunisia, or Italy and Libya – like the United States and Egypt�
Then, suddenly, a series of unpredictable events took place in Arab countries 
that seemed to be largely the result of European engagement in support of demo-
cratic reforms and human rights� The Arab Spring began with the downfall of the 
regime of President Ben Ali in January 2011, following protests that started in 
December 2010� The events in Tunisia ignited mass protests against the govern-
ment of Mubarak in Egypt, and in February, his thirty-year rule was at an end� 
The flame of the Arab Spring jumped from country to country, particularly to 
Libya and Syria� In the case of Libya, a key role in the downfall of Gaddafi was 
played by NATO intervention and, following several months of fighting, power 
was taken over by rebels supported by Western powers and Gaddafi was killed in 
October� There was no direct Western intervention in Syria and the insurgents 
proved too weak to bring down Bashar al-Assad� The uprising turned into a pro-
longed, bloody and destructive civil war, indirectly engaged in by France, Saudi 
Arabia, Turkey, Iran and in later stages also Russia and the United States� Civil 
war also started in Yemen� In Bahrain, the Arab Spring was ended by a military 
intervention by Saudi Arabia, in much the way that Soviet forces intervened in 
Hungary in 1956� The other Arab countries also witnessed protests that were 
either less violent or quickly brought to an end�
Sadly, nowhere except Tunisia – which had certain democratic traditions and 
potential – did the Arab revolutions manage to meet the aspirations of those who 
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started them, and the EU watched on powerless as the hope of an Arab Spring 
turned into a dark and cold November autumn�256 In Egypt, following a short 
period of Muslim democracy, power was taken using force by the military� Libya 
turned even more quickly into a failed state, similarly to Yemen, while Syrian ter-
ritory not under government control saw a war of all against all, with jihadis of 
various stripes at centre stage� In the end, this led to the creation of a cancerous, 
rogue Islamic State that ruled large parts of Syria and Iraq (following the destruc-
tion of Iraq as a result of American aggression and occupation in 2003–2010)� 
A certain positive role was played by the EU in stabilising democratic changes 
in Tunisia, even though the situation there remained quite uncertain� It was in 
Libya that the EU failed dramatically� The intervention of the Atlantic Alliance 
(or of several member nations acting under the NATO banner) turned out to 
be a mistake, including the abuse of the authority granted by United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1973� The operation could have and indeed should 
have been taken on by the EU, which had the appropriate capabilities to fulfil the 
mandate of the resolution� However, the EU was unable to hold back France and 
the UK, who intervened with the clear intention of bringing down Gaddafi and 
whose approach was clearly motivated by neo-colonial motives – especially re-
gaining access to Libya’s nationalised oil� After Gaddafi’s downfall, Libya did not 
just become a failed state – it was also a source for weapons and mercenaries that 
fed conflicts in various Central African countries, as well as being the open gates 
through which hundreds of thousands of refugees and immigrants travelled to 
Europe in the next few years�
Both the EU and most of its member states seemed to treat the growing refu-
gee crisis as a short-term problem connected to the conflicts that were the result 
of the Arab Spring� Even the Italian Mare Nostrum operation in 2013 looked 
at first a bit like a game of cops and robbers� The aim was to discourage those 
who had made a profitable and comfortable business (for them, not the refugees) 
out of smuggling people from northern Africa and the Middle East� In the end, 
Italian ships took onboard people who had been smuggled across the Mediter-
ranean in primitive boats� Many died due to the chaotic nature of the effort and 
due to bad weather conditions� In just one year, the Italians took onboard about 
a hundred thousand people� Several times as many reached the European con-
tinent, avoiding border patrols� In effect, the actions of the EU and its members 
were making it easier for those hundreds of thousands of refugees and migrants 
256 S� Parzymies, Arabska wiosna – dwa lata później [Arab Spring – Two Years On], 
“Sprawy Międzynarodowe” [“International Affairs”] 2013, no� 1�
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to reach Europe where their security and well-being would be taken care of� The 
EU intervention civilised what was initially an entirely spontaneous phenom-
enon akin to a rising wave� Information about the lack of a border and the good 
reception to be had in the EU probably served to encourage people in many 
countries of the Middle East and Africa, including those not in the throes of 
conflict�
But the tsunami came from a different direction� In mid-2015, a wave of refu-
gees and migrants swept towards Europe from Syria and Iraq� This was the result 
of the civil war and the thuggish actions of the Islamic State which formed in 
2014 across significant areas under jihadi control� In 2015, through Turkey and 
the Balkans, more than a million people reached Germany: with most of them 
arriving in the second half of the year and only a quarter of a million having 
arrived the previous year� Chancellor Merkel’s August declaration that all who 
need it will be taken in, most definitely acted as a catalyst� In the face of the hu-
manitarian crisis, the EU turned out to be divided, unable to adopt a common 
stance� Regardless of the degree to which it was prepared to provide shelter and 
the actual situation of the arrivals, the EU was unable to set out and defend its 
external border� Its defence was called for first by the leaders of the countries 
through which the exodus was taking place – with as many as 10 000 arrivals 
a day – and then by the president of the European Council, Donald Tusk and 
finally, in the last days of 2015, by the German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier� The defence of the EU’s external border, sealing it to make it possible 
to know who was entering the EU, is not an easy task but it is not impossible� 
The problem is not with technical or organisational capabilities but with political 
will� This has been weakened by the effects of three factors: human rights, the 
Old European complex which could be called the “The White Man’s Burden” 
and the existence of the Schengen zone� There was an additional, unique factor: 
Germany’s guilt complex – their awareness of responsibility for World War II� 
Germany was still a hostage to their not so recent past� At first, Berlin tried to 
force its position upon the whole of the EU with a quota system which led to 
opposition from many countries and a confrontation that the EU had not previ-
ously witnessed� The EU’s inability to react to the crisis included lack of agree-
ment as to who were refugees, for whom assistance should be unconditional as a 
basic human right in accordance with the 1951 UN convention on refugees, and 
who were economic or social migrants who had joined the refugees in search of 
work and a better life in rich EU countries� Characteristically, nearly all who ar-
rived in the EU since August 2015 wanted to reach Germany, Sweden or Norway 
where they would have the best conditions�
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The problem with the reaction by the EU and its member states had many di-
mensions and contexts� It was not just a humanitarian problem but also an eco-
nomic, social, cultural and security problem� In other words, it was very much a 
political problem� It brought out fundamental difference between member states 
in terms of their experience with contact with other cultures� What was natural 
for former colonial powers, was a reason for panic for countries without colo-
nial experience; the latter reacted with fear and superstition to “the exotic”� The 
crisis and the feelings it aroused fed nationalist, chauvinist parties and groups� 
At the same time, many of the opinion makers called for solidarity and tolerance 
understood in naïve, sentimental terms� The refugee crisis put in sharp relief the 
question of European identity – what it really means and whether there is any 
fundamental agreement about it in today’s EU�
Somewhere in the background was the issue of the responsibility of the Eu-
ropean countries which had played a role in causing the conflicts in Libya and 
Syria and therefore had responsibility for their consequences� In the second half 
of 2015, it came to be commonly thought that this crisis, coming as it did on 
the heels of the 2008 and 2009 crises, was the most serious since the formation 
of the Community and had the potential to cause its break-up� Comparisons 
were made to the late Roman Empire, which was not able in the end to defend 
its borders� The inflow of peoples across Rome’s various borders was not just 
indicative of the Empire’s weakness but also watered down its ability to defend 
its civilisational identity, a necessity for its survival�257 The lifecycle of civilisa-
tions discussed in the previous chapter – for example the series of paintings by 
Thomas Cole dubbed The Course of Empire, discussed by Niall Ferguson – sud-
denly looked like realistic scenarios� It could happen to us too – as Paul Valéry 
said, civilisations are mortal, even ours�
The question of the implications of the inflow of refugees into the EU, un-
precedented in its sudden onset and scale and made up almost entirely of Mus-
lims, was raised dramatically by the two terrorist attacks in Paris in January and 
November 2015� While the first seemed to be aimed just at European freedom of 
expression – a vengeful reaction to the caricatures of Islamic figures published 
in Charlie Hebdo, a French satirical magazine – the second attack matched 
Huntington’s vision of a clash of civilisations� In a coordinated series of attacks, 
130 people were killed making it the French 9/11� It was carried out by Islamic 
257 J� Borkowicz, Imigranci pustoszą miasta [Immigrants Are Devasting Cities], “Rzeczpo-
spolita” (the “Plus Minus” supplement), 31 October–1 November 2015; M� Cichocki, 
Gliniane skorupy Rzymu [Rome’s Casing of Clay], “Rzeczpospolita” (the “Plus Minus” 
supplement), 5–6 December 2015�
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State jihadis in revenge for France’s role in the Syrian conflict� The November 
13, 2015, attack on France served as an alarm for the whole of Europe, as did 
the next bloody attack in Brussels in March 2016� The terrorists were European 
Muslims, second- and third-generation migrants from Arab countries� At the 
same time, several thousand of the jihadis fighting under Islamic State flags were 
Muslims born in Europe� Meanwhile, a wave of refugees and migrants from Arab 
countries was entering Europe� Would they become Europeans or, failing that, 
would their children and grandchildren? How many would join a jihad outside 
of Europe or even within it? The questions that arose in that situation were not 
unreasonable ones to ask�
It is quite wrong to equate Muslims with Islamist terrorists� But the second of 
those groups is not imaginary but a dramatic reality that has confronted many 
innocent victims in Europe, America, the Middle East and Africa and this ex-
perience should not be treated lightly� Should Europeans spend ever larger sums 
on internal security, limit the rights of citizens, give up on the freedom of move-
ment afforded by Schengen, tolerate anti-Semitic excesses or accept areas where 
European law does not apply – just to avoid being called “Islamophobic”? There 
are no easy answers to these questions� But they must be asked given the rapidly 
rising number of people whom we are sheltering or allowing to stay, since they 
are coming here looking for work and a better life – which can also benefit us� 
During the long months of the refugee crisis and at a time of terrorist attacks, the 
EU as a whole including a large number of its national leaders preferred to stick 
their heads in the sand� It was only in December 2015, after several months had 
gone by, that the president of the European Council, Donald Tusk, dared to say 
that the EU’s external borders must be protected since the wave of migrants “is 
too large not to hold it back”�258 The EU “strategy” taken up at the beginning of 
this phase of the crisis in June/July of 2015 remained only on paper� Of its three 
elements, only the first was put into action: assistance for refugees; counteracting 
the large-scale “industry” smuggling people and engagement aimed at ending 
the conflicts� It meant that the EU was reduced to the role of the Red Cross or, 
to put it in different terms, a humanitarian power� It took till the early spring of 
2016 for a more sober attitude from Europe� And as for terrorism, not even the 
French President, F� Hollande, invoking Article 42�7 of the Treaty on EU right 
after the November 13 Paris attack (the Article regards assistance to a state under 
258 D� Tusk, Chrońmy granice Unii, op. cit. He did this when the number of refugees and 
migrants to Germany in 2015 alone exceeded a million people�
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military attack259), was able to achieve EU cooperation on fighting the Islamic 
State which stood behind the attacks� It should be recalled that after the Septem-
ber 11, 2001, attacks the whole Atlantic Alliance declared their readiness – the 
basis of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty – to support the United States in 
Afghanistan where the Al-Qaeda headquarters were located�
Erdogan’s Turkey decided to use the crisis for their own benefit, and the EU 
was ready to help� Most refugees from the Middle East (including Iraq and Af-
ghanistan) reached Europe via Turkey, with significant and well-remunerated 
help from Turkish transporters, whose actions are tolerated by the authorities� 
Berlin, finally seeking to reduce the wave of refugees, proposed to provide Tur-
key with financial assistance – which is understandable – as well as to help in 
speeding up accession talks� This happened at a time when the policies of the 
Turkish government – well known and criticised within Europe – were actually 
decreasing that country’s ability to fulfil membership criteria� (Turkey’s policies 
included limiting the rights of its citizens, increased repression of Kurds seeking 
autonomy and the less than clear role played by Ankara in the Syrian conflict it-
self�) The promises made by Chancellor Merkel were confirmed a few weeks later 
by the European Council� This should be seen as an example of the dangerous 
way in which the EU was allowing itself to be blackmailed in strategic matters 
under the pressure of short-term problems of its own making�
3 Unresolved duel with Russia
During the preceding years, the only attractive symbol of the EU’s effectiveness 
was the Balkans – the only region where EU enlargement was feasible in the 
foreseeable future� In July 2013, Croatia had become the twenty-eighth member 
of the EU� The 2012 agreement between Serbia and Kosovo, reached as a result of 
great efforts by Ashton and significant pressure from the whole EU, opened the 
way for Serbia too� And so in 2013, Serbia applied to begin accession negotia-
tions but is not likely to join earlier than 2020� Two more countries with signifi-
cant internal problems are waiting in the queue – Macedonia and Albania� The 
ongoing fragility and uncertainty of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s situation excludes 
259 It was widely assumed that the right response was to invoke Article 222, that is the 
solidarity clause from the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU� Independently of 
the fact that the situation did not satisfy the criteria of Article 42�7, the EU was not 
in possession of the appropriate structure to grant the support envisaged in that 
article� Which is why the EU defence ministers lined up to express their solidarity 
with France and that was an end to their response�
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the possibility of talks� Insofar as the EU can talk of success in this region, it is 
because these are countries formed from the break-up of Yugoslavia� After all, 
Yugoslavia had been a fairly developed country with strong ties to the rest of 
Europe� Were it not for the war, it would have probably joined the EU during the 
large-scale 2002–2004 enlargement�
The last major opposition to the EU’s international aspirations – opposition 
to its international identity and its ability to affect the international order – came 
from its immediate neighbourhood, from Eastern Europe� Paradoxically, this 
was, as a result of the success of the EU’s activity in the region, carried out since 
2009 in terms of the Eastern Partnership� Its formula included the possibility of 
associate status, including a free trade agreement� Three countries had decided 
to take advantage of the Partnership’s opportunities and did so despite internal 
difficulties as well as discouraging signals and pressure from Russia: Ukraine 
(with significant assistance from Poland), Georgia and Moldavia� Developments 
regarding associate status were very slow due to the erratic behaviour of the gov-
ernments of those countries, the legacy of the Soviet Union that still hung heav-
ily upon them and the oligarchic structure that dominated their economies and 
politics� The EU made considerable efforts to help these countries deal with their 
problems, seeing the associate status as an opportunity to reform their political 
systems to ensure basic standards of democracy and the rule of law, as well as 
to modernise and open up their economies� Of course, associate status and the 
free trade zone were meant to tie these countries to the EU, in effect helping to 
free them from a one-sided dependence upon Russia� While Moscow displayed 
displeasure with these developments, it was also strengthening its ties with the 
EU at the same time – the EU had always treated Russia as a strategic partner� 
One symbol of the trust shown towards Russia was the building of the Nord 
Stream gas pipeline across the Baltic, even though there was plenty of evidence 
that Gazprom and deliveries of energy resources might be used by Moscow as 
a means of ensuring dependence and putting pressure on other countries, as 
well as a means of creating tensions within the EU� Furthermore, from the mid-
dle of the first decade of the XXI century, Russian civil liberties and democratic 
standards were demonstrably regressing� The government was evidently becom-
ing authoritarian� At the same time, Moscow was beginning to put pressure upon 
the countries of the former USSR, treating them worse than satellite states had 
been treated under communism – the war with Georgia providing just one ex-
ample of this� This led to a cooling of relations and undermined the idea of the 
“change through engagement” that played a role in the policies towards Russia 
of some countries, including Germany� This approach was intended to achieve 
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positive internal changes in Russia by sustaining relations, including economic 
relations, with Europe�
In the end, Russia challenged the EU openly� This happened right after Putin 
returned to the post of president in the middle of 2012� Moscow emphatically 
opposed Ukraine’s growing links with the EU that were to be formalised by the 
signing of an association agreement during the Eastern Partnership’s meeting in 
Vilnius in November 2013�260 President Yanukovych, dependent upon Moscow’s 
support and blackmailed by Putin, withdrew at the last minute� This step angered 
Ukrainians who saw association with the EU as a chance to civilise their country 
and decrease their colonial dependence upon Russia� The government tried to 
crush the Euromaidan mass protests that started in December 2014, with about 
a hundred people dying in the process� Holding EU flags and shouting “Europe 
is here”, the Ukrainians did not give in and a frightened Yanukovych escaped in 
February 2015 to Russia� Moscow reacted by annexing Crimea a few days later and 
inspiring and equipping a separatist rebellion in March in the Donbas region�261
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine meant the EU was faced with a particu-
larly difficult geopolitical problem� In Western Europe relations with Russia 
were valued and there was no wish to spoil them� (And the same could be said 
for the entire EU in view it’s acting as one�) But what Russia had done had not 
occurred in European international relations since 1945� It was not just a se-
rious breach of the UN Charter but was an attack on the post-war European 
order that had been co-created by Russia and of which the EU felt itself to be 
a guardian� It was also a breach of the principles on which the EU–Russian 
relations, their mutual strategic partnership, were based� Finally, Russia had in 
effect attacked one of the EU’s vital policies – the Eastern Partnership – thereby 
contradicting the logic of the entire European unification project, open, as it 
was, to all countries on the continent that wanted to participate� This could not 
be ignored, or so one might think� For several months the EU limited itself to 
sending Moscow warnings not to proceed any further� The first sanctions were 
less than serious: a travel ban within the EU for about thirty Russian notables 
and the freezing of their accounts in the West� Moscow must have been pleas-
antly surprised, particularly since it kept receiving assurances concerning the 
260 To make sure that this happened, the EU gave up on a number of conditions that had 
earlier been given to Ukraine, including the freeing of J� Tymoshenko who had been 
put in prison in an act of political revenge, in the hope that the implementation of the 
agreement will gradually force Kiev to accept further political and economic reforms�
261 According to various reports, separatism was to be sparked in six regions but the 
efforts were successful only in two�
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importance of relations with Russia from European capitals� And that would 
have probably been the end of it were it not that separatists (or the Russians who 
supported them) shot down a passenger liner flying from Amsterdam to Kuala 
Lumpur on July 17, 2014� Nearly 300 people, including 200 Dutch, died� The EU 
was forced to react more forcefully� At the end of July, the EU accepted stronger 
sanctions that affected Moscow in the longer term: 1) an export ban on weap-
ons and dual-use technology, 2) an export ban on technology for the mining 
industry and 3) a ban on Russian access to Western stock markets� The effect of 
the sanctions was strengthened by sanctions imposed by the United States and 
other individual Western countries�262
A war in the immediate neighbourhood of the EU – punishment for a neigh-
bouring state wanting to associate itself with the EU – was both geopolitical and 
axiological in character� It could be said that it presented the EU with the perfect 
opportunity to demonstrate its determination to play a significant internation-
al role� Brussels could prove its normative force and superiority over a brutal 
neighbour whose overall potential was, nonetheless, much less than the joint 
potential of all EU members together� It seemed all the more appropriate with 
the anti-European rhetoric Putin and his entourage were using to justify their 
aggression� For the EU this could have been its hic Rhodus, hic salta.263
Nothing of the sort happened� The EU did come to gradually conclude an 
association agreement with Ukraine and supported the new Kiev government 
financially and politically� However, the dialogue with Russia in the face of 
the conflict was carried out not by the EU but by Berlin and Paris� Two capi-
tals, together with Moscow and Kiev, formed what came to be known as the 
Normandy Format, and the Minsk I and Minsk II agreements were signed 
on the basis of this framework, halting military action on the front between 
separatist Donbas and the remainder of Ukraine� Occupied Crimea was not 
discussed� The EU sanctions were to be called off once the conditions of the 
agreement were met, but the ceasefire was the only value it had – the EU did 
not even send a mission to ensure that it was being respected� Nothing more� 
262 Apart from sanctions that were similar to those put in place by the EU, Russia’s 
membership of the G-8 was suspended and Western leaders ceased to meet with 
Putin� The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe suspended the right 
of the Russian delegation to participate in its work� Finally, NATO suspended the 
contacts with Russia it had as part of the NATO–Russia Founding Act and decided to 
strengthen its presence in the countries that formed the eastern flank of the Alliance�
263 R� Kuźniar, Ukraine – Europe’s hic Rhodus, hic salta, in: B�J� Góralczyk (ed�), European 
Union on the Global Scene: United or Irrelevant, Aspra-JR, Warsaw, 2015�
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Disputes regarding interpretation were discussed by the Normandy Four: Pu-
tin, Poroshenko, Merkel and Hollande� Putin constantly displayed bad faith and 
a disrespectful attitude towards the others� The EU’s position was worsened not 
just by its absence at the negotiating table but, also, by the individual initia-
tives made by EU capitals towards Russia, which made it easier for Moscow to 
be intransigent in the face of Brussels’ expectations� For example, the German 
vice chancellor – Merkel’s number two – contacted Moscow regarding ways to 
sidestep the Commission’s objections regarding a second Nord Stream pipe-
line which was potentially blocked by sanctions on all mining and extractive 
industries� The Italian government carried on business with Moscow as if noth-
ing had happened and the prime minister of Hungary worked ceaselessly to 
develop economic links with Russia� By the end of 2015, the situation had not 
changed� Moscow was counting on the EU getting tired, while the EU itself had 
lost its best opportunity to use its foreign and security policy (including the de-
fence component) to demonstrate its unity in the face of an act of aggression in 
its immediate neighbourhood� Once again, the aggression had been aimed at a 
country which could have been considered for membership in the long term, a 
prospect it had been deprived of as a result of that aggression� While holding the 
better cards, the EU was unable in Ukraine in 2014–2015 to win the geopolitical 
duel with Russia�264
The last few years have shown that on the one hand the EU remains attrac-
tive, as seen by the inflow of refugees and migrants, the stance taken by Serbia 
and the Ukrainian Euromaidan revolution of 2013/2014� On the other hand, its 
ability to influence and shape its surroundings has weakened� Recently, this has 
also included the sphere in which the EU considers itself a power – the nor-
mative sphere� In the long term, in more difficult international circumstances, 
normative power is ineffective unless it is supported by strategic potential and 
capabilities� It is a bit like for women – charm is not enough, it is also necessary 
to have the capacity to defend one’s interests and enforce one’s justified expec-
tations� In these times of trouble, the EU might find solace in the Nobel Peace 
Prize which it received in 2012� The Nobel Prize was well deserved, though late 
in coming� For the EU made great contributions to maintaining peace on a con-
tinent that had been notorious for wars, as well as protecting peace around the 
world� The fact that most of the criticisms of the Nobel Committee’s choice came 
264 Camille Grand felt that “Putin must lose”, because “while he may play better than 
the West, his cards are much worse”� In conversation with J� Bielecki, interview for 
“Rzeczpospolita”, 24 March 2014�
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from within Europe just shows how mannered and self-destructive the European 
opinion-forming circles have become�265 However, the Nobel Peace Prize for the 
EU in 2012 should rather be thought of, in Oscar style, as a “Lifetime Achieve-
ment Award” rather than a prize for “Best Film of 2012”�
265 R� Kuźniar, Nobel dla Unii Europejskiej? Jak najbardziej [Nobel Prize for the European 
Union? Well deserved], “Sprawy Międzynarodowe” [“International Affairs”] 2013, 
no� 2; compare: A� Bebler, Pokój w Europie a Pokojowa Nagroda Nobla [Peace in 
Europe and the Nobel Peace Prize], ibid�
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Whatever else it may have been, the European Union (EU) has been a European 
attempt to regain position and influence in the international order, an influence 
that had been lost as a result of World War II� The end of the Cold War and 
the shift to a multipolar international order was not the “return of Europe”, nor 
the recreation of the arrangement of centre (Europe) vis-à-vis periphery (the 
Rest of the World), but rather Europe’s regaining its capacity to participate in 
the shaping of the international order� To achieve this, the Union had first of all 
to become representative of Europe, that is to enlarge significantly, as it indeed 
did – expanding from twelve countries in 1994 to twenty-eight in 2015� Secondly, 
the Union needed to develop instruments to influence its immediate and remote 
neighbours� This was attempted by means of a common security, defence and 
foreign policy, as well as a common currency and the eurozone� If the sum of the 
EU’s efforts in this direction is far from satisfactory, we should consider why this 
was so and what lessons can be learned for the future� The author is aware that 
both the presentation of the material from which we draw conclusions and the 
conclusions drawn themselves depend on one’s epistemological perspective and 
values� He nevertheless holds out hope that these considerations may serve in 
the process of creating a shared awareness of what the “international identity” of 
the EU is and what the place of our Europe should be in the international order� 
The predominance of criticism and the deficit of optimism in assessments of 
the EU’s record may be useful as a warning and an inspiration to further action 
which might change the unfavourable course of events�
From the history of Europe in the international order, we can clearly conclude 
that it has marked itself out from the Rest of the World and has been perceived as 
a distinct culture� Polish researchers – led by Oskar Halecki, Bronisław Geremek 
and Krzysztof Pomian – were in no doubt: the borders and the identity of Eu-
rope were of a cultural nature� The foundation of this culture was Christianity, or 
more precisely Western, Roman Christianity – Christianitas� And on this foun-
dation, a foundation shared by the nations of Europe, there have been various 
attempts at unification� These efforts finally succeeded with the European Com-
munity, freely entered into as it was� Its founding fathers were strongly inspired 
by Christian social thought, a Christian vision of social order� From the Mid-
dle Ages to modern times, Europe had been the bearer of a clear civilisational 
identity in its dealings with the Rest of the World, including its spiritual and 
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material achievements� It was the latter, and the resulting work and life ethic, 
which ensured Europe its exceptional general development and the growth of 
its potential� This growth, in turn, gave Europe a leading role with respect to the 
Rest of the World for several centuries� Europe’s greatness, and in particular its 
international position, buried two threats to its civilisation which appeared on 
its own territory – fascism and communism� Both ideologies were extreme and 
powerful countercultures taking aim at the European tradition�
The projection of Europe onto the Rest of the World happened via the pow-
ers who had discovered that world, had familiarised themselves with it and then 
made it dependent on them in various ways (colonialism, imperialism etc�)� The 
overseas expansion of the European powers was the vehicle, the form and the 
instrument by means of which European civilisation was transferred to various 
regions of the world� Each of the European powers “exported” Europe in a some-
what different version, in various colours (English, Spanish, French etc�), but the 
substance, European culture, was the same� This “export” was possible not only 
thanks to civilisational energy and attractiveness but also thanks to the definite 
military superiority of the European countries� The world experienced European 
conquest and exploitation, as well as European values and norms, including so-
cial organisation and human rights� In the last period of European “domination” 
over the world, Europe gave the world its normative model of international order 
(the League of Nations), the first order of this kind the world had seen�
After World War II and with the fall of the colonial system and the weakening 
of the European powers, the European Community attempted to take up Eu-
rope’s former role towards the Rest of the World� There was a dualism in Europe’s 
influence on overseas countries and regions� Later, after the end of the Cold War, 
the task of transferring Europe’s values, norms and influence to the Rest of the 
World was to be taken up by the EU� This was felt necessary to satisfy Europe’s 
interests in the new international order, particularly in the context of globalisa-
tion processes where it seemed that large players would be favoured on the inter-
national stage� So, the Union availed itself of the appropriate instruments which 
were to enable its role as a global actor� However, it quickly turned out that these 
EU procedures failed in consolidating the European powers (above all the UK, 
France and Germany) in their external relations� Indeed, the EU was pushed into 
the background as a representative of Europe before the world, thereby damag-
ing Europe’s position in the international order�
In the light of the aforementioned circumstances, the issue of Europe’s place 
in the new international order emerging after 2008 – in the non-Western inter-
national order – is rightly addressed with some nervousness� There is a fear that 
Europe has really lost its capacity to influence the world, to (co)create the world 
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order, to bring its own values and models of development to the world – or just 
to make the world just a little “European”� The question today is now less “How 
much Europe is there in the World?” and more “How much of the World is in 
Europe?” Perhaps from now on it will be the world that will be changing Europe, 
marginalising Europe, weakening her European character� Europe could lose its 
specific character, its charm and its attractiveness� It would cease to be different 
from the rest of the world in a negative sense – it would cease to be the world’s 
“better” part (however politically incorrect that may sound)� So, we may ask the 
question: What role will we be playing and how significant a role will it be? After 
all Europe is not going to disappear from the world immediately� The answer is 
ambivalent as there are proportions to take into consideration which are hard to 
quantify� Nevertheless, we must bear in mind that what had seemed unlikely for 
at least the last 500 years, is now conceivable: a world without Europe�
“A World without Europe?” – a publication bearing this title, prepared a few 
years ago by French researchers, must have seemed provocative at the time�266 
Today, there is much in the world suggesting the title has foresight� For it will 
become a reality if, as Europe, we cease to differ from the rest of the world, if Eu-
rope becomes a mere geographical designation without the capacity to influence 
the world� Which is why I would like at this point to draw attention to only two 
problems which are obstacles for Europe, unified as the EU, to playing a role in 
international life fitting to its illustrious past as well as its great potential today� 
Certainly, one might point out further problems, but the two discussed below are 
of particular significance, as I hope to show�
1 No entity without identity
The first issue is the problem of the identity of the EU, or rather the identity of the 
community of states which comprise the EU� Marcin Król begins his pessimistic 
Europa w obliczu końca [Europe Facing Its Demise] with the following, highly 
Spenglerian claim: “We are facing a moderate economic crisis, a serious political 
crisis, a dramatic civilizational crisis and perhaps a mortal spiritual crisis”�267 This 
is a crisis of cultural identity (ideological, spiritual) strongly connected, it would 
seem, to political identity� The cultural identity of any given group is made up of 
a set of ideas, beliefs, convictions, habits, values and norms they have created and 
with which members identify� A strong and rich cultural identity is important 
266 P� Esper et al�, A World without Europe?, Fayard, Paris, 2012�
267 M� Król, Europa w obliczu końca [Europe Faces Its Demise], Czerwone i Czarne, 
Warsaw, 2012, p� 8�
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not only for the coherence of the group in question but also for its internal soli-
darity and for the dynamism of its subsequent development� Cultural identity 
emerges out of ethnicity, religion, history, place and sometimes language� In 
his much-discussed book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World 
Order, Samuel Huntington wanted above all to say – as he himself emphasises – 
that “culture does matter”� Culture – after almost two centuries of ideology – will 
now come to dominate the shaping of the world order� Leszek Kołakowski writes 
in a similar vein: “Niezaprzeczalnie przynależność do określonej wspólnoty kul-
turowej, historycznej i językowej jest naturalną ludzką potrzebą”� [“It cannot be 
questioned that membership of a definite cultural, historical and linguistic com-
munity is a natural human need”�] He takes it as obvious that “we first of all feel 
solidarity with our own cultural community, we perceive its intrinsic value, we 
seek its survival and flourishing”�268
Researchers and thinkers are in doubt: “Europe has been formed by Christian-
ity, anyone denying this gets an “F” in History”,269 says Professor Krzysztof Pomi-
an, the historian of European culture and the academic director of the Museum 
of Europe in Brussels� Leszek Kołakowski also cannot imagine European civili-
sation without Christianity� In his Jezus ośmieszony [Jesus Ridiculed], he judges 
Christianity – the figure and message of Christ (the Gospel) to be a positive and 
fundamental element in European culture� And he considers the contrary ten-
dency – the departure from this tradition, its removal from European conscious-
ness – as a symptom of malaise in our civilisation�270 Referring to Kołakowski’s 
essay, the Dominican Friar Maciej Zięba presents Europe’s situation as follows: 
“Dziejowy prąd oderwał ostatnimi czasy Europę od chrześcijańskiego konty-
nentu i jak gigantyczna kra rozpoczęła ona dryfowanie po bezkresnym oceanie 
historii świata”� [“The main current of history has in recent times taken Europe 
away from its Christian continent and like a gigantic ice floe is drifting across 
the endless expanse of the history of the world”�] And he adds that, “The ethos 
of Christianity has disappeared from contemporary Europe”� [Original Pol-
ish: “Etosu chrześcijańskiego już nie ma we współczesnej Europie”�] No “post-
Christian ethos” or abstract “European post-values” will be appearing in the 
place of Christianity, as any such purported values are suspended in a vacuum� 
268 L� Kołakowski, Czy ludzkość może jeszcze ocalić swoje człowieczeństwo? [Can Mankind 
Still Preserve Its Humanity?], “Gazeta Wyborcza”, 4 April 2015�
269 K� Pomian, Europa to nadal szansa [Europe Is Still an Opportunity] (in conversation 
with W� Pięciak), “Tygodnik Powszechny”, 18 December 2011�
270 L� Kołakowski, Jezus ośmieszony. Esej apologetyczny i sceptyczny [Jesus Ridiculed. An 
Apologetic and Sceptical Essay], Znak, Kraków, 2014�
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This situation is a herald of storms ahead for Europe and its existential standing� 
This “ice-flow, which we can still continue our lives in a comfortable manner, is 
melting away”� [Original: “kra, na której można sobie jeszcze ułożyć wygodne 
życie, nieustannie topnieje”�]271
In the work we have already cited, Marcin Król points out that it is Europe 
which has become “a particular spiritual realm where religion is withering and 
ceasing to play any role� In contrast to the rest of the world, including the USA”� 
[Original: “szczególnym terenem duchowym, na którym religia więdnie i przestaje 
odgrywać rolę� Inaczej niż wszędzie indziej łącznie za Stanami Zjednoczonymi”�] 
It is in Europe that “serious contemporary intellectuals can achieve success – not 
necessarily approval – thanks to their books which prove that God does not exist, 
and they do this with passion and commitment”� [Original: “bardzo poważni 
współcześni intelektualiści zyskują powodzenie – niekoniecznie aprobatę  – 
dzięki książkom, które dowodzą, że Bóg nie istnieje, i czynią to z zawzięciem i 
zaangażowaniem”�]272 This process is going on under the influence of contempo-
rary, postmodern and liberal cultural and ideological currents, especially as pre-
sent in mass media but also supported by the decisions and documents of the EU 
organs� The most well-known case of this kind is the categorical opposition (espe-
cially from France)273 towards the subtly expressed formulation for the Preamble 
of the EU Constitution – including reference to the Christian heritage of Europe� 
For a large group of members of the Convention on the future of Europe, this for-
mulation was unacceptable� Though it was concerned with the spiritual heritage 
271 M� Zięba, Kłopot za kłopotem. Katolik w dryfującej Europie [One Problem after 
Another. A Catholic on a Europe That Is Adrift], W drodze, Poznań, 2015, pp� 22–23�
272 “a zarazem bez najmniejzej wiedzy, że na temat istnienia lub nieistnienia Boga napis-
ano w historii ludzkiej kultury tysiące ważnych prac”� [“… without the faintest aware-
ness that the history of human culture has given us thousands of works on the subject 
of the existence or the non-existence of God”�] A little further on, Professor Król 
writes that, “equally distinguished commentators and scholars write books which 
are an expression of their surprise at the fact that so many people still experience 
religious sentiment and how much religious feelings may still be of help in shaping 
morality”� [Original: “…że równie wybitni publicyści i uczeni piszą książki, które 
są wyrazem ich zaskoczenia tym, jak wielu ludzi wciąż żywi uczucia religijne, jak 
bardzo uczucia religijne mogą być pomocne w kształtowaniu moralności”], op. cit�, 
pp� 50, 130–131�
273 Paradoxically, it was in France that the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
was rejected� But perhaps not that paradoxically in the history of Europe it is well 
known that opposition to Christianity is the prelude to opposition to Europe as a 
civilisation�
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of Europe, the same Europe was referred to until the late Middle Ages as Christi-
anitas� The same tendency had also been visible in the editing of the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights (in 2000), where no reference was made to natural rights 
conceived of as based on the dignity of man as a birth right (a conception with 
Christian roots)� In this European document, there was no place for the basic and 
universal point of reference in the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights� However, 
in the “Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and 
domestic violence” (the so-called Istanbul Convention), it came as a surprise that 
the concept of gender was used, a concept which is rather in contrast to Europe’s 
cultural heritage�274 The ideological justification of the Convention, otherwise ap-
parently unnecessary, shows how human rights, like other great ideas such as de-
mocracy or liberalism, are in practice vulnerable to partial distortion�
David Engels frequently draws attention to the more or less explicit resistance 
of EU organs to the Christian heritage of Europe in his magnificent work Le dé-
clin: la crise de l’Union européenne et la chute de la République romaine: quelques 
analogies historiques [Decline: The Crisis of the European Union and the Fall of 
the Roman Republic: Historical Analogies]� The author focuses on the blurring 
of the identity of the Roman Empire and of Europe (the EU) as one of the main 
factors in the crisis of the one and the fall of the other political project� “Europe 
has almost completely abandoned its complex Christian heritage and national 
patriotism, treating every form of enthusiasm for non-universal values as po-
tentially chauvinist”� At the same time, he notes that the EU was not able to offer 
anything in place of this tradition, something that might strengthen a common 
European identity – something besides sterile norms and values, values defined 
as universal and so not necessarily European� A basic fault of these bureaucratic-
normative manoeuvres (“dictatorship”) is their emotional and spiritual (or meta-
physical) emptiness� Europeans demonstrate in this way their incapacity to feel 
a spiritual or emotional bond with Europe as they are deprived of their con-
nection with both their European and their respective national traditions� The 
EU, in attempting to sterilise Europeans, removes those emotions which are an 
essential component of any deeper identity, without offering anything instead� 
274 The conception or theory of gender applied in practice aims to overcome all socio-
cultural aspects of certain roles for women, especially roles related to being a wife 
or a mother� The use of this conception in the Convention against violence was not 
justified, because in European culture (read: “Christian culture”), violence towards 
women does not come from the culture to which the conception of gender is op-
posed� Without doubt, the conception may be relevant in addressing the problem of 
discrimination of women�
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What is worse, Christianity has faced discrimination in its own backyard, while 
other external religions, faiths and cultures have been privileged� This has been 
done in the name of “tolerance”, by means of which Christianity is being re-
moved while ensuring a friendly attitude to public manifestations of Islam�275 
That is why, for example, an ever-larger number of European cities avoid public 
celebrations of Christmas so as not to offend the religious sentiments of Islamic 
people, nevertheless permitting Islamic prayers in public places a few times per 
day� In the EU’s programme of sterilising the European cultural and moral herit-
age, David Engels perceives the source of a threat to the traditional values which 
are essential to the survival of the family and native European peoples – however 
politically incorrect that might sound� If the current trends continue, Europeans 
may become a minority in Europe� Besides, it is precisely political correctness, 
according to Engels, that is responsible for many of Europe’s identity problems, 
and if we do not treat these ailments, we will founder as a civilisation� Among 
these civilisational troubles, Engels includes the pursuit of a bureaucratic ho-
mogenisation of Europe (the ironing out of internal diversity), according to the 
conception imposed by the organs of Brussels�276
To some extent a symptom or symbol of this tendency as Engels analyses it, 
is the victory of Conchita Wurst in the Eurovision Song Contest of 2014� The 
point at issue is not so much the indefinite gender of the singer,277 which inspired 
significant support from groups defining themselves as progressive, as much as 
the fact that the artistry – both the lyrics and the performance – were kitsch 
incarnate, especially considering the great European traditions (Piaf, Aznavour, 
The Beatles, Dalida etc�)� The depth of this peculiar symbol lay elsewhere� In 
the well-made film The Great European Disaster Movie (2015), the narrator (a 
lecturer) flies to Berlin for a lecture on the no-longer-existent EU� On the way, he 
tells a young passenger that for him the victory of Conchita Wurst was proof of 
the greatness of the EU� But if the EU was indeed at its peak in 2014, then its col-
lapse (in the film this takes place in 2021) could not come so quickly�278 Perhaps 
275 D� Engels, Le déclin. La crise de l’Union européenne et la chute de la République 
romaine – quelques analogies historiques, Toucan, Paris, 2013, pp� 22–24, 26–29, 
130–131�
276 Ibidem, pp� 272, 284–287�
277 “Conchita Wurst” is the artistic pseudonym of the Austrian singer representing the 
LGBT community�
278 The Great European Disaster [The English title], directed by A� Piras� The narrator, 
in grotesque fashion, carried an imitation Conchita-Wurst bears – almost like a 
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the victory of Conchita Wurst should be interpreted as the harbinger of the end 
of the EU�
The EU’s identity crisis made itself felt on the occasion of the exceptional 
wave of refugees and migrants to Europe in 2015� For the supporters of accept-
ing refugees and migrants without limits, this was an opportunity to deepen the 
cultural diversity of Europe (i�e� to weaken its original identity); for others (from 
those with reservations to clear opponents), this wave represented a challenge to 
European identity� It is worth mentioning at this point an interesting remark of 
Leszek Kołakowski, who wrote in the essay we have already quoted from: “Cóż 
jest zatem oburzającego w tym, że ludzie bronią swej ojczyzny, ziemi ojców, że 
z lękiem reagują na masową imigrację stanowiącą zagrożenie dla ich tożsamo-
ści kulturowej, dla ich nie tylko fizycznej, lecz także duchowej przestrzeni, że 
nie chcą pozwolić na rozpłynięcie ich kulturowej tożsamości”� [“And what is so 
shocking in the fact that people defend their homeland, the land of their fore-
fathers, that they fear the mass migration threatening their cultural identity – 
for  them it is not only a physical but also a spiritual space – that they do not 
wish their cultural identity to evaporate”�]279 Marek Cichocki’s text was extremely 
interesting both as interpretation and as prognosis, in reference to the problem 
of changes in identity under the influence of large, external migratory pressures� 
Recalling the assessments of historians and writers on the Roman Empire, Pro-
fessor Cichocki claims that the fall of the empire was not so much due to the 
“impact” of a barbarian attack but was rather the result of the long-term develop-
ment of connections between the Romans and the barbarians: in the end, “they 
became less Roman in form and in spirit”� [Original: “stawali się coraz mniej 
rzymscy i w formie i z ducha”�] Cichocki also writes about the total fiasco of the 
policy of resettlement and assimilation of migrants from outside of the Roman 
Empire and the advancing barbarity of those Romans who had weaker identity 
– also as a result of internal cultural changes�280 In the stand-off between two 
identities, the stronger will win� The vulgar version of liberalism concentrates 
on comfort and pleasure and makes European identity weaker and weaker until 
it loses the will and capacity to survive� Christianity today, in its confrontation 
with the commercial-hedonistic version of liberalism, has no chance� The situa-
tion described by Michel Houellebecq in Submission is by no means as abstract 
as it might seem� There are cultural changes, negatively impacting Europe’s de-
talisman� At one point, he holds this “beard” against the face of the young girl, com-
menting that it would suit her well�
279 L� Kołakowski, Czy ludzkość może…, op. cit�
280 M� Cichocki, Gliniane skorupy Rzymu, op. cit�
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mographic potential and there is increased immigration (“someone has to stand 
behind future economic growth” as the economic-demographic mantra goes) 
– does all this mean Europeans are getting less European? What will become of 
Europe’s (and the EU’s) role in the international order?
Pope Francis, a well-intentioned “outside” observer of Europe’s identity crisis 
had penetrating things to say on the subject� During his speech to the European 
Parliament in Strasbourg on November 25, 2014, he spoke of the “image of Eu-
rope as aged and subdued”, giving the “impression of exhaustion and age – like 
a grandmother beyond the age of fertility and without zest for life”� He identified 
the sources of this syndrome in the “lack of understanding of human rights and 
paradoxically in their overuse”, the tendency to claim an ever-greater number 
of individual rights, devoid of social or anthropological context and without ac-
companying duties� He perceived this tendency in the egoism of European cul-
ture, exhibiting the sin of pride, closed off from the transcendental dimension of 
life, in the growing uniformity of politics, market, culture and even thought� He 
warned us against “the risk of living in the sphere of ideas alone, words alone, 
images, sophism… even to the point of mixing up democratic realities with 
political nominalism”� He recalled that the “history of Europe for 2000 years is 
tied to Christianity”� It is a history where “conflict and error have been present, 
but which has enlivened the desire to develop the Good”� This is “our identity”� 
Speaking the same day at the Council of Europe, the Pope said that, “achieve-
ments of thought, culture, scientific discovery are all only possible with a trunk 
to bear the branches and deep roots to sustain the tree� If the roots are destroyed, 
the trunk will slowly become hollow and die and the branches – once abundant 
and strong – will begin to droop towards the ground and fall”� Leszek Kołakowski 
once expressed the same thought in similar words�281
We are not speaking here about a return to pre-enlightenment times or even 
turning the clock back to the first half of the XX century� That would be impos-
sible and undesirable� Yet the speed with which Europe is being deprived of a 
great part of its cultural heritage (not only its Christianity), without anything 
appearing to take the cultural place of what is being lost, may lead to serious 
civilisational consequences� Some of which are already in evidence� This cannot 
but have an impact on the strength and vitality of Europe, its ability to defend its 
own interests and its role in the international order�
281 “Jeśli nasza cywilizacja dopuści do wyschnięcia swoich religijnych korzeni, obumrze 
wraz z nimi”� [“If our civilisation allows its religious roots to wither, it will die out 
together with them�”] L� Kołakowski, Czy ludzkość może…, op. cit.
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2 The atrophy of the EU’s will to power
The inability to formulate a real foreign policy is the second of the problems an-
nounced earlier – the second obstacle standing in the way of a significant pres-
ence of the EU on the international scene� In a text entitled Can Europe Survive 
the Rise of the Rest?, Timothy Garton Ash claims: “If Europeans are to preserve 
the remarkable combination of prosperity, peace, relative social security and 
quality of life that they have achieved over the last 60 years, they need the scale 
that only the European Union can provide� In a world of giants, you had better 
be a giant yourself…” So, we had better learn to look at the world as they do� 
Which is why “Today’s Europeans” need to adapt Bismarck’s wisdom, declaring 
“China, India and Russia are to the right, America and Brazil to the left — that’s 
our map of Europe”�282
The absence of a real security and foreign policy – contrary to the intentions 
of the nineties of the XX century – in the case of the EU issue from an underde-
veloped geopolitical instinct� This situation was due to history and later due to 
the logic of the project of unification itself� World War II, at the roots of which 
lay the sick geopolitical conceptions of the Third Reich, devalued for Europe the 
very value of state thinking in geopolitical categories� It was completely natural 
that this (albeit erroneous) conclusion was drawn� The prophylactic against any 
return of geopolitics and its catastrophic consequences was to be the European 
Community� And in this regard, it worked very well: geopolitics was simply re-
moved from thinking about relations between Community members� A side ef-
fect, however, was the complete absence of the geopolitical element from the 
“understanding” of the world by the Union and its organs� Geopolitical aware-
ness was simply not conveyed from the level of state to the level of the Union�283 
The EU was supposed to be a normative power, charismatically using its soft 
power, granting development aid and supporting in humanitarian crises, but – 
God forbid! – it was not to behave like a traditional power� Let us make it clear: 
defined in the context of this conception of international order, represented by 
the creation of the EU, this kind of normative power would not have been a bad 
282 T�G� Ash, Can Europe Survive the Rise of the Rest?, “New York Times”, Sunday Review, 
1 September 2012,
283 See P� Verluise, Geopolityka granic Wspólnoty Europejskiej, Adam Marszałek, Toruń, 
2014� [English version by P� Verluise, The Geopolitics of the European Union Borders, 
ESKA, Paris, 2014�] The book is concerned with the borders and limits of possible 
enlargement of the EU, and not the perception of the surrounding global context of 
the EU and the actions of the EU in the logic of that global space�
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thing� However, in the face of the “hardening” of the international environment 
surrounding the EU and the return of geopolitics, the EU stood helpless� This 
is clear if we look at the confrontation with Russia and its war against Ukraine, 
seeking membership of the EU� Russia’s reaction nullified the normative inten-
tion of the EU’s Eastern Partnership�284
Judy Dempsey is an excellent observer and commentator on the situation in 
our part of the world; in her opinion, the inability of the EU to take up an asser-
tive position against Russia’s behaviour in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the 
EU’s unity is a consequence of the damage done by the Cold War to the mental-
ity of Western Europeans� The Cold War not only made them subordinate to the 
United States, but also led to the appearance of a “European zone of comfort and 
complacency” which may ultimately lead to the squandering of the entire project 
of European unity�285 There is a kind of lobotomy affecting Europe not only in the 
civilisational sphere but also in geopolitics and strategy� And again, this would 
not be such a threatening circumstance if Europe (the EU) were alone in the 
world� Whereas the situation is just the opposite: those with clear civilisational 
identity in the world are demonstrating their geopolitical and strategic assertive-
ness, especially China, the United States and Russia� The legal and normative 
dimension of the international order is extremely important� Yet, as the distin-
guished historian of war and theoretician of strategy Michael Howard writes: 
“To ignore the strategic aspect, as did Woodrow Wilson and his disciples is at 
best to forfeit the capacity to create an international order reflecting one’s own 
value system; at worst, to see it destroyed altogether”�286
In her passionate and informed work L’Europe a-t-elle un avenir stratégique? 
[Does Europe Have a Strategic Future?], Nicole Gnesotto writes about the EU as a 
“necessary force” for similar reasons to those pointed out by T�G� Ash: “Globali-
sation confronts Europeans essentially less with the risk of demise as with math-
ematical marginalisation”� One of the conditions for developing a joint foreign 
policy, without which there will be no European influence on global governance, 
284 Compare S� Biscop, Geopolitics with European Characteristics. An Essay on Pragmatic 
Idealism, Equality, and Strategy, “Egmont Paper” 82, March 2016�
285 J� Dempsey, Samozadowolenie i europejska strefa komfortu [Complacency and the 
European Comfort Zone] (a conversation with W� Przybylski), publica�pl, 2 June 2014� 
J� Dempsey was for many years the New York Times correspondent for Central 
and Eastern Europe, headquartered in Berlin, and subsequently editor-in-chief of 
“Strategic Europe”�
286 M� Howard, Foreword, in: P� Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course 
of History, New York, 2002, pp� XVI–XVII�
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is the explication of the basic principles of one’s own model of management� 
By this, Gnesotto understands “collective solidarity, the search for common in-
terests, introducing divided sovereignty into a certain number of policies� In 
other words, Europeans must accept the subordination of the particular interests 
of one’s own state to the defence of the national European interest, something 
different from the sum of the interests of 27 national interests”�287 The problem 
posed by Gnesotto is essentially this: What level of integration is required for 
there to be an effective common EU security and foreign policy� The Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is an intergovernmental policy, which one 
might think would doom it at the outset – in view of the lack of a unifying cultur-
al foundation and shared geopolitical instinct (shared perception, will to react)� 
Perhaps deeper integration is not enough for such a common policy to appear 
and that is why a “federational jump” is required, as Minister Radosław Sikorski 
and others put it (Sikorski when delivering a much commented speech in Berlin, 
in November 2011�)
The transformation of the EU into a full-blooded federation, if this is ever 
to happen, has been postponed for the foreseeable future� Indeed, even then it 
would be hard to imagine how foreign and security policy could be successfully 
carried out by the “community method”� This approach, like the intergovernmen-
tal method, has its pluses and minuses� It can work, sometimes even too well, at 
a bureaucratic-administrative level, but sometimes causes harm to the very idea 
of integration� For the officials in Brussels have the tendency to uniformly over-
regulate various areas of life in Europe to an excessive and unauthorised extent, 
this harms the basic mandate of the EU – “unity in diversity”� Overdeveloped 
procedures and instruments of defence, foreign and security policy – that is on 
that level which is generally the domain of the community method – have greatly 
exceeded the political capacity of the EU to take strong decisions and reach its 
full potential� (We recall that the EU still represents only a little above 20% of the 
world’s gross domestic product [GDP] while being second in terms of military 
budget288 – that is well ahead of Russia and China�) We might put it as follows: 
287 N� Gnesotto, op. cit� It was twenty-seven and not twenty-eight countries because 
Croatia was not yet an EU member� It is interesting that the author uses the concept 
of European national interest, which seems to imply a “European nation”, something 
which could not exist without a cultural and spiritual foundation� France has consist-
ently denied just this – and the author is French�
288 More details in: P� Turczyński, Potencjał wojskowy Unii Europejskiej na początku 
XXI wieku [The Military Potential of the European Union at the Beginning of the XXI 
Century], Wyższa Szkoła Oficerska Wojsk Lądowych, Wrocław, 2012�
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integration has gone far down the path but down the wrong path, down the bu-
reaucratic path� What the EU really needs to achieve sound foreign policy and 
a serious role on the international stage is political union, a recurring theme 
but one lacking an implementation plan� It is symptomatic here that the same 
mistake is made in the report by Charles Grant from the Centre for European 
Reform in London, entitled How to Build a Modern European Union� While it is 
true that he writes that the “The European External Action Service (EEAS) has 
failed to fulfil expectations”, but the solution is to be found in the same organi-
sation (by means of better integration of EU policies, increased funding), and 
not at the level of the European politics that created the EEAS and uses it in this 
way�289 The issue of the relationship between the degree of integration and the ca-
pacity to carry out a serious security and foreign policy requires deeper analysis� 
However, it is worth mentioning at this point that North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (NATO), which involves a much lower level of integration of its member 
states, is nevertheless capable of thinking geopolitically and taking key decisions 
concerning NATO’s relations with its global environment� Perhaps this is merely 
the result of the American leadership of NATO, but then that would also suggest 
that the EU is doomed to failure�
Here we reach the third problem announced above – the third barrier to the 
EU occupying a significant role on the world stage� Paradoxically – or perhaps it 
is not that paradoxical – the weak link in the chain for the EU to have a “proper” 
foreign and security policy is actually the presence of the EU’s big powers� This 
situation is paradoxical in the sense that since the Maastricht Treaty, and the 
subsequent launch of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in 1999, 
it has been those powers which have advocated a “strong Europe”, a global actor; 
it is they who have sought the strengthening of foreign, security and defence 
policy� In the crisis surrounding Iraq, one could hear in Paris and Berlin laments 
that the divisions appearing in Europe are inhibiting its ability to be a strong 
voice on the world stage� And they were right� The enthusiasm of the EU pow-
ers to develop the EU into a big power in its own right began to cool with the 
signing of the Lisbon Treaty, though rather not as a direct result of the document 
itself� Evidence of a lack of “will power” were the appointments to the position 
of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
(HR) – as we said above, this position was twice taken by persons without expe-
rience, charisma or broad support� The negative selection was made by the EU 
289 C� Grant et al�, How to Build a Modern European Union, Centre for European Reform, 
London, October, 2013, pp� 33–35, http://www�cer�eu/sites/default/files/rp_119�pdf�
Europe in the International Order224
powers concerned precisely to avoid having a person who might influence their 
individual foreign policies or might influence the overall foreign and security 
policy of the EU�
One might say we doth protest too much� Not so� As evidence for our criti-
cism we may put forward examples of serious decisions in the domain of foreign 
and security policy� In the period of great effort to strengthen the CSDP (after 
the Lisbon Treaty), France and Great Britain surprised their partners by signing 
a separate bilateral cooperation agreement to tighten cooperation in this area 
(the so-called Lancaster House Treaties of November 2010)�290 This cooperation 
quickly took on a combative form in the joint operation of the two countries 
against Gaddafi’s Libya in March 2011, thereby pre-empting any more concerted 
effort of the entire EU� Then Berlin and Paris – in an attempt to restore interna-
tional security and order to Europe – formed an axis for the purposes of their 
negotiations with Russia regarding the latter’s aggression towards Ukraine (the 
so-called Normandy format)� Once again a common EU foreign and security 
policy was excluded (perhaps defence was thereby excluded as well)� Occasion-
ally, the EU’s G-3 or Big Three involved itself in resolving significant internation-
al problems (such as the Iranian nuclear programme)� But all these individual 
measures limited the capacity of the EU to perform as a global actor, that is com-
ing to terms with its international environment as the EU�
In recent years, Germany has come to represent a separate case in this regard� 
German egoism in economic ties with the world had already been evident previ-
ously in its relations with China, for example� In recent years, however, German 
historical baggage has become a problem for the entire EU and has undermined 
German credentials as an EU leader in the area of security and defence� The first 
example of this sort is Germany’s attitude to Russia, which has exhibited a kind 
of schizophrenia� On the one hand Chancellor Merkel has espoused a firm at-
titude to Moscow (in response to the war in Ukraine), on the other hand a large 
portion of Germany’s political elite and various centres of economic power have 
expressed considerable “understanding for Russia” and have tried to do busi-
ness with Russia, diluting the effects of sanctions� This generally soft attitude to 
Russia is a consequence of World War II (i�e� a guilt complex) as well as earlier 
German–Russian relations�
290 See also: J� Pawełek-Mendez, Francusko-brytyjska współpraca w dziedzinie bezpie-
czeństwa i obrony według traktatów Lancaster House z 2010 r [Franco-British Coop-
eration on Security and Defence and the Lancaster House Treaties of 2010], “Sprawy 
Międzynarodowe” [“International Affairs”] 2013, no� 1�
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A second case is provided by the migration/refugee crisis from 2015� Here 
we have also witnessed the effects of historical guilt complexes and Germany’s 
desire to repair its reputation� In this matter Berlin acted unilaterally, but then 
subsequently tried to share the costs of its initiative with the rest of the EU� This 
led to tensions both within Germany and in its relations with other states� The 
whole issue created a considerable sense of historical irony in the context of 
the EU’s relations with Turkey – and a deep irony at that� After World War I, 
the European powers dictated terms of peace to Turkey (as Turkey had been an 
ally of Germany), including the independence of Kurdistan� Ankara at present 
has been taking advantage of the migration/refugee crisis – which Turkey itself 
exacerbated – to dictate terms to the EU on EU aid for Turkey, as well as obtain-
ing assurances of accelerated accession negotiations� This is all happening while 
Turkey is openly becoming an authoritarian state that undermines European 
values and standards of human rights� All that was needed was an unceremoni-
ous about-face from Chancellor Merkel� Germany, the leading power of the EU, 
has begun to lose legitimacy in that role�291 Germany has begun to look worry-
ingly similar to the France of the interwar period� Both countries caused there to 
be gaps in the European security system of the time (France with regard to the 
League of Nations, Germany – to the EU)�
In recent years, the situation has developed whereby the EU powers have be-
come the weakest link instead of being the driving force of a common foreign 
and security policy� Indeed, they have sometimes been a barrier to achieving 
progress even in the form of treaties� The words of Donald Tusk, the current 
president of the European Council, bear witness to the abdication of the EU 
in the domain of a potentially active foreign and security policy� At the Strate-
gic Forum in Bled, Slovenia, in August 2015, he expressed his opinion that the 
real challenge for the EU is not a better world outside of its borders� “The real 
challenge is to sustain and consolidate our imperfect order, which thus far we 
have enjoyed within the European Community”� With the current conditions, 
one cannot deny the gravity of this challenge� Yet it would be historical short-
sightedness not to understand that the defence of the European element in the 
international order lies in the interest of Europe itself�
291 J� Janning, Germany – Europe’s lonely leader, ECFR, Berlin, January 2016�
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3 The year 2016 – opportunity for a breakthrough?
The events of 2016 seem, on the one hand, to have prolonged the crisis of the 
EU� However, they may yet prove to be an opportunity for a breakthrough in the 
apathy and integration regress that has beset the Community since the end of 
the 2000s� The regress has weakened the EU’s ability to act in external relations 
leading to the decline of its international role� In 2016, at least three things came 
to pass which might yet reverse the decline: Great Britain’s decision to leave the 
EU; the option of a two-speed EU; and the adoption of a new security strategy 
and the implementation of its assumptions (in the background here is also the 
election of a new, openly anti-EU president in the United States)� All three events 
represent challenges which might mobilise the Community to implement inter-
nal changes to strengthen the EU on the international stage� Will this happen? It 
is difficult to say, but if it cannot turn this challenge into an opportunity, another 
chance may not come along for a long time�
Brexit represents the shifting of tectonic plates, bringing with it the loss of 
a major, valuable part of the EU’s overall potential: first of all, in demographic 
terms (the UK is the second largest population after Germany); secondly in 
economic terms (where the UK is also second only to Germany) and thirdly in 
military terms (where the UK is second to France)� And British capacity is not 
only expressible in numerical terms� The UK also has great creative and cul-
tural potential, scientific and technological capability and it is a world leader in 
finance� And we are not only losing quantitative and qualitative potential� The 
exit of the UK from the Union means a considerable loss of influence in the world 
for a united Europe� London brought connections to the Community by means 
of its special relationship with the United States and in virtue of its imperial, 
colonial heritage� British diplomacy is famed for its cunning and efficiency and 
this too was a resource available to the EU on the international stage� Further 
damage to the EU’s international standing will be the loss of a permanent seat at 
the Security Council of the United Nations� And the Community will lose also 
in another manner, from within� It will lose the Anglo-Saxon spirit of competi-
tion and valour as well as its sober realism in assessing important political and 
ideological issues� This spirit has caused its share of discomfort in the past, but 
more often it was a positive stimulus in the internal relations of the Community�
Brexit may also bring the EU significant benefits� First, the so-called “brakes” 
on the EU’s development may be removed – that force which had previously 
been slowing down deeper integration, especially in social, political and security 
matters� Secondly, there is greater chance of the EU developing as an autono-
mous strategic force – one independent of the United States� London has always 
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turned to the United States and NATO to block this direction of EU independ-
ence (represented by the CSDP)� In this way, the Community may more quickly 
mature into an independent role in matter of international security, it having 
been held back in the past by the Cold War and problems with relations with 
Russia�
It is worth noting at this point that the exit of the UK from the EU, though a 
painful blow to the idea and potential of unification, should not come as a com-
plete surprise� On the contrary, we should have seen this coming ever since… 
the first years of the UK’s membership in the Community� We may recall, fol-
lowing one of the Polish experts here, that Great Britain was neither an original 
nor a “natural” member of the Community and later of the EU�292 The point at 
issue here is the British tradition of foreign policy and its geographical situation� 
London decided to join the subsequent Communities only once it had turned 
out that – contrary to the UK’s calculations – the Community had turned out 
to be a success which it was in the UK’s interest to participate in� The politi-
cal dimension of the integration process was continually ignored or rejected by 
London (viz� Thatcher’s Bruges speech in 1988)� When Churchill signed under 
the idea of a United States of Europe in 1947, he did not see a place for his own 
country there� What is more, he convinced the subsequent president of France, 
Charles de Gaulle, that whenever the British would have to choose, they would 
choose America over Europe� From the start the British had lacked full European 
credentials and a sense of solidarity with Europe� It was to be expected that when 
hard times came along, as they did in the second half of the 2010s, British egoism 
would take over – and not loyalty towards partners from a struggling continent 
(at that moment facing the great wave of immigration and frequent terrorist at-
tacks)� And yet both the above crises are the result of the ill-thought-out, neo-
colonial armed interventions of Great Britain against Iraq and Libya� It is easy to 
cause a catastrophe and then refuse to pick up the bill� It was nonetheless surpris-
ing how easily the British gave in to anti-European demagoguery driven in the 
UK by extreme politicians and a section of the tabloids� This was also the result 
of the superficiality of their belief in European integration�
The second element of a possible breakthrough helped by Brexit could be the 
shift to an EU of two speeds� As long as the UK was a member of the EU, it was 
hard to imagine it being left in the second group of countries� On the other hand, 
292 P� Borkowski, Pożegnanie z Brytanią i złudzeniami [Farewell to Britain and to Illu-
sions], “Rocznik Strategiczny” [“The Strategic Yearbook”], 2016/2017, p� 117 and 
following pages�
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it was the UK that was holding back the “faster” countries� Without the UK, the 
creation of a group of countries to be “left behind” should be much easier� Es-
pecially because they are otherwise countries which signed up for this status as 
second category countries: they either are opposed to deeper integration or are 
openly against EU obligations or infringe community legal standards, above all 
in the area of the democratic rule of law – a basic criteria of membership�293
The referendum in the UK to leave the EU was to some extent part of a wider 
process which had appeared in Europe already a few years before that� There had 
begun a wave of populism which did not hide its enmity to the EU� These were 
not the eurosceptic or “euro-pessimist” political forces which had appeared in 
the past but were political groups demanding the complete dissolution of the 
EU, or at least its reduction to a common market or the departure of their own 
country from the EU� In the UK such a movement was successful, whereas in 
France not�294 Elsewhere, whether in positions of power of simply enjoying a de-
gree of support, these new political groups will oppose the participation of their 
respective countries in closer forms of EU integration� Some use the slogan “A 
Europe of sovereign nations”, recalling the situation before World War II� How-
ever, “sovereignty” in the understanding of the populist groupings means the 
freedom to carry out authoritarian revolutions and freedom from any reaction 
from legitimate EU organs� They do not normally, however, bring their countries 
out of the EU because of the financial costs or because of anticipated opposition 
from the majority of their populations� In any case, these countries will not be 
invited to form the future core of the EU� The “core” may be formed soon, now 
that the parliamentary elections in Germany have been completed and where 
pro-EU parties predominate�
All indicators suggest that in an EU with a core of higher speed countries 
and without the UK, France and Germany will again be in the driving seat for 
further integration� The close cooperation of a duet of strongly pro-European 
293 This refers to Hungary, but especially to Poland where the ruling party has, since the 
2015 elections, carried out a parliamentary coup d’état and has violated the constitu-
tion, redirecting the country towards an authoritarian system� By 2016 this situation 
had drawn the attention of the European Commission which initiated procedures 
envisaged in EU treaties towards Poland regarding the respect for membership con-
ditions for the EU�
294 The National Front candidate, Marine Le Pen, who announced her intention of or-
ganising a referendum on France’s exit from the EU, suffered a decisive loss in the 
presidential elections of May 2017� Before that, the previously strong populist forces 
had lost elections in Austria and Holland�
12 The Conditions of the EU’s Survival as a World Power  229
politicians – Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron – may give Europe leader-
ship which will be both accepted and supported by other core countries� If this 
leadership does indeed form, it may also strengthen the international position of 
the EU, insofar as it will cooperate with the proper EU organs and those head-
ing them – as opposed to attempting to replace them� Tighter integration and 
strong leadership could enable a consistent and firm position of the EU on the 
key international problems�
Thirdly, after 2016, there has been a growing awareness in the EU that its own 
security needs to be taken seriously� Unfriendly behaviour and security threats 
to the EU, its member states and its citizens appeared from the east (Russia), 
from the south-east (Turkey, Islamic State, Syria among others) and from the 
south (North Africa, especially Libya) had to have a sobering effect on the Eu-
ropean political elites� The EU’s neighbours turned out to be ungrateful for the 
EU’s involvement in various spheres: the economy, security, humanitarian work, 
democracy and human rights� The EU is not resigning from its involvement in 
these areas, but it does need to seriously rethink its strategy in relation to its own 
interests, especially in terms of its own security� Otherwise the EU’s neighbours 
may first destabilise the EU from inside (through social, cultural and political 
changes) and then take its political and institutional structure apart�
The first indication that the EU is once again harbouring the ambition of be-
coming a group that could seriously look after the security of its members was the 
adoption in June 2016 of a new security strategy after a long delay (the previous 
strategy had been adopted in 2003)� In view of the timing of the announcement – 
shortly after the UK referendum on Brexit – the title of the document might 
seem a little optimistic: “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe� A 
Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS)”� 
However, its content reflected both the more realistic perception of the security 
situation of the EU and the new logic of its own foreign, security and defence 
policy� Probably the best expert on EU documents and practices, Professor Sven 
Biscop from Brussels confirms this interpretation� In his opinion, the new think-
ing within the EU about its security, represented by the EUGS, is an acceptance 
of Realpolitik, but not in the common, vulgar understanding of that term� This is 
a Realpolitik which is not so much a break with ideals or values, but a rejection of 
utopian thinking and wishful thinking in foreign policy� In sum, a realism about 
the means of achieving goals in accordance with EU core values� Sven Biscop 
sees in this realism a new Security Strategy for the EU, with new priorities: firstly, 
the security of the EU itself and its citizens; secondly, a reduced emphasis on the 
promotion of democracy when this is at the cost of destabilising regions near the 
EU; and thirdly, the necessity of developing military potential (hard power) in 
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view of the geopolitical challenges represented by the international context of the 
EU�295 The remaining priorities contained in the EUGS – strengthening coopera-
tive regional structures and global governance based on law and multilateral in-
stitutions – hardly provoke controversy� The development of an EU hard power 
should serve its strategic autonomy, as expressed in the maxim “We cooperate 
with the USA when possible; we act alone (without the USA) when necessary”�
In this Strategy there are clearly defined conditions for the achievement of EU 
goals in foreign, security and defence policy� They are (above all) the credibility 
which is the result of the political unity and the potential of the Community; the 
capacity for rapid reactions, that is the EU’s responsiveness; thirdly, there is the 
condition of being able to combine all the EU’s resources into a whole for the pur-
poses of achieving specific goals� The declarations of the EUGS do not disappoint� 
But EU institutions and those employed there are masters of verbal expression 
and the bon mot� Nevertheless, we should perhaps this time suspend our albeit 
justified scepticism� The year 2017 was characterised by further decisions con-
firming the determination of the EU to implement this Strategy� The EU Summit 
in June 2017 brought further key decisions� The first concerns the establishment 
of units for operational planning, with a function similar to that of the NATO 
Headquarters� The second decision concerns the settlement of the European de-
fence budget, which will allow the undertaking of joint defence projects with the 
support of EU financing� Finally, an ongoing cooperation structure (PESCO) was 
given the go ahead to facilitate security and defence, i�e� tightening integration (in 
terms of increased effort and solidarity) for a smaller group of countries� Experts 
considered that the train called the CSDP could finally move ahead�296
No doubt, a catalyst for the awakening of the EU from years of slumber in its 
attitude towards its own security and global relations was the election of Donald 
Trump to the presidency of the United States� Trump’s attitude to the EU from 
the start included three unpleasant elements� First of all, Trump made no secret 
of his low opinion of the EU as a political community (he encouraged the Brit-
ish to vote “leave”); he was the first president of the United States to deem the EU 
dispensable� Second of all, Trump took a businesslike, transactional approach to 
European security (as he did to the security of the West), resulting in his question-
ing the role of the United States in NATO� Thirdly, in his reactions to international 
295 S� Biscop, EU Global Strategy: Europe Holds Some Trump Cards Yet, “Rocznik Stra-
tegiczny” [“The Strategic Yearbook”], 2016/2017�
296 A� Kellner, Assessing the CSDP after the June 2017 EU Summit, “ELN”, 6 July 2017; I� 
Bet-El, The Train Has Left the Station: European Security and Defence and the June 
European Council, “ELN”, 11 July 2017�
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events, he has turned out to be an unstable and unpredictable president� Though 
Trump appears to remain broadly pro-NATO, there remain serious doubts as to 
his reliability when it comes to Europe (in his explicit statements he has been more 
pro-Russia than pro-European)� European politicians (including Donald Tusk and 
Angela Merkel) have begun to openly state that Trump’s USA represents a problem 
for Europe, that Europe can no longer rely on America� Which means that Europe 
should take its security into its own hands� This should have always been obvious, 
but for well-known reasons it has not been clear to all since World War II� As the 
brilliant French expert François Heisbourg expressed it, Europe is aware of the 
unique place of the United States regarding European defence, but since Europe 
has itself questioned the role of the United States, and this distance looks rather 
set to widen, Europe should now look to its own security� This shift represents not 
only additional costs but also additional opportunities�297
The growing awareness among European leaders of the necessity of deepen-
ing integration and rebuilding EU relations with the outside world is reflected in 
the common-sense attitude (finally!) expressed by ECFR director Mark Leon-
ard in the middle of 2017� In a broad analysis of the EU’s situation in a new 
international context, he writes of the need to focus above all on the defence 
of its own interests – the interests of member states and EU citizens, including 
economic issues and the previously unpopular geopolitical matters� In foreign 
policy, Leonard advances the idea that the EU should reduce its universalist mis-
sion (the leaders of China, India, Russia or the United States will not accept the 
EU’s vision of the world here) and he recommends the increased capacity of the 
EU to defend itself, as well as a unique development model for Europe and the 
development of security for the EU in the context of its neighbours�298 In other 
words, Europe should exhibit less of the Prometheism [Józef Piłsudzki’s idea of 
impacting international relations by supporting national movements to weaken 
in particular Russia and subsequently the Soviet Union] appropriate more for 
NGOs and more of the features of a “good landowner” who takes care of his or 
her own property and preserves good relations with his or her neighbours� In 
view of the EU’s situation and the disadvantageous changes in this part of the 
world, one cannot yet say whether 2016 will turn out to have been the “annus 
horribilis”, when we hit the bottom and bounced back� The year 2017 has given 
some reason to hope so�
297 F� Heisbourg, Bezpieczeństwo Europy zależy od niej samej [Europe’s Security Depends 
on Europe], “Gazeta Wyborcza”, 2 August 2017�




The answer to the question “How much Europe in the international order?” has 
become incredibly difficult� And Europeans have for some time been keen to 
avoid posing difficult questions� They are content with the efficiency and ele-
gance of their politically correct speeches about the wondrousness of the Euro-
pean project� Rarely does one find among the army of well-educated and erudite 
analysts and observers of Europe someone willing to stand out and, risking the 
disapproval of their peers, say: If we do not halt the current course of events, 
the present time in the history of Europe will come to seem to posterity like a 
ball on the Titanic� Was the final of the 2015 Rugby World Cup not a sign of the 
times? Rugby, like several other sports, is a very European game; it combines val-
our, intelligence and a certain ethos� For decades, the French and national teams 
from the British Isles excelled� And now for the first time in history the four 
best teams meeting in the semi-finals did not include a single team from Europe 
(though it may be said that the four countries represented have some European 
roots – Australia, New Zealand, Republic of South Africa [RPA] and Argentina)� 
What was lacking in the European teams? Valour, ethos…? Of course, it’s easy to 
dismiss this symbolism as coincidence, but perhaps it is worth taking a moment 
to pause for thought�
There is no way to foretell the future of the European Union (EU) and the 
continent of Europe under its “care”� The current situation is troubling, and the 
long-term trends are downwards� But in thinking about the future of the Old 
Continent, we should not fall into fatalism� Europe has come out of crises in 
the past, though the current one seems the deepest it has faced since the end of 
World War II� The right starting point should always be an accurate diagnosis� 
And it seems that Europeans have the greatest difficulties here� Trapped in the 
corsets of dogma and a culture of connivance, accustomed to the “politics of the 
ostrich”, they eagerly hide from reality� The attitude of carpe diem (but without 
looking at the consequences for tomorrow) penetrates culture and social life as 
well as politics� If we cannot reverse this trend, it is at least worth considering 
what awaits us and try to make sure the least pessimistic scenario comes to pass� 
We should reflect and find a point of reference, a relevant historical experience 
or contemporary model which might serve in sketching a vision of Europe in the 
international order in fifty or hundred years’ time�
This could be done by taking the starting point to be the current condition of 
the European project� For example, Bogdan Góralczyk presents three scenarios: 
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1) federation in spite of everything; 2) the appearance of a hard core and 3) the 
return of nation states and the decline of the role of the EU�299 Instead of that, we 
may, as sometimes is done, imagine a future Europe through the prism of the fate 
or situation of one of its countries, which for some reason we deem representa-
tives or illustrative of the whole of Europe� This procedure (in a certain sense 
pars pro toto), more literary than scientific, allows one to sketch the future place 
and role of Europe in the world� Four countries come to my mind in this respect: 
Greece, France, the I Rzeczpospolita and Switzerland� Their fate and place in the 
history of Europe may be indicative of Europe’s future on the international stage�
Switzerland is a popular choice as a point of reference� It is, after all, a safe 
country; its wealth is legendary; it is a place where one lives in abundance and 
those who come from abroad are admitted according to the country’s capacity 
to absorb new migrants� The national, ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity of 
Switzerland is also a reason to take it as a case study� Yet upon closer inspection, 
we see that Switzerland will not do� First of all, the country monitors its borders 
carefully� Secondly, it takes care of its cultural identity (vide the referendum ban-
ning minarets in 2009)� Thirdly, in Switzerland (a federation, though in name a 
“confederation”), diversity is respected more than in the EU� The federal authori-
ties do not, for example, attempt to remove religion from the public sphere in the 
various cantons� Switzerland’s concern for its borders stands in sharp contrast to 
the EU’s relaxed attitude� The esteemed German economist Hans-Werner Sinn is 
forthright on this subject: “Every country needs its borders to protect its natural 
resources, its infrastructure and public services� The property rights of a country 
are as important as the property rights of citizens”�300 The EU lacks the unity and 
the determination to protect its external borders� In the face of the pressure of 
external migration, this will inevitably lead to internal instability and tension 
and the subsequent erosion of its cohesion�
The example of the first Polish state, the Commonwealth of Many Nations 
(Polish: “Rzeczpospolitej wielu narodów”) – the first period of which is called 
today the First Republic (Polish: “I Rzeczpospolita”) and which includes the Un-
ion of Lublin, often compared today to the EU – is particularly disheartening� 
This country – at one moment rather wealthy and well developed – expanded its 
territory excessively and lost touch with advances being made in Europe as well 
299 And he adds that there are currently three options facing the EU: survive and change, 
survive without changing and not survive� B�J� Góralczyk (ed�), The Crises of 2008 
and 2014…, op. cit�, pp� 246–252�
300 H�-W� Sinn, Źle się dzieje w państwie europejskim [It’s Not Going Well in the European 
State] (interviewed by W� Gadomski), “Gazeta Wyborcza”, 2–3 January 2016�
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as losing its “geopolitical instinct”� Its internal political system became more and 
more eccentric and its effective management became impossible – the system 
of the Royal elections in Poland (literally “free” elections) gradually eroded the 
power of the King� The First Republic might be taken as the archetype of the 
failed state� It collapsed with the acquiescence of its ruling class which put its 
purported freedom and democracy above the sheer survival of the state� (The 
democracy included distortions such as the liberum veto, which obstructed the 
convening of the Sejm (the lower house) and blocked important decisions�) In 
this situation, royal authority counted for less than the magnate-oligarchs whose 
private armies were larger than the Royal forces� Long before the actual collapse 
of the First Republic, the state had lost its ability to defend its borders (the simi-
larities to the Roman Empire are clear, as well as to … the EU in 2015)�301
Greece is often considered to be the origin of Europe and is certainly con-
sidered to be the origin of democracy� Europe is happy to recall the moments 
of Greek’s greatness and its art, literature, philosophy or Olympic tradition – 
and it is right to do so� Yet the dark side of that period is forgotten or remains 
completely unknown, especially the degeneration of democracy that led to the 
deserved downfall of Ancient Greece� Greece might serve as the point of refer-
ence for the future fate of the EU, but then not only its ancient period but also 
its contemporary incarnation� With a collapsed economy after 2010, Greece was 
kept alive till 2016 on the life-support machine of the EU, a situation that will 
continue for some time to come� The cause of the contemporary collapse was a 
carefree attitude of living beyond one’s means, being proud of one’s past, joy in 
the present and a refusal to think about the future� It is notable that the chair of 
the European Council in his speech at the Strategic Forum in Bled, August 2015, 
invoked pride (in culture, wealth, the principle of solidarity) as the main emo-
tion which should reinvigorate Europeans and bring them to the defence of their 
model of civilisation, their prosperity and their uniqueness� And he recalled at 
this point the pride the ancient Greeks felt in their relations with the “barbar-
ians”� The year 2015, in view of what was happening in Greece and in the EU, was 
not the best time to bring up that particular example�
Finally, our fourth point of reference is contemporary France� Perhaps the 
case of France most closely matches our need to find the right conception for 
Europe (the EU) and its place in the world in fifty to hundred years� France is 
a mature civilisation, a country with a great past and culture� At the same time, 
301 See also: J� Topolski, Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów 1501–1795 [The Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth 1501–1795], Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, Poznań, 2015�
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France today is building its identity – and requiring the same from the whole 
of Europe – not on the basis of a spiritual heritage but on the basis of a sterile 
interpretation of the principles of republicanism� France opened her doors to 
immigration from the Islamic world and from Africa (from former colonies), 
permitting the civilisational “counterattack” (in Toynbee’s conception) of a great 
impact� Gothic cathedrals stand empty (visited mostly by tourists from Japan and 
Central Europe), whereas Islamic sites are full of life� Displays of Christianity in 
public places are disapproved of� It is in France that the battle for the right con-
ception of freedom will take place (especially the attack on the editors of “Charlie 
Hebdo”)� It is no accident that the plot of the novel Submission takes place in 
France�302 At the same time, France is the embodiment of European hedonism, 
the desire to dissolve in music and champagne, to delight in fine cuisine and 
wine� A world of fashion, refined entertainment, the artistically sublime� Some-
times France resembles an elderly, wealthy Lady� She is still able to afford the 
frolics of her younger years and has servants in attendance; she looks down from 
aristocratic heights at the world around her� Our Lady is able to use the force of 
her guard in defence of her palace and her estate (willingly engaging in military 
operations)� When the time comes for revolution, she will no doubt behave as in 
the famous lines of Agnieszka Osiecka: “like chubby princesses proudly greeting 
the revolt when it came”� Will Europe in the world become what France has be-
come in Europe? Perhaps this is the most attractive vision when compared with 
the other aforementioned – and more unpleasant – options� But for how long…?
Of course, none of these scenarios will come to pass as described above� In 
imagining the future of Europe, we should look for something in between these 
various possibilities� Unless it happens that – for some reason unbeknownst to 
us or under the force of an impulse we cannot yet foresee – Europeans will reign 
in and reverse the current tendencies� As long as it is not too late�
302 M� Houellebecq, Submission, Picador, New York, 2016� The author describes in his 
book the seizure of power in 2022 France by the Muslim Brotherhood and the sub-
sequent Islamification of the country� This development was aided by the attitude of 
the Socialist Party which decided to support the Islamic party solely for the purpose 
of opposing the rise to power of the National Front�
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